We present a report based on information gathered through monitoring carried out by SOVA Center. The information is published on the Center’s website in the section “Religion in a Secular Society” (www.sova-center.ru/religion), including links to sources in the media and on the internet; the report provides references only to sources not indicated on the website. For events of the preceding year,[1] only necessary updates are provided. Our task is not to provide a comprehensive description of all events in the religious and public sphere; as a rule, the events mentioned in the report serve as illustrations of the trends observed.
Problems and issues related to the abuse of anti-extremism legislation are, for the most part, presented in other reports.[2]
The ongoing anti-migrant campaign, as in the previous year, significantly complicated the situation of Muslim organizations. Protests against the construction of mosques were often held under anti-migration slogans, and representatives of far-right movements played a significant role in organizing them.
Under the pretext of combating illegal migration and extremism, the authorities continued to shut down already operating Muslim prayer houses and rooms. Far-right actors also frequently took part in raids aimed at identifying such premises. However, it should be noted that in many cases, prayer houses and rooms were indeed opened with violations and without the necessary approvals.
The list of undesirable organizations continued to grow through adding religious associations, although not very actively. The intensity of prosecution, including criminal cases, for cooperation with undesirable religious organizations and for financing them has at least not decreased. Believers received new sentences, including real terms of imprisonment, and new cases were initiated.
Criminal prosecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses continued. They faced sanctions, including lengthy terms of actual imprisonment, as punishment for continuing the activities of an extremist organization.
The number of administrative cases for “unlawful missionary activity” continued to grow. As before, Protestant believers and Muslims faced such administrative prosecution most frequently.
Administrative pressure on unregistered religious associations increased in 2025. Communities of the International Union of Evangelical Christian-Baptist Churches, which refuses state registration, were subjected to numerous inspections, some of which were accompanied by disruptions of worship services. As a result of this pressure, several communities suspended their activities. The leaders of one community, after being prohibited from using their house of prayer for several months, agreed to submit a notification of the commencement of a religious group’s activities.
The scope of criminal prosecution for offending religious feelings decreased compared to 2024 but remained high. As before, charges under this article were mostly based on online publications.
Public defenders of believers’ feelings most often continued to act in defense of Russian Orthodox believers and chose forms tested in previous years, such as organizing public campaigns and submitting complaints to law enforcement agencies. The campaign against the “fall of crosses” - schematic depictions of churches without crosses, which Orthodox activists had been finding objectionable for several years - received legislative support. The State Duma adopted a law protecting religious symbols that banned such images in the media and advertising.
The level of vandalism motivated by religious hatred increased sharply, primarily due to incidents targeting Muslim sites. Many of these incidents, a significant portion of which can be classified as dangerous, involved representatives of far-right movements.
Defamation of religious minorities in mass media continued, both at the federal and regional levels. One such media defamation campaign triggered two acts of vandalism against Protestant churches.
Here, we will mention two laws aimed at protection against the “fall of crosses.” On July 15, the State Duma adopted a law on the protection of religious symbols; the Federation Council approved it on July 25, and Vladimir Putin signed it on July 31. The law prohibited the depiction of religious buildings and objects without religious symbols in mass media, on the internet, in advertising, on goods, signage, and in state and municipal symbols. The Russian Orthodox Church had advocated for the adoption of such a law.
On December 18, the State Duma adopted a law mandating the presence of crosses on any reproductions of the coat of arms of the Russian Federation. The Federation Council approved it on December 19, and Vladimir Putin signed it on December 29. At the initiative of a group of deputies led by Vyacheslav Volodin, Article 1 of the law “On the State Coat of Arms of the Russian Federation” was supplemented with the following clarification: “The small crowns, the large crown, and the orb are topped with straight, equidistant, four-pointed crosses with expanding ends.”
Amendments to the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations,” intended to restrict worship services in residential buildings, were introduced in the State Duma three times in 2025, but none of these initiatives succeeded.
Thus, in January, deputies from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation submitted a draft law to the State Duma prohibiting organized religious worship and the placement of religious organizations in residential apartment buildings, as well as refusing registration to religious organizations whose locations do not comply with legal requirements. The document received negative reviews for failure to comply with the “legal criteria of necessity and proportionality of permissible restrictions on rights and freedoms deriving from the legal provisions of Article 55 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.”[4] As early as July, the Communist Party submitted a new version of this draft law. This time, the authors proposed amendments to the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” and to the Housing Code to prohibit the placement of religious associations in residential and non-residential areas of residential apartment buildings. However, the revised version also received a negative evaluation from the Legal Department and the State Duma Commission on Ensuring Housing Rights of Citizens.
Deputies from the New People (Novyye lyudi) party proposed a bill in October to ban religious services in non-residential areas of apartment buildings, as well as regular worship services on residential premises, but withdrew their draft a month later. The amendments drew criticism from representatives of various religious organizations.
Another similar draft law was submitted to the State Duma in June. Deputies proposed a ban on religious worship services in apartment buildings when attended by visiting groups, while not prohibiting residents from performing religious rites. In addition, the document provides for a ban on the registration of religious organizations that are located or conduct religious services in residential and non-residential areas of residential buildings. At the time of writing, the draft law has not yet reached its first reading.
In April, a group of deputies led by Pavel Krasheninnikov, the chairman of the State Duma Committee on State Building and Legislation, submitted to the State Duma a bill “On Amendments to Articles 3 and 4 of the Federal Law “On Veterans.””
The draft law grants the status of combat veterans to clergy who have visited military units participating in combat operations in Ukraine. It also proposes granting the status of disabled combat veterans to clergy who became disabled due to wounds or concussions received when visiting military units. The Russian Orthodox Church had long advocated this idea to the authorities. However, the bill never reached its first reading; the government determined that it required substantial revision.
The authors of yet another initiative to ban advertising of esoteric services, including astrology, magic, fortune-telling, and others, also failed in their efforts. In March 2025, Nina Ostanina, Andrei Svintsov, and Alexei Kornienko proposed the relevant amendments to the laws “On Advertising” and “On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection.” However, the government recommended rejecting this bill, since its wording “does not comply with the principle of legal certainty,” and equating “all forms of alternative practices” carries the risk of a “legal imbalance.”
One of the initiative’s authors, Deputy Svintsov, had come up with a similar initiative two months earlier, but limited only to tarot practitioners. However, he withdrew his draft bill after the first reading.
As in 2024, there were only a few conflicts related to the construction of Orthodox churches, most of which had begun in previous years. The conflict over the construction of a church on the embankment in Yubileyny Microdistrict of Krasnodar was the most significant. Throughout the year, residents continued to stage protests and hold pickets. Public hearings on the construction were held in October, and the majority of participants - more than 1,400 out of 1,928 - spoke against building the church at this location. However, the Commission on Land Use and Development, disregarding the opinion of the majority of the microdistrict’s residents, recommended that the city administration approve the construction of the church.
Opponents of the construction continued their appeals to the authorities, including recording a video address to Putin, and, having received no desired response, began collecting signatures for the resignation of the city mayor, Evgeny Naumov. The local Communist Party branch organized a similar petition campaign.
In January 2026, Mayor Naumov signed a resolution outlining the plans for the embankment, which implied that the church would be built at the location opposed by residents. However, the allocated area was reduced from 26,015 to 7,200 square meters.
The St. Petersburg Committee for State Control, Use, and Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments also approved the construction of the Church of St. George the Victorious in Pushkin commemorating the “special military operation” soldiers, despite opposition from the majority of public hearing participants The residents appealed to the Metropolitan Varsonofy (Sudakov) of St. Petersburg and Ladoga, asking for his assistance in finding a “better and more appropriate location” for the church. Ignored by secular and church authorities, the construction’s opponents placed a banner with the words “No Place for a Church Here” on a building near the construction site in June.
In Makhachkala, protests continued against the construction of the Church of St. Alexander Nevsky on the shore of Lake Ak-Gyol. The opponents went to court attempting to challenge the city’s master plan, land use, and development rules, which, in 2016, designated this site as a zone permitting the construction of religious buildings. According to the plaintiffs, both documents violate residents’ right to unobstructed access to the lake and were adopted with procedural violations.
Chelyabinsk residents protested against the construction of a church in Traktorozavodsky District next to a lyceum. Residents of nearby buildings fear “round-the-clock bell ringing” and inconveniences associated with construction. In September, the city authorities reported that the church project had not been approved and no construction permit had been issued; they promised to organize public hearings.
As before, the construction of mosques in various regions was accompanied by numerous conflicts, some of which have persisted for years. As in the previous year, these protests often had an anti-migrant character, and their active participants—and in some cases organizers—were representatives of far-right organizations.
For example, the Russian Community (Russkaya Obschina) expressed dissatisfaction with the possible purchase by a Muslim community of a building for a prayer house in Balashikha, located near a kindergarten and a defense industry enterprise. The city administration was forced to provide justifications and explained that it had no plans to open a prayer house and never approved the purchase of the premises by a religious organization.
Residents of New Moscow continued to protest against the possible construction of an interreligious center with a mosque in Kommunarka. This time, opponents of the construction recorded a video address to Vyacheslav Volodin, Dmitry Medvedev, and Mikhail Mishustin. The appeal contained numerous anti-migrant clichés.
Protests continued against the construction of a mosque in Verkhnyaya Kurya Microdistrict of Perm. The construction’s opponents placed niqab-clad snow figures accompanied by offensive slogans on the construction site. A criminal case against Anna Pyanzina, the action’s organizer, was initiated under Article 282 (incitement of hatred) of the Criminal Code (CC). However, it was soon closed, after a linguistic examination failed to find incitement to hostility in the texts of the posters (“Niqabs for snow women,” “White women for black guests,” “Give me a hot Muslim.”)
Of course, conflicts surrounding mosque construction also involved motives other than xenophobia. Opponents raised concerns about possible everyday inconveniences, similar to objections against Orthodox church construction. Thus, residents of the Solnechny Gardening Partnership near Krasnoyarsk, where a Muslim prayer house has already been operating, expressed their dissatisfaction with the prospect of a mosque on the same plot. Neighbors assumed that the building would produce late-night noise and worsen the transport situation. However, according to the owner, there are no plans to build a mosque. A Husayniyya (a venue for Shia mourning rituals) has been operating on the site and observing all applicable regulations for prayer houses. Most neighbors have no objections to gatherings of believers.
We are not aware of conflicts related to the construction of religious buildings of other religious organizations.
The closures of Muslim prayer houses and prayer rooms in various regions continued in 2025. For example, a prayer house organized by the Muslim community in a building it had purchased without the appropriate authorization was closed in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. The building had been registered in 2012 as a catering facility. A building inspection, following a complaint from local residents, revealed violations of sanitary and fire safety regulations. The building owner received a warning about the inadmissibility of violating the law.
Prayer houses were closed in Mytishchi and Balashikha in the Moscow Region.
The Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for Krasnodar Krai reported the discovery of five illegal Muslim prayer rooms in the region: in Krasnodar, the Varenikovskaya stanitsa in Krymsky District, the Khorin Khutor, and in the settlements of Mayak and Podgornaya Sinyukha in Otradnensky District. In two cases - Krasnodar and Varenikovskaya – reports were filed against the organizers under Article 5.26 Part 4 CAO (missionary activity violating the requirements of legislation on freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and religious associations). In the remaining three cases, inspections were based on the alleged religious group activities without notifying the relevant authorities. The results of these inspections are unknown.
Illegal prayer rooms were shut down in Karagay District of Perm Krai and in Sosnovsky District of the Chelyabinsk Region. In both cases, the organizers faced charges under Article 5.26 CAO.
The Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Samara Region initiated an inspection following complaints from residents of the Mekhzavod settlement about disturbances caused by the inability of parishioners to fit inside their prayer house during services, leading them to gather outside. As a result of the inspection, the chairman of the Muslim religious society of the Krasnoglinsky District, Ildar Minkhametov, was fined 50,000 rubles for organizing an unauthorized gathering.
In Stary Oskol, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with the prosecutor’s office, conducted an inspection following complaints from local residents that cars of believers, who arrived at a prayer house to celebrate Eid al-Fitr, were blocking an exit road. The inspection failed to confirm the facts stated in the complaint but established that no religious organization was registered at that address. An administrative case was initiated against the building owner under Article 8.8 Part 1 CAO (use of a land plot in a manner inconsistent with its designated purpose and/or permitted use), and the organizer of the prayer gathering received a warning about the inadmissibility of violating counter-extremism legislation.
Alisher Ch., the owner of a prayer house, recognized as an unauthorized construction back in 2023, was fined 30,000 rubles in Vyazma under Article 20.35 Part 2 CAO (violating requirements for anti-terrorist protection of facilities (territories) of religious organizations). In 2023, the court ordered the demolition of the building, but the owner dismantled only part of the structure and registered it as his residence, thus making the demolition legally impossible.
As in the previous year, we observed only a small number of problems experienced by other religious organizations when using existing property. Based on an anonymous complaint about the emergency condition of the building of the Evangelical Christian (Pentecostal) church “Word of Life,” the administration of Severodvinsk in the Arkhangelsk Region prohibited the community from conducting worship services in the building. No relevant inspections or expert assessments ever took place. This decision was preceded by a social media defamation campaign against the church and its pastor. Believers moved their services to rented premises and filed a complaint with the prosecutor’s office over the authorities’ actions.
In addition, we know of Jehovah’s Witnesses' property seized in two regions. As in previous years, courts declared building donation agreements invalid following the blanket ban on Jehovah’s Witness organizations. A court declared invalid a 2017 agreement under which a local Jehovah’s Witness organization had transferred ownership of a land plot and a building to the organization “Jehovah’s Witnesses in Austria.” In the Tula Region, the Main Interregional Directorate of the Federal Bailiff Service filed another claim with the arbitration court against the “Religious Confession of Christian Jehovah’s Witnesses in Spain,” seeking the confiscation of a land plot in Tula from the community. A similar claim made in 2024 was left without consideration because the plaintiff failed to provide certain required documentation. We do not know the outcome of the 2025 case. In addition, a building previously seized from Jehovah’s Witnesses was put up for sale in Chita.
As in prior years, property was most often transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, the government of St. Petersburg issued a decree on transferring to the St. Petersburg Theological Academy one of the buildings of Psychiatric Hospital No. 6 on the embankment of the Obvodny Canal. The religious organization asserted its rights to the building in 2023. The building is a cultural heritage site of regional significance and housed the Alexander Nevsky Antoniev Theological School before 1917.
The Ministry of Property of the Moscow Region transferred ownership of the following three sites to the Exaltation of the Cross parish in Orekhovo-Zuyevo: a church, a Sunday school, and a spiritual and educational center on Fabzavucha Street. The religious organization, which for 15 years had been engaged in restoring the church, had been using these buildings. The church is a cultural heritage site of regional significance.
The transfer of property to other religious organizations, as a rule, also proceeded without incident. Thus, the Orenburg authorities transferred to the Orenburg Regional Spiritual Administration of Muslims the former building of the “Husainiya” madrasa, recognized as being in emergency condition. In Troitsk of the Chelyabinsk Region, the Regional Spiritual Administration of Muslims has become the owner of a mosque building with a land plot. The building, constructed in 1878, is a cultural heritage site of municipal significance.
In addition, in Nizhny Novgorod, the building of a historic Catholic church on Studenaya Street was transferred to the parish of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The building successively housed a Catholic church, a printing house, and a regional branch of the Russian Energy Agency.
In Rostov-on-Don, the building of the Nakhichevan Theological Seminary was transferred to the ownership of the Russian and New Nakhichevan Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The building is a cultural heritage site of regional significance.
Museum property was occasionally transferred to religious organizations; however, as in the previous year, these cases did not give rise to conflicts. For example, the Savvino-Storozhevsky Monastery near Moscow received the Guardhouse building (Karaulnaya Palatka), previously maintained by the Zvenigorod Museum-Reserve, to be used free of charge for 49 years. In Ryazan, the Palace of Prince Oleg - the earliest civil building of the Ryazan Kremlin - was transferred to the diocese. The museum exhibition previously housed there was relocated to the Museum Center, as had been done with exhibitions from Kremlin churches transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church earlier.
In some cases, religious organizations had to go to court to defend their property rights. Thus, in February, the Oktyabrsky District Court of Ufa recognized the ownership rights of the local Muslim religious organization “Mahalla No. 2025” to a madrasa building in the village of Nagaevo, constructed in 2007 but never legalized or operational.
The local Muslim religious organization of the village of Staromochalei in Pilninsky District of the Nizhny Novgorod Region filed a claim with the regional arbitration court against the district administration seeking to legalize a mosque building that had been considered an unauthorized construction. We do not know the outcome of the proceedings but assume that the court sided with the religious organization, since the district administration reportedly did not object to the plaintiff’s claims.
An Orthodox parish in Samara successfully defended its right to a land plot for building a church. The Samara Regional Court rejected the claim of the Samara Department of Urban Planning, which had challenged the decision that recognized the refusal to grant the parish a land plot for a church complex as unlawful. The Samara mayor’s office attempted to challenge the decision of the court of first instance, which the parish had also won.
The Arbitration Court of the Belgorod Region rejected the claim of the Krasnensky District administration, which asserted the municipality’s ownership of three real estate assets - a residential building, a garage, and a boiler house - previously acquired by the parish of the Church of the Nativity of Christ in the village of Gorki.
Also in January, the Orenburg Regional Court, following a claim by the regional office of the Ministry of Justice, liquidated the local Christian Church of Evangelical Christians (Church of the Living God) in Mednogorsk for its charter’s lack of compliance with legal requirements and for failure to provide documents confirming its activities.
Several Muslim organizations in different regions were closed for various violations. In January, the Moscow Regional Court granted a claim by the Ministry of Justice and liquidated a local Muslim religious organization in the town of Kotelniki near Moscow. For several years, local residents and Russkaya Obschina had demanded that the prayer house be closed. In 2025, the premises were sealed, and a criminal case under Article 173.1 CC (illegal creation or reorganization of a legal entity) was initiated against the organization’s leader, Salavat Ibatullin.
In November, a court satisfied the claim filed by the Ministry of Justice and liquidated Mahalla No. 2708, a Muslim religious organization in Sergiev Posad. The grounds for liquidation were described as “formal indications.” The organization’s prayer house, which had been operating for more than 20 years, has been closed. According to Arslan Sadriev, the organization’s head, problems began after a change in the city administration in 2020. A criminal case under Article 173.1 CC was also initiated against Sadriev.
Based on a claim by the Ministry of Justice, a court in Mozhaysk liquidated the Vatanim Muslim community for mentioning in the minutes of its founding meeting a person who had died three days before the meeting. The religious organization also lost its appeal.
In October, the Orenburg Regional Court liquidated the Light of the World local religious organization in Kuvandyk for non-compliance of its charter with legal requirements and for lack of documentation confirming its religious activity based on a claim filed by the Ministry of Justice.
In addition, the activities of religious associations that had previously refused state registration were suspended in 2025 upon request from the prosecutor’s office. In July, the Yoshkar-Ola City Court, acting on a prosecutorial claim, prohibited the activities of a group of Evangelical Christian Baptists until a notification of the commencement of their religious group’s activities was submitted to the Ministry of Justice. The religious group belongs to the unregistered International Union of Evangelical Christian Baptist Churches (IU ECB), and it was gathering for joint prayer in a private residence for several decades. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Mari El upheld the decision of the court of first instance.
In October, the Armavir City Court suspended the activity of a local religious group, also belonging to the IU ECB, which refuses state registration, until a notification of the commencement of their religious group’s activities was submitted to the Ministry of Justice. Also in October, the Timashevsk District Court of Krasnodar Krai suspended the activity of a similar community in Timashevsk, citing the same requirements.
As in the case of religious organizations previously included in this list, the Prosecutor General’s Office justified its decision by referring to their support for the Ukrainian authorities and the threat they allegedly pose to Russia’s constitutional order.
Followers of religious organizations already recognized as undesirable, as in the preceding year, were subjected to administrative and criminal prosecution. Thus, Irina Smirnova, a resident of Bryansk, was found guilty under Article 284.1 Part 2 CC (provision of funds and rendering of financial services to an undesirable organization) for transferring funds to representatives of the AllatRa international movement. She received a two-year suspended sentence and a two-year ban on website administration or engaging in online activities related to the collection and analysis of information about undesirable organizations. A resident of Serpukhov received a one-and-a-half-year suspended sentence with a one-year probation on a similar charge.
AllatRa followers were sentenced to compulsory labor at least twice: two years for Omsk businessman Roman Miroshnikov, under Parts 1 and 2 of Article 284.1 CC (participation in the activities of an undesirable organization and financing and organizing its activities), and one and a half years for Denis Sadigov from Murmansk under Part 2 of the same article.
Yelena Moiseenko from the Saratov Region, and Irina Uchparmakyan from Samara, were each sentenced to 240 hours of community service under the same part of the same article. Meanwhile, Stanislav and Yelena Boyko, a married couple from Perm, were each fined 5,000 rubles under Article 20.33 CAO (participation in the activities of an undesirable organization) for cooperation with AllatRa and keeping Sokrovennik, the AllatRa newspaper, at their home.
We should also note that AllatRa was recognized as extremist in June, and we already recorded one case of sanctions for involvement in AllatRa as an extremist organization; a 49-year-old woman from Sibay received an official warning.
New criminal cases were initiated in 2025 for financing AllatRa. We recorded such cases opened against a resident of Kaliningrad and two residents of Krasnodar Krai, as well as several cases in Samara.
Followers of Vladimir Muntyan’s “Revival” organizations (the All-Ukrainian Spiritual Center and the Charitable Foundation) were also prosecuted under Article 284.1 Part 2 CC. For example, Olga Leontyeva, a 63-year-old resident of Izhevsk, was sentenced to imprisonment for a year and a half. However, the court took into account her remorse, her health condition, and her obligation to care for her elderly mother and disabled daughter and replaced her real prison term with a suspended sentence followed by one year of probation. Olesya Kosenkova from the Priyutovo settlement in Bashkortostan and a resident of Zarinsk in Altai Krai also received suspended sentences under the same article: two years followed by a two-year probation period and one and a half years, respectively.
Several followers of Muntyan were sentenced to community service under the same part of the same article: Rezida Sadeeva from Neftekamsk - to 360 hours; Lyubov Karimova from Udmurtia, Sergei Ogloblin from Novouralsk, and an unnamed resident of Asbest - to 300 hours each; a resident of Perm Krai – to 250 hours; and Dinara Akhmetova from Izhevsk – to 240 hours. Meanwhile, a Moscow court referred Viktoria Brazhnik, a Ukrainian-born defendant charged under the same provision, for compulsory psychiatric treatment.
At least four additional criminal cases for financing Muntyan’s organizations were initiated during the year: in Severodvinsk of the Arkhangelsk Region, Yekaterinburg, the Nizhny Novgorod Region, and Udmurtia.
Unlike followers of AllatRa or Muntyan’s organizations, adherents of Falun Gong faced real imprisonment. In Moscow, 46-year-old Natalia Minenkova was sentenced to four years of imprisonment, with a seven-year ban on engaging in public and political activities, including via the Internet, under Article 284.1 Part 3 CC (carrying out the activities of an undesirable organization). Zhu Yun, a Russian citizen residing in Tomsk, received three years in a minimum-security penal colony under the same criminal charge, with a three-year ban on engaging in public and political activities.
Seven employees of the Aptrend training center in Moscow were fined under Article 20.33 CAO for distributing books by L. Ron Hubbard with the copyright of the Church of Spiritual Technology. A complaint against Aptrend was filed by its student. As a result, the center decided to cease its activities. In Kaliningrad, a case under Article 284.1 Part 3 CC was initiated against a coach who used materials of undesirable Scientology organizations.
The list of “foreign agents” was expanded in 2025 to include defrocked Russian Orthodox priest Ioann Kurmoyarov, supernumerary cleric Andrei Kordochkin of the Madrid diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as the Islam-focused Alif TV Project.
Jehovah’s Witnesses faced sanctions under Article 282.2 CC (organizing the activities of an extremist organization) and Article 282.3 CC (financing the activities of an extremist organization). According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, 29 believers were sentenced to imprisonment. The longest sentences - seven years in a minimum-security penal colony - were imposed on Aleksandr Neverov from Saransk, Samvel Babayan from Samara, and Evgeny Sokolov from Voronezh. The oldest individuals sentenced to actual prison terms, Valery Knyazev and Indus Talipov from Izhevsk, both aged 74, received three-year sentences. All of them were found guilty under Article 282.2 CC.
In addition, Jehovah’s Witnesses estimated that 111 searches were conducted in believers’ homes during the year and often involved various violations, including the use of violence.
Believers of other religious organizations also faced criminal sanctions. The Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Novosibirsk delivered a guilty verdict against the leaders of the Church of the Last Testament. Sergei Torop (Vissarion), Vadim Redkin, and Vladimir Vedernikov were found guilty under Article 239 Part 1 CC (creating a non-profit organization infringing on the personality and rights of citizens), paragraphs “a” and “b” of Article 111 Part 3 CC (intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm), and paragraph “d” of Article 112 Part 2 CC (intentional infliction of moderate bodily harm). Vedernikov was additionally convicted under Article 159 Part 4 CC (fraud). Torop and Vedernikov were sentenced to 12 years, and Redkin to 11 years of imprisonment in a maximum-security penal colony. It is worth noting that the bodily harm in their case refers to mental health damage allegedly caused by participation in their community - a highly questionable charge.
In the Belgorod Region, Aleksandr Ovsyannikov was sentenced to two and a half years in a minimum-security penal colony for publishing materials of the “Russian Orthodox Church – Tsarist Empire” under Parts 2 and 3 of Article 239 CC (creating a non-profit organization whose activities involve inducing citizens to refuse to fulfill their civic duties or to commit other unlawful acts, and participation in such an organization).
Another verdict under Part 1 of the same article was issued against F. Abdullaeva, a resident of Smolensk, for creating the Alla-Ayat religious group and distributing materials of this organization. The court sentenced her to two years of imprisonment, followed by a two-year probation, but released her from punishment due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. In December 2021, the same court found Abdullaeva guilty under the same provision, but the appellate court overturned the verdict in 2022 and sent the case for retrial.
Fines remained the primary form of punishment under this article. In the first half of 2025, they were imposed in 153 cases, warnings were issued in 16 cases, and community service was imposed seven times (in the first half of 2024, the numbers were 118, 14, and 1, respectively). In seven cases, punishment also involved administrative deportation, and in six cases, confiscation of the instrument of the administrative offense.[5]
Based on the data, it can be assumed that the total number of “anti-missionary” cases increased significantly in 2025 compared to the previous year.
Most known cases of liability under this article, once again, concerned Muslims and Protestants.
Organizing prayer rooms was often interpreted as “unlawful missionary activity.” For example, in Yakutsk, hotel owner I. Abdilkhashimov was fined 10,000 rubles under Article 5.26 Part 4 CAO (conducting missionary activity in violation of legal requirements) for organizing a prayer room. Z., a director of a fruit and vegetable company, also from Yakutsk, was fined 5,000 rubles for a similar offense under the same provision. The fruit and vegetable company was fined 100,000 rubles, since the prayer room had been organized on its premises. Under the same provision, organizers of prayer rooms in Syktyvkar and Kostroma were each fined 5,000 rubles.
A resident of Kursk, originally from Dagestan, was fined 5,000 rubles under the same provision for distributing the As-Salam newspaper near a residential building without documents confirming his authority to conduct missionary activity.
In Temryuk of the Krasnodar Krai, the organizer of a musical titled “Interchurch Evening of Praise” and two performing musicians were each fined 10,000 rubles under Article 5.26 Part 4 CAO. The 49-year-old believer organized the event and invited a Protestant religious group from Magnitogorsk. Law enforcement authorities treated his actions as unlawful missionary activity. The event was disrupted by police and Federal Security Service officers.
In the stanitsa of Bryukhovetskaya in Krasnodar Krai, church minister Sergei Timoshchuk (IU ECB) was fined 5,000 rubles under the same provision. The charges were based on a religious worship service he had conducted in a private home at the invitation of friends. Baptist Viktor Seregin was fined in Bryansk for holding a worship service in his home without authorization documents for missionary activity.
We should also note two noteworthy cases under Part 4 of this article. In Kostroma, Dmitry Kuzmin, a deputy of the Kostroma Regional Duma and the Kostroma City Duma from the Communist Party, was fined 5,000 rubles for “unlawful missionary activity.” As an Evangelical Christian running for election, he conducted missionary activity on premises not designated for that purpose without authorization from a religious organization. In Novorossiysk, Sergei Yenichev was fined 10,000 rubles despite having authorization documents for missionary activity. According to the local police officer who visited Yenichev at his home, Yenichev, being an Evangelical Christian, was disseminating the foundations of the Orthodox (!) doctrine.
Foreign nationals also regularly faced sanctions for “unlawful missionary activity.” For example, in Ukhta, entrepreneur R. was fined 35,000 rubles under Article 5.26 Part 5 CAO (missionary activity by a foreign citizen in violation of legal requirements) for organizing a prayer room in a café. Guvanch Saparov and Didar Muradov were each fined 30,000 rubles under the same provision for performing namaz in the Moscow metro without documents confirming their authority to conduct a religious rite in a public place.
In many cases, fines for “unlawful missionary activity” imposed on foreign citizens were accompanied by deportation from the country. Thus, in Kemerovo, two citizens of Uzbekistan were each fined 30,000 rubles for performing namaz in a local supermarket under the same charge and then deported.
For example, in November, officers of the Center for Combating Extremism of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for the Moscow Region, the Main Military Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia, the prosecutor’s office, the criminal investigation department, and the State Traffic Inspectorate, as well as officers of the Riot Police and the National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardiya), with the participation of unnamed volunteer patrol members, conducted a comprehensive inspection of a local Muslim religious organization in Elektrostal. As a result of the inspection, reports were compiled under Article 8.8 Part 1 CAO (use of a land plot not in accordance with its designated purpose) and Article 5.26 Part 4. 37 individuals were taken to the military recruitment office.
We are aware of similar raids in Moscow against the following organizations: Risalyat on Ogorodny Proezd and Istina on Basovskaya Street. Raids also took place in Balashikha, Naro-Fominsk, Staraya Kupavna, and Troitsk in the Moscow Region, as well as in Tver and Surgut.
In addition to Muslims, Baptists – specifically, the communities belonging to the International Union of Evangelical Christian Baptist Churches (IU ECB) - experienced systematic pressure from law enforcement agencies in 2025. Security forces in various regions attended worship services, sometimes disrupting them, and conducted inspections, citing the alleged “reports” on gatherings of “suspicious persons.”
Such visits took place in several communities in Krasnodar Krai. Specifically, in the settlement of Lazarevskoye, police officers, an assistant prosecutor, a local police officer, and a plainclothes individual arrived at a community’s house of prayer and disrupted an evening service. They refused to show their identification. One of the parishioners was detained, taken to a police station, and fingerprinted, but no charges were filed. Four volumes of religious literature were seized from the premises.
In Tula, an IU ECB church was visited by a local police officer and two FSB officers during an evening service. Criminal investigation officers appeared at the service before this visit, recorded video footage, and then informed their colleagues about a gathering of “dubious individuals.”
In Murino of the Leningrad Region, a deputy prosecutor, a local police officer, police officers, and several plainclothes individuals came to inspect a Baptist service held on the Trinity Day and, despite the presbyter’s warning that he was ready to speak after the worship service, attempted to question the believers during the holiday service.
In Novocherkassk of the Rostov Region, following a similar visit by representatives of six agencies, including the prosecutor’s office and Rosgvardiya, six administrative cases were initiated against a Baptist community. We have no information about the outcome of these cases.
As in the previous year, we recorded cases of discrimination against Muslim women for wearing headscarves in educational institutions. However, whereas previously we tended to classify such cases as non-state discrimination, state bodies were almost always involved in the incidents related to “hijabs” in 2025. For example, a lyceum director in Khabarovsk demanded that a student who came to the September 1 assembly wearing a headscarf remove it, while acknowledging that the existing regulations contained no direct prohibition on wearing headscarves. The student’s parents were forced to file complaints with the prosecutor’s office and the regional commissioner for children’s rights. The Investigative Committee did initiate an inspection based on the incident, but not due to the parents’ complaint. Rather, the inspection followed accusations against the girl’s father that appeared in far-right Telegram channels. The authors of those messages accused him of being affiliated with “Wahhabism,” belonging to an ethnic criminal group, and threatening the director.
In Zhukovsky District of the Kaluga Region, parents of students at one of the schools expressed outrage over two seventh- and ninth-grade students wearing headscarves to classes. The complainants received support not only from the school administration but also from the regional Ministry of Education. The girls were forced to stop attending classes, and their parents sought legal assistance. The regional Minister of Internal Policy, Oleg Kalugin, commented on the case after it gained publicity, approving the actions of the school administration and stating that “school is a civic institution; it is a secular institution, therefore there is no need to emphasize one’s religious particularities here.”[6]
In some cities of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, prosecutors took control over students’ appearance. For example, parents in Nizhnevartovsk were warned of potential school inspections related to students wearing religious attire. If students were found wearing religious clothing, including hijabs and niqabs, heads of institutions would face responsibility. Educational institutions in Nefteyugansk received similar directives.
It is worth adding that we know of several conflicts related to performing namaz in public places that we cannot classify as discrimination. For example, a Yandex Taxi driver in Tyumen did not begin a trip until he finished performing namaz; meanwhile, the car remained in waiting mode. In response to the passenger’s complaint, Yandex Taxi support offered her compensation and promised to impose sanctions on the driver. Another driver, of a scheduled bus in Vladivostok, began praying directly in front of the bus, obstructing the passage of other vehicles. An administrative offense report was filed against the driver. In addition, a radiologist at the Gatchina Interdistrict Hospital left his workplace to perform namaz and asked his patients to wait, including a patient with an open wound and venous bleeding. The hospital administration conducted a conversation with the doctor and also revised the work schedules, “taking into account the staff's religious needs.”
It should also be noted that the performance of namaz in public places regularly became a topic of public discussion. In some cases, officials attempted to address this issue through administrative sanctions. For example, in April, the administration of Andropovsky Municipal District of Stavropol Krai sent a letter to various institutions threatening them with fines for performing namaz in public places and angering many Muslims. After a comment by Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya, who called this initiative “open discrimination and legal arbitrariness,” the letter was withdrawn.
It is worth noting that official Muslim structures did not share the outrage in this case. Muhammad Rakhimov, the mufti of Stavropol Krai, supported the administration’s initiative, stating that “all religious rites are performed on premises or with the permission of local authorities. There is no point in unauthorized campaigns. And if they occur without permission, naturally, this should be punishable.”[7]
On several occasions, believers and religious organizations were able to challenge fines for “unlawful missionary activity.” For example, the Krasnodar Regional Court overturned two rulings of the Oktyabrsky District Court of Krasnodar and terminated the cases against two Brazilian Pentecostal pastors, each of whom had been fined 30,000 rubles and sentenced to deportation under Article 5.26 Part 5 CAO. Vicente Julio Cesar Kravchenko and Eder Da Silva Figueiredo were detained in August when security forces arrived at the church, disrupted the holiday service in honor of the Dormition of the Mother of God, and removed both pastors from the hall without explaining the reasons to the congregation. The court of first instance failed to take into account that both clerics were lawfully present in Russia, held residence permits, were employed, and possessed documents confirming their authority from the religious organization “Kingdom of God” and the Russian United Union of Evangelical Christians (Pentecostals).
The regional court annulled the fines and deportation orders. However, the church members filed a complaint with the Investigative Committee to open a criminal case regarding the disruption of the service under paragraph “a” of Article 148 Part 4 CC (unlawful obstruction of the activities of religious organizations or the conduct of worship services and other religious rites using official position) and paragraph “d” of Article 286 Part 3 CC (abuse of official powers resulting in a substantial violation of the rights and lawful interests of citizens or organizations by a group of persons by prior agreement or an organized group). We do not know whether this complaint resulted in any legal action.
In Tyumen, the court terminated an administrative case against the Light of the World Evangelical Christian church under Article 5.26 Part 3 CAO (activities by a religious organization without indicating its official full name, including the issuance or distribution of literature, printed, audio, and video materials without proper labeling). The prosecutor’s office sought to hold the organization liable for the absence of labeling on several books and video files. However, these materials had not been published by the religious organization itself and were not distributed during missionary activity, so the court closed the case.
In Noyabrsk of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, proceedings were terminated against Catholic priest Marek Jashkowski, a citizen of Poland, who had faced charges under Article 5.26 Part 5 for failure to notify authorities of the commencement of the activities of a religious group. The priest explained that he was the rector of the parish of St. Joseph the Worker and traveled twice a month at the invitation of parishioners to conduct services, without attempting to attract outsiders. The parish had also repeatedly attempted to register as a religious organization. The court found no elements of an offense in Fr. Marek’s actions and closed the case.
We are also aware of several cases in which believers successfully defended in courts their right to perform alternative civilian service on religious grounds – in particular, a 25-year-old volunteer from St. Petersburg, a member of an Orthodox youth volunteer organization assisting the homeless. An Orthodox priest confirmed the young man’s pacifist views.
A Christian named Mikhail from the Moscow Region succeeded in obtaining the right to alternative civilian service only on his third attempt. His first application, submitted in 2023, was considered only in 2024 and rejected on the grounds of “insufficient evidence that military service contradicts his beliefs or religion.” Mikhail challenged the decision in court but lost at all three levels. The same outcome occurred with his second application. In March 2025, he submitted a third application, and the military prosecutor’s office confirmed that the military commissariat had committed violations. In April, the draft commission approved his request.
Yegor, a 21-year-old believer from a Protestant church in Krasnodar, obtained permission to perform alternative civilian service, even though the medical commission declared him fit for military service and ignored his educational deferment. He cited religious beliefs that do not allow him to take up arms as grounds for refusing military service. His pastor accompanied him to the commission hearing and confirmed that Yegor had attended church since childhood.
Despite Russia’s refusal to recognize the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court continued to consider previously submitted complaints. In March, it issued a judgment in the case “Kolyasnikov and Others v. Russia.” The applicants included pastor Alexei Kolyasnikov from Krasnodar, fined in 2014 for reading the Bible in a café, as well as Jehovah’s Witnesses, representatives of Aum Shinrikyo, the Embassy of Jesus Evangelical Christian (Pentecostal) Church of Nizhny Novgorod, the Methodist Christian Church of Vladivostok, and other organizations. The Court established a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) and ordered the respondent state to pay the applicants between 2,500 and 7,500 euros within three months.
In October, the ECHR delivered a judgment in the case “Markin and Others v. Russia,” combining the complaints filed between 2018 and 2022 by 28 Jehovah’s Witnesses from several regions who faced prosecution for continuing the activities of an extremist organization. The Court found a violation of the same Article 9 and ordered the state to pay each applicant 15,000 euros within three months, with an additional 3,000 to 3,500 euros awarded to three of the defendants.
We also note that the community of the Kurganinsk house of prayer in Krasnodar Krai, whose activities were suspended in 2024 due to failure to notify authorities of the commencement of its activities, submitted the required notification and resumed its activities in December 2025, regaining access to the house of prayer that had remained sealed for six months. The community belongs to the previously mentioned International Union of Evangelical Christian Baptist Churches (IU ECB), which unites churches that refuse state registration as a matter of principle.
Defendants convicted under Part 1 of this article were sentenced to actual imprisonment in three cases, but all three involved additional, more serious charges. The most severe sentence - seven years in a minimum-security penal colony with a three-year ban on administering internet resources - was imposed on blogger Vadim Kharchenko from Gelendzhik. In addition to offending religious feelings, he was charged under three other criminal articles. We do not know which of his publications formed the basis for prosecution under this provision.
Two individuals received lengthy suspended sentences under this article. Nikolay Pozharuk, a resident of the Sverdlovsk Region, received a suspended sentence of six years and 10 days with a probation period of two and a half years for posting a comment offensive to Christians. Ilya Stebenev, a student at the Penza Railway Transport College, received a four-year suspended sentence with a two-year probation and a fine of 5,000 rubles. The court found that he had offended religious feelings in three comments under a Telegram post titled “Moscow Welcomes the Growth of the Muslim Population, Putin Said.” Both individuals were also charged with unlawful handling of explosive substances.
In nine cases, offenders convicted under Article 148 Part 1 were sentenced to community service. The most severe such punishment - 250 hours each - was imposed on Mansur Zhabrailov, a rural schoolteacher from Chechnya (with a two-year ban on teaching), and Aleksandr Aganin, a resident of Serov in the Sverdlovsk Region (with confiscation of his mobile phone as the instrument of the offense). Internet publications served as the grounds for criminal prosecution in both cases. Zhabrailov was also charged under Article 282 CC. Oleg Merzlyakov, a resident of Yakshur village in Zavyalovsky District of Udmurtia, received 100 hours of community service under Article 148 Part 1 for publicly swearing at a priest and the Orthodox faith on the grounds of a local church, while intoxicated.
Dmitry Vetrov, a resident of Ivanovo, faced a fine of 140,000 rubles for comments on VKontakte that were offensive to Christians of various denominations.
In addition, we are aware of four court decisions under Article 148 Part 2 (the same acts committed in places specifically designated for worship and other religious rites). Punishment was imposed on four individuals in one case only (in 2024, there were nine such decisions, including six convictions against seven individuals, and three decisions on compulsory psychiatric treatment). Residents of the Novgorod Region - Igor Yakovlev, Timur Dekanov, Vsevolod Talavyra, and Georgy Pavlov - were each sentenced to 240 hours of community service for desecrating burial crosses while intoxicated “by demonstrating various gestures,” photographing the process, and publishing the images. A vandal charged under the same provision, along with three other articles for his actions in the Assumption Church in Ivanovo, was referred for compulsory treatment. Blogger Anna Borshchuk, who published a video of herself urinating near Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg, was released from criminal liability after apologizing and voluntarily working at the church as an act of atonement. The case against Igor Maksimov, a parishioner of a Greek Catholic church who had placed stylized icon-like images of Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, and Josyf Slipyj in the church refectory, was terminated due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Maksimov was also charged under Part 1 of Article 354.1 CC (rehabilitation of Nazism).
Those deemed by the authorities to have offended religious feelings also faced administrative sanctions under Article 5.26 Part 2 CAO (intentional public desecration of religious or liturgical literature, objects of religious veneration, worldview symbols or emblems, or their damage or destruction). According to the data provided by OVD-Info, there were at least 43 such cases. In most cases, the substance of the claims is unknown due to the absence of court decisions. Seven of the ten cases known to us resulted in fines, and three - in community service.
Many cases pertained to online publications. For example, Moscow resident Ilya Kostyakov was sentenced to 80 hours of community service for a TikTok video.
Restaurant managers faced administrative sanctions for offending religious feelings on two occasions. In Simferopol, a court fined Vladimir Sizykh, founder of the El Pastor restaurant chain, 100,000 rubles. Décor in one of his restaurants included “a modified image of the Mother of God (with a skull instead of her face) and a caricature depicting the Lord Jesus Christ as a shepherd with a boombox on his shoulder,” which law enforcement authorities and the court considered offensive to Orthodox believers.
In Orenburg, a court fined Dmitry Ivanov, manager of the Georgian cuisine restaurant “Nino-Vano,” 150,000 rubles for promotional flyers depicting St. Basil’s Cathedral with domes shaped like khinkali dumplings. Notably, a lawyer of the Orenburg diocese participated in the proceedings and argued that although St. Basil’s Cathedral was a museum, it also remained an active church, and therefore the depiction of its domes as khinkali offended a sacred site.
In addition, police detained a 15-year-old resident of Saratov who shouted “Allahu Akbar” in an Orthodox church and recorded it on video. A preventive conversation was held with the girl, and a report was filed against her parents under Article 5.35 CAO (failure by parents to properly fulfill their duties of care and upbringing of a minor).
Members of the State Duma repeatedly acted as defenders of religious feelings. In particular, their attention was often focused on the so-called “fall of crosses” - schematic depictions of churches without crosses. For example, Communist Party deputy Mikhail Matveev appealed to the Investigative Committee and the Prosecutor General’s Office, demanding criminal proceedings under Articles 148 and 282 CC against AST Publishers, which had released an educational game “Russia’s Landmarks.” The game’s cover depicted Orthodox churches without crosses, while mosques featured crescents, and a Kremlin tower displayed a star. The publisher explained that the crosses were not visible due to the orientation of the image and stated that the game would not be reissued.
Anna Kuznetsova and Pyotr Tolstoy, Deputy Speakers of the State Duma, complained about what they considered an offensive social studies textbook by Phoenix Publishing House with the cover depicting St. Basil’s Cathedral without crosses. The deputies requested an inspection: Tolstoy addressed the Prosecutor General, while Kuznetsova appealed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The results of the inspection are unknown, but in July, the State Duma adopted the aforementioned law protecting religious symbols and prohibiting such images.
The same deputy, Mikhail Matveev, also filed a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office against Tver Tissue, a toilet paper manufacturer whose packaging depicted St. Basil’s Cathedral and the Spasskaya Tower of the Moscow Kremlin. The deputy regarded this as both an offense to believers’ feelings and an attempt to discredit state authorities. Following the complaint, the company changed the packaging, removing the image of the church, but the company director, nevertheless, received a prosecutorial order to remedy the violations of legislation on freedom of conscience and religious associations. Twelve thousand rolls of the “offensive” toilet paper were destroyed.
In another case involving “offensive” toilet paper, the matter went to court. A court in Moscow prohibited the sale of souvenir toilet paper depicting a 1,000-ruble banknote. The court considered the depiction of Prince Yaroslav the Wise - canonized as a saint - on the fake banknote to be offensive to believers’ feelings and contrary to spiritual and moral values.
The Federal Antimonopoly Service for Khabarovsk Krai halted advertising by the car audio workshop “BASS HOUSE 4212” after it was deemed offensive to believers’ feelings, as it used an image of Christ. The client, who was the shop’s sole proprietor, was found to have violated advertising law.
Orthodox activists continued to target cultural events. For example, in the fall of 2025, Sorok Sorokov demanded the removal of the painting “In the Utility Room” from the solo exhibition of Aleksandr Rukavishnikov, held at the Fineart gallery at Winzavod. According to the defenders of Orthodox believers’ feelings, the painting “depicts the Lord Jesus Christ consuming vodka in the company of four intoxicated men,” and its display should be prosecuted under Article 148 CC. According to the curator of the exhibition project, Maria Moskvicheva, “three sturdy Orthodox fellows arrived with a prepared complaint to the Winzavod administration, immediately called the police, and then the Investigative Committee.”[8] Rukavishnikov refused to remove the painting.
In November, representatives of Sorok Sorokov demanded that comedians Nurlan Saburov, Sergei Detkov, and Alexei Shcherbakov publicly apologize for profanity-laden jokes about Christ featured in a 2023 episode of the show “What Happened Next?” Having received no apology, Orthodox activists filed a claim with the Investigative Committee requesting that the statements of the show’s participants be examined for offending believers’ feelings. Already in January 2026, Saburov was banned from entering Russia for 50 years. The decision was motivated by the need to protect national security and spiritual and moral values.
In addition, Sorok Sorokov complained about “blasphemous” goods in the Witch’s Path, a store located near the Pokrovsky Monastery in Moscow. Orthodox activists were outraged by items found among the merchandise, including books on occultism and magic from Ukrainian publishers; candles shaped like sexual organs with pentagrams; icons with horns; figurines of demons; and other similar objects. These goods were subsequently removed from sale. The store owner, Anna Avdeeva, was fined 100,000 rubles under Article 5.26 Part 2 CAO.
Other Orthodox activists, from a Cossack organization affiliated with the Danilov Monastery, successfully petitioned for the suspension of the Enchantress fair, where they had identified “esoteric” goods and related workshops. First, the Cossacks visited the fair, and then, after they complained about a “satanic event taking place across the street from the monastery,” police officers, FSB inspectors, and district administration representatives arrived. Following these inspections, the premises’ owners cut the electricity and announced the involuntary suspension of the fair.
Orthodox activists also complained about “blasphemous” publications, as in the case of a video in which three girls twerked in front of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow. Sorok Sorokov activists complained to the Investigative Committee, requesting that the dancers be held criminally liable for offending believers’ feelings. Soon after the complaint, the girls were charged under Article 20.1 CAO (disorderly conduct), and the administration of the Stroganov Russian State University of Art and Industry, where they studied, expelled them “for violating public order and offending the religious feelings of citizens.”
Perhaps the most high-profile episode in the fight to protect Orthodox believers’ feelings was the conflict between Sorok Sorokov and Apti Alaudinov, Deputy Head of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Orthodox activists demanded prosecution against him under Articles 148 and 282 CC and his removal from his army post after he made offensive remarks about Schema-Hegumen Gavriil (Vinogradov), who had accused Muslims of being ready to “slaughter Muscovites.” The defenders of religious feelings did not withdraw their claim even after Alaudinov apologized to the clergyman on his Telegram channel. By that time, Gavriil had already been removed from his position for xenophobic statements. However, after a face-to-face meeting between Orthodox activists and Alaudinov, Sorok Sorokov concluded that “Apti Alaudinov is not an enemy of Russians and Orthodox believers, but a friend,” and decided not to insist on sanctions and to “continue the dialogue.”
At times, church structures raised concerns about threats to believers’ feelings, without the public activists’ mediation. For example, the authorities of Achinsk in Krasnoyarsk Krai canceled the burning of an effigy during Maslenitsa celebrations, citing a request from representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church.
In May, Metropolitan Longin (Korchagin) of Simbirsk and Novospassk called on Alexei Russkikh, the governor of the Ulyanovsk Region, to ban Protoka, a festival of self-development and healthy lifestyle, which moved to the region in 2024 after being held for ten years in the Samara Region. According to the metropolitan, the festival “teaches young people various occult and neo-pagan ‘spiritual’ practices” and promotes ideas of occultism. Despite his efforts, the festival took place, albeit under a different name - “the Place of Power.”
Metropolitan Dimitry (Eliseev) of Chita and Petrovsk-Zabaykalsky publicly criticized Halloween decorations on the Centaur Cinema building. In his view, distorted crosses with red streaks placed at the entrance symbolized Satanism and offended the feelings of believers. At the same time, he noted that “there are elements of the holiday that are not prohibited - pumpkins, candles, and so on. But the cross is a Christian symbol,” and promised to file a law enforcement claim. Although no formal complaint was filed, the regional Ministry of Internal Affairs initiated an inspection. We have no information on its results.
Defense of the offended religious feelings came not only from Orthodox activists and representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church but also from other public figures. For example, Yekaterina Mizulina, head of the Safe Internet League, identified “a clear offense to believers’ feelings, which is a punishable offense” and “a continuation of systematic efforts to discredit the Russian Orthodox Church that attempts to get children involved” in TikTok videos featuring fifth- and sixth-grade students using a toilet brush as a holy water brush. Based on her reaction, the administration of a Moscow school conducted an internal review and required the students involved to apologize. A St. Petersburg school, whose students had filmed a similar video, limited its response to holding discussions with children and parents about the “inappropriate behavior.”
Television host Boris Korchevnikov drew public attention to the “Forest Gates,” an art object constructed in Kirov. According to him, the ornamentation of the gates, installed at the entrance to the Poroshino sports and tourism park, featured pagan motifs, and the object represented a “Vedic” “window to hell.” The park administration tried to explain that the gates depicted a forest and a family of bears whose noses visitors would rub “for good luck,” and that the installation was located away from the “health trail” and did not obstruct access. However, under pressure from city authorities, the park administration was forced to dismantle the gates.
It should also be noted that, in some cases, organizers of cultural events took preventive measures and imposed restrictions without waiting for complaints, if an event seemed potentially offensive. Thus, in Kazan, the exhibition “The Finiteness of Infinity,” featuring works by artist Ivan Stan from Mari El, was closed on its opening day “for technical reasons.” The head of the Supermodern Gallery, where the exhibition was held, demanded the removal of two of Stan’s works because they were “imbued with paganism and Satanism.”
We are aware of only one case in which non-Orthodox believers asserted that their feelings had been offended, and their claim had consequences. The installation of airport trash bins bearing the silhouette of Lake Baikal, sacred to the Buryat people, as well as the placement of a prayer drum next to a smoking area, provoked outraged responses. The airport administration promised to replace the bins and relocate the prayer drum.
In October, a teenager attacked a Muslim woman wearing a head covering on the street in Saratov and stabbed her in the back. He filmed the incident and subsequently published the video on social media. The victim managed to resist but was hospitalized. The attacker was detained, and a case was initiated against him under Article 30 Part 3 and Article 105 Part 2 CC (attempted murder).
Oleg T., a resident of the Sverdlovsk Region, carried out a rampage in the Church of the Holy Martyr Sergius of Podolsk in Klimovsk (the Moscow Region) in February. He threatened the church store employees, tore off an employee’s headscarf, beat them with a stick, smashed the glass on an icon, and stole approximately three thousand rubles. A criminal case was initiated against him under Article 148 Part 4 CC (violation of the right to freedom of conscience and religion, with the use of violence).
In April, Natalia Medvedeva, a former photojournalist for Ogonyok and author of conspiracy books, attempted to tear off the niqab of a female passenger in the Moscow metro but was beaten by the woman’s companion, who also broke the attacker’s tablet. Administrative reports under Article 20.1 CAO (disorderly conduct) were filed against both Medvedeva and Ibodullozoda Muzaffardzhon Fazliddin (the companion of the niqab-wearing passenger). Medvedeva was sentenced to seven days of administrative arrest, Fazliddin to 13 days. Later, he was sentenced to two and a half years in a penal colony for the same actions under paragraphs “a” and “c” of Article 213 Part 1 (hooliganism involving violence, committed on public transport) and Article 167 Part 2 CC (intentional destruction or damage of another person’s property).
Compared to 2024, the number of acts of vandalism motivated by religion increased sharply - we are aware of 23 such cases in 2025 (vs. 10 in 2024). These included one shooting and 11 incidents of arson (vs. one explosion and three incidents of arson in 2024).
Muslim sites were targeted most frequently - 15 cases (vs. 4 in 2024). Prayer houses and mosques were set on fire in Ramenskoye and Yegoryevsk (the Moscow Region), as well as in Blagoveshchensk, Usinsk, and Tolyatti. In Tambov, an attacker fired a pneumatic pistol at a prayer house, damaging a windowpane. In Khabarovsk, vandals destroyed the entrance to a Muslim cemetery and smashed a stand displaying verses from the Qur’an. In St. Petersburg, Adygea, Khabarovsk, and the Chelyabinsk Region, perpetrators threw parts of pig carcasses at Muslim sites. Representatives of far-right organizations were involved in many of these incidents.
Orthodox sites were targeted by vandals three times (vs. 5 in 2024). In addition to the aforementioned rampage in the Klimovsk church, the Ilyinsky Church at the Banykinskoye Cemetery in Tolyatti was vandalized. The perpetrators left the inscription “There is no God but Allah!” A wooden cross near the Church of St. George the Victorious in Sol-Iletsk also suffered damage. In the latter case, a local resident detained on suspicion of arson explained that her actions had been motivated by disagreement with the location of the cross.
Jewish sites were also targeted three times (once in 2024). Perpetrators threw Molotov cocktails at the synagogue building in Obninsk, which had already been attacked in 2024. A cell of the neo-Nazi network NS/WP, banned in the Russian Federation, took responsibility for the arson. An armed resident of Yessentuki attempted to enter a synagogue in Sochi, where a children’s class was taking place, but failed and instead broke the gate with a hammer and threw stones at the building. The attacker was registered with a psychiatric clinic. In Moscow, a teenager drew offensive words and Nazi symbols on a Jewish community tent during the Sukkot holiday.
Protestant sites were targeted by vandals at least twice (no such cases were recorded in 2024). In the settlement of Ulakhan-An in Khangalassky District of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), unknown individuals set fire to a building belonging to a local Evangelical Christian-Baptist church. In Abakan, vandals defaced an Evangelical Christian prayer house with offensive graffiti.
In April, a number of federal and regional media outlets - including REN TV, Izvestia, the Perm edition of Arguments and Facts, and ProPerm - published “exposé” reports about the Russian United Church of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals), its presiding bishop Eduard Grabovenko, and the alleged involvement of church leadership in driving former pastor Nikolai Shavrin to suicide. The authors of the reports accused Grabovenko and other pastors of extorting money and property from parishioners, maintaining ties with foreign religious organizations, supporting Ukraine, and so on.
For example, REN TV claimed that “evangelical Christianity has always been considered a ‘soft power’ of the U.S. State Department, which generously funded grants ‘to promote religious freedom.’”[9] Izvestia, in support of its “anti-sectarian” accusations, cited as expert opinion statements by Aleksandr Dvorkin, a leading anti-sectarian Orthodox campaigner,
In connection with the defamatory campaign, the church had to issue a press release describing the situation as “mass harassment,” which affected “thousands of churches in the country and hundreds of thousands of citizens of the Russian Federation.” A similar statement was issued by the Russian Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, which linked the series of defamatory publications to the acts of vandalism against Protestant churches described above.
Publications by Tulskie Novosti about Adventists forced the Seventh-day Adventist Church to bring the matter to court. In May, Tulskie Novosti published a video report emphasizing the foreign origin of Adventists, claiming that in the 1990s, the organization gained popularity thanks to foreign funding and the “spiritual hunger, illiteracy, and permissiveness of that time,” and now, “the influx of people into the sect appears to have decreased, thanks to greater religious literacy among the population.”[10] The journalists engaged Aleksey Yarasov (deputy head of the missionary department of the Tula Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church) and a former member of the Adventist church who had converted to Orthodoxy, as experts.
Adventist church leaders contacted the editorial office, demanded the removal of the offensive report, and filed a lawsuit when their demand was refused. Several believers and Zaoksky Adventist University also filed separate defamation claims. The court consolidated these claims into a single case, which concluded in February 2026 with a settlement agreement.
In September, several media outlets circulated a report by Baza claiming that Adventists were assisting a Moscow retiree in a court case to seize her daughter’s legally owned apartment, allegedly using threats and forged documents. The Information Department of the Euro-Asian Division of the Seventh-day Adventist Church issued a statement calling these publications “a gross violation of journalistic ethics” and “deliberate slander.”
In November, NTV aired an exposé report with the telling title “Sectarians, Magicians, and Witches: How ‘Religious NATO’ Is Waging War Against Russia,” covering several religious organizations. In particular, according to the authors, followers of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) “softly but persistently recruit new members”: “Perhaps no religious organization in the world has so many people with ties to American security services.”
NTV journalists also traditionally accused the Church of Scientology of profit-seeking: “For Hubbard’s followers, the main thing is profit. A reward for each new adherent. The operation is a financial pyramid that benefits those at the top.”
The report’s authors also mentioned representatives of other organizations in a negative context, as well as all “sorcerers, witches, magicians, and esoteric practitioners of all kinds,” who allegedly “cast curses on Russians as instructed by the Security Service of Ukraine, holding sabbats on the air of central Ukrainian channels. Satan Worship has already become a cult in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”[11]
A journalist from the outlet Prufy.ru classified “Mormonism” among “prohibited movements” without hesitation and accused believers of espionage: “Mormonism, along with many other prohibited movements, appeared in Russia in the 1990s. Young Mormons who come to Russia to preach and teach English are regularly accused of espionage.”[12]
It should be added that the majority of reports on criminal cases and sentences against Jehovah’s Witnesses also contain “anti-sectarian” rhetoric. For example, a REN TV report in February on such a criminal case was titled “Sectarians in Hiding Recruit Adherents near Nizhny Novgorod.”[13]
The incident provoked wide public resonance. The doctor’s critics included Marina Akhmedova, a member of the Presidential Council for Human Rights, as well as deputies Vladislav Davankov of the State Duma and his colleague from the “New People” party - Krasnodar City Duma deputy Sergei Klimov. Under such pressure, Tepsaeva chose to resign from the clinic.
Some of these clerics faced criminal prosecution. Thus, Nikolai Romanyuk, a 63-year-old pastor of the Evangelical Christian Holy Trinity Church,” was found guilty under paragraphs “b” and “c” of Article 280.4 Part 2 CC (public calls to carry out activities directed against state security, committed using an official position and on the internet) and sentenced to four years in a minimum-security penal colony followed by a three-year ban on pastoral activity. The case was based on his 2022 sermon, in which the pastor criticized the idea of Pentecostals participating in combat operations.
Ilya Vasiliev, head of the Moscow Zen Centre and founder of the Civic School of Hackers, was sentenced in June under paragraph “e” of Article 207.3 Part 2 CC (public dissemination of deliberately false information containing data on the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation under the guise of reliable reports, motivated by political, ideological, racial, national, or religious hatred or enmity) to eight years of imprisonment in a minimum-security penal colony with a four-year ban on activities related to administering internet websites. The case was based on Vasiliev’s post from December 2022 about the shelling of Kherson during a Christmas ceasefire, later deleted. In October, this sentence was overturned, and the case was sent for retrial, while Vasiliev remained in custody.
A case under Article 205.2 Part 2 CC (public justification of terrorism committed using the internet) was opened against hieromonk Nikandr (Evgeny Pinchuk) of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia under the omophorion of Metropolitan Agafangel. Nikandr had previously faced administrative and criminal charges for discrediting the army. The charge was related to the justification of the activities of the Russian Volunteer Corps (Russkiy dobrovolcheskiy korpus, RDK), recognized as a terrorist organization. The court ordered his detention as a preventive measure.
A case under Article 280.3 Part 1 CC (repeat discrediting of the army) was also initiated against preacher Eduard Charov, who does not associate himself with any particular denomination and had previously faced administrative sanctions for discrediting the army. The case was based on a video address by Yevgeny Prigozhin recorded shortly before his June 2023 mutiny and shared by Charov on Vkontakte. Prigozhin’s address stated that the military actions in Ukraine were not connected with aggression on its part. The case is already in court. In 2024, another case against Charov was opened under Article 205.2 Part 2 CC; its consideration began in March 2025 and has not been concluded.
Clergy also faced administrative charges for criticizing Russia’s actions in the conflict with Ukraine. For example, priest Nikolai Savchenko, a cleric of the Church of St. Peter, Metropolitan of Moscow, was arrested for 14 days in St. Petersburg under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO (public display of prohibited symbols or attributes) for a 2014 photograph showing him on Nevsky Prospekt holding a Ukrainian flag. The court interpreted the photograph as a display of symbols of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, recognized as extremist in Russia.
Archbishop Grigory Mikhnov-Vaytenko of the Apostolic Orthodox Church was fined 30,000 rubles under Part 1 of Article 20.3.3 CAO (discrediting the army) for publishing a video in 2022.
Grigory Okhanov, former chairman of Kerigma, the St. Petersburg Association of Orthodox Youth Communities, was fined 30,000 rubles under the same Article 20.3.3 for his interviews of 2022 and 2024, which condemned military actions in Ukraine. At the time of the earlier interviews, Okhanov was a cleric of the Russian Orthodox Church. He later moved to Turkey and became a priest of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
In St. Petersburg, two university instructors - Olga Dautova, professor at the Ushinsky Academy of Postgraduate Pedagogical Education, and her husband Sergei Khristoforov, associate professor at Herzen State Pedagogical University - were dismissed for their association with the School of the Unified Principle, which holds a pro-Ukrainian position and is based on the teachings of the “Orthodox spiritual visionary” Olga Asaulyak. According to media reports, followers of the School prayed for Volodymyr Zelensky.
As in the previous two years, the only known cases of clergy punished for their anti-war stance by their own religious organization pertain to the Russian Orthodox Church. The number of such cases has noticeably decreased. Nevertheless, they did occur, and in all instances known to us, the most severe sanction - defrocking - was imposed:
Priest Vadim Kuzmitsky, former rector of the Church of the “Vsetsaritsa” Icon of the Mother of God in Srednyaya Akhtuba (Volgograd Region), was defrocked in July. In 2022, he had been suspended from ministry and left Russia. The disciplinary measures were based on an address in which he anathematized those who initiated the military actions.
In December, the ecclesiastical court of the Moscow diocese ruled to defrock Archpriest Andrei Lorgus - a priest, publicist, rector of the Institute of Christian Psychology, and author of books on Christian psychology. The court found that he had violated a number of Apostolic rules and rules of the Ecumenical Councils but did not specify the nature of these violations. It is known that in 2022, while already a supernumerary cleric and residing outside Russia, the Archpriest signed a letter by clergy condemning Russia’s actions in the armed conflict with Ukraine. The patriarch signed the defrocking decree in 2026.
In January, Metropolitan Savva (Mikheev) of Vologda and Kirillov approved a decision of the ecclesiastical court and signed a decree defrocking hieromonk Tikhon (Sokolovsky) of the Spaso-Prilutsky Dimitriev Monastery in Vologda for “unauthorized departure from the monastery and diocese and deviation into schism.” In the autumn of 2024, due to his anti-war position, the priest joined the clergy of the Orthodox Community of Apostolic Tradition in the name of the Holy Trinity in St. Petersburg, which is part of the Apostolic Orthodox Church. Prior to this, Tikhon had been prohibited from using social media and preaching.
[1] O. Sibireva, “Challenges to Freedom of Conscience in Russia in 2024,” SOVA Center, May 6, 2025 (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/religion/publications/2025/05/d47105.
[2] Episodes related to hate crimes against persons or property and law enforcement practices in this area are described in: “Radicalization of Far-Right Violence: Ideologically Motivated Crimes against Persons and Property and State Responses in Russia in 2025,” SOVA Center, Febuary 9, 2026 (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2026/02/d47128/). Law enforcement related to public statements and participation in certain associations will be discussed in the relevant report.
[3] Anti-Extremism Lawmaking in 2025,” SOVA Center, January 28, 2026 (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2026/01/d47127/).
[4] “Klishas: Federation Council Committee Will Not Support a Ban on Religious Organizations in Residential Buildings,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 20, 2025 (https://rg.ru/2025/03/20/klishas-komitet-sf-ne-podderzhit-zapret-na-religioznye-organizacii-v-zhilyh-domah.html).
[5] “Judicial Statistics Data,” Judicial Department at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, October 20, 2025 (https://cdep.ru/?id=79).
[6] “Kaluga Minister Spoke Out Against Wearing Hijabs in Schools,” RIA Novosti, September 18, 2025 (https://ria.ru/20250918/hidzhaby-2042735282.html).
[7] N. Aksenov, “Mufti of Stavropol Supports Ban on Public Prayers Outside,” Kommersant – Caucasus, April 21, 2025 (https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7674515).
[8] “Sorok Sorokov Demanded the Removal of Alexander Rukavishnikov’s Painting from the Fineart Exhibition,” MoskvichMAG, October 1, 2025 (https://moskvichmag.ru/gorod/sorok-sorokov-potrebovalo-snyat-kartinu-aleksandra-rukavishnikova-s-vystavki-v-fineart/).
[9] “How Pastors of the ‘New Testament’ Built a Business Empire at the Expense of Parishioners,” REN TV, April 7, 2025 (https://ren.tv/longread/1322936-kto-i-kak-prevrashchaet-veru-v-istochnik-lichnogo-dokhoda).
[10] “Life According to the Word of God: What Is the Adventist Movement Based On?” Tulskie Novosti, May 6, 2025 (https://newstula.ru/fn_1659438.html).
[11] “Sectarians, Magicians, and Witches: How the ‘Religious NATO’ Is Waging War against Russia,” NTV, November 22, 2025 (https://www.ntv.ru/novosti/2950570/).
[12] Ye. Gunenkova, “An American Church Caught Fire in Moscow. One Exists in Ufa as Well,” Prufy, January 9, 2025 (https://prufy.ru/news/chp/162611-v_moskve_gorela_amerikanskaya_tserkov_takaya_est_i_v_ufe/).
Problems and issues related to the abuse of anti-extremism legislation are, for the most part, presented in other reports.[2]
SUMMARY
LEGAL REGULATION
Bills Not (Yet) Developed
PROBLEMS CONCERNING PLACES OF WORSHIP
Conflicts Surrounding Temple Construction
Problems With the Use Existing Buildings
Conflicts Related to the Transfer of State and Municipal Property to Religious Organizations
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RELIGION
Liquidation of Religious Organizations
Recognition of the Activities of Religious Organizations as Undesirable, and Religious Figures as “Foreign Agents”
Criminal Prosecution
Restriction of Missionary Activity
Other Forms of Discrimination
Positive Verdicts
PROTECTING THE FEELINGS OF BELIEVERS
Protecting from Above
Protecting from Below
INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION FROM DEFAMATION AND ATTACS
Violence and Vandalism
Defamation of Religious Minorities
Insufficient Protection of Religious Minorities
PERSECUTION OF CLERGY FOR CRITICISM IN CONNECTION WITH THE ARMED CONFLICT WITH UKRAINE
Summary
In 2025, the state policy of discrimination against religious minorities largely followed the approaches established in previous years, as noted in our prior reports. Below, we indicate only the main trends of the past year.The ongoing anti-migrant campaign, as in the previous year, significantly complicated the situation of Muslim organizations. Protests against the construction of mosques were often held under anti-migration slogans, and representatives of far-right movements played a significant role in organizing them.
Under the pretext of combating illegal migration and extremism, the authorities continued to shut down already operating Muslim prayer houses and rooms. Far-right actors also frequently took part in raids aimed at identifying such premises. However, it should be noted that in many cases, prayer houses and rooms were indeed opened with violations and without the necessary approvals.
The list of undesirable organizations continued to grow through adding religious associations, although not very actively. The intensity of prosecution, including criminal cases, for cooperation with undesirable religious organizations and for financing them has at least not decreased. Believers received new sentences, including real terms of imprisonment, and new cases were initiated.
Criminal prosecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses continued. They faced sanctions, including lengthy terms of actual imprisonment, as punishment for continuing the activities of an extremist organization.
The number of administrative cases for “unlawful missionary activity” continued to grow. As before, Protestant believers and Muslims faced such administrative prosecution most frequently.
Administrative pressure on unregistered religious associations increased in 2025. Communities of the International Union of Evangelical Christian-Baptist Churches, which refuses state registration, were subjected to numerous inspections, some of which were accompanied by disruptions of worship services. As a result of this pressure, several communities suspended their activities. The leaders of one community, after being prohibited from using their house of prayer for several months, agreed to submit a notification of the commencement of a religious group’s activities.
The scope of criminal prosecution for offending religious feelings decreased compared to 2024 but remained high. As before, charges under this article were mostly based on online publications.
Public defenders of believers’ feelings most often continued to act in defense of Russian Orthodox believers and chose forms tested in previous years, such as organizing public campaigns and submitting complaints to law enforcement agencies. The campaign against the “fall of crosses” - schematic depictions of churches without crosses, which Orthodox activists had been finding objectionable for several years - received legislative support. The State Duma adopted a law protecting religious symbols that banned such images in the media and advertising.
The level of vandalism motivated by religious hatred increased sharply, primarily due to incidents targeting Muslim sites. Many of these incidents, a significant portion of which can be classified as dangerous, involved representatives of far-right movements.
Defamation of religious minorities in mass media continued, both at the federal and regional levels. One such media defamation campaign triggered two acts of vandalism against Protestant churches.
Legal Regulation
Several legislative acts affecting the activities of religious organizations were adopted in 2025. The norms related to anti-extremism legislation are described in another report.[3]Here, we will mention two laws aimed at protection against the “fall of crosses.” On July 15, the State Duma adopted a law on the protection of religious symbols; the Federation Council approved it on July 25, and Vladimir Putin signed it on July 31. The law prohibited the depiction of religious buildings and objects without religious symbols in mass media, on the internet, in advertising, on goods, signage, and in state and municipal symbols. The Russian Orthodox Church had advocated for the adoption of such a law.
On December 18, the State Duma adopted a law mandating the presence of crosses on any reproductions of the coat of arms of the Russian Federation. The Federation Council approved it on December 19, and Vladimir Putin signed it on December 29. At the initiative of a group of deputies led by Vyacheslav Volodin, Article 1 of the law “On the State Coat of Arms of the Russian Federation” was supplemented with the following clarification: “The small crowns, the large crown, and the orb are topped with straight, equidistant, four-pointed crosses with expanding ends.”
Bills Not (Yet) Developed
In November, a group of deputies led by Leonid Slutsky submitted to the State Duma a draft amendment to the Code of Administrative Offenses (CAO) introducing fines for the “distortion of the image” of religious buildings when selling goods, providing services, or advertising. It suggested fines of up to 30,000 rubles for individuals, up to 50,000 rubles for officials, and up to 300,000 rubles for legal entities. The authors of the initiative explain the need for these amendments by a “legal vacuum” that arose after the adoption of the law on the protection of religious symbols in July 2025. At the time of writing this report, the draft law had not yet passed the first reading.Amendments to the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations,” intended to restrict worship services in residential buildings, were introduced in the State Duma three times in 2025, but none of these initiatives succeeded.
Thus, in January, deputies from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation submitted a draft law to the State Duma prohibiting organized religious worship and the placement of religious organizations in residential apartment buildings, as well as refusing registration to religious organizations whose locations do not comply with legal requirements. The document received negative reviews for failure to comply with the “legal criteria of necessity and proportionality of permissible restrictions on rights and freedoms deriving from the legal provisions of Article 55 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.”[4] As early as July, the Communist Party submitted a new version of this draft law. This time, the authors proposed amendments to the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” and to the Housing Code to prohibit the placement of religious associations in residential and non-residential areas of residential apartment buildings. However, the revised version also received a negative evaluation from the Legal Department and the State Duma Commission on Ensuring Housing Rights of Citizens.
Deputies from the New People (Novyye lyudi) party proposed a bill in October to ban religious services in non-residential areas of apartment buildings, as well as regular worship services on residential premises, but withdrew their draft a month later. The amendments drew criticism from representatives of various religious organizations.
Another similar draft law was submitted to the State Duma in June. Deputies proposed a ban on religious worship services in apartment buildings when attended by visiting groups, while not prohibiting residents from performing religious rites. In addition, the document provides for a ban on the registration of religious organizations that are located or conduct religious services in residential and non-residential areas of residential buildings. At the time of writing, the draft law has not yet reached its first reading.
In April, a group of deputies led by Pavel Krasheninnikov, the chairman of the State Duma Committee on State Building and Legislation, submitted to the State Duma a bill “On Amendments to Articles 3 and 4 of the Federal Law “On Veterans.””
The draft law grants the status of combat veterans to clergy who have visited military units participating in combat operations in Ukraine. It also proposes granting the status of disabled combat veterans to clergy who became disabled due to wounds or concussions received when visiting military units. The Russian Orthodox Church had long advocated this idea to the authorities. However, the bill never reached its first reading; the government determined that it required substantial revision.
The authors of yet another initiative to ban advertising of esoteric services, including astrology, magic, fortune-telling, and others, also failed in their efforts. In March 2025, Nina Ostanina, Andrei Svintsov, and Alexei Kornienko proposed the relevant amendments to the laws “On Advertising” and “On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection.” However, the government recommended rejecting this bill, since its wording “does not comply with the principle of legal certainty,” and equating “all forms of alternative practices” carries the risk of a “legal imbalance.”
One of the initiative’s authors, Deputy Svintsov, had come up with a similar initiative two months earlier, but limited only to tarot practitioners. However, he withdrew his draft bill after the first reading.
Problems Concerning Places of Worship
Conflicts Surrounding Temple Construction
As before, religious organizations occasionally encountered difficulties with the construction of religious buildings.As in 2024, there were only a few conflicts related to the construction of Orthodox churches, most of which had begun in previous years. The conflict over the construction of a church on the embankment in Yubileyny Microdistrict of Krasnodar was the most significant. Throughout the year, residents continued to stage protests and hold pickets. Public hearings on the construction were held in October, and the majority of participants - more than 1,400 out of 1,928 - spoke against building the church at this location. However, the Commission on Land Use and Development, disregarding the opinion of the majority of the microdistrict’s residents, recommended that the city administration approve the construction of the church.
Opponents of the construction continued their appeals to the authorities, including recording a video address to Putin, and, having received no desired response, began collecting signatures for the resignation of the city mayor, Evgeny Naumov. The local Communist Party branch organized a similar petition campaign.
In January 2026, Mayor Naumov signed a resolution outlining the plans for the embankment, which implied that the church would be built at the location opposed by residents. However, the allocated area was reduced from 26,015 to 7,200 square meters.
The St. Petersburg Committee for State Control, Use, and Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments also approved the construction of the Church of St. George the Victorious in Pushkin commemorating the “special military operation” soldiers, despite opposition from the majority of public hearing participants The residents appealed to the Metropolitan Varsonofy (Sudakov) of St. Petersburg and Ladoga, asking for his assistance in finding a “better and more appropriate location” for the church. Ignored by secular and church authorities, the construction’s opponents placed a banner with the words “No Place for a Church Here” on a building near the construction site in June.
In Makhachkala, protests continued against the construction of the Church of St. Alexander Nevsky on the shore of Lake Ak-Gyol. The opponents went to court attempting to challenge the city’s master plan, land use, and development rules, which, in 2016, designated this site as a zone permitting the construction of religious buildings. According to the plaintiffs, both documents violate residents’ right to unobstructed access to the lake and were adopted with procedural violations.
Chelyabinsk residents protested against the construction of a church in Traktorozavodsky District next to a lyceum. Residents of nearby buildings fear “round-the-clock bell ringing” and inconveniences associated with construction. In September, the city authorities reported that the church project had not been approved and no construction permit had been issued; they promised to organize public hearings.
As before, the construction of mosques in various regions was accompanied by numerous conflicts, some of which have persisted for years. As in the previous year, these protests often had an anti-migrant character, and their active participants—and in some cases organizers—were representatives of far-right organizations.
For example, the Russian Community (Russkaya Obschina) expressed dissatisfaction with the possible purchase by a Muslim community of a building for a prayer house in Balashikha, located near a kindergarten and a defense industry enterprise. The city administration was forced to provide justifications and explained that it had no plans to open a prayer house and never approved the purchase of the premises by a religious organization.
Residents of New Moscow continued to protest against the possible construction of an interreligious center with a mosque in Kommunarka. This time, opponents of the construction recorded a video address to Vyacheslav Volodin, Dmitry Medvedev, and Mikhail Mishustin. The appeal contained numerous anti-migrant clichés.
Protests continued against the construction of a mosque in Verkhnyaya Kurya Microdistrict of Perm. The construction’s opponents placed niqab-clad snow figures accompanied by offensive slogans on the construction site. A criminal case against Anna Pyanzina, the action’s organizer, was initiated under Article 282 (incitement of hatred) of the Criminal Code (CC). However, it was soon closed, after a linguistic examination failed to find incitement to hostility in the texts of the posters (“Niqabs for snow women,” “White women for black guests,” “Give me a hot Muslim.”)
Of course, conflicts surrounding mosque construction also involved motives other than xenophobia. Opponents raised concerns about possible everyday inconveniences, similar to objections against Orthodox church construction. Thus, residents of the Solnechny Gardening Partnership near Krasnoyarsk, where a Muslim prayer house has already been operating, expressed their dissatisfaction with the prospect of a mosque on the same plot. Neighbors assumed that the building would produce late-night noise and worsen the transport situation. However, according to the owner, there are no plans to build a mosque. A Husayniyya (a venue for Shia mourning rituals) has been operating on the site and observing all applicable regulations for prayer houses. Most neighbors have no objections to gatherings of believers.
We are not aware of conflicts related to the construction of religious buildings of other religious organizations.
Problems With the Use of Existing Buildings
As in previous years, Muslims most frequently encountered difficulties in using their existing buildings. Typically, residents of nearby buildings complained about various inconveniences associated with the proximity of worship services. Official bodies responded to these complaints with sanctions against religious organizations. As with the mosque construction conflicts, representatives of far-right organizations often played an active role in campaigns against already operational Muslim facilities.The closures of Muslim prayer houses and prayer rooms in various regions continued in 2025. For example, a prayer house organized by the Muslim community in a building it had purchased without the appropriate authorization was closed in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. The building had been registered in 2012 as a catering facility. A building inspection, following a complaint from local residents, revealed violations of sanitary and fire safety regulations. The building owner received a warning about the inadmissibility of violating the law.
Prayer houses were closed in Mytishchi and Balashikha in the Moscow Region.
The Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for Krasnodar Krai reported the discovery of five illegal Muslim prayer rooms in the region: in Krasnodar, the Varenikovskaya stanitsa in Krymsky District, the Khorin Khutor, and in the settlements of Mayak and Podgornaya Sinyukha in Otradnensky District. In two cases - Krasnodar and Varenikovskaya – reports were filed against the organizers under Article 5.26 Part 4 CAO (missionary activity violating the requirements of legislation on freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and religious associations). In the remaining three cases, inspections were based on the alleged religious group activities without notifying the relevant authorities. The results of these inspections are unknown.
Illegal prayer rooms were shut down in Karagay District of Perm Krai and in Sosnovsky District of the Chelyabinsk Region. In both cases, the organizers faced charges under Article 5.26 CAO.
The Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Samara Region initiated an inspection following complaints from residents of the Mekhzavod settlement about disturbances caused by the inability of parishioners to fit inside their prayer house during services, leading them to gather outside. As a result of the inspection, the chairman of the Muslim religious society of the Krasnoglinsky District, Ildar Minkhametov, was fined 50,000 rubles for organizing an unauthorized gathering.
In Stary Oskol, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with the prosecutor’s office, conducted an inspection following complaints from local residents that cars of believers, who arrived at a prayer house to celebrate Eid al-Fitr, were blocking an exit road. The inspection failed to confirm the facts stated in the complaint but established that no religious organization was registered at that address. An administrative case was initiated against the building owner under Article 8.8 Part 1 CAO (use of a land plot in a manner inconsistent with its designated purpose and/or permitted use), and the organizer of the prayer gathering received a warning about the inadmissibility of violating counter-extremism legislation.
Alisher Ch., the owner of a prayer house, recognized as an unauthorized construction back in 2023, was fined 30,000 rubles in Vyazma under Article 20.35 Part 2 CAO (violating requirements for anti-terrorist protection of facilities (territories) of religious organizations). In 2023, the court ordered the demolition of the building, but the owner dismantled only part of the structure and registered it as his residence, thus making the demolition legally impossible.
As in the previous year, we observed only a small number of problems experienced by other religious organizations when using existing property. Based on an anonymous complaint about the emergency condition of the building of the Evangelical Christian (Pentecostal) church “Word of Life,” the administration of Severodvinsk in the Arkhangelsk Region prohibited the community from conducting worship services in the building. No relevant inspections or expert assessments ever took place. This decision was preceded by a social media defamation campaign against the church and its pastor. Believers moved their services to rented premises and filed a complaint with the prosecutor’s office over the authorities’ actions.
In addition, we know of Jehovah’s Witnesses' property seized in two regions. As in previous years, courts declared building donation agreements invalid following the blanket ban on Jehovah’s Witness organizations. A court declared invalid a 2017 agreement under which a local Jehovah’s Witness organization had transferred ownership of a land plot and a building to the organization “Jehovah’s Witnesses in Austria.” In the Tula Region, the Main Interregional Directorate of the Federal Bailiff Service filed another claim with the arbitration court against the “Religious Confession of Christian Jehovah’s Witnesses in Spain,” seeking the confiscation of a land plot in Tula from the community. A similar claim made in 2024 was left without consideration because the plaintiff failed to provide certain required documentation. We do not know the outcome of the 2025 case. In addition, a building previously seized from Jehovah’s Witnesses was put up for sale in Chita.
Conflicts Related to the Transfer of State and Municipal Property to Religious Organizations
As before, state and municipal property was occasionally transferred to religious organizations, but we are not aware of any cases where such transfers caused conflicts.As in prior years, property was most often transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, the government of St. Petersburg issued a decree on transferring to the St. Petersburg Theological Academy one of the buildings of Psychiatric Hospital No. 6 on the embankment of the Obvodny Canal. The religious organization asserted its rights to the building in 2023. The building is a cultural heritage site of regional significance and housed the Alexander Nevsky Antoniev Theological School before 1917.
The Ministry of Property of the Moscow Region transferred ownership of the following three sites to the Exaltation of the Cross parish in Orekhovo-Zuyevo: a church, a Sunday school, and a spiritual and educational center on Fabzavucha Street. The religious organization, which for 15 years had been engaged in restoring the church, had been using these buildings. The church is a cultural heritage site of regional significance.
The transfer of property to other religious organizations, as a rule, also proceeded without incident. Thus, the Orenburg authorities transferred to the Orenburg Regional Spiritual Administration of Muslims the former building of the “Husainiya” madrasa, recognized as being in emergency condition. In Troitsk of the Chelyabinsk Region, the Regional Spiritual Administration of Muslims has become the owner of a mosque building with a land plot. The building, constructed in 1878, is a cultural heritage site of municipal significance.
In addition, in Nizhny Novgorod, the building of a historic Catholic church on Studenaya Street was transferred to the parish of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The building successively housed a Catholic church, a printing house, and a regional branch of the Russian Energy Agency.
In Rostov-on-Don, the building of the Nakhichevan Theological Seminary was transferred to the ownership of the Russian and New Nakhichevan Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The building is a cultural heritage site of regional significance.
Museum property was occasionally transferred to religious organizations; however, as in the previous year, these cases did not give rise to conflicts. For example, the Savvino-Storozhevsky Monastery near Moscow received the Guardhouse building (Karaulnaya Palatka), previously maintained by the Zvenigorod Museum-Reserve, to be used free of charge for 49 years. In Ryazan, the Palace of Prince Oleg - the earliest civil building of the Ryazan Kremlin - was transferred to the diocese. The museum exhibition previously housed there was relocated to the Museum Center, as had been done with exhibitions from Kremlin churches transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church earlier.
In some cases, religious organizations had to go to court to defend their property rights. Thus, in February, the Oktyabrsky District Court of Ufa recognized the ownership rights of the local Muslim religious organization “Mahalla No. 2025” to a madrasa building in the village of Nagaevo, constructed in 2007 but never legalized or operational.
The local Muslim religious organization of the village of Staromochalei in Pilninsky District of the Nizhny Novgorod Region filed a claim with the regional arbitration court against the district administration seeking to legalize a mosque building that had been considered an unauthorized construction. We do not know the outcome of the proceedings but assume that the court sided with the religious organization, since the district administration reportedly did not object to the plaintiff’s claims.
An Orthodox parish in Samara successfully defended its right to a land plot for building a church. The Samara Regional Court rejected the claim of the Samara Department of Urban Planning, which had challenged the decision that recognized the refusal to grant the parish a land plot for a church complex as unlawful. The Samara mayor’s office attempted to challenge the decision of the court of first instance, which the parish had also won.
The Arbitration Court of the Belgorod Region rejected the claim of the Krasnensky District administration, which asserted the municipality’s ownership of three real estate assets - a residential building, a garage, and a boiler house - previously acquired by the parish of the Church of the Nativity of Christ in the village of Gorki.
Discrimination Based on Religion
Liquidation of Religious Organizations
We know of several cases of the liquidation of religious organizations in 2025. In January, the Kaluga Regional Court satisfied a claim by the regional office of the Ministry of Justice to liquidate the Kaluga Evangelical Lutheran Church, a local religious organization that had operated for 16 years. The liquidation decision was based on a certificate from the FSB stating that the religious organization did not conduct regular worship services. However, both parishioners and Archbishop Alexander Franz confirmed that services were held and that the community remained active. According to Pastor Dmitry Martyshenko, the authorities repeatedly pressured the church.Also in January, the Orenburg Regional Court, following a claim by the regional office of the Ministry of Justice, liquidated the local Christian Church of Evangelical Christians (Church of the Living God) in Mednogorsk for its charter’s lack of compliance with legal requirements and for failure to provide documents confirming its activities.
Several Muslim organizations in different regions were closed for various violations. In January, the Moscow Regional Court granted a claim by the Ministry of Justice and liquidated a local Muslim religious organization in the town of Kotelniki near Moscow. For several years, local residents and Russkaya Obschina had demanded that the prayer house be closed. In 2025, the premises were sealed, and a criminal case under Article 173.1 CC (illegal creation or reorganization of a legal entity) was initiated against the organization’s leader, Salavat Ibatullin.
In November, a court satisfied the claim filed by the Ministry of Justice and liquidated Mahalla No. 2708, a Muslim religious organization in Sergiev Posad. The grounds for liquidation were described as “formal indications.” The organization’s prayer house, which had been operating for more than 20 years, has been closed. According to Arslan Sadriev, the organization’s head, problems began after a change in the city administration in 2020. A criminal case under Article 173.1 CC was also initiated against Sadriev.
Based on a claim by the Ministry of Justice, a court in Mozhaysk liquidated the Vatanim Muslim community for mentioning in the minutes of its founding meeting a person who had died three days before the meeting. The religious organization also lost its appeal.
In October, the Orenburg Regional Court liquidated the Light of the World local religious organization in Kuvandyk for non-compliance of its charter with legal requirements and for lack of documentation confirming its religious activity based on a claim filed by the Ministry of Justice.
In addition, the activities of religious associations that had previously refused state registration were suspended in 2025 upon request from the prosecutor’s office. In July, the Yoshkar-Ola City Court, acting on a prosecutorial claim, prohibited the activities of a group of Evangelical Christian Baptists until a notification of the commencement of their religious group’s activities was submitted to the Ministry of Justice. The religious group belongs to the unregistered International Union of Evangelical Christian Baptist Churches (IU ECB), and it was gathering for joint prayer in a private residence for several decades. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Mari El upheld the decision of the court of first instance.
In October, the Armavir City Court suspended the activity of a local religious group, also belonging to the IU ECB, which refuses state registration, until a notification of the commencement of their religious group’s activities was submitted to the Ministry of Justice. Also in October, the Timashevsk District Court of Krasnodar Krai suspended the activity of a similar community in Timashevsk, citing the same requirements.
Recognition of the Activities of Religious Organizations as Undesirable, and Religious Figures as “Foreign Agents”
The Prosecutor General’s Office continued to add religious organizations to the list of organizations whose activities are recognized as undesirable in Russia. Three such organizations were added to the list in 2025: the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA); Brigham Young University in Utah founded by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons); and Friede Allen e.V. (“Peace to All”), a Germany-based charitable foundation that assists clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church persecuted for criticizing military actions in Ukraine. The initiative to recognize the latter organization as undesirable was submitted to the prosecutor’s office by Yana Lantratova, head of the State Duma Committee on the Development of Civil Society, Public and Religious Organizations.As in the case of religious organizations previously included in this list, the Prosecutor General’s Office justified its decision by referring to their support for the Ukrainian authorities and the threat they allegedly pose to Russia’s constitutional order.
Followers of religious organizations already recognized as undesirable, as in the preceding year, were subjected to administrative and criminal prosecution. Thus, Irina Smirnova, a resident of Bryansk, was found guilty under Article 284.1 Part 2 CC (provision of funds and rendering of financial services to an undesirable organization) for transferring funds to representatives of the AllatRa international movement. She received a two-year suspended sentence and a two-year ban on website administration or engaging in online activities related to the collection and analysis of information about undesirable organizations. A resident of Serpukhov received a one-and-a-half-year suspended sentence with a one-year probation on a similar charge.
AllatRa followers were sentenced to compulsory labor at least twice: two years for Omsk businessman Roman Miroshnikov, under Parts 1 and 2 of Article 284.1 CC (participation in the activities of an undesirable organization and financing and organizing its activities), and one and a half years for Denis Sadigov from Murmansk under Part 2 of the same article.
Yelena Moiseenko from the Saratov Region, and Irina Uchparmakyan from Samara, were each sentenced to 240 hours of community service under the same part of the same article. Meanwhile, Stanislav and Yelena Boyko, a married couple from Perm, were each fined 5,000 rubles under Article 20.33 CAO (participation in the activities of an undesirable organization) for cooperation with AllatRa and keeping Sokrovennik, the AllatRa newspaper, at their home.
We should also note that AllatRa was recognized as extremist in June, and we already recorded one case of sanctions for involvement in AllatRa as an extremist organization; a 49-year-old woman from Sibay received an official warning.
New criminal cases were initiated in 2025 for financing AllatRa. We recorded such cases opened against a resident of Kaliningrad and two residents of Krasnodar Krai, as well as several cases in Samara.
Followers of Vladimir Muntyan’s “Revival” organizations (the All-Ukrainian Spiritual Center and the Charitable Foundation) were also prosecuted under Article 284.1 Part 2 CC. For example, Olga Leontyeva, a 63-year-old resident of Izhevsk, was sentenced to imprisonment for a year and a half. However, the court took into account her remorse, her health condition, and her obligation to care for her elderly mother and disabled daughter and replaced her real prison term with a suspended sentence followed by one year of probation. Olesya Kosenkova from the Priyutovo settlement in Bashkortostan and a resident of Zarinsk in Altai Krai also received suspended sentences under the same article: two years followed by a two-year probation period and one and a half years, respectively.
Several followers of Muntyan were sentenced to community service under the same part of the same article: Rezida Sadeeva from Neftekamsk - to 360 hours; Lyubov Karimova from Udmurtia, Sergei Ogloblin from Novouralsk, and an unnamed resident of Asbest - to 300 hours each; a resident of Perm Krai – to 250 hours; and Dinara Akhmetova from Izhevsk – to 240 hours. Meanwhile, a Moscow court referred Viktoria Brazhnik, a Ukrainian-born defendant charged under the same provision, for compulsory psychiatric treatment.
At least four additional criminal cases for financing Muntyan’s organizations were initiated during the year: in Severodvinsk of the Arkhangelsk Region, Yekaterinburg, the Nizhny Novgorod Region, and Udmurtia.
Unlike followers of AllatRa or Muntyan’s organizations, adherents of Falun Gong faced real imprisonment. In Moscow, 46-year-old Natalia Minenkova was sentenced to four years of imprisonment, with a seven-year ban on engaging in public and political activities, including via the Internet, under Article 284.1 Part 3 CC (carrying out the activities of an undesirable organization). Zhu Yun, a Russian citizen residing in Tomsk, received three years in a minimum-security penal colony under the same criminal charge, with a three-year ban on engaging in public and political activities.
Seven employees of the Aptrend training center in Moscow were fined under Article 20.33 CAO for distributing books by L. Ron Hubbard with the copyright of the Church of Spiritual Technology. A complaint against Aptrend was filed by its student. As a result, the center decided to cease its activities. In Kaliningrad, a case under Article 284.1 Part 3 CC was initiated against a coach who used materials of undesirable Scientology organizations.
The list of “foreign agents” was expanded in 2025 to include defrocked Russian Orthodox priest Ioann Kurmoyarov, supernumerary cleric Andrei Kordochkin of the Madrid diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as the Islam-focused Alif TV Project.
Criminal Prosecution
Criminal prosecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses continued. New charges of the activities of an extremist organization were filed in 2025. Jehovah’s Witnesses reported 27 new cases opened against 52 believers. According to our data, at least 171 people were being held in penal colonies and pre-trial detention as of late February 2026.Jehovah’s Witnesses faced sanctions under Article 282.2 CC (organizing the activities of an extremist organization) and Article 282.3 CC (financing the activities of an extremist organization). According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, 29 believers were sentenced to imprisonment. The longest sentences - seven years in a minimum-security penal colony - were imposed on Aleksandr Neverov from Saransk, Samvel Babayan from Samara, and Evgeny Sokolov from Voronezh. The oldest individuals sentenced to actual prison terms, Valery Knyazev and Indus Talipov from Izhevsk, both aged 74, received three-year sentences. All of them were found guilty under Article 282.2 CC.
In addition, Jehovah’s Witnesses estimated that 111 searches were conducted in believers’ homes during the year and often involved various violations, including the use of violence.
Believers of other religious organizations also faced criminal sanctions. The Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Novosibirsk delivered a guilty verdict against the leaders of the Church of the Last Testament. Sergei Torop (Vissarion), Vadim Redkin, and Vladimir Vedernikov were found guilty under Article 239 Part 1 CC (creating a non-profit organization infringing on the personality and rights of citizens), paragraphs “a” and “b” of Article 111 Part 3 CC (intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm), and paragraph “d” of Article 112 Part 2 CC (intentional infliction of moderate bodily harm). Vedernikov was additionally convicted under Article 159 Part 4 CC (fraud). Torop and Vedernikov were sentenced to 12 years, and Redkin to 11 years of imprisonment in a maximum-security penal colony. It is worth noting that the bodily harm in their case refers to mental health damage allegedly caused by participation in their community - a highly questionable charge.
In the Belgorod Region, Aleksandr Ovsyannikov was sentenced to two and a half years in a minimum-security penal colony for publishing materials of the “Russian Orthodox Church – Tsarist Empire” under Parts 2 and 3 of Article 239 CC (creating a non-profit organization whose activities involve inducing citizens to refuse to fulfill their civic duties or to commit other unlawful acts, and participation in such an organization).
Another verdict under Part 1 of the same article was issued against F. Abdullaeva, a resident of Smolensk, for creating the Alla-Ayat religious group and distributing materials of this organization. The court sentenced her to two years of imprisonment, followed by a two-year probation, but released her from punishment due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. In December 2021, the same court found Abdullaeva guilty under the same provision, but the appellate court overturned the verdict in 2022 and sent the case for retrial.
Restriction of Missionary Activity
The prosecution of religious organizations and believers for “unlawful missionary activity” continued in 2025. At the time of writing, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation had published statistical data on the application of Article 5.26 CAO (violation of legislation on freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and religious associations) only for the first half of 2025. During this period, courts considered 292 cases under this article - significantly more than in the comparable period of 2024 (187 cases). The number of people subjected to punishment under this article also increased to 176, including 134 individuals, 32 legal entities, 9 officials, and 1 individual entrepreneur (in the first half of 2024, the numbers were 133, 84, 40, 8, and 1, respectively).Fines remained the primary form of punishment under this article. In the first half of 2025, they were imposed in 153 cases, warnings were issued in 16 cases, and community service was imposed seven times (in the first half of 2024, the numbers were 118, 14, and 1, respectively). In seven cases, punishment also involved administrative deportation, and in six cases, confiscation of the instrument of the administrative offense.[5]
Based on the data, it can be assumed that the total number of “anti-missionary” cases increased significantly in 2025 compared to the previous year.
Most known cases of liability under this article, once again, concerned Muslims and Protestants.
Organizing prayer rooms was often interpreted as “unlawful missionary activity.” For example, in Yakutsk, hotel owner I. Abdilkhashimov was fined 10,000 rubles under Article 5.26 Part 4 CAO (conducting missionary activity in violation of legal requirements) for organizing a prayer room. Z., a director of a fruit and vegetable company, also from Yakutsk, was fined 5,000 rubles for a similar offense under the same provision. The fruit and vegetable company was fined 100,000 rubles, since the prayer room had been organized on its premises. Under the same provision, organizers of prayer rooms in Syktyvkar and Kostroma were each fined 5,000 rubles.
A resident of Kursk, originally from Dagestan, was fined 5,000 rubles under the same provision for distributing the As-Salam newspaper near a residential building without documents confirming his authority to conduct missionary activity.
In Temryuk of the Krasnodar Krai, the organizer of a musical titled “Interchurch Evening of Praise” and two performing musicians were each fined 10,000 rubles under Article 5.26 Part 4 CAO. The 49-year-old believer organized the event and invited a Protestant religious group from Magnitogorsk. Law enforcement authorities treated his actions as unlawful missionary activity. The event was disrupted by police and Federal Security Service officers.
In the stanitsa of Bryukhovetskaya in Krasnodar Krai, church minister Sergei Timoshchuk (IU ECB) was fined 5,000 rubles under the same provision. The charges were based on a religious worship service he had conducted in a private home at the invitation of friends. Baptist Viktor Seregin was fined in Bryansk for holding a worship service in his home without authorization documents for missionary activity.
We should also note two noteworthy cases under Part 4 of this article. In Kostroma, Dmitry Kuzmin, a deputy of the Kostroma Regional Duma and the Kostroma City Duma from the Communist Party, was fined 5,000 rubles for “unlawful missionary activity.” As an Evangelical Christian running for election, he conducted missionary activity on premises not designated for that purpose without authorization from a religious organization. In Novorossiysk, Sergei Yenichev was fined 10,000 rubles despite having authorization documents for missionary activity. According to the local police officer who visited Yenichev at his home, Yenichev, being an Evangelical Christian, was disseminating the foundations of the Orthodox (!) doctrine.
Foreign nationals also regularly faced sanctions for “unlawful missionary activity.” For example, in Ukhta, entrepreneur R. was fined 35,000 rubles under Article 5.26 Part 5 CAO (missionary activity by a foreign citizen in violation of legal requirements) for organizing a prayer room in a café. Guvanch Saparov and Didar Muradov were each fined 30,000 rubles under the same provision for performing namaz in the Moscow metro without documents confirming their authority to conduct a religious rite in a public place.
In many cases, fines for “unlawful missionary activity” imposed on foreign citizens were accompanied by deportation from the country. Thus, in Kemerovo, two citizens of Uzbekistan were each fined 30,000 rubles for performing namaz in a local supermarket under the same charge and then deported.
Other Forms of Discrimination
Muslim organizations in various regions were still regularly subjected to police pressure. As a rule, such interventions were connected with raids aimed at identifying illegal migrants and often accompanied by disruptions of worship services and other violations. In addition to law enforcement agencies and various state bodies, representatives of the Russkaya Obschina and other far-right organizations occasionally took part in these raids.For example, in November, officers of the Center for Combating Extremism of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for the Moscow Region, the Main Military Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia, the prosecutor’s office, the criminal investigation department, and the State Traffic Inspectorate, as well as officers of the Riot Police and the National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardiya), with the participation of unnamed volunteer patrol members, conducted a comprehensive inspection of a local Muslim religious organization in Elektrostal. As a result of the inspection, reports were compiled under Article 8.8 Part 1 CAO (use of a land plot not in accordance with its designated purpose) and Article 5.26 Part 4. 37 individuals were taken to the military recruitment office.
We are aware of similar raids in Moscow against the following organizations: Risalyat on Ogorodny Proezd and Istina on Basovskaya Street. Raids also took place in Balashikha, Naro-Fominsk, Staraya Kupavna, and Troitsk in the Moscow Region, as well as in Tver and Surgut.
In addition to Muslims, Baptists – specifically, the communities belonging to the International Union of Evangelical Christian Baptist Churches (IU ECB) - experienced systematic pressure from law enforcement agencies in 2025. Security forces in various regions attended worship services, sometimes disrupting them, and conducted inspections, citing the alleged “reports” on gatherings of “suspicious persons.”
Such visits took place in several communities in Krasnodar Krai. Specifically, in the settlement of Lazarevskoye, police officers, an assistant prosecutor, a local police officer, and a plainclothes individual arrived at a community’s house of prayer and disrupted an evening service. They refused to show their identification. One of the parishioners was detained, taken to a police station, and fingerprinted, but no charges were filed. Four volumes of religious literature were seized from the premises.
In Tula, an IU ECB church was visited by a local police officer and two FSB officers during an evening service. Criminal investigation officers appeared at the service before this visit, recorded video footage, and then informed their colleagues about a gathering of “dubious individuals.”
In Murino of the Leningrad Region, a deputy prosecutor, a local police officer, police officers, and several plainclothes individuals came to inspect a Baptist service held on the Trinity Day and, despite the presbyter’s warning that he was ready to speak after the worship service, attempted to question the believers during the holiday service.
In Novocherkassk of the Rostov Region, following a similar visit by representatives of six agencies, including the prosecutor’s office and Rosgvardiya, six administrative cases were initiated against a Baptist community. We have no information about the outcome of these cases.
As in the previous year, we recorded cases of discrimination against Muslim women for wearing headscarves in educational institutions. However, whereas previously we tended to classify such cases as non-state discrimination, state bodies were almost always involved in the incidents related to “hijabs” in 2025. For example, a lyceum director in Khabarovsk demanded that a student who came to the September 1 assembly wearing a headscarf remove it, while acknowledging that the existing regulations contained no direct prohibition on wearing headscarves. The student’s parents were forced to file complaints with the prosecutor’s office and the regional commissioner for children’s rights. The Investigative Committee did initiate an inspection based on the incident, but not due to the parents’ complaint. Rather, the inspection followed accusations against the girl’s father that appeared in far-right Telegram channels. The authors of those messages accused him of being affiliated with “Wahhabism,” belonging to an ethnic criminal group, and threatening the director.
In Zhukovsky District of the Kaluga Region, parents of students at one of the schools expressed outrage over two seventh- and ninth-grade students wearing headscarves to classes. The complainants received support not only from the school administration but also from the regional Ministry of Education. The girls were forced to stop attending classes, and their parents sought legal assistance. The regional Minister of Internal Policy, Oleg Kalugin, commented on the case after it gained publicity, approving the actions of the school administration and stating that “school is a civic institution; it is a secular institution, therefore there is no need to emphasize one’s religious particularities here.”[6]
In some cities of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, prosecutors took control over students’ appearance. For example, parents in Nizhnevartovsk were warned of potential school inspections related to students wearing religious attire. If students were found wearing religious clothing, including hijabs and niqabs, heads of institutions would face responsibility. Educational institutions in Nefteyugansk received similar directives.
It is worth adding that we know of several conflicts related to performing namaz in public places that we cannot classify as discrimination. For example, a Yandex Taxi driver in Tyumen did not begin a trip until he finished performing namaz; meanwhile, the car remained in waiting mode. In response to the passenger’s complaint, Yandex Taxi support offered her compensation and promised to impose sanctions on the driver. Another driver, of a scheduled bus in Vladivostok, began praying directly in front of the bus, obstructing the passage of other vehicles. An administrative offense report was filed against the driver. In addition, a radiologist at the Gatchina Interdistrict Hospital left his workplace to perform namaz and asked his patients to wait, including a patient with an open wound and venous bleeding. The hospital administration conducted a conversation with the doctor and also revised the work schedules, “taking into account the staff's religious needs.”
It should also be noted that the performance of namaz in public places regularly became a topic of public discussion. In some cases, officials attempted to address this issue through administrative sanctions. For example, in April, the administration of Andropovsky Municipal District of Stavropol Krai sent a letter to various institutions threatening them with fines for performing namaz in public places and angering many Muslims. After a comment by Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya, who called this initiative “open discrimination and legal arbitrariness,” the letter was withdrawn.
It is worth noting that official Muslim structures did not share the outrage in this case. Muhammad Rakhimov, the mufti of Stavropol Krai, supported the administration’s initiative, stating that “all religious rites are performed on premises or with the permission of local authorities. There is no point in unauthorized campaigns. And if they occur without permission, naturally, this should be punishable.”[7]
Positive Verdicts
In some cases, believers and religious organizations successfully defended their rights, including through the courts.On several occasions, believers and religious organizations were able to challenge fines for “unlawful missionary activity.” For example, the Krasnodar Regional Court overturned two rulings of the Oktyabrsky District Court of Krasnodar and terminated the cases against two Brazilian Pentecostal pastors, each of whom had been fined 30,000 rubles and sentenced to deportation under Article 5.26 Part 5 CAO. Vicente Julio Cesar Kravchenko and Eder Da Silva Figueiredo were detained in August when security forces arrived at the church, disrupted the holiday service in honor of the Dormition of the Mother of God, and removed both pastors from the hall without explaining the reasons to the congregation. The court of first instance failed to take into account that both clerics were lawfully present in Russia, held residence permits, were employed, and possessed documents confirming their authority from the religious organization “Kingdom of God” and the Russian United Union of Evangelical Christians (Pentecostals).
The regional court annulled the fines and deportation orders. However, the church members filed a complaint with the Investigative Committee to open a criminal case regarding the disruption of the service under paragraph “a” of Article 148 Part 4 CC (unlawful obstruction of the activities of religious organizations or the conduct of worship services and other religious rites using official position) and paragraph “d” of Article 286 Part 3 CC (abuse of official powers resulting in a substantial violation of the rights and lawful interests of citizens or organizations by a group of persons by prior agreement or an organized group). We do not know whether this complaint resulted in any legal action.
In Tyumen, the court terminated an administrative case against the Light of the World Evangelical Christian church under Article 5.26 Part 3 CAO (activities by a religious organization without indicating its official full name, including the issuance or distribution of literature, printed, audio, and video materials without proper labeling). The prosecutor’s office sought to hold the organization liable for the absence of labeling on several books and video files. However, these materials had not been published by the religious organization itself and were not distributed during missionary activity, so the court closed the case.
In Noyabrsk of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, proceedings were terminated against Catholic priest Marek Jashkowski, a citizen of Poland, who had faced charges under Article 5.26 Part 5 for failure to notify authorities of the commencement of the activities of a religious group. The priest explained that he was the rector of the parish of St. Joseph the Worker and traveled twice a month at the invitation of parishioners to conduct services, without attempting to attract outsiders. The parish had also repeatedly attempted to register as a religious organization. The court found no elements of an offense in Fr. Marek’s actions and closed the case.
We are also aware of several cases in which believers successfully defended in courts their right to perform alternative civilian service on religious grounds – in particular, a 25-year-old volunteer from St. Petersburg, a member of an Orthodox youth volunteer organization assisting the homeless. An Orthodox priest confirmed the young man’s pacifist views.
A Christian named Mikhail from the Moscow Region succeeded in obtaining the right to alternative civilian service only on his third attempt. His first application, submitted in 2023, was considered only in 2024 and rejected on the grounds of “insufficient evidence that military service contradicts his beliefs or religion.” Mikhail challenged the decision in court but lost at all three levels. The same outcome occurred with his second application. In March 2025, he submitted a third application, and the military prosecutor’s office confirmed that the military commissariat had committed violations. In April, the draft commission approved his request.
Yegor, a 21-year-old believer from a Protestant church in Krasnodar, obtained permission to perform alternative civilian service, even though the medical commission declared him fit for military service and ignored his educational deferment. He cited religious beliefs that do not allow him to take up arms as grounds for refusing military service. His pastor accompanied him to the commission hearing and confirmed that Yegor had attended church since childhood.
Despite Russia’s refusal to recognize the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court continued to consider previously submitted complaints. In March, it issued a judgment in the case “Kolyasnikov and Others v. Russia.” The applicants included pastor Alexei Kolyasnikov from Krasnodar, fined in 2014 for reading the Bible in a café, as well as Jehovah’s Witnesses, representatives of Aum Shinrikyo, the Embassy of Jesus Evangelical Christian (Pentecostal) Church of Nizhny Novgorod, the Methodist Christian Church of Vladivostok, and other organizations. The Court established a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) and ordered the respondent state to pay the applicants between 2,500 and 7,500 euros within three months.
In October, the ECHR delivered a judgment in the case “Markin and Others v. Russia,” combining the complaints filed between 2018 and 2022 by 28 Jehovah’s Witnesses from several regions who faced prosecution for continuing the activities of an extremist organization. The Court found a violation of the same Article 9 and ordered the state to pay each applicant 15,000 euros within three months, with an additional 3,000 to 3,500 euros awarded to three of the defendants.
We also note that the community of the Kurganinsk house of prayer in Krasnodar Krai, whose activities were suspended in 2024 due to failure to notify authorities of the commencement of its activities, submitted the required notification and resumed its activities in December 2025, regaining access to the house of prayer that had remained sealed for six months. The community belongs to the previously mentioned International Union of Evangelical Christian Baptist Churches (IU ECB), which unites churches that refuse state registration as a matter of principle.
Protecting the Feelings of Believers
Protection from Above
Law enforcement under Article 148 Part 1 CC (“offending the religious feelings of believers” without aggravating circumstances) remained active, although the number of sentences reported under this provision was lower than in the previous year: 19 sentences (vs. 26 in 2024). 17 sentences to 18 individuals involved punishment (in 2024, it was true for 22 sentences to 24 individuals, and two others were referred for compulsory treatment). As before, we do not necessarily have information about the specific grounds for convictions under this article. We also consider a significant portion of the sentences under this provision, for which we know the details, to have been imposed inappropriately.Defendants convicted under Part 1 of this article were sentenced to actual imprisonment in three cases, but all three involved additional, more serious charges. The most severe sentence - seven years in a minimum-security penal colony with a three-year ban on administering internet resources - was imposed on blogger Vadim Kharchenko from Gelendzhik. In addition to offending religious feelings, he was charged under three other criminal articles. We do not know which of his publications formed the basis for prosecution under this provision.
Two individuals received lengthy suspended sentences under this article. Nikolay Pozharuk, a resident of the Sverdlovsk Region, received a suspended sentence of six years and 10 days with a probation period of two and a half years for posting a comment offensive to Christians. Ilya Stebenev, a student at the Penza Railway Transport College, received a four-year suspended sentence with a two-year probation and a fine of 5,000 rubles. The court found that he had offended religious feelings in three comments under a Telegram post titled “Moscow Welcomes the Growth of the Muslim Population, Putin Said.” Both individuals were also charged with unlawful handling of explosive substances.
In nine cases, offenders convicted under Article 148 Part 1 were sentenced to community service. The most severe such punishment - 250 hours each - was imposed on Mansur Zhabrailov, a rural schoolteacher from Chechnya (with a two-year ban on teaching), and Aleksandr Aganin, a resident of Serov in the Sverdlovsk Region (with confiscation of his mobile phone as the instrument of the offense). Internet publications served as the grounds for criminal prosecution in both cases. Zhabrailov was also charged under Article 282 CC. Oleg Merzlyakov, a resident of Yakshur village in Zavyalovsky District of Udmurtia, received 100 hours of community service under Article 148 Part 1 for publicly swearing at a priest and the Orthodox faith on the grounds of a local church, while intoxicated.
Dmitry Vetrov, a resident of Ivanovo, faced a fine of 140,000 rubles for comments on VKontakte that were offensive to Christians of various denominations.
In addition, we are aware of four court decisions under Article 148 Part 2 (the same acts committed in places specifically designated for worship and other religious rites). Punishment was imposed on four individuals in one case only (in 2024, there were nine such decisions, including six convictions against seven individuals, and three decisions on compulsory psychiatric treatment). Residents of the Novgorod Region - Igor Yakovlev, Timur Dekanov, Vsevolod Talavyra, and Georgy Pavlov - were each sentenced to 240 hours of community service for desecrating burial crosses while intoxicated “by demonstrating various gestures,” photographing the process, and publishing the images. A vandal charged under the same provision, along with three other articles for his actions in the Assumption Church in Ivanovo, was referred for compulsory treatment. Blogger Anna Borshchuk, who published a video of herself urinating near Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg, was released from criminal liability after apologizing and voluntarily working at the church as an act of atonement. The case against Igor Maksimov, a parishioner of a Greek Catholic church who had placed stylized icon-like images of Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, and Josyf Slipyj in the church refectory, was terminated due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Maksimov was also charged under Part 1 of Article 354.1 CC (rehabilitation of Nazism).
Those deemed by the authorities to have offended religious feelings also faced administrative sanctions under Article 5.26 Part 2 CAO (intentional public desecration of religious or liturgical literature, objects of religious veneration, worldview symbols or emblems, or their damage or destruction). According to the data provided by OVD-Info, there were at least 43 such cases. In most cases, the substance of the claims is unknown due to the absence of court decisions. Seven of the ten cases known to us resulted in fines, and three - in community service.
Many cases pertained to online publications. For example, Moscow resident Ilya Kostyakov was sentenced to 80 hours of community service for a TikTok video.
Restaurant managers faced administrative sanctions for offending religious feelings on two occasions. In Simferopol, a court fined Vladimir Sizykh, founder of the El Pastor restaurant chain, 100,000 rubles. Décor in one of his restaurants included “a modified image of the Mother of God (with a skull instead of her face) and a caricature depicting the Lord Jesus Christ as a shepherd with a boombox on his shoulder,” which law enforcement authorities and the court considered offensive to Orthodox believers.
In Orenburg, a court fined Dmitry Ivanov, manager of the Georgian cuisine restaurant “Nino-Vano,” 150,000 rubles for promotional flyers depicting St. Basil’s Cathedral with domes shaped like khinkali dumplings. Notably, a lawyer of the Orenburg diocese participated in the proceedings and argued that although St. Basil’s Cathedral was a museum, it also remained an active church, and therefore the depiction of its domes as khinkali offended a sacred site.
In addition, police detained a 15-year-old resident of Saratov who shouted “Allahu Akbar” in an Orthodox church and recorded it on video. A preventive conversation was held with the girl, and a report was filed against her parents under Article 5.35 CAO (failure by parents to properly fulfill their duties of care and upbringing of a minor).
Members of the State Duma repeatedly acted as defenders of religious feelings. In particular, their attention was often focused on the so-called “fall of crosses” - schematic depictions of churches without crosses. For example, Communist Party deputy Mikhail Matveev appealed to the Investigative Committee and the Prosecutor General’s Office, demanding criminal proceedings under Articles 148 and 282 CC against AST Publishers, which had released an educational game “Russia’s Landmarks.” The game’s cover depicted Orthodox churches without crosses, while mosques featured crescents, and a Kremlin tower displayed a star. The publisher explained that the crosses were not visible due to the orientation of the image and stated that the game would not be reissued.
Anna Kuznetsova and Pyotr Tolstoy, Deputy Speakers of the State Duma, complained about what they considered an offensive social studies textbook by Phoenix Publishing House with the cover depicting St. Basil’s Cathedral without crosses. The deputies requested an inspection: Tolstoy addressed the Prosecutor General, while Kuznetsova appealed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The results of the inspection are unknown, but in July, the State Duma adopted the aforementioned law protecting religious symbols and prohibiting such images.
The same deputy, Mikhail Matveev, also filed a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office against Tver Tissue, a toilet paper manufacturer whose packaging depicted St. Basil’s Cathedral and the Spasskaya Tower of the Moscow Kremlin. The deputy regarded this as both an offense to believers’ feelings and an attempt to discredit state authorities. Following the complaint, the company changed the packaging, removing the image of the church, but the company director, nevertheless, received a prosecutorial order to remedy the violations of legislation on freedom of conscience and religious associations. Twelve thousand rolls of the “offensive” toilet paper were destroyed.
In another case involving “offensive” toilet paper, the matter went to court. A court in Moscow prohibited the sale of souvenir toilet paper depicting a 1,000-ruble banknote. The court considered the depiction of Prince Yaroslav the Wise - canonized as a saint - on the fake banknote to be offensive to believers’ feelings and contrary to spiritual and moral values.
The Federal Antimonopoly Service for Khabarovsk Krai halted advertising by the car audio workshop “BASS HOUSE 4212” after it was deemed offensive to believers’ feelings, as it used an image of Christ. The client, who was the shop’s sole proprietor, was found to have violated advertising law.
Protection from Below
As before, various public activists regularly spoke out in defense of believers’ feelings. Most often, their efforts were aimed at protecting the feelings of Russian Orthodox believers. As in previous years, organized activist groups, primarily the Sorok Sorokov organization, were the key defenders of Orthodox believers’ feelings.Orthodox activists continued to target cultural events. For example, in the fall of 2025, Sorok Sorokov demanded the removal of the painting “In the Utility Room” from the solo exhibition of Aleksandr Rukavishnikov, held at the Fineart gallery at Winzavod. According to the defenders of Orthodox believers’ feelings, the painting “depicts the Lord Jesus Christ consuming vodka in the company of four intoxicated men,” and its display should be prosecuted under Article 148 CC. According to the curator of the exhibition project, Maria Moskvicheva, “three sturdy Orthodox fellows arrived with a prepared complaint to the Winzavod administration, immediately called the police, and then the Investigative Committee.”[8] Rukavishnikov refused to remove the painting.
In November, representatives of Sorok Sorokov demanded that comedians Nurlan Saburov, Sergei Detkov, and Alexei Shcherbakov publicly apologize for profanity-laden jokes about Christ featured in a 2023 episode of the show “What Happened Next?” Having received no apology, Orthodox activists filed a claim with the Investigative Committee requesting that the statements of the show’s participants be examined for offending believers’ feelings. Already in January 2026, Saburov was banned from entering Russia for 50 years. The decision was motivated by the need to protect national security and spiritual and moral values.
In addition, Sorok Sorokov complained about “blasphemous” goods in the Witch’s Path, a store located near the Pokrovsky Monastery in Moscow. Orthodox activists were outraged by items found among the merchandise, including books on occultism and magic from Ukrainian publishers; candles shaped like sexual organs with pentagrams; icons with horns; figurines of demons; and other similar objects. These goods were subsequently removed from sale. The store owner, Anna Avdeeva, was fined 100,000 rubles under Article 5.26 Part 2 CAO.
Other Orthodox activists, from a Cossack organization affiliated with the Danilov Monastery, successfully petitioned for the suspension of the Enchantress fair, where they had identified “esoteric” goods and related workshops. First, the Cossacks visited the fair, and then, after they complained about a “satanic event taking place across the street from the monastery,” police officers, FSB inspectors, and district administration representatives arrived. Following these inspections, the premises’ owners cut the electricity and announced the involuntary suspension of the fair.
Orthodox activists also complained about “blasphemous” publications, as in the case of a video in which three girls twerked in front of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow. Sorok Sorokov activists complained to the Investigative Committee, requesting that the dancers be held criminally liable for offending believers’ feelings. Soon after the complaint, the girls were charged under Article 20.1 CAO (disorderly conduct), and the administration of the Stroganov Russian State University of Art and Industry, where they studied, expelled them “for violating public order and offending the religious feelings of citizens.”
Perhaps the most high-profile episode in the fight to protect Orthodox believers’ feelings was the conflict between Sorok Sorokov and Apti Alaudinov, Deputy Head of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Orthodox activists demanded prosecution against him under Articles 148 and 282 CC and his removal from his army post after he made offensive remarks about Schema-Hegumen Gavriil (Vinogradov), who had accused Muslims of being ready to “slaughter Muscovites.” The defenders of religious feelings did not withdraw their claim even after Alaudinov apologized to the clergyman on his Telegram channel. By that time, Gavriil had already been removed from his position for xenophobic statements. However, after a face-to-face meeting between Orthodox activists and Alaudinov, Sorok Sorokov concluded that “Apti Alaudinov is not an enemy of Russians and Orthodox believers, but a friend,” and decided not to insist on sanctions and to “continue the dialogue.”
At times, church structures raised concerns about threats to believers’ feelings, without the public activists’ mediation. For example, the authorities of Achinsk in Krasnoyarsk Krai canceled the burning of an effigy during Maslenitsa celebrations, citing a request from representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church.
In May, Metropolitan Longin (Korchagin) of Simbirsk and Novospassk called on Alexei Russkikh, the governor of the Ulyanovsk Region, to ban Protoka, a festival of self-development and healthy lifestyle, which moved to the region in 2024 after being held for ten years in the Samara Region. According to the metropolitan, the festival “teaches young people various occult and neo-pagan ‘spiritual’ practices” and promotes ideas of occultism. Despite his efforts, the festival took place, albeit under a different name - “the Place of Power.”
Metropolitan Dimitry (Eliseev) of Chita and Petrovsk-Zabaykalsky publicly criticized Halloween decorations on the Centaur Cinema building. In his view, distorted crosses with red streaks placed at the entrance symbolized Satanism and offended the feelings of believers. At the same time, he noted that “there are elements of the holiday that are not prohibited - pumpkins, candles, and so on. But the cross is a Christian symbol,” and promised to file a law enforcement claim. Although no formal complaint was filed, the regional Ministry of Internal Affairs initiated an inspection. We have no information on its results.
Defense of the offended religious feelings came not only from Orthodox activists and representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church but also from other public figures. For example, Yekaterina Mizulina, head of the Safe Internet League, identified “a clear offense to believers’ feelings, which is a punishable offense” and “a continuation of systematic efforts to discredit the Russian Orthodox Church that attempts to get children involved” in TikTok videos featuring fifth- and sixth-grade students using a toilet brush as a holy water brush. Based on her reaction, the administration of a Moscow school conducted an internal review and required the students involved to apologize. A St. Petersburg school, whose students had filmed a similar video, limited its response to holding discussions with children and parents about the “inappropriate behavior.”
Television host Boris Korchevnikov drew public attention to the “Forest Gates,” an art object constructed in Kirov. According to him, the ornamentation of the gates, installed at the entrance to the Poroshino sports and tourism park, featured pagan motifs, and the object represented a “Vedic” “window to hell.” The park administration tried to explain that the gates depicted a forest and a family of bears whose noses visitors would rub “for good luck,” and that the installation was located away from the “health trail” and did not obstruct access. However, under pressure from city authorities, the park administration was forced to dismantle the gates.
It should also be noted that, in some cases, organizers of cultural events took preventive measures and imposed restrictions without waiting for complaints, if an event seemed potentially offensive. Thus, in Kazan, the exhibition “The Finiteness of Infinity,” featuring works by artist Ivan Stan from Mari El, was closed on its opening day “for technical reasons.” The head of the Supermodern Gallery, where the exhibition was held, demanded the removal of two of Stan’s works because they were “imbued with paganism and Satanism.”
We are aware of only one case in which non-Orthodox believers asserted that their feelings had been offended, and their claim had consequences. The installation of airport trash bins bearing the silhouette of Lake Baikal, sacred to the Buryat people, as well as the placement of a prayer drum next to a smoking area, provoked outraged responses. The airport administration promised to replace the bins and relocate the prayer drum.
Insufficient Protection from Defamation and Attacks
Violence and Vandalism
The level of violence motivated by religion remained low, but such incidents still occurred from time to time. Muslim women were victims of such violence on at least two occasions. In August, a woman from Rodniki in the Ivanovo Region, while intoxicated, struck a Muslim woman on the back of her head, “expressing hatred toward the victim … in connection with her belonging to the Muslim religion.” The attacker was sentenced to eight months of restriction of freedom under Article 116 CC (battery).In October, a teenager attacked a Muslim woman wearing a head covering on the street in Saratov and stabbed her in the back. He filmed the incident and subsequently published the video on social media. The victim managed to resist but was hospitalized. The attacker was detained, and a case was initiated against him under Article 30 Part 3 and Article 105 Part 2 CC (attempted murder).
Oleg T., a resident of the Sverdlovsk Region, carried out a rampage in the Church of the Holy Martyr Sergius of Podolsk in Klimovsk (the Moscow Region) in February. He threatened the church store employees, tore off an employee’s headscarf, beat them with a stick, smashed the glass on an icon, and stole approximately three thousand rubles. A criminal case was initiated against him under Article 148 Part 4 CC (violation of the right to freedom of conscience and religion, with the use of violence).
In April, Natalia Medvedeva, a former photojournalist for Ogonyok and author of conspiracy books, attempted to tear off the niqab of a female passenger in the Moscow metro but was beaten by the woman’s companion, who also broke the attacker’s tablet. Administrative reports under Article 20.1 CAO (disorderly conduct) were filed against both Medvedeva and Ibodullozoda Muzaffardzhon Fazliddin (the companion of the niqab-wearing passenger). Medvedeva was sentenced to seven days of administrative arrest, Fazliddin to 13 days. Later, he was sentenced to two and a half years in a penal colony for the same actions under paragraphs “a” and “c” of Article 213 Part 1 (hooliganism involving violence, committed on public transport) and Article 167 Part 2 CC (intentional destruction or damage of another person’s property).
Compared to 2024, the number of acts of vandalism motivated by religion increased sharply - we are aware of 23 such cases in 2025 (vs. 10 in 2024). These included one shooting and 11 incidents of arson (vs. one explosion and three incidents of arson in 2024).
Muslim sites were targeted most frequently - 15 cases (vs. 4 in 2024). Prayer houses and mosques were set on fire in Ramenskoye and Yegoryevsk (the Moscow Region), as well as in Blagoveshchensk, Usinsk, and Tolyatti. In Tambov, an attacker fired a pneumatic pistol at a prayer house, damaging a windowpane. In Khabarovsk, vandals destroyed the entrance to a Muslim cemetery and smashed a stand displaying verses from the Qur’an. In St. Petersburg, Adygea, Khabarovsk, and the Chelyabinsk Region, perpetrators threw parts of pig carcasses at Muslim sites. Representatives of far-right organizations were involved in many of these incidents.
Orthodox sites were targeted by vandals three times (vs. 5 in 2024). In addition to the aforementioned rampage in the Klimovsk church, the Ilyinsky Church at the Banykinskoye Cemetery in Tolyatti was vandalized. The perpetrators left the inscription “There is no God but Allah!” A wooden cross near the Church of St. George the Victorious in Sol-Iletsk also suffered damage. In the latter case, a local resident detained on suspicion of arson explained that her actions had been motivated by disagreement with the location of the cross.
Jewish sites were also targeted three times (once in 2024). Perpetrators threw Molotov cocktails at the synagogue building in Obninsk, which had already been attacked in 2024. A cell of the neo-Nazi network NS/WP, banned in the Russian Federation, took responsibility for the arson. An armed resident of Yessentuki attempted to enter a synagogue in Sochi, where a children’s class was taking place, but failed and instead broke the gate with a hammer and threw stones at the building. The attacker was registered with a psychiatric clinic. In Moscow, a teenager drew offensive words and Nazi symbols on a Jewish community tent during the Sukkot holiday.
Protestant sites were targeted by vandals at least twice (no such cases were recorded in 2024). In the settlement of Ulakhan-An in Khangalassky District of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), unknown individuals set fire to a building belonging to a local Evangelical Christian-Baptist church. In Abakan, vandals defaced an Evangelical Christian prayer house with offensive graffiti.
Defamation of Religious Minorities
As in previous years, mass media regularly published defamatory materials about religious minorities. Such materials continued to target Protestant churches and new religious movements.In April, a number of federal and regional media outlets - including REN TV, Izvestia, the Perm edition of Arguments and Facts, and ProPerm - published “exposé” reports about the Russian United Church of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals), its presiding bishop Eduard Grabovenko, and the alleged involvement of church leadership in driving former pastor Nikolai Shavrin to suicide. The authors of the reports accused Grabovenko and other pastors of extorting money and property from parishioners, maintaining ties with foreign religious organizations, supporting Ukraine, and so on.
For example, REN TV claimed that “evangelical Christianity has always been considered a ‘soft power’ of the U.S. State Department, which generously funded grants ‘to promote religious freedom.’”[9] Izvestia, in support of its “anti-sectarian” accusations, cited as expert opinion statements by Aleksandr Dvorkin, a leading anti-sectarian Orthodox campaigner,
In connection with the defamatory campaign, the church had to issue a press release describing the situation as “mass harassment,” which affected “thousands of churches in the country and hundreds of thousands of citizens of the Russian Federation.” A similar statement was issued by the Russian Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, which linked the series of defamatory publications to the acts of vandalism against Protestant churches described above.
Publications by Tulskie Novosti about Adventists forced the Seventh-day Adventist Church to bring the matter to court. In May, Tulskie Novosti published a video report emphasizing the foreign origin of Adventists, claiming that in the 1990s, the organization gained popularity thanks to foreign funding and the “spiritual hunger, illiteracy, and permissiveness of that time,” and now, “the influx of people into the sect appears to have decreased, thanks to greater religious literacy among the population.”[10] The journalists engaged Aleksey Yarasov (deputy head of the missionary department of the Tula Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church) and a former member of the Adventist church who had converted to Orthodoxy, as experts.
Adventist church leaders contacted the editorial office, demanded the removal of the offensive report, and filed a lawsuit when their demand was refused. Several believers and Zaoksky Adventist University also filed separate defamation claims. The court consolidated these claims into a single case, which concluded in February 2026 with a settlement agreement.
In September, several media outlets circulated a report by Baza claiming that Adventists were assisting a Moscow retiree in a court case to seize her daughter’s legally owned apartment, allegedly using threats and forged documents. The Information Department of the Euro-Asian Division of the Seventh-day Adventist Church issued a statement calling these publications “a gross violation of journalistic ethics” and “deliberate slander.”
In November, NTV aired an exposé report with the telling title “Sectarians, Magicians, and Witches: How ‘Religious NATO’ Is Waging War Against Russia,” covering several religious organizations. In particular, according to the authors, followers of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) “softly but persistently recruit new members”: “Perhaps no religious organization in the world has so many people with ties to American security services.”
NTV journalists also traditionally accused the Church of Scientology of profit-seeking: “For Hubbard’s followers, the main thing is profit. A reward for each new adherent. The operation is a financial pyramid that benefits those at the top.”
The report’s authors also mentioned representatives of other organizations in a negative context, as well as all “sorcerers, witches, magicians, and esoteric practitioners of all kinds,” who allegedly “cast curses on Russians as instructed by the Security Service of Ukraine, holding sabbats on the air of central Ukrainian channels. Satan Worship has already become a cult in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”[11]
A journalist from the outlet Prufy.ru classified “Mormonism” among “prohibited movements” without hesitation and accused believers of espionage: “Mormonism, along with many other prohibited movements, appeared in Russia in the 1990s. Young Mormons who come to Russia to preach and teach English are regularly accused of espionage.”[12]
It should be added that the majority of reports on criminal cases and sentences against Jehovah’s Witnesses also contain “anti-sectarian” rhetoric. For example, a REN TV report in February on such a criminal case was titled “Sectarians in Hiding Recruit Adherents near Nizhny Novgorod.”[13]
Insufficient Protection of Religious Minorities
Public activity of fighters against "sectarians" and other minorities remained low but was still occasionally present. For example, in July, Vladislav Pozdnyakov, founder of the Male State community, threatened Mata Tepsaeva, a doctor at a Moscow clinic. According to Pozdnyakov, she had refused to treat a male patient for religious reasons. The Male State leader published a recording of a conversation with a clinic administrator and a photograph of Tepsaeva in a hijab and called on his followers to file complaints and seek the doctor’s dismissal. The clinic’s chief physician accused Pozdnyakov of falsifying the audio recording and explained that the refusal to treat the patient was based not on religious considerations, but on Tepsaeva’s lack of the necessary licenses and professional qualifications to treat male patients.The incident provoked wide public resonance. The doctor’s critics included Marina Akhmedova, a member of the Presidential Council for Human Rights, as well as deputies Vladislav Davankov of the State Duma and his colleague from the “New People” party - Krasnodar City Duma deputy Sergei Klimov. Under such pressure, Tepsaeva chose to resign from the clinic.
Persecution of Clergy for Criticism in Connection with the Armed Conflict with Ukraine
Clergy of various religious organizations sometimes publicly criticized the military conflict with Ukraine and then faced sanctions from the state, and sometimes from religious organizations.Some of these clerics faced criminal prosecution. Thus, Nikolai Romanyuk, a 63-year-old pastor of the Evangelical Christian Holy Trinity Church,” was found guilty under paragraphs “b” and “c” of Article 280.4 Part 2 CC (public calls to carry out activities directed against state security, committed using an official position and on the internet) and sentenced to four years in a minimum-security penal colony followed by a three-year ban on pastoral activity. The case was based on his 2022 sermon, in which the pastor criticized the idea of Pentecostals participating in combat operations.
Ilya Vasiliev, head of the Moscow Zen Centre and founder of the Civic School of Hackers, was sentenced in June under paragraph “e” of Article 207.3 Part 2 CC (public dissemination of deliberately false information containing data on the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation under the guise of reliable reports, motivated by political, ideological, racial, national, or religious hatred or enmity) to eight years of imprisonment in a minimum-security penal colony with a four-year ban on activities related to administering internet websites. The case was based on Vasiliev’s post from December 2022 about the shelling of Kherson during a Christmas ceasefire, later deleted. In October, this sentence was overturned, and the case was sent for retrial, while Vasiliev remained in custody.
A case under Article 205.2 Part 2 CC (public justification of terrorism committed using the internet) was opened against hieromonk Nikandr (Evgeny Pinchuk) of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia under the omophorion of Metropolitan Agafangel. Nikandr had previously faced administrative and criminal charges for discrediting the army. The charge was related to the justification of the activities of the Russian Volunteer Corps (Russkiy dobrovolcheskiy korpus, RDK), recognized as a terrorist organization. The court ordered his detention as a preventive measure.
A case under Article 280.3 Part 1 CC (repeat discrediting of the army) was also initiated against preacher Eduard Charov, who does not associate himself with any particular denomination and had previously faced administrative sanctions for discrediting the army. The case was based on a video address by Yevgeny Prigozhin recorded shortly before his June 2023 mutiny and shared by Charov on Vkontakte. Prigozhin’s address stated that the military actions in Ukraine were not connected with aggression on its part. The case is already in court. In 2024, another case against Charov was opened under Article 205.2 Part 2 CC; its consideration began in March 2025 and has not been concluded.
Clergy also faced administrative charges for criticizing Russia’s actions in the conflict with Ukraine. For example, priest Nikolai Savchenko, a cleric of the Church of St. Peter, Metropolitan of Moscow, was arrested for 14 days in St. Petersburg under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO (public display of prohibited symbols or attributes) for a 2014 photograph showing him on Nevsky Prospekt holding a Ukrainian flag. The court interpreted the photograph as a display of symbols of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, recognized as extremist in Russia.
Archbishop Grigory Mikhnov-Vaytenko of the Apostolic Orthodox Church was fined 30,000 rubles under Part 1 of Article 20.3.3 CAO (discrediting the army) for publishing a video in 2022.
Grigory Okhanov, former chairman of Kerigma, the St. Petersburg Association of Orthodox Youth Communities, was fined 30,000 rubles under the same Article 20.3.3 for his interviews of 2022 and 2024, which condemned military actions in Ukraine. At the time of the earlier interviews, Okhanov was a cleric of the Russian Orthodox Church. He later moved to Turkey and became a priest of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
In St. Petersburg, two university instructors - Olga Dautova, professor at the Ushinsky Academy of Postgraduate Pedagogical Education, and her husband Sergei Khristoforov, associate professor at Herzen State Pedagogical University - were dismissed for their association with the School of the Unified Principle, which holds a pro-Ukrainian position and is based on the teachings of the “Orthodox spiritual visionary” Olga Asaulyak. According to media reports, followers of the School prayed for Volodymyr Zelensky.
As in the previous two years, the only known cases of clergy punished for their anti-war stance by their own religious organization pertain to the Russian Orthodox Church. The number of such cases has noticeably decreased. Nevertheless, they did occur, and in all instances known to us, the most severe sanction - defrocking - was imposed:
Priest Vadim Kuzmitsky, former rector of the Church of the “Vsetsaritsa” Icon of the Mother of God in Srednyaya Akhtuba (Volgograd Region), was defrocked in July. In 2022, he had been suspended from ministry and left Russia. The disciplinary measures were based on an address in which he anathematized those who initiated the military actions.
In December, the ecclesiastical court of the Moscow diocese ruled to defrock Archpriest Andrei Lorgus - a priest, publicist, rector of the Institute of Christian Psychology, and author of books on Christian psychology. The court found that he had violated a number of Apostolic rules and rules of the Ecumenical Councils but did not specify the nature of these violations. It is known that in 2022, while already a supernumerary cleric and residing outside Russia, the Archpriest signed a letter by clergy condemning Russia’s actions in the armed conflict with Ukraine. The patriarch signed the defrocking decree in 2026.
In January, Metropolitan Savva (Mikheev) of Vologda and Kirillov approved a decision of the ecclesiastical court and signed a decree defrocking hieromonk Tikhon (Sokolovsky) of the Spaso-Prilutsky Dimitriev Monastery in Vologda for “unauthorized departure from the monastery and diocese and deviation into schism.” In the autumn of 2024, due to his anti-war position, the priest joined the clergy of the Orthodox Community of Apostolic Tradition in the name of the Holy Trinity in St. Petersburg, which is part of the Apostolic Orthodox Church. Prior to this, Tikhon had been prohibited from using social media and preaching.
[1] O. Sibireva, “Challenges to Freedom of Conscience in Russia in 2024,” SOVA Center, May 6, 2025 (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/religion/publications/2025/05/d47105.
[2] Episodes related to hate crimes against persons or property and law enforcement practices in this area are described in: “Radicalization of Far-Right Violence: Ideologically Motivated Crimes against Persons and Property and State Responses in Russia in 2025,” SOVA Center, Febuary 9, 2026 (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2026/02/d47128/). Law enforcement related to public statements and participation in certain associations will be discussed in the relevant report.
[3] Anti-Extremism Lawmaking in 2025,” SOVA Center, January 28, 2026 (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2026/01/d47127/).
[4] “Klishas: Federation Council Committee Will Not Support a Ban on Religious Organizations in Residential Buildings,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 20, 2025 (https://rg.ru/2025/03/20/klishas-komitet-sf-ne-podderzhit-zapret-na-religioznye-organizacii-v-zhilyh-domah.html).
[5] “Judicial Statistics Data,” Judicial Department at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, October 20, 2025 (https://cdep.ru/?id=79).
[6] “Kaluga Minister Spoke Out Against Wearing Hijabs in Schools,” RIA Novosti, September 18, 2025 (https://ria.ru/20250918/hidzhaby-2042735282.html).
[7] N. Aksenov, “Mufti of Stavropol Supports Ban on Public Prayers Outside,” Kommersant – Caucasus, April 21, 2025 (https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7674515).
[8] “Sorok Sorokov Demanded the Removal of Alexander Rukavishnikov’s Painting from the Fineart Exhibition,” MoskvichMAG, October 1, 2025 (https://moskvichmag.ru/gorod/sorok-sorokov-potrebovalo-snyat-kartinu-aleksandra-rukavishnikova-s-vystavki-v-fineart/).
[9] “How Pastors of the ‘New Testament’ Built a Business Empire at the Expense of Parishioners,” REN TV, April 7, 2025 (https://ren.tv/longread/1322936-kto-i-kak-prevrashchaet-veru-v-istochnik-lichnogo-dokhoda).
[10] “Life According to the Word of God: What Is the Adventist Movement Based On?” Tulskie Novosti, May 6, 2025 (https://newstula.ru/fn_1659438.html).
[11] “Sectarians, Magicians, and Witches: How the ‘Religious NATO’ Is Waging War against Russia,” NTV, November 22, 2025 (https://www.ntv.ru/novosti/2950570/).
[12] Ye. Gunenkova, “An American Church Caught Fire in Moscow. One Exists in Ufa as Well,” Prufy, January 9, 2025 (https://prufy.ru/news/chp/162611-v_moskve_gorela_amerikanskaya_tserkov_takaya_est_i_v_ufe/).
[13] “Sectarians in Hiding Recruit Adherents near Nizhny Novgorod,” REN TV, February 13, 2025 (https://ren.tv/news/kriminal/1307535-zhiteli-nizhegorodskoi-oblasti-zhaluiutsia-na-sektantov-verbuiushchikh-liudei-cherez-pochtu).
