This report is based on the information gathered through monitoring carried out by SOVA Center. The information is available on our website in the section “Religion in Secular Society” (www.sova-center.ru/religion), including links to sources in the media and on the Internet; only sources not noted on the website are referenced in the report. Only necessary updates are given on the events of the previous year[1]. It is not our goal to provide a comprehensive description of all events in the religious and public sphere; the events mentioned in the report tend to be illustrative of the observed trends.
Problems and stories related to the abuse of anti-extremism legislation are mainly presented in other reports dedicated to that topic[2].
The anti-migrant campaign carried out by the authorities had a negative impact on the situation of Muslims, who during the year were subjected to pressure simultaneously from officials, law enforcement, vigilante organizations, and fellow citizens. The "hijab problem" has once again become relevant: an attempt to ban it legally at the federal level has failed, but regional legislators in the Vladimir region have included the hijab and niqab in the list of clothes not recommended for wearing in educational institutions. Most of the examples of non-state discrimination that we are aware of also targeted Muslims.
The pressure on Muslims was most clearly manifested in the situation with the construction and use of prayer facilities. The construction of mosques and Muslim prayer houses was almost always marked by protests from local residents, who often used xenophobic arguments. Occasionally, residents also objected to the presence of venues used by Muslim organizations in their neighborhoods. Such complaints have led to multiple closures of existing houses of worship (13 occurred in the Moscow region alone). Raids of mosques and houses of worship targeting illegal migrants were carried out regularly in different regions, which also disrupted worship services.
In most cases, the construction of Orthodox churches proceeded without direct conflict with local residents; however, the latter often spoke out against the construction of new churches during public hearings. Surveys conducted in different regions show that religious buildings in general are not among the citizens’ priorities: in fact, they would prefer anything else over new churches.
Some religious organizations made it to the list of organizations whose activities in Russia are considered undesirable, and some religious figures were added to the list of foreign agents, but their numbers were not dramatic. Four evangelical organizations, the Temple of Satan organization, and three religious figures were included in these lists, respectively. Administrative and criminal prosecution continued for cooperation with organizations whose activities had previously been deemed undesirable, and new sentences were imposed, including real prison time.
The criminal prosecution of Jehovah's Witnesses for organizing activities and financing an extremist organization continued. According to Yaroslav Sivulsky, Representative of the European Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, "sentences were fewer but tougher.” Alexander Chagan from Togliatti received the longest punishment of eight years in prison. As before, searches of Jehovah's Witnesses' homes in the new cases were often accompanied by violations, including use of violence against believers.
As before, Protestants and Muslims were more often subjected to administrative prosecution for "illegal missionary activities." Fines remained the most frequently used form of punishment under this article, and the number of cases increased.
The intensity of criminal prosecutions for “insulting religious feelings” has increased compared to the previous year, when we also noted an increase in the number of convictions under this article. As before, the majority of convictions and new cases were related to offensive publications online.
Public defenders of religious feelings continued to be primarily concerned with the organization of public campaigns against figures and events that, in their opinion, offended these feelings. As in previous years, these defenders were activists from the Sorok Sorokov Orthodox movement in collaboration with right-wing radical associations. Notably, both sides, both defenders of religious feelings and those who, from their point of view, offended these feelings, often referenced the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine: the former emphasized the gravity of the ongoing "blasphemy,” committed at the time when Russian fighters were defending Orthodoxy weapon in hand, while for the latter, their support of the Russian army served as proof of their commitment to traditional values.
On June 11, 2024, the State Duma adopted in the third reading, and on June 22, Vladimir Putin signed amendments to the federal laws "On Privatization of State and Municipal Property" and "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations," which prohibit the transfer of religious property from state ownership to any third parties, with the exception of religious organizations. These amendments were adopted due to the absence at that time in the current legislation of a direct ban on the alienation of religious property in a general manner, which allowed the authorities to sell such properties to third parties. The adopted amendments made this impossible, and transactions involving the alienation of religious property concluded after 2010 can now be declared void in court.
On July 10, the State Duma passed in the third reading, and on July 22, President Putin signed amendments to Part 4 of the Civil Code, which, among other things, now includes a provision for checking new trademarks to ensure they do not insult the feelings of believers. The law was written with the participation of the Russian Orthodox Church. In accordance with the law, the Ministry of Economic Development has issued an order mandating the Interreligious Council of Russia to participate in the examination of registered trademarks conducted by Rospatent. Religious organizations involved in the examination need not be members of this council.
On July 23, the State Duma approved in the second and third readings, and on August 8, President Putin signed amendments to the Administrative Code granting the Interior Ministry the right to administratively expel foreign citizens from Russia for certain offenses, including illegal missionary activity (Part 5 of Article 5.26 of the Administrative Code).
On July 30, the State Duma passed in the second and third reading, and on August 8, President Putin signed amendments to the laws “On the Sanitary and Epidemiological Welfare of the Population” and “On the Fundamentals of Healthcare in the Russian Federation,” allowing clergy of centralized religious organizations to visit patients in intensive care units to conduct worship services. In November, the Ministry of Health approved new requirements for clergy visits to hospitals in accordance with the adopted amendments. The document gave the clergy of centralized religious organizations the right to visit hospitals at the invitation of the patients themselves or their relatives, but only with the permission of the head of the medical institution. The Ministry of Health recommended that medical institutions appoint employees responsible for organizing such visits and provide rooms for meetings with spiritual mentors and performing religious rituals. Clergy will not be visiting infectious diseases departments and, in case of a quarantine, patients from other departments. As the draft was being discussed, the Russian Orthodox Church tried to strike out this paragraph, but the Ministry of Health refused to oblige.
On November 12, the State Duma passed in the third reading, and on November 23, President Putin signed amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences, introducing the liability for the propaganda of child-free lifestyle in the media, the Internet, and movies. After the first reading, Patriarch Kirill, who generally supported the bill, asked its authors to add exemption for religious celibacy. His request was granted, and a note was added to the bill’s second reading to clarify that “it is not an administrative offense to disseminate information about monasticism and the monastic way of life, observance of the vow of celibacy and related refusal to procreate and (or) to commit public actions aimed at presenting monasticism and the monastic way of life, observance of the vow of celibacy and related refusal of procreation as attractive, if such Information and public actions are based on the internal regulations of centralized religious organizations or religious organizations within their structure.”[3]
In this form, the bill was adopted in its final reading. Thus, the dissemination of information about celibacy within the doctrine of those religious associations that do not have a centralized organization in Russia will now be punishable.
On October 22, the Ministry of Education and Youth Policy of the Vladimir region issued an order changing the requirements for schoolchildren's clothing and banning the wearing of religious clothing in schools. The order expanded a 2017 decree regulating student clothing by adding hijabs, niqabs, and other religious clothing to the list of items that are not recommended for school wear. The regional branch of the Ministry clarified that the changes “ensure the secular nature of state and municipal educational institutions and the preservation in them of religious neutrality.”[4]
On May 20, Valery Fadeyev, Chairman of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, in an interview with Parlamentskaya Gazeta said that the wearing of niqabs (a garment for Muslim women that covers entire body and face, leaving only a slit for the eyes) should be banned, "since nowadays niqabs are banned even in some Central Asian countries.”
A week later, at the initiative of Vladislav Davankov, first deputy head of the New People parliamentary faction, a bill was submitted to the State Duma giving regional and municipal authorities the right to ban the wearing of niqabs and other religious clothing covering the face and giving educational institutions the right to set requirements for the appearance, color, style, and rules of wearing students' clothes and to ban the wearing of religious clothing if more than half of the student or parent council members support this measure. The bill caused outrage among the Muslim community.
In September, the government announced that it did not support Davankov’s bill and believed that it "needed significant revision." In January 2025, the author withdrew the bill.
Another bill to ban niqabs was drafted by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation almost simultaneously with New People. Notably, the word "niqab" was never mentioned in the text of this bill, however, the authors provided an extensive list of cases when a citizen's closed face should not be considered administrative offence, and religious clothing was deliberately not included in this list. As Mikhail Matveyev, one of the main authors of the bill, explained, “we are moving away from arguments about religious clothing so as not to give “the infringed” another reason to make a row and lead us into arguments about what fashion is in this or that desert of the world today. What we are concerned about is the safety of Russian citizens.”[5]
The government’s feedback to this bill was negative, and it was never submitted to the State Duma.
Two more bills (neither of which has been adopted) concerning the activities of religious organizations have caused a wide public resonance. Both of them amend the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.”
On October 30, a draft amendment to Article 16 of this Law, developed by a group of deputies from the New People party, was submitted to the State Duma. The bill introduces a ban on holding worship services in non-residential premises of apartment buildings, as well as on holding systematic worship services in residential premises. According to the explanatory note, the proposed measures are aimed against “gatherings of large groups of strangers who do not reside in an apartment building in question, including illegal migrants," which "increase the risks of worsening the criminal situation in the area, provoke domestic conflicts, and violate fire and public safety standards."[6]
Commenting on this legislative initiative, representatives of various religious organizations noted that it contradicts the principle of freedom of conscience and violates the Constitution. Even the Head of the Legal Department of the Moscow Patriarchate, Abbess Xenia Chernega, who supported the bill as a whole, expressed concern that its adoption would place the sacraments of Communion, Unction, and other religious rites performed by clergymen in residential buildings at the request of citizens living in them, including those seriously ill or near death, under threat of prohibition.”[7]
In response to the concerns expressed by believers, Oleg Leonov, a member of the New People faction and deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee for the Development of Civil Society and Public and Religious Associations, explained that the bill was aimed solely against “sects,” which “as a rule, do not have their own temples,” and that the proposed measures would not prevent religious ceremonies from being carried out at home.
Another draft amendment to the same law was introduced in December by deputies of the National Assembly of the Republic of Dagestan. This bill introduces an indefinite ban on the establishment of religious organizations by the leaders and members of the governing bodies of prohibited organizations; grants regional authorities the right to coordinate with the territorial bodies of the Ministry of Justice decisions on registration of local and centralized religious organizations; deprives religious organizations that are not part of centralized organizations of the right to distribute religious literature and religious objects; and extends the timeframe for making decisions on the registration of religious associations from one month to six months "for carrying out a state religious expert examination."
Several other legislative acts that have been adopted or are currently under consideration, including those related to the activities of religious organizations, relate to anti-extremist legislation, and are therefore mentioned in the other report.[8]
The construction of Orthodox churches led to conflicts less frequently than in previous years. The largest was the ongoing conflict over the construction of a temple on an embankment in Krasnodar's Yubileyny neighborhood. Krasnodar residents protested against the construction, collected signatures for petitions to various authorities, and even turned to Putin for help, asking him to intervene and stop the construction of the temple and the destruction of the green zone. In addition to collecting signatures, solitary pickets were held, for which some of the activists were charged with administrative offences. In particular, City Duma deputy Alexander Safonov and social activist Vitaly Cherkasov were fined under Part 2 of Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code (organizing or holding rallies without notifying the authorities) for organizing the collection of signatures against the construction of the temple during a meeting with voters. Police came and talked to some of the protesters, such as the concierge of one of the houses on Klara Luchko Boulevard, who kept the signature lists. The protests continued in 2025.
We are not aware of any other conflicts as remarkable as this one, but we do know that urban residents are in general not enthusiastic about construction of Orthodox churches and religious buildings; they believe that the existing ones suffice and that other facilities are much more necessary.
These sentiments are reflected in the results of both nationwide and regional public opinion polls. For example, a June VTsIOM poll showed that only 8% of Russians believe that there are not enough functioning Orthodox churches in their locality; 77% of respondents say there are enough temples in their locality, and 10% of respondents believe that there are too many. The shortage of churches was mainly reported by rural residents (14%), while the excess was noted by residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg (21%)[9]. The survey results published in January by the Omsk authorities showed that 90% believed that there were enough religious buildings and construction of new ones was not necessary[10].
In practice, citizens most often spoke against construction of new churches during public hearings or in social networks and online voting, but in most cases their protests did not lead to major conflicts.
For example, in Tolyatti, the Samara region, the hearing participants protested against the construction of a temple near 40 Years of Victory Street. Following the hearing, the city authorities declined the approval of the construction, proposed by the parish of the Church of the Great Martyr Anastasia Uzoreshitelnitsa [Deliverer from Potions], and announced the construction of a kindergarten there instead. The hearing participants in Samara, who discussed the potential for construction on Novo-Sadovaya Street, also spoke in favor of a kindergarten or a school instead of a church.
Residents of the Pushkinsky district in the city of Zavolzhye, Nizhny Novgorod region, appealed to the head of the Gorodetsky Municipal District, Alexander Mudrov, to revoke the decision to build a temple near residential buildings on Grunin and Bauman streets and move it closer to the cemetery.
Residents of Novosibirsk demanded to stop the construction of a church on Nemirovich-Danchenko Street, fearing that the heating infrastructure would be damaged, leaving the entire residential area without heating. The mayor's office confirmed that although the site had indeed been handed over to the ROC for free use, no building permit had been issued.
The St. Petersburg authorities refused to hand over part of the Sestroretsk Dunes Nature Reserve to the church for the construction of a spiritual and educational center with wellness and restaurant compounds and a hotel. Local residents have collected more than 800 signatures against the construction and tree felling.
Often, however, the authorities ignored the opponents of construction even when they made up the majority of votes at public hearings. Thus, after the majority at the public hearing voted against changing the status of a land plot at the Akhedzhak Datcha and the construction of a temple there, the Krasnodar Land Use and Development Commission recommended rejecting all the votes against the diocesan project and counting only the five votes in support of the construction. The site in question is located near the backwater of the Kuban River and the Park of the 30th Anniversary of Victory, previously owned by Louise Akhedzhak, the daughter of the former deputy governor of the Krasnodar Territory, and is a protected area.
The St. Petersburg authorities recommended not taking into account the voices against the construction of a temple in memory of the participants of the SMO (special military operation) at the corner of Peterburgskoe Chaussee and Detskoselsky Boulevard in Pushkin, opposed by the majority of participants in both the public debate and the survey in the Citizen Pushkin local activists group.
The Murmansk authorities similarly ignored the residents’ opinion and went ahead with the construction of the St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Savior’s Transfiguration on Kapitan Burkov Street. Most of the public debate participants, with honorary residents of the city and Alexander Makarevich, a deputy of the Murmansk Regional Duma, among them, asked for the construction to be moved elsewhere so as not to overload the infrastructure and the narrow road and not to exceed the height of the Alyosha Memorial to the Defenders of the Soviet Arctic, the symbol of the city.
The Samara authorities gave permission to use the land plot opposite the Press House, at the intersection of Aurora and Garazhnaya Streets, for the construction of a temple, although the public hearings participants would prefer to see an educational institution here.
The mayor of Vladivostok issued a permit for the use of a land plot on Basargin Street for religious activities, although the majority of residents of the area who participated in the discussion did not support the building of a church there.
In Nizhny Novgorod, after local residents’ protests, the diocese decided against the building of two churches: on Hero Smirnov Street in the Avtozavodsky district and in the green zone in the Prioksky district. In the second case, the city authorities counted only part of the votes cast against the construction, ignoring the majority of participants, but then the latter appealed to the prosecutor's office, and the diocese itself announced it would move the construction elsewhere.
As in the previous year, there were many protests in different regions against the construction of mosques. In most cases, the main reason for the discontent of local residents, as in the case of Orthodox churches, were potential inconveniences associated with the proximity of a religious building – aggravated transport situation, an increased load on infrastructure, noise, or the locals’ preference to see the construction of facilities other than mosques.
This was the case, for example, in Yelizovo, Kamchatka Krai, where citizens protested against the construction of a mosque at public hearings; in Vladivostok, whose residents opposed the conversion of a former next-door store into a Muslim prayer house; and in Khabarovsk, where the local residents’ protests against mosque construction mosque made the Investigative Committee look into the legality of the site use.
In addition to the disruptions to daily life, protesters often cited the risks associated with the growing number of migrants visiting the mosque. Thus, residents of New Moscow opposed the construction of an interfaith center with a mosque in the Kommunarka district, as they believe the criminal situation in the area would be aggravated "manifold due to the presence of such a large ideological complex serving a huge number of migrants who are extremely radicalized against Russian people.”[11] Opponents of the construction appealed to Putin and the head of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, with a request to intervene and prevent "people from Central Asia from replacing us."
Residents of the Verkhnyaya Kurya district of Perm, who also opposed the construction of a mosque, shared with Bastrykin their apprehension of a worsening criminal situation and the "lawlessness" caused by migrants. The opponents of the mosque did not limit themselves to appeals on social networks and expressed their views in graffiti, writing on the fence surrounding the construction site: "Return the land to the children. This is where a school should be." The head of the Investigative Committee is now monitoring the situation with the construction of the mosque, but the protests continued in early 2025.
In most cases, the authorities supported opponents of the construction of mosques. For example, the authorities of Bataysk, the Rostov region, refused to change the purpose of a land plot on Limanny Passage where a mosque was to be erected after most of the participants of the public discussion voted against the changing of the site status and against the construction.
After the local residents’ protests, the Yekaterinburg authorities refused to issue a permit to the Muslim community Islam Nuri to build a charity house in the village of Sadovy. The city administration cited the threat to environmental safety due to the proximity of the cattle burial ground and the increased burden on the transport and engineering infrastructure of the area as the justification for the refusal.
Protests against the construction of a mosque in Ufa led to the city authorities terminating the agreement with the Muslim community on the allocation of a land plot on Mendeleev Street. Opponents of the construction were wary of the felling of trees, noise, and other inconveniences associated with the activities of a religious organization, as well as the influx of migrants. In addition, they expressed preference for the construction of a social facility, not a religious one, on that sire – a children's educational or medical institution.
We are not aware of any conflicts related to the construction of religious buildings of other religions.
In addition, three prayer houses that had previously been declared illegal by court decisions were demolished in the Moscow region: Abu Bakr in Troitsk (New Moscow), Druzhba between Mytishchi and Lobnya, and a prayer house near the village of Kiovo near Mytishchi.
As a rule, the inspections, resulting in sanctions against Muslim prayer premises, were carried out after complaints from local residents, who were unhappy about the proximity of a religious organization. Similarly to protests against the construction of mosques, anti-migrant rhetoric was often used. For instance, after residents of the village of Malakhovka complained in a video message to Putin about the large number of migrants gathering in the prayer house and posing a danger to local residents, the agreement between the Lyubertsy authorities and the local Muslim religious organization Svet on the gratuitous use of the building was terminated. Interestingly, the head of the community, Imam Ramil Rahmankulov, attempted to save the prayer house and stressed that his community had been sending humanitarian aid to Donbass since 2014, and was now helping the Russians fighting in Ukraine, but officials ignored these arguments and terminated the lease.
Such local residents’ complaints often enjoyed the support of radical right-wing organizations. For example, residents of an apartment building on Dmitrovskoye Chaussee in Moscow, supported by Russkaya Obschina [Russian Community], appealed to Bastrykin demanding that a Muslim prayer room located in the building, where hundreds of people gathered on Fridays, be shut down. Residents of Balashikha, near Moscow, also complained about the inconveniences associated with the Iman Muslim prayer house, visited by "crowds of migrants." Their complaints were also supported by Russkaya Obschina.
Orthodox organizations outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church also faced difficulties in using their property.
In Noginsk, near Moscow, the Trinity Church under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was demolished after the court decision to demolish it as an illegal building was made back in 2016 (at that time the parish referred to itself as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate). The parish tried to appeal this decision all the way to the European Court of Human Rights, but in 2022 the ECHR found the demolition decision lawful and the parish's complaint unacceptable.
The administration of Slavyansk-on-Kuban tried to get the court to recognize the Pokrovsko-Tikhonovsky Temple of the Russian Orthodox Church, built on a plot belonging to the bishop of this church, as illegal and demolish it, but the court found that the building was built lawfully and dismissed the claim.
We are aware of very few cases of other religious organizations having problems with using existing property. The seizure of property from Jehovah’s Witnesses continued. We are aware of such seizures in four regions: In Moscow, a three-storey house in the Mikhalkovo estate area, two apartments and a basement near Sretensky Boulevard and non-residential premises in the Northern Administrative District were seized; in Tyumen, a plot of land and an apartment building; in Kazan, three four-room apartments in the Vakhitovsky district; and in Kuibyshev, the Novosibirsk region, a plot and an uninhabited building. In all cases, the courts ruled that the donations of property to foreign organizations of Jehovah's Witnesses were fictitious and seized it in favor of the state. The Office of the Federal Register for the Chuvash Republic issued a warning to the owner of an apartment building in the village of Pihtulino, where the Cheboksary Society for Krishna Consciousness was holding meetings. An inspection, carried out after neighbors complained about the use of the house as a religious facility, established that the building was originally built as a place of worship, but on a site intended for residential development. The warning suggested that the building owner stop the misuse of the site or change the type of permitted use.
The Abakan City Court seized a land plot from the local religious organization of Evangelical Christians (Pentecostals) "Church of Glorification" for debts. The church failed to pay the fine imposed in July 2022. Together with the late fees, the total amounted to almost 850,000 rubles.
A long-term conflict over the building of the House of the Gospel in St. Petersburg, which the Baptist community sought access to, has finally been resolved. The building is surrounded by the territory of the Elektroapparat factory, and for a long time attempts to negotiate access were unsuccessful. In the end, the Baptist community received the keys to the building and was able to begin restoration work and hold worship services.
For example, in the Solnechnogorsk district of the Moscow region, the building of the Church of St. Michael the Archangel, designed by Vasily Bazhenov, was transferred to the parish of the village of Tarakanovo. The parish has been restoring this church since 2006. It is an object of cultural heritage of regional importance.
The Ministry of Property and Land Relations of the Vladimir region has transferred to the St. Andrew's stauropegial Monastery of Moscow the Church of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary, also an object of cultural heritage of regional significance, built in 1777 in the village of Kliny in the Kolchuginsky district.
Ufa City Hall has transferred to the ownership of the Ufa Diocese the land plot under the Cathedral of the Nativity of the Virgin, previously in perpetual use of the diocese.
Sometimes the property was transferred to other religious organizations. For example, St. Petersburg authorities handed over to the Catholic parish of Our Lady of Lourdes the building of the House of the Clergy in Kovensky Pereulok, where historically the Sunday school and the office were located. And in the Leningrad Region, the Vuoksela Church building near Priozersk was transferred to the ownership of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Ingria.
In February, the Samara Region Arbitration Court granted the claim of the local “Hussain’s Name” Muslim religious organization to the Department of Urban Planning, the Mayor's office, and the administration of the Kuibyshev district of Samara for recognition of ownership of the mosque building on the Kryazhskoye Chausee.
In Tyumen, the Muslim religious organization Krinkul was able to confirm, after several years, its ownership of the school building in the Kazarovo neighborhood. According to archival data, the building was built as a mosque, but it housed a local school, and the Muslim community did not claim it. After the school moved, the Muslims tried to claim ownership of the former mosque, but the city authorities handed it over to the Centralized City Library System instead. The community filed a lawsuit and passed several courts. In September, the court of appeal confirmed that the community could indeed claim the ownership of the building of the former mosque.
In some cases, religious organizations were unable to obtain the rights to the property even through the court. For example, in Yaroslavl, the parish of the Church of St. Leontius of Rostov was unable to defend its ownership of an uninhabited building where a boiler room, an icon painting workshop, and utility rooms were located. Although the parish had completed the restoration of the building, which it had received for perpetual use, installed windows and doors, and connected electricity and other utilities, the regional arbitration court ruled that the ownership of the building remains with the city.
The transfer of museum property to the Russian Orthodox Church continued, and as a rule such transfers proceeded without disputes. In January, Andrei Rublev’s Trinity icon, transferred to the use of the Russian Orthodox Church a year earlier, was displayed for worship at Christ the Savior Cathedral, where it remained until June, although representatives of the Ministry of Culture had promised that the icon would be sent for a lengthy and extensive restoration. In June, it was moved to the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius, where it is to stay permanently. The transportation of the 15th century artifact first to Christ the Savior Cathedral and then to the Lavra was carried out without a special climate controlled case, and in the Lavra, it is exhibited in a regular display case that cannot guarantee the very specific temperature and humidity conditions required for the icon’s preservation.
The process of transferring the Ryazan Kremlin's cathedrals and churches to the Russian Orthodox Church has been completed. In November, the Church of the Descent of the Holy Spirit, the last church belonging to the museum compound, which housed the museum library, was transferred to the Ryazan Diocese.
The authorities of the Kurgan region have concluded an agreement with the diocese on the transfer of icons, currently kept in the storerooms of museums, that were seized from churches during the Soviet times. In January, the first icon was transferred to the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Kurgan.
In Zabaykalsky Krai, the debate was resumed on the possibility of transferring the building of the Decembrists’ Museum to the Chita Diocese. However, the Minister of Culture of the region Irina Levkovich assured in April that "the issue of transferring the building of the Decembrists’ Museum to the ownership of the Russian Orthodox Church was not considered. The possibility of searching for a building and improving the surrounding area was also not discussed. There are no plans to move the museum's collection."[13]
We should add that in cases of transfer of cultural monuments, the authorities sometimes sanction religious organizations that fail to take good care of the property. For example, the Arbitration Court of the Perm region ordered the regional Spiritual Administration of Muslims to restore a mosque in the city of Osa, which is an object of cultural heritage. After an inspection had revealed the unsatisfactory condition of the mosque and minaret, the regional inspectorate for the protection of cultural heritage sites appealed to the court, since the religious organization that owned the monument had failed to respond to both the initial order to eliminate violations and the subsequent warning. According to the court's decision, the regional Spiritual Administration of Muslims will have to carry out the restoration of the mosque over the next three years.
In May, the Omsk Regional Court, at the request of the regional department of the Ministry of Justice, liquidated the local Greek Catholic parish of the Intercession of the Most Holy Theotokos. The reason for the liquidation was gross violations of federal law. In March, this decision was confirmed by the Court of Cassation. Earlier, a case was initiated against the minister of this parish, Igor Maksimov, under Part 1 of Article 3541 of the Criminal Code (rehabilitation of Nazism) and Part 2 of Article 148 of the Criminal Code (insulting the religious feelings of believers, committed in places designated for worship).
In October, the Supreme Court of Crimea satisfied the claim of the regional Ministry of Justice and liquidated the independent Alushta Muslim community. The reasons for the liquidation included “actions aimed at carrying out extremist activities” and a number of violations, including the untimely expulsion from the community of its former chairman Lenur Khalilov and former member of the organization Ruslan Mesutov, who were convicted for involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir. According to the lawyer Rustem Kyamilev, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea, whose jurisdiction did not include the Alushta community, was involved in the liquidation.
In other cases, it was more of a legal statement of a fait accompli. In October, the Rossoshansky District Court of the Voronezh region satisfied the claim of the regional Ministry of Justice to liquidate the local church of Evangelical Christian Baptists, which had effectively ceased its activities after the death of its presbyter.
In October, the Rostov Regional Court, also following a claim filed by the Ministry of Justice, liquidated the Rostov Religious Jewish Community, which was part of the Congress of the Jewish Religious Organizations and Associations in Russia (CJROAR). As in the above-mentioned case, the community had long ceased to be active.
This same court heard the cases on the liquidation of two more religious organizations, the Assyrian Church of the East in Shakhty and the Jewish Community of Novocherkassk. In the first case, the Ministry of Justice withdrew its claim as the community managed to eliminate the detected violations. We are not aware of the outcome of the other case.
Followers of religious organizations previously recognized as undesirable were subjected to administrative and criminal prosecution. The Central District Court of Prokopyevsk, the Kemerovo region, found Sergei Mikhalev, the pastor of one of the religious groups of Evangelical Christians, who published materials of the New Generation on his VKontakte page, guilty under Part 1 of Article 2841 of the Criminal Code (participation in the activities of an undesirable organization after administrative punishment for a similar act) and sentenced him to one year of compulsory labor with a deduction of 15% of wages, which is to be transferred to the state.
The Central District Court of Togliatti fined local resident Olga Patrolina under Article 20.33 of the Administrative Code (participation in the activities of an undesirable organization) for posting a link to a song about Christ sung in the New Generation church. Another believer, a native of Uzbekistan, was fined by the same court under the same article for publishing a sermon by the pastor of this church.
The Moscow Simonovsky District Court heard and ruled in the case of ongoing activities of Vladimir Muntian's Vozrozhdeniye [Revival] Charitable Foundation and the All-Ukrainian Spiritual Center Vozrozhdeniye religious organization, both based in Ukraine. Mikhail Koval, I. Nagornova, and N. Ukhova were accused under Part 3 of Article 2841 of the Criminal Code (organizing the activities of an undesirable organization). All of them admitted their guilt (Koval and Ukhova – in full, Nagornova – in part), but the verdict of the court is unknown to us. Victoria Kosheleva from Sochi was found guilty under Part 2 of Article 2841 of the Criminal Code (provision of financial services intended to support the activities of an undesirable organization) for cooperation with the same organizations and was sentenced to two years of imprisonment in a penal colony.
In Pyatigorsk, Oksana Shchetkina, the leader of the local organization Friends of Falun Gong, was sentenced to a real prison term under Part 3 of Article 284.1 of the Criminal Code. Several other cases under the same part of the same article on cooperation with Falun Gong organizations were investigated in different regions. In Moscow, three people were charged, and two of them, Natalia Minchenkova and Gennady Buslov, were sentenced to prison. Similar cases were initiated in Krasnodar and Tomsk. The leader of the local Falun Gong organization in Mordovia, I. Maksinyaev, was convicted under the same part of the same article in January 2025 and was sentenced to compulsory labor.
Nadezhda Lai, the head of Falun Gong in Irkutsk, four residents of Krasnodar, and Zoya Orlenko, Kirill Belan, and Alexander Kozlov were fined for cooperation with Falun Gong organizations under Article 20.33 of the Administrative Code.
In addition, we have information about criminal cases for cooperation with the Allatra movement: one case was brought against a resident of Omsk under three parts of Article 284 of the Criminal Code, and another against a resident of Solnechnogorsk near Moscow under Part 2 of Article 2841.
Three religious figures were added to the list of foreign agents in 2024: Albert Ratkin, the pastor of Evangelical Christian (Pentecostal) Word of Life Church, Archbishop Grigory Mikhnov-Vaitenko of the Apostolic Orthodox Church, and priest Andrei Lvov, defrocked from the Russian Orthodox Church and converted to the Apostolic Orthodox Church, who had left Russia.
According to the Jehovah's Witnesses, during 2024, 116 believers were found guilty under Art. 2822 (organizing the activities of an extremist organization) and Art. 2823 of the Criminal Code (financing the activities of an extremist organization); 43 of them (37%) were sentenced to prison time, and 24 got more than 5 years. According to Yaroslav Sivulsky, Representative of the European Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, "this year, sentences were fewer but tougher.”[14]
Alexander Chagan, a Jehovah's Witness from Tolyatti, was given the longest term of eight years of imprisonment in a general regime colony with a one-year restriction of liberty and a three-year ban on participation in activities related to religious organizations. Three believers from Khabarovsk, Nikolai Polevodov, Vitaly Zhukov, and Stanislav Kim, were sentenced to terms between eight years and two months and eight years and six months, but on appeal the sentence was commuted to suspended imprisonment and a shorter term.
According to the Jehovah's Witnesses, 96 homes were searched in 2024, of which 17 were carried out in Crimea. Four cases of violence by security forces during searches and one case of torture in places of detention were recorded. In addition, Rinat Kiramov, a Jehovah's Witness from Akhtubinsk, who is serving a sentence in the Tula region, complained of torture.
Criminal persecution of representatives of other religious organizations continued too. In Izhevsk, in December, Sergey Artemyev, the pastor of the local religious organization of Evangelical Christians (Pentecostals), the Light of the World Church, was charged in court under Part 1 of Article 239 of the Criminal Code (creation of a religious association whose activities involve violence against citizens or other harm to their health, and leadership of such an association) and Paragraph B of Part 3 of Article 111 of the Criminal Code (intentional infliction of serious harm to health, resulting in mental disorder). From February to November, the pastor was under house arrest, although even the victims petitioned for a commutation of his punishment.
The investigation alleges that between 2019 and January 2024, Artemyev "conducted weekly worship services for parishioners on a paid basis, during which he deliberately and consciously used and systematically applied: methods of mental and psychological influence on a person, <...> psychological violence" with the goal of "continuing to receive money from parishioners" and extract "financial profits from the controlled adepts."[15] At the same time, one of the victims, whose testimony the prosecution referred to, stated that she did not recognize herself as such, since the pastor had not caused her "the slightest harm, nor had he harmed any of the servants of the Light of the World Church." At the time of writing of this report, the case was still being considered in court.
In Ulyanovsk, a case under Parts 2 and 3 of the same article (creation of a non-profit organization whose activities involve encouraging citizens to refuse to perform civil duties or commit other illegal acts, and participation in such an organization) and Article 2052 of the Criminal Code (public calls for terrorist activities, public justification of terrorism) was brought against Metropolitan Zosima (Leonid Vlasov), the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Tsarist Empire. Vlasov was detained in February together with several of his followers. He calls himself the prophet, patriarch, and king of the "triune Russia" – Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and urges his followers to give up their passports and tax numbers. The case was brought to court in November, but the verdict had not yet been rendered at the time of writing of this report.
The number of persons punished under this article has also increased compared to 2023: a total of 294 persons were punished, including 184 individuals, 90 legal entities, 18 officials, and 2 people engaged in entrepreneurial activities without forming a legal entity (in 2023, a total of 228: 139, 74, 15, and 0, respectively).
Fines continued to be the most frequently used form of punishment: they were imposed in 255 cases. In 38 cases, warnings were issued to the perpetrators, and in one case mandatory work was ordered. Administrative arrest was not used as a punishment. In 15 cases, the main punishment was supplemented by administrative expulsion from Russia, and in 23 cases by confiscation.
The total fines under the regulations that came into force increased significantly compared to the previous year and amounted to 4,747,000 rubles (in 2023 – 2,771,000 rubles).[16].
Most of the cases prosecuted under this article during the year that we are aware of involved Muslims, with Protestants coming in second. For example, a native of Azerbaijan was fined in Tula under Part 4 of this article (carrying out missionary activities in violation of the requirements of the legislation on freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and religious organizations) for organizing premises for namaz without obtaining a permit from a religious organization; in Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai, Baptist pastor Anatoly Mukhin was fined under the same part of the same article for organizing a worship service of an unregistered religious group in the presence of two non-Baptist believers. In Belorechensk, Krasnodar Krai, Baptist pastor Daniil Litovkin was fined under the same part of the same article for organizing a visit by a group of Baptists to a city hospital to wish patients Happy Easter and distribute gifts and a religious newspaper.
The local religious organization of Muslims of Semikarakorsky district of Rostov region and the head of a Christian center in Krasnoslobodsky district of Mordovia were fined under Part 3 of Article 5.26 (carrying out activities by a religious organization without indicating its official full name, including the issue or distribution of unmarked literature as part of missionary activities).
Muslims were most often prosecuted under Part 5 of this article (carrying out missionary activities by a foreign citizen in violation of the requirements of the legislation on freedom of conscience and freedom of religion and religious associations). Usually the offense consisted in organizing or conducting namaz without documents confirming the authority to conduct missionary activities. In particular, Uzbek citizen Nobijon Obitov in Bashkiria, Ohunjon Isabaev in the Tula region, and Abdukodir Abdukhalilov in Troitsk (New Moscow) were fined for this offense.
Often the fine under this part of Article 5.26 was supplemented by administrative expulsion from the country. This, for example, happened in Moscow to citizens of Tajikistan A. Yakubov and Muhammadrachab Erov, and Bakhodir Sabirov, in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky – the citizen of Uzbekistan Rasuljon Mamatoirov, in Tuapse – citizens of Tajikistan Samariddin Saliev and Jalili Saidzoda.
Representatives of other religious organizations have also been prosecuted under this article. For example, in Sochi, the 85-year-old former vicar of the local Catholic parish of the Apostles Simon and Thaddeus, Vladislav Klotz, was fined under Part 5 of this article, followed by administrative expulsion, and in Zelenodolsk, the court imposed a similar penalty under the same part of the same article on Irish citizen Hugh Turvey for his participation in the Shravanam Kirtanam festival, “where he conducted religious spiritual practices Sankirtana, gave lectures on Vaishnavism, and chanted Hari Krishna mantras”[17] without permits. In the Rostov region, a priest of the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church, Dionisiy (Dmitry Belolipetsky), was fined under Part 4 of the same article for conducting religious activities without notifying the relevant authorities.
The most notorious of all was the November incident in Khabarovsk, where officers of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Federal Migration Service (FMS), together with riot police, broke into the prayer house of the local Muslim religious organization Blagonravie [Good Morality] during Friday prayers. Using foul language, they forced the believers face down on the floor. 25 people were crammed into two cars using a stun gun. Some elderly believers lost consciousness and some had convulsions. Notably, no illegal migrants were detected during that raid.
The Muslim community went to court. According to the chairman of the organization, Mussa Kushtov, this was the third raid by law enforcers in a year. At the same time, multiple inspections have repeatedly confirmed that the community was using the rented building legally and there were no violations in its activities. The behavior of law enforcement officers in Khabarovsk was discussed at the meeting of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Moscow.
Another example: a case under Part 2 of Article 3221 of the Criminal Code (organization of illegal migration committed by an organized group of persons) was brought against members of the Hafizlyk local religious organization of Muslims in Moscow. The case was initiated after a complaint from residents of the Nizhegorodsky district of Moscow, who were unhappy about the proximity of a religious organization.
In St. Petersburg, Michael Schwarzkopf, pastor of the Petrikirche, Propst (senior pastor) of the Northwestern Church District of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of European Russia, was forced to leave the country together with his family before his residence permit expired because he was charged under Part 5 of Article 18.8 of the Administrative Code (repeated violation by a foreign citizen of the visa regime of the Russian Federation). The reason for the administrative case was the fact that he stayed for more than seven days at a place different from his official registration address without notifying the authorities. However, both apartments – the one where the pastor was registered and the one where he actually lived – belong to the Lutheran community.
Unlike in the previous year, we are aware of several cases of non-state discrimination, and most of them are related to the wearing of Muslim clothing in public places, including educational institutions. For example, the management of the Lyantorsk Oil Technical College in Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug refused to allow a freshman girl wearing a headscarf to attend classes. The girl's family said they were prepared to take legal action. In one of Mirny's schools in Yakutia, a teacher ordered a seventh-grader in a headscarf to leave class. The child switched to homeschooling. A lecturer at Ivanovo State Medical University, Zhidomorov, forced a female Muslim student to read to the class a poem the lecturer authored about the dangers of the hijab “for educational purposes” in class. The university started an official inquiry into the incident.
In Obninsk, the Kaluga region, a Muslim couple was forced to leave a restaurant by the security guards at the request of other patrons, who claimed that wearing a hijab in public places was unacceptable. And in Nizhnevartovsk, the administration of at least two swimming pools banned female visitors wearing burkinis.
We would like to mention an incident in Moscow, where a Muslim Yandex Taxi driver refused to drive the rabbi of the Yahad youth organization, Michael Stavropol, explaining that the reason was not the ethnicity, but the religion of the passenger. The Yandex Taxi security service said it would examine the incident and impose measures on the driver.
Thus, the periodical of the Falun Dafa Information Center managed to challenge a 50,000 ruble fine imposed by the Kalininsky District Court of St. Petersburg in 2023 under Article 20.33 of the Administrative Code for publishing information about Falun Gong organizations recognized as undesirable in Russia. The St. Petersburg City Court overturned the ruling and sent the case to the district court for a new review. In March, the Kalininsky District Court dismissed the case for lack of corpus delicti.
Imam Ismail Yurdamov managed to get the 8,000 ruble fine under Part 4 of Article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offenses canceled. In February, the Kirov District Court of Crimea canceled the corresponding ruling of the magistrate court. The court of second instance took into account that Yurdamov performed religious rituals in the village of Privetnoye at the request of the residents of the village and the acting imam, as the latter could not perform the rituals himself due to his age and health condition.
The Evangelical Christian Baptist Church of Novocherkassk, the Rostov region, challenged a fine under Part 3 of Article 5.26 of the Administrative Code for unlabeled literature. In April, the Fourth Cassation Court of General Jurisdiction partially satisfied the complaint of the religious organization and cancelled the fine of 30,000 rubles, overturning the decisions of two previous instances and closing the case due to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The sentence for "illegal missionary work," given to the priest of the Armenian Catholic Church, Mais Melikyan, an Armenian citizen, was partially commuted. He was fined 35,000 rubles under Part 5 Article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences and expelled from the country by the Lazarevsky District Court of Sochi for storing in a garage used as a chapel the Armenian translation of the Old Testament without the markings of a religious organization. The Krasnodar Krai Court in November canceled the expulsion clause, leaving the fine unchanged.
In the Chelyabinsk region, the Federal Tax Service was twice unsuccessful in its attempt to collect arrears from the branch of Jehovah's Witnesses in Austria registered in Miass. In May, the Arbitration Court of the region refused to satisfy the claim of the Federal Tax Service to recover arrears in the amount of 6500 rubles, and in September – 23,000 rubles. In both cases, the reason for the refusal was the expiration of the established time limit for collection.
In December, after multiple refusals, the Ussuriysk District Court of Primorsky Krai approved the transfer of shaman Alexander Gabyshev to a general hospital, softening the regime of forced treatment.
The harshest sentence of those where the punishment is known to us was handed down to blogger Khavier Yarmagomedov. In December, the Dorogomilovsky District Court of Moscow sentenced him to seven years in a general regime colony, a fine, and a ban on administering Internet sites for eight years. The blogger was found guilty not only under the article mentioned above, but also under Paragraph B of Part 3 of Art. 242 (illegal trafficking in pornographic materials committed on the Internet) and Paragraphs A and D of Part 2 of Art. 2421 of the Criminal Code (trafficking in materials or objects containing pornographic images of minors). Yarmagomedov was prosecuted under Article 148 of the Criminal Code for his stream, where he stomped on a cross and spat on it.
In two other cases, the perpetrators were sentenced to real terms, also under several articles. In September, the Novoaleksandrovsky District Court of Stavropol Krai found three young men guilty under Part 1 of Article 148 and Part 2 of Article 213 of the Criminal Code (hooliganism committed by a group of persons motivated by religious hatred); they burned a New Testament in a brazier, uttering insults and ridicule, then published the video in Telegram. Taking into account the unserved part of the punishment under the previous sentence, the court gave 20-year-old Danila Zharikhin two years and two months in prison and a ban on driving for nine months; 21-year-old Dmitry Sobenin was sentenced to two years in a penal colony; and the minor Yuri M. was sentenced to ten days of suspended imprisonment with a probation period of two years. In December, the Krasnoarmejsky District Court of Volgograd found trash-streamer Pavel Prokudin guilty under Part 1 of Article 148 of the Criminal Code and Part 1 of Article 282 of the Criminal Code (incitement to hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity) for criticizing the Russian military participating in military operations in Ukraine, negative statements about the elderly, and insulting statements about God and believers. The court sentenced him to two and a half years' imprisonment and 150 hours of compulsory labor, with the real term imposed under Art. 282.
Blogger Sofia Angel-Barocco was sentenced by the Maikop City Court in September to a suspended sentence of two years and a fine of 100,000 rubles with a ban on administering Internet resources for two years under Part 1 of Article 148 and Part 2 of Article 280 of the Criminal Code (calls for extremist activity committed on the Internet) for publishing a YouTube video claiming that “churches around the world are burning because of the spells” and expressing approval of the terrorist attack in Jerusalem in 2023. In December, the Leninogorsk City Court of Tatarstan sentenced blogger Artem Medkov, who broke a wooden cross and resisted the police officers who detained him, to two years of probation. The court found him guilty under Part 1 of Article 148 and Part 1 of Article 318 of the Criminal Code (use of violence against a representative of the authorities without endangering their life and health).
The longest compulsory labor – 150 hours under Part 1 of Article 148 each – was given to Valery Gorya from Armavir for insulting comments in Telegram about Allah and Muslims, and Denis Bolokhnov, a resident of Ryazan, for “negative comments about the religious feelings of believers.”
We have information about six verdicts under Part 2 of Article 148 of the Criminal Code (the same actions, but committed in places specially designated for worship, other religious rites and ceremonies), whereas in 2023 there was only one conviction under this part of the article. Here the strictest punishment, three and a half years in a colony, was imposed on Nikita Zhuravel, whom the Visaitovsky District Court of Grozny in February found guilty under Part 2 of Article 148 and under Part 2 of Article 213 of the Criminal Code for burning the Koran in front of a mosque and publishing a video about it.
The highest fine of 300,000 rubles under the same articles was imposed by the Novomoskovskiy District Court of the Tula Region on Mikhail Dzyubinsky, who in 2023 organized a pogrom in the Dormition Monastery. In addition to a fine, the court sentenced him to compulsory treatment. The longest term of compulsory labor, 440 hours, was given to blogger Sofya Burger, who in March was found guilty by the Leninsky District Court of Krasnodar under Part 2 of Article 148 for publishing a video in which she danced in a cemetery with a cigarette in her mouth and made obscene gestures with her hands.
In December, the Kolpinsky District Court of St. Petersburg, at the request of the prosecutor's office, banned the distribution of the video “New Wave” by rapper Morgenstern (Alisher Valiev), declared a foreign agent, and DJ Smash, for "disrespecting the rituals and rules of the church.”
In December, after Tatyana Yanusik, a deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Khakassia from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, published a photo of herself with her arms outstretched against the backdrop of a sculpture of Christ, some residents of the republic complained that the photo offended religious feelings. Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Khakassia Sergey Sokol instructed the Commission on Regulations to "carry out appropriate work with the author of the incident and provide a moral assessment of the action." We do not know whether the instruction was carried out or what its outcome was).
As before, defenders of religious feelings often targeted cultural events. The main tactic of Orthodox activists was to organize public campaigns against figures and events that, according to activists, offended the feelings of believers. For example, in Tambov, complaints from Orthodox activists and Russkaya Obschina led to the cancellation of a concert by three heavy rock bands scheduled for September 21 at the HEROES bar. The reason for the complaints was the Lucifer's Dungeon and Frostlagte Måne and Mor’s concert announcement, which said: “Being harbingers of the Apocalypse, we will open the gates to hell and unleash real demons. Don't miss this Saturday Sabbath.” In addition, the activists were outraged by the fact that the concert was scheduled for September 21, the day of the celebration of the Nativity of the Virgin.
In Samara and Volgograd, performances by comedian Guram Demidov were cancelled after complaints from Sorok Sorokov, who found his joke about Christ opening a chain of booze supermarkets and selling wine for the price of water offensive.
After Russkaya Obschina’s complaint, the Investigative Committee for the Kaluga region launched a procedural review of "pseudo-religious entertainment events" during which "the cult of death and religious Satanism were demonstrated" at the Mafia club in Kozelsk, the Kaluga region. The event in question was a Halloween party.
A Samara sushi restaurant chain Sushkin sЫn was forced to change its name and close the restaurant after complaints about insulting the feelings of believers from Russkaya Obschina and State Duma deputy Alexander Khinstein and the opening of a criminal case against the chain administration under the relevant article. The activists were offended by the name, which, in their opinion, referred to the expression "son of a bitch," used in combination with the image of the Virgin in the restaurant decor.
Protests were not always successful. Omsk Cossacks and representatives of the Omsk Parents' Assembly demanded cancellation of the ballet Rasputin starring Sergei Polunin, because “G. E. Rasputin was slandered and defamed by the people who prepared and carried out a coup in Russia." <…> They intentionally created the ugly image of Rasputin, who was a friend of the royal family. It is unacceptable for an Orthodox person to mock a saint, it offends the feelings of believers.”[19] However, the authorities refused to cancel the ballet. Metropolitan Dionysius (Porubai) of Omsk and Taurida, in an interview with a local TV channel, did not bless his flock to attend this performance.
Defenders of religious feelings also turned their attention to New Age stores. For example, Orthodox activists organized police visits to the Magic Lilu store on Novy Arbat. When the police arrived, they forced the shoppers out, temporarily closed the store, and seized "pornographic figurines and goods with extremist symbols."
Defenders of religious feelings did not stop at organizing public campaigns against activities they objected to and complaining to various authorities. From time to time, they themselves paid visits to venues where, in their opinion, blasphemy was being committed, demanding that it be stopped. In St. Petersburg, Russkaya Obschina, Russian Imperial Movement (RID), and the Russian People's Militia (about 100 people in total) disrupted a “satanist” party in the S'aint bar on Rubinstein Street, decorated with crosses, angels, images of saints, and references to the Bible, the events of the Middle Ages, and the Young Pope TV series. Note that the bar is located in the courtyard, there is no sign at the door, and the iron entrance door can easily be mistaken for the basement door, making it difficult for a casual visitor to find it and get in. Upon arrival, the activists announced: “We are Orthodox Christians, and for us, the activities of your bar are associated with incitement of inter-religious strife, which is prohibited by our legislation. In any case, we will not allow you to continue this activity in our city,”[20] and called the police. An attempt to enter another venue belonging to the same chain failed because the staff were alerted and locked the door. However, following the visit to the bar on Rubinstein Street, the chain owner, Sophie Noskova-Abramovich, was fined 30,000 rubles under Part 1 of Article 148 of the Criminal Code.
In St. Petersburg, Orthodox activists and representatives of Russkaya Obschina came to the Starcon science fiction, film, and science festival, where they were angered by a cosplayed interior from the horror game Resident Evil Village. Defenders of the feelings of believers likened the portraits of the video game characters to a "sacred corner" with icons, found it blasphemous, and called the police. The police seized the exhibits, and Obschina representatives wrote a statement to the authorities.
In April, Sorok Sorokov tried to disrupt the ZLOFest festival of horror films held in Moscow. At the call of Orthodox activists, the police arrived and removed the guests from the venue. The representatives of Russkaya Obschina also arrived at the festival and made sure that some of the most “sacrilegious” images were removed.
Sorok Sorokov complained about comedian Alexander Revva, who used the exclamation “The Mother of God gave birth in a barn!” as a joke in an episode of the Stars NTV show on the eve of Easter. In addition to Orthodox activists, actress Yana Poplavskaya also voiced objections to the show. As a result, the next episode was not aired, and no explanation was given by the NTV management. Irina Filatova, a CPRF member of the State Duma, asked Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, to investigate Revva for insulting the religious feelings of believers; we have no information about the outcome.
In several instances, conflicts related to offending the feelings of the Orthodox have arisen around the objects of urban sculpture. The administration of the Russian North national park, at the request of the Vologda Metropolitan Church, dismantled the figure of Veles, installed on Maura Mountain as part of the creation of the tourist Path of Myths and Legends. Metropolitan Savva (Mikheev) of Vologda and Kirillov was outraged that the pagan idol appeared opposite the Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery, in the place where a chapel used to stand. Vologda Region Governor Georgy Filimonov supported the diocese.
In Dalnegorsk, Primorsky Krai, Priest Andrei Vasyakin, dean of the Dalnegorsk district, appealed to the mayor of the town, Alexander Terebilov, on behalf of the Orthodox believers to remove the sculpture of the alien Ushan, a character from the cartoon The Mystery of the Third Planet. In his opinion, art objects dedicated to “demonic creatures” are inappropriate on the street where the worship cross stands and processions are held. The mayor refused to do so, noting that the townspeople did not complain about the sculpture, and “the cartoon character is kind, cheerful, and resourceful, takes care of nature, and takes a responsible approach to his work.” Nevertheless, the mayor agreed to explore “compromise options to isolate the art object from the gaze of the participants of the procession for the duration of the procession.”[21]
Voronezh authorities, despite the opinion of the diocese, approved the monument to the leader of the Sektor Gaza band Yury Khoy (Klinskikh) in the city. According to Priest Vitaly Tarasov, head of the culture department of the Voronezh Metropolitan Church, Sektor Gaza’s music popularizes “anti-family values; debauchery; drug use and drinking; insulting the feelings of believers; Satanism”. However, the city's Cultural Heritage Commission voted in favor of the monument, in support of which some 25,000 citizens had previously voiced their support.
From time to time, Orthodox believers continued to be outraged by drawings and images of churches with missing crosses. After the issue of a new 1000-ruble banknote was suspended in 2023 after Orthodox Christians complained that the image of the church of the Kazan Kremlin lacked crosses, while the image of Suyumbike Tower had a crescent moon, the Central Bank announced that no religious sites would be depicted on the bill. In November, Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina announced the decision to “take a step back and develop a new design for the reverse side” and hold a contest, for which 25 objects in the Volga Federal District were selected: after an online voting, the image of the winning object will be placed on the reverse side of the 1000-ruble bill. The controversial sites of the Kazan Kremlin were not selected for the contest.
Complaints about insults to the feelings of believers from individual defenders were extremely rare. We know of only one such case: a resident of Belgorod appealed to Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov with a complaint about the packaging of bread from the local Kolos factory. The package depicts the canonized Russian Orthodox Church Prince Vladimir. According to the complaint, placing such packaging in the trash is blasphemy and brings down God's wrath on Belgorod residents. She filed a similar complaint in 2022, but so far the packaging has not been altered.
In rare cases, cultural event organizers took action before receiving any complaints from offended believers. For example, the administration of a Moscow club where the Poot’ [The Path] band from Pskov was to play in February, canceled the concert out of concern that the band's performance of “anti-Christian” songs might offend the feelings of believers. At the same time, the club administration referred to the opinion of the district administration. It was not clear who complained to the district administration.
There were examples of representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church defending those who, according to some of their co-religionists, offended their religious feelings. Thus, the Bratsk Diocese did not support its priest, who threatened to fine the participants of the Dubak Challenge, a social media challenge where people post photographs of themselves throwing splashing water into the freezing cold air. The priest claimed that a flash mob with churches in the background was offensive to the Orthodox. The diocese said, however, that the photos with the water freezing against the background of the temple "are not only not offensive, but also beautiful." The priest was forced to remove his post with threats.
We know of only a few cases in which believers of other faiths claimed that their feelings had been offended. For example, the owners of a nightclub in Ulan-Ude, under public pressure, had to paint over a graffiti created two years earlier depicting half Buddha face and half skull. After the discussion of the graffiti on social networks, where many said that the drawing offended the feelings of believers, the owners of the building were fined for violating the facade renovation procedure. They then painted over the image and apologized to those whose feelings were hurt.
After the residents of Buryatia and Kalmykia were outraged by the bathroom accessories (toilet brushes, liquid soap dispensers, and toothbrush holders) with images of Buddha in the Leman Pro store chain, the company promised to remove these items from stores. However, the Shajin Lama of the Republic of Kalmykia, Geshe Tenzin Choidak, filed a complaint with the republican prosecutor's office, and an investigation was launched. The prosecutor's office of the Moscow region also investigated this incident on the complaint of the Deputy Chairman of the State Duma, Sholban Kara-ool, and then ordered the chain management to eliminate the violations. In addition, a case was opened under Part 2 of Article 5. 26 of the Administrative Code (willful public desecration of religious or devotional literature, objects of religious veneration, signs or emblems of worldview symbols and attributes) on the distribution of goods with the image of Buddha.
The St. Petersburg restaurant Gifts of Ossetia promised to revise its menu after the Supreme Council of Ossetians was outraged by the assortment of pies. According to the council, chicken and pork pies offend the feelings of the Ossetian people because «poultry and pork are considered “dirty” and “unclean”, and in the history of the Ossetian people they have never been used in meal preparation and have also been considered sacrilege.»[22]
In July, a female passenger on the Moscow metro attacked a hijab-wearing passenger with a knife. The victim then pepper-sprayed the attacker in the face. The attacker was stopped by other passengers. She was drunk and shouted insults at the victim.
In September, the chief mufti of the Tyumen region, Zinnat Sadykov, was attacked in his office by a man armed with a hammer and a tear gas canister. The Mufti managed to call for help and was not hurt. The attacker sought revenge for the detention of two imams suspected of raising money for ISIS and recruiting people to fight in Syria.
In September, a woman in Moscow attacked two underage Dagestan girls wearing hijabs. The woman called them “Tajik,” accused them of arrogance, told them to go back to "their country," and said that with their appearance they supported men's violence against women. Then she knocked the phone out of one girls’ hands and grabbed the other by the hair through the head scarf. In 2025, the attacker was fined 10,000 rubles under Article 20.3.1 of the Administrative Code (incitement to hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity).
We have information about nine cases of vandalism motivated by religious hatred (seven in 2023). Orthodox sites were most often attacked by vandals (five cases). In June, in Tyumen, an attacker tried to set fire to the church of St. Demetrius of Don using Molotov cocktails. The entrance to the building sustained damage, none of the parishioners and employees of the church were injured.
In April, a native of Udmurtia, while intoxicated, staged a pogrom in the church of St. Michael the Archangel in Zelenograd, smashed an icon and threatened to set fire to the building. He was found guilty under Part 2 of Article 148 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to compulsory labor. In the same month, a resident of Ivanovo staged a pogrom in the Dormition Cathedral, smashing icons and other temple property with a candlestick. In addition to Part 2 of Article 148, the perpetrator was found guilty under two more articles of the Criminal Code and sent for compulsory medical treatment.
Graffiti appeared on Orthodox sites twice, both in St. Petersburg. In February, a vandal wrote "ROC for murderers" on the wall of the Intercession Church at the Polytechnic University and on the Church of the Virgin of Tenderness Icon. He also wrote "University supports murderers" on the wall of the Polytechnic University building. The perpetrator was charged with three criminal counts and sent to a pre-trial detention center. In August, an inscription appeared on the arch near the Blessed St. Xenia of Petersburg Church with a reference to a Koran verse calling for the persecution of polytheists. A case of insulting the religious feelings of believers was opened against the suspect, a graduate of the Institute of Music, Theater, and Choreography of Herzen University.
Muslim sites were targeted four times, and two of these incidents can be classified as dangerous, although no one was injured. In June, in Fryazino near Moscow, a supporter of the M.K.U. (a racist online community calling itself Maniacs. Cult of Murder) blew up the entrance to a Muslim center and was detained by police. In December, on the eve of Christmas according to the Gregorian calendar, the attackers tried to set fire to the Nur mosque in Serpukhov, but ran away, leaving molotov cocktails outside the building. A cell of the neo-Nazi movement NS/WP claimed responsibility for the arson attempt.
In July, parts of pork carcasses were placed at the doors of mosques twice, once in Moscow and once in Tyumen.
Thus, most publications, describing the numerous trials of Jehovah's Witnesses in different regions, usually referred to the defendants as "sectarians" and "recruiters." For example, Nizhny Novgorod Online, reporting on the detention of "over two dozen adherents" of Jehovah's Witnesses in the region, emphasized: "The leader of the cell tried to flee to the Astrakhan region, as he was taking conspiratorial measures. He had 1.5 million rubles and another thousand euros in cash on him."[23].
The Mash Telegram channel, writing about the attempt of the Perm administration to return the Palace of Culture building bought by Pentecostals to municipal ownership, calls the believers "American sectarians" and distorts, probably intentionally, the last name of the Head Bishop of the Russian Church of Evangelical Christians, Eduard Grabovenko, accusing him of avarice and extorting money from parishioners: “Grobovenko (“grob” means “coffin” in Russian) has organized his own business club named after the son of God,” “has earned tens of millions of rubles exploiting those especially gullible,” “the Grobovenkos profited from people on almost everything – from entrance tickets to listen to sermons to literally slave labor.” [24]
Every once in a while, various publications published lists of dangerous "sects," bringing in Orthodox "anti-sectarians" as experts to explain the dangers. For example, Sovershenno Sekretno [Top Secret] published an interview with Alexander Dvorkin, who listed almost all religious movements that have operated in Russia since the 1990s as the organizations that "influence the psyche of entire groups of people, turning them into submissive slaves."[25] In a similar publication, Life.ru mentioned Nurcular, claiming that the organization "had a well-defined structure," and its "adherents" were "trained, in fact, as shahid capable of becoming a living bomb at the first word of the leader"[26] (in reality, the existence of a unified structure of Said Nursi's followers in Russia has not been confirmed, and it is known with certainty that this movement is not only not combative, but is not politicized at all).
In some cases, religious organizations have been able to defend their reputations through the courts. For example, the Evangelical Lutheran Parish of St. Anna (Annenkirche) in St. Petersburg filed a lawsuit against blogger Vadim Egorov for the protection of honor, dignity, and business reputation (Article 152 of the Civil Code) after Egorov published an interview with artist Nika Kletsky; in the interview, the blogger called Annenkirche "a separatist association" and "a bit of an anti-Russian project." The parties reached an amicable agreement, Egorov promised to make a public apology, and the Vyborg District Court dismissed the case.
In April, activists of Russian People's Militia demanded that an employee of the Novosibirsk pharmacy Melody of Health on Karl Marx Street remove her headscarf, because, in their opinion, the hijab was not a tradition of Russian Islam, but signalled wearer’s belonging to radical Islamic movements. After that, representatives of Militia appealed to the pharmacy manager demanding measures against the hijab-wearing employee. The pharmacy administration did not forbid the employee to wear a headscarf in the workplace.
We are not aware of cases of clergymen being held administratively responsible for such statements, but we are aware of several cases of criminal prosecution. Thus, in Krasnodar Krai, 86-year-old Archbishop of Slavyansk and South Russia Viktor Pivovarov (Russian Orthodox Church) was found guilty under Part 1 of Article 2803 of the Criminal Code (repeated discrediting of the armed forces) and fined 150,000 rubles. In 2023, he was brought to administrative responsibility for anti-war preaching.
In May, a case was initiated against Eduard Charov, a preacher from Krasnoufimsk, who does not identify with any Christian denomination, under Part 1 of Article 2803 and Part 2 of Article 2052 of the Criminal Code (public justification of terrorism on the Internet). The article on the repeated discrediting of the army was used because of a repost of an image with arguments about patriotism, which said that a real patriot should not justify "poverty and corruption with imaginary greatness and spiritual bonds." And Charov’s positive comment under the news about the arson of the military enlistment office was qualified as a justification for terrorism.
A case was initiated against Ilya Vasilyev, rector of the religious association Moscow Zen Center, under Paragraph E of Part 2 of Article 2073 of the Criminal Code (public dissemination under the guise of reliable reports of deliberately false information containing data on the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, motivated by political, ideological, racial, national, or religious hatred or enmity). The reason for the case was two Facebook posts. Vasilyev has been in custody since June.
In October, a case under Article 2804 of the Criminal Code (public calls to carry out activities against the security of the state) was brought against Nikolai Romaniuk, pastor of the Holy Trinity Church of Christians of Evangelical Faith in Balashikha, for a sermon in which he criticized the idea of Pentecostals participating in the fighting in Ukraine. During the search, although he did not offer any resistance, the pastor was hit on the head with a rifle butt; he suffered a micro-stroke and became deaf in one ear. Searches took place at several other ministers and parishioners of this church, as well as at the house of prayer in Balashikha. The pastor has been in jail since October.
The former hieromonk of the Russian Orthodox Church John (Kurmoyarov), who was convicted in 2023 for "fakes about the army" and converted to the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, failed to challenge the court's decision. After serving his sentence, he left Russia in 2024.
As in 2023, priests were also punished for their anti-war position by their own religious organizations, and such cases are known to us only with regard to the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. Some were expelled from holy orders (we know of two such cases). Most of them were banned from serving (we know of seven cases). This, in particular, happened in June to the cleric of the Yekaterinodar and Kuban dioceses, Archpriest Andrey Drugai, who refused to recite the Prayer for Holy Russia, prescribed by the Patriarch, and signed a letter in support of the defrocked Moscow Archpriest Alexy Uminsky, which will be discussed below. After the ban, Drugai left Russia.
In March, the rector of the Trinity Church in Dmitrov near Moscow, Priest Alexander Vostrodymov, was banned from serving until Easter (May 5). Later, the ban, imposed for "incorrect statements on the Internet," was extended. It is known that Father Alexander signed the clergy's anti-war appeal in 2022.
In April, Priest Dimitri Safronov, a cleric of the Moscow Church of the Intercession of the Most Holy Theotokos on Lyshikovaya Gora, was banned from serving for three years by the Patriarch’s decree, also for refusing to say the Prayer for Holy Russia. In addition, on the fortieth day after the death of Alexei Navalny, he served a memorial service at the politician’s grave. The priest was sent to the church of St. Pimen the Great In Novye Vorotniki as a psalmist for the duration of the ban.
Another Moscow priest, a cleric of the Church of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross of the Patriarchal Compound in Mitin, Priest Konstantin Kokora, was banned for the same period of time for refusing to read the Prayer and was also appointed as a psalmist to another church.
Archpriest Vadim Perimenov, a cleric of the Kain Diocese of the Novosibirsk Metropolitan Area, for the same "offense" was first transferred to a rural parish and then banned from serving for a period of one year. In a letter to the ruling bishop, he explained that in his decision not to recite the prayer, he was “guided by the Holy Scriptures... and his conscience,” as he considers it “unacceptable for himself to pray for victory in the fratricidal war between Orthodox Christians.”
In September, the rector of the Chelyabinsk Church in honor of the martyr Peter, Metropolitan Krutitsky, Peter Ustinov was banned from serving. According to Ustinov, the main reason for the ban was his refusal to recite the Prayer for Holy Russia. In addition, the bishop was displeased with the priest reading some of the texts in Russian (and not in Church Slavonic) during the divine service and using disposable spoons for communion.
In March, the Holy Synod recalled Priest Dimitri Ostanin, who was serving in Norway, from Bergen for his anti-war position, and then the Patriarch’s decree banned him from serving.
In several cases, a ban on serving was followed by a more severe punishment of defrocking. In January, the Moscow diocesan court defrocked Archpriest Alexy Uminsky, by that time already removed from rectory of the Moscow Trinity Church in Khokhly, where he had served prayer services for peace, publicly disagreeing with the official position of the church regarding military operations in Ukraine and refusing to read the prescribed prayer. The official reason for the defrocking was a violation of the 25th Rule of the Holy Apostles, violation of the priestly oath. In February, this decision was approved by the Patriarch. It should be noted that the Patriarch appointed Archpriest Andrey Tkachev, known for his fundamentalist views and numerous scandalous statements on TV and on the Internet, to replace the rector of this generally liberal parish. Father Alexy left Russia and was soon reinstated in the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
In April, Priest Andrey Kudrin, a cleric of the Church of the Icon of the Virgin of Life-Giving Spring in Bibirevo, Moscow, was dismissed from his post and banned from priesthood. The official reason for the ban was not provided, but it was known that, since the beginning of the military conflict in Ukraine, Father Andrey was reciting a prayer for the reconciliation of the peoples of Russia and Ukraine instead of the Prayer for Holy Russia. In July, the church court of the Moscow diocese defrocked the priest, and in August the decision was approved by the Patriarch.
Vologda Hieromonk Tikhon (Sokolovsky), who was first banned by the ruling bishop from Internet activity, then from preaching, and in July 2024 from serving, was finally defrocked in 2025. By the time of his defrocking, Father Tikhon had converted to the Apostolic Orthodox Church.
[1] Olga Sibireva. Challenges to Freedom of Conscience in Russia in 2023 // SOVA Center. 2024. March 25 (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/religion/publications/2024/03/d47072/).
SUMMARY
LEGAL REGULATION
Bills not (yet) developed
PROBLEMS CONCERNING PLACES OF WORSHIP
Problems Concerning the Construction of Temples
Problems With the Use Existing Buildings
Conflicts Over the Transfer of State and Municipal Property to Religious Organizations
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RELIGION
Liquidation of Religious Organizations
Recognition of the Activities of Religious Organizations as Undesirable and of Religious Figures as Foreign Agents
Criminal Prosecution
Restriction of Missionary Activity
Other Examples of Discrimination
Positive Verdicts
PROTECTING the FEELINGS of BELIEVERS
Protecting from Above
Protecting from Below
INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION FROM DEFAMATION AND ATTACS
Violence and Vandalism
Defamation of Religious Minorities
Insufficient Protection of Religious Minorities
PERSECUTION OF CLERGY FOR CRITICISM OF THE ARMED CONFLICT WITH UKRAINE
Summary
In 2024, many of the trends that we have observed and noted in previous reports have seen further development. Most importantly, the state policy of discrimination against religious minorities has continued.The anti-migrant campaign carried out by the authorities had a negative impact on the situation of Muslims, who during the year were subjected to pressure simultaneously from officials, law enforcement, vigilante organizations, and fellow citizens. The "hijab problem" has once again become relevant: an attempt to ban it legally at the federal level has failed, but regional legislators in the Vladimir region have included the hijab and niqab in the list of clothes not recommended for wearing in educational institutions. Most of the examples of non-state discrimination that we are aware of also targeted Muslims.
The pressure on Muslims was most clearly manifested in the situation with the construction and use of prayer facilities. The construction of mosques and Muslim prayer houses was almost always marked by protests from local residents, who often used xenophobic arguments. Occasionally, residents also objected to the presence of venues used by Muslim organizations in their neighborhoods. Such complaints have led to multiple closures of existing houses of worship (13 occurred in the Moscow region alone). Raids of mosques and houses of worship targeting illegal migrants were carried out regularly in different regions, which also disrupted worship services.
In most cases, the construction of Orthodox churches proceeded without direct conflict with local residents; however, the latter often spoke out against the construction of new churches during public hearings. Surveys conducted in different regions show that religious buildings in general are not among the citizens’ priorities: in fact, they would prefer anything else over new churches.
Some religious organizations made it to the list of organizations whose activities in Russia are considered undesirable, and some religious figures were added to the list of foreign agents, but their numbers were not dramatic. Four evangelical organizations, the Temple of Satan organization, and three religious figures were included in these lists, respectively. Administrative and criminal prosecution continued for cooperation with organizations whose activities had previously been deemed undesirable, and new sentences were imposed, including real prison time.
The criminal prosecution of Jehovah's Witnesses for organizing activities and financing an extremist organization continued. According to Yaroslav Sivulsky, Representative of the European Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, "sentences were fewer but tougher.” Alexander Chagan from Togliatti received the longest punishment of eight years in prison. As before, searches of Jehovah's Witnesses' homes in the new cases were often accompanied by violations, including use of violence against believers.
As before, Protestants and Muslims were more often subjected to administrative prosecution for "illegal missionary activities." Fines remained the most frequently used form of punishment under this article, and the number of cases increased.
The intensity of criminal prosecutions for “insulting religious feelings” has increased compared to the previous year, when we also noted an increase in the number of convictions under this article. As before, the majority of convictions and new cases were related to offensive publications online.
Public defenders of religious feelings continued to be primarily concerned with the organization of public campaigns against figures and events that, in their opinion, offended these feelings. As in previous years, these defenders were activists from the Sorok Sorokov Orthodox movement in collaboration with right-wing radical associations. Notably, both sides, both defenders of religious feelings and those who, from their point of view, offended these feelings, often referenced the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine: the former emphasized the gravity of the ongoing "blasphemy,” committed at the time when Russian fighters were defending Orthodoxy weapon in hand, while for the latter, their support of the Russian army served as proof of their commitment to traditional values.
Legal Regulation
During the year, legislative acts affecting the activities of religious organizations were adopted or considered.On June 11, 2024, the State Duma adopted in the third reading, and on June 22, Vladimir Putin signed amendments to the federal laws "On Privatization of State and Municipal Property" and "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations," which prohibit the transfer of religious property from state ownership to any third parties, with the exception of religious organizations. These amendments were adopted due to the absence at that time in the current legislation of a direct ban on the alienation of religious property in a general manner, which allowed the authorities to sell such properties to third parties. The adopted amendments made this impossible, and transactions involving the alienation of religious property concluded after 2010 can now be declared void in court.
On July 10, the State Duma passed in the third reading, and on July 22, President Putin signed amendments to Part 4 of the Civil Code, which, among other things, now includes a provision for checking new trademarks to ensure they do not insult the feelings of believers. The law was written with the participation of the Russian Orthodox Church. In accordance with the law, the Ministry of Economic Development has issued an order mandating the Interreligious Council of Russia to participate in the examination of registered trademarks conducted by Rospatent. Religious organizations involved in the examination need not be members of this council.
On July 23, the State Duma approved in the second and third readings, and on August 8, President Putin signed amendments to the Administrative Code granting the Interior Ministry the right to administratively expel foreign citizens from Russia for certain offenses, including illegal missionary activity (Part 5 of Article 5.26 of the Administrative Code).
On July 30, the State Duma passed in the second and third reading, and on August 8, President Putin signed amendments to the laws “On the Sanitary and Epidemiological Welfare of the Population” and “On the Fundamentals of Healthcare in the Russian Federation,” allowing clergy of centralized religious organizations to visit patients in intensive care units to conduct worship services. In November, the Ministry of Health approved new requirements for clergy visits to hospitals in accordance with the adopted amendments. The document gave the clergy of centralized religious organizations the right to visit hospitals at the invitation of the patients themselves or their relatives, but only with the permission of the head of the medical institution. The Ministry of Health recommended that medical institutions appoint employees responsible for organizing such visits and provide rooms for meetings with spiritual mentors and performing religious rituals. Clergy will not be visiting infectious diseases departments and, in case of a quarantine, patients from other departments. As the draft was being discussed, the Russian Orthodox Church tried to strike out this paragraph, but the Ministry of Health refused to oblige.
On November 12, the State Duma passed in the third reading, and on November 23, President Putin signed amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences, introducing the liability for the propaganda of child-free lifestyle in the media, the Internet, and movies. After the first reading, Patriarch Kirill, who generally supported the bill, asked its authors to add exemption for religious celibacy. His request was granted, and a note was added to the bill’s second reading to clarify that “it is not an administrative offense to disseminate information about monasticism and the monastic way of life, observance of the vow of celibacy and related refusal to procreate and (or) to commit public actions aimed at presenting monasticism and the monastic way of life, observance of the vow of celibacy and related refusal of procreation as attractive, if such Information and public actions are based on the internal regulations of centralized religious organizations or religious organizations within their structure.”[3]
In this form, the bill was adopted in its final reading. Thus, the dissemination of information about celibacy within the doctrine of those religious associations that do not have a centralized organization in Russia will now be punishable.
On October 22, the Ministry of Education and Youth Policy of the Vladimir region issued an order changing the requirements for schoolchildren's clothing and banning the wearing of religious clothing in schools. The order expanded a 2017 decree regulating student clothing by adding hijabs, niqabs, and other religious clothing to the list of items that are not recommended for school wear. The regional branch of the Ministry clarified that the changes “ensure the secular nature of state and municipal educational institutions and the preservation in them of religious neutrality.”[4]
Bills not (yet) developed
The aforementioned regional ban on the wearing of religious clothing in schools was undoubtedly inspired by attempts to legally ban religious clothing at the federal level, but these projects have not been developed.On May 20, Valery Fadeyev, Chairman of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, in an interview with Parlamentskaya Gazeta said that the wearing of niqabs (a garment for Muslim women that covers entire body and face, leaving only a slit for the eyes) should be banned, "since nowadays niqabs are banned even in some Central Asian countries.”
A week later, at the initiative of Vladislav Davankov, first deputy head of the New People parliamentary faction, a bill was submitted to the State Duma giving regional and municipal authorities the right to ban the wearing of niqabs and other religious clothing covering the face and giving educational institutions the right to set requirements for the appearance, color, style, and rules of wearing students' clothes and to ban the wearing of religious clothing if more than half of the student or parent council members support this measure. The bill caused outrage among the Muslim community.
In September, the government announced that it did not support Davankov’s bill and believed that it "needed significant revision." In January 2025, the author withdrew the bill.
Another bill to ban niqabs was drafted by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation almost simultaneously with New People. Notably, the word "niqab" was never mentioned in the text of this bill, however, the authors provided an extensive list of cases when a citizen's closed face should not be considered administrative offence, and religious clothing was deliberately not included in this list. As Mikhail Matveyev, one of the main authors of the bill, explained, “we are moving away from arguments about religious clothing so as not to give “the infringed” another reason to make a row and lead us into arguments about what fashion is in this or that desert of the world today. What we are concerned about is the safety of Russian citizens.”[5]
The government’s feedback to this bill was negative, and it was never submitted to the State Duma.
Two more bills (neither of which has been adopted) concerning the activities of religious organizations have caused a wide public resonance. Both of them amend the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.”
On October 30, a draft amendment to Article 16 of this Law, developed by a group of deputies from the New People party, was submitted to the State Duma. The bill introduces a ban on holding worship services in non-residential premises of apartment buildings, as well as on holding systematic worship services in residential premises. According to the explanatory note, the proposed measures are aimed against “gatherings of large groups of strangers who do not reside in an apartment building in question, including illegal migrants," which "increase the risks of worsening the criminal situation in the area, provoke domestic conflicts, and violate fire and public safety standards."[6]
Commenting on this legislative initiative, representatives of various religious organizations noted that it contradicts the principle of freedom of conscience and violates the Constitution. Even the Head of the Legal Department of the Moscow Patriarchate, Abbess Xenia Chernega, who supported the bill as a whole, expressed concern that its adoption would place the sacraments of Communion, Unction, and other religious rites performed by clergymen in residential buildings at the request of citizens living in them, including those seriously ill or near death, under threat of prohibition.”[7]
In response to the concerns expressed by believers, Oleg Leonov, a member of the New People faction and deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee for the Development of Civil Society and Public and Religious Associations, explained that the bill was aimed solely against “sects,” which “as a rule, do not have their own temples,” and that the proposed measures would not prevent religious ceremonies from being carried out at home.
Another draft amendment to the same law was introduced in December by deputies of the National Assembly of the Republic of Dagestan. This bill introduces an indefinite ban on the establishment of religious organizations by the leaders and members of the governing bodies of prohibited organizations; grants regional authorities the right to coordinate with the territorial bodies of the Ministry of Justice decisions on registration of local and centralized religious organizations; deprives religious organizations that are not part of centralized organizations of the right to distribute religious literature and religious objects; and extends the timeframe for making decisions on the registration of religious associations from one month to six months "for carrying out a state religious expert examination."
Several other legislative acts that have been adopted or are currently under consideration, including those related to the activities of religious organizations, relate to anti-extremist legislation, and are therefore mentioned in the other report.[8]
Problems Concerning Places of Worship
Problems Concerning the Construction of Temples
As before, religious organizations occasionally encountered difficulties with the construction of religious buildings.The construction of Orthodox churches led to conflicts less frequently than in previous years. The largest was the ongoing conflict over the construction of a temple on an embankment in Krasnodar's Yubileyny neighborhood. Krasnodar residents protested against the construction, collected signatures for petitions to various authorities, and even turned to Putin for help, asking him to intervene and stop the construction of the temple and the destruction of the green zone. In addition to collecting signatures, solitary pickets were held, for which some of the activists were charged with administrative offences. In particular, City Duma deputy Alexander Safonov and social activist Vitaly Cherkasov were fined under Part 2 of Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code (organizing or holding rallies without notifying the authorities) for organizing the collection of signatures against the construction of the temple during a meeting with voters. Police came and talked to some of the protesters, such as the concierge of one of the houses on Klara Luchko Boulevard, who kept the signature lists. The protests continued in 2025.
We are not aware of any other conflicts as remarkable as this one, but we do know that urban residents are in general not enthusiastic about construction of Orthodox churches and religious buildings; they believe that the existing ones suffice and that other facilities are much more necessary.
These sentiments are reflected in the results of both nationwide and regional public opinion polls. For example, a June VTsIOM poll showed that only 8% of Russians believe that there are not enough functioning Orthodox churches in their locality; 77% of respondents say there are enough temples in their locality, and 10% of respondents believe that there are too many. The shortage of churches was mainly reported by rural residents (14%), while the excess was noted by residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg (21%)[9]. The survey results published in January by the Omsk authorities showed that 90% believed that there were enough religious buildings and construction of new ones was not necessary[10].
In practice, citizens most often spoke against construction of new churches during public hearings or in social networks and online voting, but in most cases their protests did not lead to major conflicts.
For example, in Tolyatti, the Samara region, the hearing participants protested against the construction of a temple near 40 Years of Victory Street. Following the hearing, the city authorities declined the approval of the construction, proposed by the parish of the Church of the Great Martyr Anastasia Uzoreshitelnitsa [Deliverer from Potions], and announced the construction of a kindergarten there instead. The hearing participants in Samara, who discussed the potential for construction on Novo-Sadovaya Street, also spoke in favor of a kindergarten or a school instead of a church.
Residents of the Pushkinsky district in the city of Zavolzhye, Nizhny Novgorod region, appealed to the head of the Gorodetsky Municipal District, Alexander Mudrov, to revoke the decision to build a temple near residential buildings on Grunin and Bauman streets and move it closer to the cemetery.
Residents of Novosibirsk demanded to stop the construction of a church on Nemirovich-Danchenko Street, fearing that the heating infrastructure would be damaged, leaving the entire residential area without heating. The mayor's office confirmed that although the site had indeed been handed over to the ROC for free use, no building permit had been issued.
The St. Petersburg authorities refused to hand over part of the Sestroretsk Dunes Nature Reserve to the church for the construction of a spiritual and educational center with wellness and restaurant compounds and a hotel. Local residents have collected more than 800 signatures against the construction and tree felling.
Often, however, the authorities ignored the opponents of construction even when they made up the majority of votes at public hearings. Thus, after the majority at the public hearing voted against changing the status of a land plot at the Akhedzhak Datcha and the construction of a temple there, the Krasnodar Land Use and Development Commission recommended rejecting all the votes against the diocesan project and counting only the five votes in support of the construction. The site in question is located near the backwater of the Kuban River and the Park of the 30th Anniversary of Victory, previously owned by Louise Akhedzhak, the daughter of the former deputy governor of the Krasnodar Territory, and is a protected area.
The St. Petersburg authorities recommended not taking into account the voices against the construction of a temple in memory of the participants of the SMO (special military operation) at the corner of Peterburgskoe Chaussee and Detskoselsky Boulevard in Pushkin, opposed by the majority of participants in both the public debate and the survey in the Citizen Pushkin local activists group.
The Murmansk authorities similarly ignored the residents’ opinion and went ahead with the construction of the St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Savior’s Transfiguration on Kapitan Burkov Street. Most of the public debate participants, with honorary residents of the city and Alexander Makarevich, a deputy of the Murmansk Regional Duma, among them, asked for the construction to be moved elsewhere so as not to overload the infrastructure and the narrow road and not to exceed the height of the Alyosha Memorial to the Defenders of the Soviet Arctic, the symbol of the city.
The Samara authorities gave permission to use the land plot opposite the Press House, at the intersection of Aurora and Garazhnaya Streets, for the construction of a temple, although the public hearings participants would prefer to see an educational institution here.
The mayor of Vladivostok issued a permit for the use of a land plot on Basargin Street for religious activities, although the majority of residents of the area who participated in the discussion did not support the building of a church there.
In Nizhny Novgorod, after local residents’ protests, the diocese decided against the building of two churches: on Hero Smirnov Street in the Avtozavodsky district and in the green zone in the Prioksky district. In the second case, the city authorities counted only part of the votes cast against the construction, ignoring the majority of participants, but then the latter appealed to the prosecutor's office, and the diocese itself announced it would move the construction elsewhere.
As in the previous year, there were many protests in different regions against the construction of mosques. In most cases, the main reason for the discontent of local residents, as in the case of Orthodox churches, were potential inconveniences associated with the proximity of a religious building – aggravated transport situation, an increased load on infrastructure, noise, or the locals’ preference to see the construction of facilities other than mosques.
This was the case, for example, in Yelizovo, Kamchatka Krai, where citizens protested against the construction of a mosque at public hearings; in Vladivostok, whose residents opposed the conversion of a former next-door store into a Muslim prayer house; and in Khabarovsk, where the local residents’ protests against mosque construction mosque made the Investigative Committee look into the legality of the site use.
In addition to the disruptions to daily life, protesters often cited the risks associated with the growing number of migrants visiting the mosque. Thus, residents of New Moscow opposed the construction of an interfaith center with a mosque in the Kommunarka district, as they believe the criminal situation in the area would be aggravated "manifold due to the presence of such a large ideological complex serving a huge number of migrants who are extremely radicalized against Russian people.”[11] Opponents of the construction appealed to Putin and the head of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, with a request to intervene and prevent "people from Central Asia from replacing us."
Residents of the Verkhnyaya Kurya district of Perm, who also opposed the construction of a mosque, shared with Bastrykin their apprehension of a worsening criminal situation and the "lawlessness" caused by migrants. The opponents of the mosque did not limit themselves to appeals on social networks and expressed their views in graffiti, writing on the fence surrounding the construction site: "Return the land to the children. This is where a school should be." The head of the Investigative Committee is now monitoring the situation with the construction of the mosque, but the protests continued in early 2025.
In most cases, the authorities supported opponents of the construction of mosques. For example, the authorities of Bataysk, the Rostov region, refused to change the purpose of a land plot on Limanny Passage where a mosque was to be erected after most of the participants of the public discussion voted against the changing of the site status and against the construction.
After the local residents’ protests, the Yekaterinburg authorities refused to issue a permit to the Muslim community Islam Nuri to build a charity house in the village of Sadovy. The city administration cited the threat to environmental safety due to the proximity of the cattle burial ground and the increased burden on the transport and engineering infrastructure of the area as the justification for the refusal.
Protests against the construction of a mosque in Ufa led to the city authorities terminating the agreement with the Muslim community on the allocation of a land plot on Mendeleev Street. Opponents of the construction were wary of the felling of trees, noise, and other inconveniences associated with the activities of a religious organization, as well as the influx of migrants. In addition, they expressed preference for the construction of a social facility, not a religious one, on that sire – a children's educational or medical institution.
We are not aware of any conflicts related to the construction of religious buildings of other religions.
Problems With the Use of Existing Buildings
As in the previous year, Muslim organizations were most often confronted with difficulties in using existing buildings. Most of the cases known to us concerned Moscow and the Moscow region. During the year, 13 Muslim prayer houses were closed in the Moscow Region alone.[12]In addition, three prayer houses that had previously been declared illegal by court decisions were demolished in the Moscow region: Abu Bakr in Troitsk (New Moscow), Druzhba between Mytishchi and Lobnya, and a prayer house near the village of Kiovo near Mytishchi.
As a rule, the inspections, resulting in sanctions against Muslim prayer premises, were carried out after complaints from local residents, who were unhappy about the proximity of a religious organization. Similarly to protests against the construction of mosques, anti-migrant rhetoric was often used. For instance, after residents of the village of Malakhovka complained in a video message to Putin about the large number of migrants gathering in the prayer house and posing a danger to local residents, the agreement between the Lyubertsy authorities and the local Muslim religious organization Svet on the gratuitous use of the building was terminated. Interestingly, the head of the community, Imam Ramil Rahmankulov, attempted to save the prayer house and stressed that his community had been sending humanitarian aid to Donbass since 2014, and was now helping the Russians fighting in Ukraine, but officials ignored these arguments and terminated the lease.
Such local residents’ complaints often enjoyed the support of radical right-wing organizations. For example, residents of an apartment building on Dmitrovskoye Chaussee in Moscow, supported by Russkaya Obschina [Russian Community], appealed to Bastrykin demanding that a Muslim prayer room located in the building, where hundreds of people gathered on Fridays, be shut down. Residents of Balashikha, near Moscow, also complained about the inconveniences associated with the Iman Muslim prayer house, visited by "crowds of migrants." Their complaints were also supported by Russkaya Obschina.
Orthodox organizations outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church also faced difficulties in using their property.
In Noginsk, near Moscow, the Trinity Church under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was demolished after the court decision to demolish it as an illegal building was made back in 2016 (at that time the parish referred to itself as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate). The parish tried to appeal this decision all the way to the European Court of Human Rights, but in 2022 the ECHR found the demolition decision lawful and the parish's complaint unacceptable.
The administration of Slavyansk-on-Kuban tried to get the court to recognize the Pokrovsko-Tikhonovsky Temple of the Russian Orthodox Church, built on a plot belonging to the bishop of this church, as illegal and demolish it, but the court found that the building was built lawfully and dismissed the claim.
We are aware of very few cases of other religious organizations having problems with using existing property. The seizure of property from Jehovah’s Witnesses continued. We are aware of such seizures in four regions: In Moscow, a three-storey house in the Mikhalkovo estate area, two apartments and a basement near Sretensky Boulevard and non-residential premises in the Northern Administrative District were seized; in Tyumen, a plot of land and an apartment building; in Kazan, three four-room apartments in the Vakhitovsky district; and in Kuibyshev, the Novosibirsk region, a plot and an uninhabited building. In all cases, the courts ruled that the donations of property to foreign organizations of Jehovah's Witnesses were fictitious and seized it in favor of the state. The Office of the Federal Register for the Chuvash Republic issued a warning to the owner of an apartment building in the village of Pihtulino, where the Cheboksary Society for Krishna Consciousness was holding meetings. An inspection, carried out after neighbors complained about the use of the house as a religious facility, established that the building was originally built as a place of worship, but on a site intended for residential development. The warning suggested that the building owner stop the misuse of the site or change the type of permitted use.
The Abakan City Court seized a land plot from the local religious organization of Evangelical Christians (Pentecostals) "Church of Glorification" for debts. The church failed to pay the fine imposed in July 2022. Together with the late fees, the total amounted to almost 850,000 rubles.
A long-term conflict over the building of the House of the Gospel in St. Petersburg, which the Baptist community sought access to, has finally been resolved. The building is surrounded by the territory of the Elektroapparat factory, and for a long time attempts to negotiate access were unsuccessful. In the end, the Baptist community received the keys to the building and was able to begin restoration work and hold worship services.
Conflicts Over the Transfer of State and Municipal Property to Religious Organizations
As before, state and municipal property continued to be transferred to religious organizations from time to time, and most often to the Russian Orthodox Church. We are not aware of any cases where such transfers caused conflicts.For example, in the Solnechnogorsk district of the Moscow region, the building of the Church of St. Michael the Archangel, designed by Vasily Bazhenov, was transferred to the parish of the village of Tarakanovo. The parish has been restoring this church since 2006. It is an object of cultural heritage of regional importance.
The Ministry of Property and Land Relations of the Vladimir region has transferred to the St. Andrew's stauropegial Monastery of Moscow the Church of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary, also an object of cultural heritage of regional significance, built in 1777 in the village of Kliny in the Kolchuginsky district.
Ufa City Hall has transferred to the ownership of the Ufa Diocese the land plot under the Cathedral of the Nativity of the Virgin, previously in perpetual use of the diocese.
Sometimes the property was transferred to other religious organizations. For example, St. Petersburg authorities handed over to the Catholic parish of Our Lady of Lourdes the building of the House of the Clergy in Kovensky Pereulok, where historically the Sunday school and the office were located. And in the Leningrad Region, the Vuoksela Church building near Priozersk was transferred to the ownership of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Ingria.
In February, the Samara Region Arbitration Court granted the claim of the local “Hussain’s Name” Muslim religious organization to the Department of Urban Planning, the Mayor's office, and the administration of the Kuibyshev district of Samara for recognition of ownership of the mosque building on the Kryazhskoye Chausee.
In Tyumen, the Muslim religious organization Krinkul was able to confirm, after several years, its ownership of the school building in the Kazarovo neighborhood. According to archival data, the building was built as a mosque, but it housed a local school, and the Muslim community did not claim it. After the school moved, the Muslims tried to claim ownership of the former mosque, but the city authorities handed it over to the Centralized City Library System instead. The community filed a lawsuit and passed several courts. In September, the court of appeal confirmed that the community could indeed claim the ownership of the building of the former mosque.
In some cases, religious organizations were unable to obtain the rights to the property even through the court. For example, in Yaroslavl, the parish of the Church of St. Leontius of Rostov was unable to defend its ownership of an uninhabited building where a boiler room, an icon painting workshop, and utility rooms were located. Although the parish had completed the restoration of the building, which it had received for perpetual use, installed windows and doors, and connected electricity and other utilities, the regional arbitration court ruled that the ownership of the building remains with the city.
The transfer of museum property to the Russian Orthodox Church continued, and as a rule such transfers proceeded without disputes. In January, Andrei Rublev’s Trinity icon, transferred to the use of the Russian Orthodox Church a year earlier, was displayed for worship at Christ the Savior Cathedral, where it remained until June, although representatives of the Ministry of Culture had promised that the icon would be sent for a lengthy and extensive restoration. In June, it was moved to the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius, where it is to stay permanently. The transportation of the 15th century artifact first to Christ the Savior Cathedral and then to the Lavra was carried out without a special climate controlled case, and in the Lavra, it is exhibited in a regular display case that cannot guarantee the very specific temperature and humidity conditions required for the icon’s preservation.
The process of transferring the Ryazan Kremlin's cathedrals and churches to the Russian Orthodox Church has been completed. In November, the Church of the Descent of the Holy Spirit, the last church belonging to the museum compound, which housed the museum library, was transferred to the Ryazan Diocese.
The authorities of the Kurgan region have concluded an agreement with the diocese on the transfer of icons, currently kept in the storerooms of museums, that were seized from churches during the Soviet times. In January, the first icon was transferred to the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Kurgan.
In Zabaykalsky Krai, the debate was resumed on the possibility of transferring the building of the Decembrists’ Museum to the Chita Diocese. However, the Minister of Culture of the region Irina Levkovich assured in April that "the issue of transferring the building of the Decembrists’ Museum to the ownership of the Russian Orthodox Church was not considered. The possibility of searching for a building and improving the surrounding area was also not discussed. There are no plans to move the museum's collection."[13]
We should add that in cases of transfer of cultural monuments, the authorities sometimes sanction religious organizations that fail to take good care of the property. For example, the Arbitration Court of the Perm region ordered the regional Spiritual Administration of Muslims to restore a mosque in the city of Osa, which is an object of cultural heritage. After an inspection had revealed the unsatisfactory condition of the mosque and minaret, the regional inspectorate for the protection of cultural heritage sites appealed to the court, since the religious organization that owned the monument had failed to respond to both the initial order to eliminate violations and the subsequent warning. According to the court's decision, the regional Spiritual Administration of Muslims will have to carry out the restoration of the mosque over the next three years.
Discrimination Based on Religion
Liquidation of Religious Organizations
Unlike in 2024, there were several cases of liquidations of religious organizations. In September, the Kurganinsky District Court of Krasnodar Krai granted the claim of the district prosecutor's office to ban the activities of the Kurganinsky House of Prayer, which is part of the International Union of Evangelical Baptist Christians, "until violations are eliminated by sending a notification about the start of the religious group's activities" to the relevant authorities. The violations, which included "illegal missionary religious activities" and the creation of a religious group without notifying the relevant authorities, were revealed in the course of a prosecutor's inspection. We do not know whether the Kurganinsk House of Prayer has resumed its activities.In May, the Omsk Regional Court, at the request of the regional department of the Ministry of Justice, liquidated the local Greek Catholic parish of the Intercession of the Most Holy Theotokos. The reason for the liquidation was gross violations of federal law. In March, this decision was confirmed by the Court of Cassation. Earlier, a case was initiated against the minister of this parish, Igor Maksimov, under Part 1 of Article 3541 of the Criminal Code (rehabilitation of Nazism) and Part 2 of Article 148 of the Criminal Code (insulting the religious feelings of believers, committed in places designated for worship).
In October, the Supreme Court of Crimea satisfied the claim of the regional Ministry of Justice and liquidated the independent Alushta Muslim community. The reasons for the liquidation included “actions aimed at carrying out extremist activities” and a number of violations, including the untimely expulsion from the community of its former chairman Lenur Khalilov and former member of the organization Ruslan Mesutov, who were convicted for involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir. According to the lawyer Rustem Kyamilev, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea, whose jurisdiction did not include the Alushta community, was involved in the liquidation.
In other cases, it was more of a legal statement of a fait accompli. In October, the Rossoshansky District Court of the Voronezh region satisfied the claim of the regional Ministry of Justice to liquidate the local church of Evangelical Christian Baptists, which had effectively ceased its activities after the death of its presbyter.
In October, the Rostov Regional Court, also following a claim filed by the Ministry of Justice, liquidated the Rostov Religious Jewish Community, which was part of the Congress of the Jewish Religious Organizations and Associations in Russia (CJROAR). As in the above-mentioned case, the community had long ceased to be active.
This same court heard the cases on the liquidation of two more religious organizations, the Assyrian Church of the East in Shakhty and the Jewish Community of Novocherkassk. In the first case, the Ministry of Justice withdrew its claim as the community managed to eliminate the detected violations. We are not aware of the outcome of the other case.
Recognition of the Activities of Religious Organizations as Undesirable and of Religious Figures as Foreign Agents
The Prosecutor General's Office continued to add religious organizations to the list of organizations whose activities are recognized as undesirable in Russia, but not very actively. During the year, three evangelical non-governmental organizations were added to this list: two affiliates of the Great Commission Ministries religious organization – the Canadian Great Commission Media Ministries (GCMM, Great Commission Media Ministry, Great Commission Mission Media Service) and the American Great Commission Media Ministries (GCMM, Great Commission Media Ministry, Great Commission Mission Media Service), and their affiliate in Finland, International Russian Radio & Television (IRR/TV). In addition, the international organization the Satanic Temple (TST) was also recognized as undesirable. According to the Prosecutor General's Office, these organizations destabilize the socio-political situation in Russia and support Ukraine, the Ukrainian armed forces, the Russian opposition, and extremist organizations.Followers of religious organizations previously recognized as undesirable were subjected to administrative and criminal prosecution. The Central District Court of Prokopyevsk, the Kemerovo region, found Sergei Mikhalev, the pastor of one of the religious groups of Evangelical Christians, who published materials of the New Generation on his VKontakte page, guilty under Part 1 of Article 2841 of the Criminal Code (participation in the activities of an undesirable organization after administrative punishment for a similar act) and sentenced him to one year of compulsory labor with a deduction of 15% of wages, which is to be transferred to the state.
The Central District Court of Togliatti fined local resident Olga Patrolina under Article 20.33 of the Administrative Code (participation in the activities of an undesirable organization) for posting a link to a song about Christ sung in the New Generation church. Another believer, a native of Uzbekistan, was fined by the same court under the same article for publishing a sermon by the pastor of this church.
The Moscow Simonovsky District Court heard and ruled in the case of ongoing activities of Vladimir Muntian's Vozrozhdeniye [Revival] Charitable Foundation and the All-Ukrainian Spiritual Center Vozrozhdeniye religious organization, both based in Ukraine. Mikhail Koval, I. Nagornova, and N. Ukhova were accused under Part 3 of Article 2841 of the Criminal Code (organizing the activities of an undesirable organization). All of them admitted their guilt (Koval and Ukhova – in full, Nagornova – in part), but the verdict of the court is unknown to us. Victoria Kosheleva from Sochi was found guilty under Part 2 of Article 2841 of the Criminal Code (provision of financial services intended to support the activities of an undesirable organization) for cooperation with the same organizations and was sentenced to two years of imprisonment in a penal colony.
In Pyatigorsk, Oksana Shchetkina, the leader of the local organization Friends of Falun Gong, was sentenced to a real prison term under Part 3 of Article 284.1 of the Criminal Code. Several other cases under the same part of the same article on cooperation with Falun Gong organizations were investigated in different regions. In Moscow, three people were charged, and two of them, Natalia Minchenkova and Gennady Buslov, were sentenced to prison. Similar cases were initiated in Krasnodar and Tomsk. The leader of the local Falun Gong organization in Mordovia, I. Maksinyaev, was convicted under the same part of the same article in January 2025 and was sentenced to compulsory labor.
Nadezhda Lai, the head of Falun Gong in Irkutsk, four residents of Krasnodar, and Zoya Orlenko, Kirill Belan, and Alexander Kozlov were fined for cooperation with Falun Gong organizations under Article 20.33 of the Administrative Code.
In addition, we have information about criminal cases for cooperation with the Allatra movement: one case was brought against a resident of Omsk under three parts of Article 284 of the Criminal Code, and another against a resident of Solnechnogorsk near Moscow under Part 2 of Article 2841.
Three religious figures were added to the list of foreign agents in 2024: Albert Ratkin, the pastor of Evangelical Christian (Pentecostal) Word of Life Church, Archbishop Grigory Mikhnov-Vaitenko of the Apostolic Orthodox Church, and priest Andrei Lvov, defrocked from the Russian Orthodox Church and converted to the Apostolic Orthodox Church, who had left Russia.
Criminal Prosecution
The criminal persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses continued. During the year, new criminal cases were opened on the continuation of the activities of an extremist organization. According to the Jehovah's Witnesses themselves, 41 people were charged in new cases (data as of mid-December). According to our data, at the beginning of March 2025, at least 143 believers were being held in colonies and pre-trial detention centers.According to the Jehovah's Witnesses, during 2024, 116 believers were found guilty under Art. 2822 (organizing the activities of an extremist organization) and Art. 2823 of the Criminal Code (financing the activities of an extremist organization); 43 of them (37%) were sentenced to prison time, and 24 got more than 5 years. According to Yaroslav Sivulsky, Representative of the European Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, "this year, sentences were fewer but tougher.”[14]
Alexander Chagan, a Jehovah's Witness from Tolyatti, was given the longest term of eight years of imprisonment in a general regime colony with a one-year restriction of liberty and a three-year ban on participation in activities related to religious organizations. Three believers from Khabarovsk, Nikolai Polevodov, Vitaly Zhukov, and Stanislav Kim, were sentenced to terms between eight years and two months and eight years and six months, but on appeal the sentence was commuted to suspended imprisonment and a shorter term.
According to the Jehovah's Witnesses, 96 homes were searched in 2024, of which 17 were carried out in Crimea. Four cases of violence by security forces during searches and one case of torture in places of detention were recorded. In addition, Rinat Kiramov, a Jehovah's Witness from Akhtubinsk, who is serving a sentence in the Tula region, complained of torture.
Criminal persecution of representatives of other religious organizations continued too. In Izhevsk, in December, Sergey Artemyev, the pastor of the local religious organization of Evangelical Christians (Pentecostals), the Light of the World Church, was charged in court under Part 1 of Article 239 of the Criminal Code (creation of a religious association whose activities involve violence against citizens or other harm to their health, and leadership of such an association) and Paragraph B of Part 3 of Article 111 of the Criminal Code (intentional infliction of serious harm to health, resulting in mental disorder). From February to November, the pastor was under house arrest, although even the victims petitioned for a commutation of his punishment.
The investigation alleges that between 2019 and January 2024, Artemyev "conducted weekly worship services for parishioners on a paid basis, during which he deliberately and consciously used and systematically applied: methods of mental and psychological influence on a person, <...> psychological violence" with the goal of "continuing to receive money from parishioners" and extract "financial profits from the controlled adepts."[15] At the same time, one of the victims, whose testimony the prosecution referred to, stated that she did not recognize herself as such, since the pastor had not caused her "the slightest harm, nor had he harmed any of the servants of the Light of the World Church." At the time of writing of this report, the case was still being considered in court.
In Ulyanovsk, a case under Parts 2 and 3 of the same article (creation of a non-profit organization whose activities involve encouraging citizens to refuse to perform civil duties or commit other illegal acts, and participation in such an organization) and Article 2052 of the Criminal Code (public calls for terrorist activities, public justification of terrorism) was brought against Metropolitan Zosima (Leonid Vlasov), the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Tsarist Empire. Vlasov was detained in February together with several of his followers. He calls himself the prophet, patriarch, and king of the "triune Russia" – Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and urges his followers to give up their passports and tax numbers. The case was brought to court in November, but the verdict had not yet been rendered at the time of writing of this report.
Restriction of Missionary Activity
The persecution of religious organizations for “illegal” missionary work continued. According to the statistics from the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on the application of Article 5.26 of the Administrative Code (violation of legislation on freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and religious associations), the number of cases considered in 2024 increased and reached 431 (compared to 354 in 2023).The number of persons punished under this article has also increased compared to 2023: a total of 294 persons were punished, including 184 individuals, 90 legal entities, 18 officials, and 2 people engaged in entrepreneurial activities without forming a legal entity (in 2023, a total of 228: 139, 74, 15, and 0, respectively).
Fines continued to be the most frequently used form of punishment: they were imposed in 255 cases. In 38 cases, warnings were issued to the perpetrators, and in one case mandatory work was ordered. Administrative arrest was not used as a punishment. In 15 cases, the main punishment was supplemented by administrative expulsion from Russia, and in 23 cases by confiscation.
The total fines under the regulations that came into force increased significantly compared to the previous year and amounted to 4,747,000 rubles (in 2023 – 2,771,000 rubles).[16].
Most of the cases prosecuted under this article during the year that we are aware of involved Muslims, with Protestants coming in second. For example, a native of Azerbaijan was fined in Tula under Part 4 of this article (carrying out missionary activities in violation of the requirements of the legislation on freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and religious organizations) for organizing premises for namaz without obtaining a permit from a religious organization; in Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai, Baptist pastor Anatoly Mukhin was fined under the same part of the same article for organizing a worship service of an unregistered religious group in the presence of two non-Baptist believers. In Belorechensk, Krasnodar Krai, Baptist pastor Daniil Litovkin was fined under the same part of the same article for organizing a visit by a group of Baptists to a city hospital to wish patients Happy Easter and distribute gifts and a religious newspaper.
The local religious organization of Muslims of Semikarakorsky district of Rostov region and the head of a Christian center in Krasnoslobodsky district of Mordovia were fined under Part 3 of Article 5.26 (carrying out activities by a religious organization without indicating its official full name, including the issue or distribution of unmarked literature as part of missionary activities).
Muslims were most often prosecuted under Part 5 of this article (carrying out missionary activities by a foreign citizen in violation of the requirements of the legislation on freedom of conscience and freedom of religion and religious associations). Usually the offense consisted in organizing or conducting namaz without documents confirming the authority to conduct missionary activities. In particular, Uzbek citizen Nobijon Obitov in Bashkiria, Ohunjon Isabaev in the Tula region, and Abdukodir Abdukhalilov in Troitsk (New Moscow) were fined for this offense.
Often the fine under this part of Article 5.26 was supplemented by administrative expulsion from the country. This, for example, happened in Moscow to citizens of Tajikistan A. Yakubov and Muhammadrachab Erov, and Bakhodir Sabirov, in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky – the citizen of Uzbekistan Rasuljon Mamatoirov, in Tuapse – citizens of Tajikistan Samariddin Saliev and Jalili Saidzoda.
Representatives of other religious organizations have also been prosecuted under this article. For example, in Sochi, the 85-year-old former vicar of the local Catholic parish of the Apostles Simon and Thaddeus, Vladislav Klotz, was fined under Part 5 of this article, followed by administrative expulsion, and in Zelenodolsk, the court imposed a similar penalty under the same part of the same article on Irish citizen Hugh Turvey for his participation in the Shravanam Kirtanam festival, “where he conducted religious spiritual practices Sankirtana, gave lectures on Vaishnavism, and chanted Hari Krishna mantras”[17] without permits. In the Rostov region, a priest of the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church, Dionisiy (Dmitry Belolipetsky), was fined under Part 4 of the same article for conducting religious activities without notifying the relevant authorities.
Other Examples of Discrimination
As in previous years, instances of police interference in the life of Muslim organizations were recorded. As a rule, it was connected with raids to detect illegal migrants, which were often accompanied by various violations and disruptions of worship services. We know of such cases in Cheboksary, in Engels in the Saratov region, and in Balashikha, Kotelniki, and Lyubertsy near Moscow.The most notorious of all was the November incident in Khabarovsk, where officers of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Federal Migration Service (FMS), together with riot police, broke into the prayer house of the local Muslim religious organization Blagonravie [Good Morality] during Friday prayers. Using foul language, they forced the believers face down on the floor. 25 people were crammed into two cars using a stun gun. Some elderly believers lost consciousness and some had convulsions. Notably, no illegal migrants were detected during that raid.
The Muslim community went to court. According to the chairman of the organization, Mussa Kushtov, this was the third raid by law enforcers in a year. At the same time, multiple inspections have repeatedly confirmed that the community was using the rented building legally and there were no violations in its activities. The behavior of law enforcement officers in Khabarovsk was discussed at the meeting of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Moscow.
Another example: a case under Part 2 of Article 3221 of the Criminal Code (organization of illegal migration committed by an organized group of persons) was brought against members of the Hafizlyk local religious organization of Muslims in Moscow. The case was initiated after a complaint from residents of the Nizhegorodsky district of Moscow, who were unhappy about the proximity of a religious organization.
In St. Petersburg, Michael Schwarzkopf, pastor of the Petrikirche, Propst (senior pastor) of the Northwestern Church District of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of European Russia, was forced to leave the country together with his family before his residence permit expired because he was charged under Part 5 of Article 18.8 of the Administrative Code (repeated violation by a foreign citizen of the visa regime of the Russian Federation). The reason for the administrative case was the fact that he stayed for more than seven days at a place different from his official registration address without notifying the authorities. However, both apartments – the one where the pastor was registered and the one where he actually lived – belong to the Lutheran community.
Unlike in the previous year, we are aware of several cases of non-state discrimination, and most of them are related to the wearing of Muslim clothing in public places, including educational institutions. For example, the management of the Lyantorsk Oil Technical College in Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug refused to allow a freshman girl wearing a headscarf to attend classes. The girl's family said they were prepared to take legal action. In one of Mirny's schools in Yakutia, a teacher ordered a seventh-grader in a headscarf to leave class. The child switched to homeschooling. A lecturer at Ivanovo State Medical University, Zhidomorov, forced a female Muslim student to read to the class a poem the lecturer authored about the dangers of the hijab “for educational purposes” in class. The university started an official inquiry into the incident.
In Obninsk, the Kaluga region, a Muslim couple was forced to leave a restaurant by the security guards at the request of other patrons, who claimed that wearing a hijab in public places was unacceptable. And in Nizhnevartovsk, the administration of at least two swimming pools banned female visitors wearing burkinis.
We would like to mention an incident in Moscow, where a Muslim Yandex Taxi driver refused to drive the rabbi of the Yahad youth organization, Michael Stavropol, explaining that the reason was not the ethnicity, but the religion of the passenger. The Yandex Taxi security service said it would examine the incident and impose measures on the driver.
Positive Verdicts
Sometimes believers and religious organizations were able to protect their rights, including through the courts.Thus, the periodical of the Falun Dafa Information Center managed to challenge a 50,000 ruble fine imposed by the Kalininsky District Court of St. Petersburg in 2023 under Article 20.33 of the Administrative Code for publishing information about Falun Gong organizations recognized as undesirable in Russia. The St. Petersburg City Court overturned the ruling and sent the case to the district court for a new review. In March, the Kalininsky District Court dismissed the case for lack of corpus delicti.
Imam Ismail Yurdamov managed to get the 8,000 ruble fine under Part 4 of Article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offenses canceled. In February, the Kirov District Court of Crimea canceled the corresponding ruling of the magistrate court. The court of second instance took into account that Yurdamov performed religious rituals in the village of Privetnoye at the request of the residents of the village and the acting imam, as the latter could not perform the rituals himself due to his age and health condition.
The Evangelical Christian Baptist Church of Novocherkassk, the Rostov region, challenged a fine under Part 3 of Article 5.26 of the Administrative Code for unlabeled literature. In April, the Fourth Cassation Court of General Jurisdiction partially satisfied the complaint of the religious organization and cancelled the fine of 30,000 rubles, overturning the decisions of two previous instances and closing the case due to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The sentence for "illegal missionary work," given to the priest of the Armenian Catholic Church, Mais Melikyan, an Armenian citizen, was partially commuted. He was fined 35,000 rubles under Part 5 Article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences and expelled from the country by the Lazarevsky District Court of Sochi for storing in a garage used as a chapel the Armenian translation of the Old Testament without the markings of a religious organization. The Krasnodar Krai Court in November canceled the expulsion clause, leaving the fine unchanged.
In the Chelyabinsk region, the Federal Tax Service was twice unsuccessful in its attempt to collect arrears from the branch of Jehovah's Witnesses in Austria registered in Miass. In May, the Arbitration Court of the region refused to satisfy the claim of the Federal Tax Service to recover arrears in the amount of 6500 rubles, and in September – 23,000 rubles. In both cases, the reason for the refusal was the expiration of the established time limit for collection.
In December, after multiple refusals, the Ussuriysk District Court of Primorsky Krai approved the transfer of shaman Alexander Gabyshev to a general hospital, softening the regime of forced treatment.
Protecting the Feelings of Believers
Protection from Above
Law enforcement under Part 1 of Article 148 of the Criminal Code (public actions expressing clear disrespect to society with the aim to insult religious feelings of believers) was even more active than the year before, when we noted an increase in the number of cases under this part of this article. Over the course of the year, we are aware of at least 25 sentences issued under it (in 2023, we knew of 14; according to official data, verdicts came into force against 13 people in 2023 and against 43 in 2024). We consider most of them to have been imposed unlawfully[18]. It should be noted that often no information was provided on the exact punishment imposed on the perpetrator.The harshest sentence of those where the punishment is known to us was handed down to blogger Khavier Yarmagomedov. In December, the Dorogomilovsky District Court of Moscow sentenced him to seven years in a general regime colony, a fine, and a ban on administering Internet sites for eight years. The blogger was found guilty not only under the article mentioned above, but also under Paragraph B of Part 3 of Art. 242 (illegal trafficking in pornographic materials committed on the Internet) and Paragraphs A and D of Part 2 of Art. 2421 of the Criminal Code (trafficking in materials or objects containing pornographic images of minors). Yarmagomedov was prosecuted under Article 148 of the Criminal Code for his stream, where he stomped on a cross and spat on it.
In two other cases, the perpetrators were sentenced to real terms, also under several articles. In September, the Novoaleksandrovsky District Court of Stavropol Krai found three young men guilty under Part 1 of Article 148 and Part 2 of Article 213 of the Criminal Code (hooliganism committed by a group of persons motivated by religious hatred); they burned a New Testament in a brazier, uttering insults and ridicule, then published the video in Telegram. Taking into account the unserved part of the punishment under the previous sentence, the court gave 20-year-old Danila Zharikhin two years and two months in prison and a ban on driving for nine months; 21-year-old Dmitry Sobenin was sentenced to two years in a penal colony; and the minor Yuri M. was sentenced to ten days of suspended imprisonment with a probation period of two years. In December, the Krasnoarmejsky District Court of Volgograd found trash-streamer Pavel Prokudin guilty under Part 1 of Article 148 of the Criminal Code and Part 1 of Article 282 of the Criminal Code (incitement to hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity) for criticizing the Russian military participating in military operations in Ukraine, negative statements about the elderly, and insulting statements about God and believers. The court sentenced him to two and a half years' imprisonment and 150 hours of compulsory labor, with the real term imposed under Art. 282.
Blogger Sofia Angel-Barocco was sentenced by the Maikop City Court in September to a suspended sentence of two years and a fine of 100,000 rubles with a ban on administering Internet resources for two years under Part 1 of Article 148 and Part 2 of Article 280 of the Criminal Code (calls for extremist activity committed on the Internet) for publishing a YouTube video claiming that “churches around the world are burning because of the spells” and expressing approval of the terrorist attack in Jerusalem in 2023. In December, the Leninogorsk City Court of Tatarstan sentenced blogger Artem Medkov, who broke a wooden cross and resisted the police officers who detained him, to two years of probation. The court found him guilty under Part 1 of Article 148 and Part 1 of Article 318 of the Criminal Code (use of violence against a representative of the authorities without endangering their life and health).
The longest compulsory labor – 150 hours under Part 1 of Article 148 each – was given to Valery Gorya from Armavir for insulting comments in Telegram about Allah and Muslims, and Denis Bolokhnov, a resident of Ryazan, for “negative comments about the religious feelings of believers.”
We have information about six verdicts under Part 2 of Article 148 of the Criminal Code (the same actions, but committed in places specially designated for worship, other religious rites and ceremonies), whereas in 2023 there was only one conviction under this part of the article. Here the strictest punishment, three and a half years in a colony, was imposed on Nikita Zhuravel, whom the Visaitovsky District Court of Grozny in February found guilty under Part 2 of Article 148 and under Part 2 of Article 213 of the Criminal Code for burning the Koran in front of a mosque and publishing a video about it.
The highest fine of 300,000 rubles under the same articles was imposed by the Novomoskovskiy District Court of the Tula Region on Mikhail Dzyubinsky, who in 2023 organized a pogrom in the Dormition Monastery. In addition to a fine, the court sentenced him to compulsory treatment. The longest term of compulsory labor, 440 hours, was given to blogger Sofya Burger, who in March was found guilty by the Leninsky District Court of Krasnodar under Part 2 of Article 148 for publishing a video in which she danced in a cemetery with a cigarette in her mouth and made obscene gestures with her hands.
In December, the Kolpinsky District Court of St. Petersburg, at the request of the prosecutor's office, banned the distribution of the video “New Wave” by rapper Morgenstern (Alisher Valiev), declared a foreign agent, and DJ Smash, for "disrespecting the rituals and rules of the church.”
In December, after Tatyana Yanusik, a deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Khakassia from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, published a photo of herself with her arms outstretched against the backdrop of a sculpture of Christ, some residents of the republic complained that the photo offended religious feelings. Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Khakassia Sergey Sokol instructed the Commission on Regulations to "carry out appropriate work with the author of the incident and provide a moral assessment of the action." We do not know whether the instruction was carried out or what its outcome was).
Protection from Below
As before, public defenders of religious feelings most often defended the feelings of Orthodox believers. As in the previous year, in most cases, organized groups of activists – mainly the Sorok Sorokov organization – stood up to defend the feelings of Orthodox believers, but more often than in the previous year they acted in conjunction with far-right organizations, such as Russkaya Obschina.As before, defenders of religious feelings often targeted cultural events. The main tactic of Orthodox activists was to organize public campaigns against figures and events that, according to activists, offended the feelings of believers. For example, in Tambov, complaints from Orthodox activists and Russkaya Obschina led to the cancellation of a concert by three heavy rock bands scheduled for September 21 at the HEROES bar. The reason for the complaints was the Lucifer's Dungeon and Frostlagte Måne and Mor’s concert announcement, which said: “Being harbingers of the Apocalypse, we will open the gates to hell and unleash real demons. Don't miss this Saturday Sabbath.” In addition, the activists were outraged by the fact that the concert was scheduled for September 21, the day of the celebration of the Nativity of the Virgin.
In Samara and Volgograd, performances by comedian Guram Demidov were cancelled after complaints from Sorok Sorokov, who found his joke about Christ opening a chain of booze supermarkets and selling wine for the price of water offensive.
After Russkaya Obschina’s complaint, the Investigative Committee for the Kaluga region launched a procedural review of "pseudo-religious entertainment events" during which "the cult of death and religious Satanism were demonstrated" at the Mafia club in Kozelsk, the Kaluga region. The event in question was a Halloween party.
A Samara sushi restaurant chain Sushkin sЫn was forced to change its name and close the restaurant after complaints about insulting the feelings of believers from Russkaya Obschina and State Duma deputy Alexander Khinstein and the opening of a criminal case against the chain administration under the relevant article. The activists were offended by the name, which, in their opinion, referred to the expression "son of a bitch," used in combination with the image of the Virgin in the restaurant decor.
Protests were not always successful. Omsk Cossacks and representatives of the Omsk Parents' Assembly demanded cancellation of the ballet Rasputin starring Sergei Polunin, because “G. E. Rasputin was slandered and defamed by the people who prepared and carried out a coup in Russia." <…> They intentionally created the ugly image of Rasputin, who was a friend of the royal family. It is unacceptable for an Orthodox person to mock a saint, it offends the feelings of believers.”[19] However, the authorities refused to cancel the ballet. Metropolitan Dionysius (Porubai) of Omsk and Taurida, in an interview with a local TV channel, did not bless his flock to attend this performance.
Defenders of religious feelings also turned their attention to New Age stores. For example, Orthodox activists organized police visits to the Magic Lilu store on Novy Arbat. When the police arrived, they forced the shoppers out, temporarily closed the store, and seized "pornographic figurines and goods with extremist symbols."
Defenders of religious feelings did not stop at organizing public campaigns against activities they objected to and complaining to various authorities. From time to time, they themselves paid visits to venues where, in their opinion, blasphemy was being committed, demanding that it be stopped. In St. Petersburg, Russkaya Obschina, Russian Imperial Movement (RID), and the Russian People's Militia (about 100 people in total) disrupted a “satanist” party in the S'aint bar on Rubinstein Street, decorated with crosses, angels, images of saints, and references to the Bible, the events of the Middle Ages, and the Young Pope TV series. Note that the bar is located in the courtyard, there is no sign at the door, and the iron entrance door can easily be mistaken for the basement door, making it difficult for a casual visitor to find it and get in. Upon arrival, the activists announced: “We are Orthodox Christians, and for us, the activities of your bar are associated with incitement of inter-religious strife, which is prohibited by our legislation. In any case, we will not allow you to continue this activity in our city,”[20] and called the police. An attempt to enter another venue belonging to the same chain failed because the staff were alerted and locked the door. However, following the visit to the bar on Rubinstein Street, the chain owner, Sophie Noskova-Abramovich, was fined 30,000 rubles under Part 1 of Article 148 of the Criminal Code.
In St. Petersburg, Orthodox activists and representatives of Russkaya Obschina came to the Starcon science fiction, film, and science festival, where they were angered by a cosplayed interior from the horror game Resident Evil Village. Defenders of the feelings of believers likened the portraits of the video game characters to a "sacred corner" with icons, found it blasphemous, and called the police. The police seized the exhibits, and Obschina representatives wrote a statement to the authorities.
In April, Sorok Sorokov tried to disrupt the ZLOFest festival of horror films held in Moscow. At the call of Orthodox activists, the police arrived and removed the guests from the venue. The representatives of Russkaya Obschina also arrived at the festival and made sure that some of the most “sacrilegious” images were removed.
Sorok Sorokov complained about comedian Alexander Revva, who used the exclamation “The Mother of God gave birth in a barn!” as a joke in an episode of the Stars NTV show on the eve of Easter. In addition to Orthodox activists, actress Yana Poplavskaya also voiced objections to the show. As a result, the next episode was not aired, and no explanation was given by the NTV management. Irina Filatova, a CPRF member of the State Duma, asked Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, to investigate Revva for insulting the religious feelings of believers; we have no information about the outcome.
In several instances, conflicts related to offending the feelings of the Orthodox have arisen around the objects of urban sculpture. The administration of the Russian North national park, at the request of the Vologda Metropolitan Church, dismantled the figure of Veles, installed on Maura Mountain as part of the creation of the tourist Path of Myths and Legends. Metropolitan Savva (Mikheev) of Vologda and Kirillov was outraged that the pagan idol appeared opposite the Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery, in the place where a chapel used to stand. Vologda Region Governor Georgy Filimonov supported the diocese.
In Dalnegorsk, Primorsky Krai, Priest Andrei Vasyakin, dean of the Dalnegorsk district, appealed to the mayor of the town, Alexander Terebilov, on behalf of the Orthodox believers to remove the sculpture of the alien Ushan, a character from the cartoon The Mystery of the Third Planet. In his opinion, art objects dedicated to “demonic creatures” are inappropriate on the street where the worship cross stands and processions are held. The mayor refused to do so, noting that the townspeople did not complain about the sculpture, and “the cartoon character is kind, cheerful, and resourceful, takes care of nature, and takes a responsible approach to his work.” Nevertheless, the mayor agreed to explore “compromise options to isolate the art object from the gaze of the participants of the procession for the duration of the procession.”[21]
Voronezh authorities, despite the opinion of the diocese, approved the monument to the leader of the Sektor Gaza band Yury Khoy (Klinskikh) in the city. According to Priest Vitaly Tarasov, head of the culture department of the Voronezh Metropolitan Church, Sektor Gaza’s music popularizes “anti-family values; debauchery; drug use and drinking; insulting the feelings of believers; Satanism”. However, the city's Cultural Heritage Commission voted in favor of the monument, in support of which some 25,000 citizens had previously voiced their support.
From time to time, Orthodox believers continued to be outraged by drawings and images of churches with missing crosses. After the issue of a new 1000-ruble banknote was suspended in 2023 after Orthodox Christians complained that the image of the church of the Kazan Kremlin lacked crosses, while the image of Suyumbike Tower had a crescent moon, the Central Bank announced that no religious sites would be depicted on the bill. In November, Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina announced the decision to “take a step back and develop a new design for the reverse side” and hold a contest, for which 25 objects in the Volga Federal District were selected: after an online voting, the image of the winning object will be placed on the reverse side of the 1000-ruble bill. The controversial sites of the Kazan Kremlin were not selected for the contest.
Complaints about insults to the feelings of believers from individual defenders were extremely rare. We know of only one such case: a resident of Belgorod appealed to Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov with a complaint about the packaging of bread from the local Kolos factory. The package depicts the canonized Russian Orthodox Church Prince Vladimir. According to the complaint, placing such packaging in the trash is blasphemy and brings down God's wrath on Belgorod residents. She filed a similar complaint in 2022, but so far the packaging has not been altered.
In rare cases, cultural event organizers took action before receiving any complaints from offended believers. For example, the administration of a Moscow club where the Poot’ [The Path] band from Pskov was to play in February, canceled the concert out of concern that the band's performance of “anti-Christian” songs might offend the feelings of believers. At the same time, the club administration referred to the opinion of the district administration. It was not clear who complained to the district administration.
There were examples of representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church defending those who, according to some of their co-religionists, offended their religious feelings. Thus, the Bratsk Diocese did not support its priest, who threatened to fine the participants of the Dubak Challenge, a social media challenge where people post photographs of themselves throwing splashing water into the freezing cold air. The priest claimed that a flash mob with churches in the background was offensive to the Orthodox. The diocese said, however, that the photos with the water freezing against the background of the temple "are not only not offensive, but also beautiful." The priest was forced to remove his post with threats.
We know of only a few cases in which believers of other faiths claimed that their feelings had been offended. For example, the owners of a nightclub in Ulan-Ude, under public pressure, had to paint over a graffiti created two years earlier depicting half Buddha face and half skull. After the discussion of the graffiti on social networks, where many said that the drawing offended the feelings of believers, the owners of the building were fined for violating the facade renovation procedure. They then painted over the image and apologized to those whose feelings were hurt.
After the residents of Buryatia and Kalmykia were outraged by the bathroom accessories (toilet brushes, liquid soap dispensers, and toothbrush holders) with images of Buddha in the Leman Pro store chain, the company promised to remove these items from stores. However, the Shajin Lama of the Republic of Kalmykia, Geshe Tenzin Choidak, filed a complaint with the republican prosecutor's office, and an investigation was launched. The prosecutor's office of the Moscow region also investigated this incident on the complaint of the Deputy Chairman of the State Duma, Sholban Kara-ool, and then ordered the chain management to eliminate the violations. In addition, a case was opened under Part 2 of Article 5. 26 of the Administrative Code (willful public desecration of religious or devotional literature, objects of religious veneration, signs or emblems of worldview symbols and attributes) on the distribution of goods with the image of Buddha.
The St. Petersburg restaurant Gifts of Ossetia promised to revise its menu after the Supreme Council of Ossetians was outraged by the assortment of pies. According to the council, chicken and pork pies offend the feelings of the Ossetian people because «poultry and pork are considered “dirty” and “unclean”, and in the history of the Ossetian people they have never been used in meal preparation and have also been considered sacrilege.»[22]
Insufficient Protection from Defamation and Attacks
Violence and Vandalism
The level of religious violence remained low. We know of three cases of religiously motivated attacks, and all three targeted Muslims.In July, a female passenger on the Moscow metro attacked a hijab-wearing passenger with a knife. The victim then pepper-sprayed the attacker in the face. The attacker was stopped by other passengers. She was drunk and shouted insults at the victim.
In September, the chief mufti of the Tyumen region, Zinnat Sadykov, was attacked in his office by a man armed with a hammer and a tear gas canister. The Mufti managed to call for help and was not hurt. The attacker sought revenge for the detention of two imams suspected of raising money for ISIS and recruiting people to fight in Syria.
In September, a woman in Moscow attacked two underage Dagestan girls wearing hijabs. The woman called them “Tajik,” accused them of arrogance, told them to go back to "their country," and said that with their appearance they supported men's violence against women. Then she knocked the phone out of one girls’ hands and grabbed the other by the hair through the head scarf. In 2025, the attacker was fined 10,000 rubles under Article 20.3.1 of the Administrative Code (incitement to hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity).
We have information about nine cases of vandalism motivated by religious hatred (seven in 2023). Orthodox sites were most often attacked by vandals (five cases). In June, in Tyumen, an attacker tried to set fire to the church of St. Demetrius of Don using Molotov cocktails. The entrance to the building sustained damage, none of the parishioners and employees of the church were injured.
In April, a native of Udmurtia, while intoxicated, staged a pogrom in the church of St. Michael the Archangel in Zelenograd, smashed an icon and threatened to set fire to the building. He was found guilty under Part 2 of Article 148 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to compulsory labor. In the same month, a resident of Ivanovo staged a pogrom in the Dormition Cathedral, smashing icons and other temple property with a candlestick. In addition to Part 2 of Article 148, the perpetrator was found guilty under two more articles of the Criminal Code and sent for compulsory medical treatment.
Graffiti appeared on Orthodox sites twice, both in St. Petersburg. In February, a vandal wrote "ROC for murderers" on the wall of the Intercession Church at the Polytechnic University and on the Church of the Virgin of Tenderness Icon. He also wrote "University supports murderers" on the wall of the Polytechnic University building. The perpetrator was charged with three criminal counts and sent to a pre-trial detention center. In August, an inscription appeared on the arch near the Blessed St. Xenia of Petersburg Church with a reference to a Koran verse calling for the persecution of polytheists. A case of insulting the religious feelings of believers was opened against the suspect, a graduate of the Institute of Music, Theater, and Choreography of Herzen University.
Muslim sites were targeted four times, and two of these incidents can be classified as dangerous, although no one was injured. In June, in Fryazino near Moscow, a supporter of the M.K.U. (a racist online community calling itself Maniacs. Cult of Murder) blew up the entrance to a Muslim center and was detained by police. In December, on the eve of Christmas according to the Gregorian calendar, the attackers tried to set fire to the Nur mosque in Serpukhov, but ran away, leaving molotov cocktails outside the building. A cell of the neo-Nazi movement NS/WP claimed responsibility for the arson attempt.
In July, parts of pork carcasses were placed at the doors of mosques twice, once in Moscow and once in Tyumen.
Defamation of Religious Minorities
As before, defamatory materials against religious minorities regularly appeared in the media, and as before, most often Protestant organizations or new religious movements were targeted. They were referred to as "sects," targeted with typical "anti-sectarian" rhetoric, and accused of extortion, brainwashing their parishioners, and espionage.Thus, most publications, describing the numerous trials of Jehovah's Witnesses in different regions, usually referred to the defendants as "sectarians" and "recruiters." For example, Nizhny Novgorod Online, reporting on the detention of "over two dozen adherents" of Jehovah's Witnesses in the region, emphasized: "The leader of the cell tried to flee to the Astrakhan region, as he was taking conspiratorial measures. He had 1.5 million rubles and another thousand euros in cash on him."[23].
The Mash Telegram channel, writing about the attempt of the Perm administration to return the Palace of Culture building bought by Pentecostals to municipal ownership, calls the believers "American sectarians" and distorts, probably intentionally, the last name of the Head Bishop of the Russian Church of Evangelical Christians, Eduard Grabovenko, accusing him of avarice and extorting money from parishioners: “Grobovenko (“grob” means “coffin” in Russian) has organized his own business club named after the son of God,” “has earned tens of millions of rubles exploiting those especially gullible,” “the Grobovenkos profited from people on almost everything – from entrance tickets to listen to sermons to literally slave labor.” [24]
Every once in a while, various publications published lists of dangerous "sects," bringing in Orthodox "anti-sectarians" as experts to explain the dangers. For example, Sovershenno Sekretno [Top Secret] published an interview with Alexander Dvorkin, who listed almost all religious movements that have operated in Russia since the 1990s as the organizations that "influence the psyche of entire groups of people, turning them into submissive slaves."[25] In a similar publication, Life.ru mentioned Nurcular, claiming that the organization "had a well-defined structure," and its "adherents" were "trained, in fact, as shahid capable of becoming a living bomb at the first word of the leader"[26] (in reality, the existence of a unified structure of Said Nursi's followers in Russia has not been confirmed, and it is known with certainty that this movement is not only not combative, but is not politicized at all).
In some cases, religious organizations have been able to defend their reputations through the courts. For example, the Evangelical Lutheran Parish of St. Anna (Annenkirche) in St. Petersburg filed a lawsuit against blogger Vadim Egorov for the protection of honor, dignity, and business reputation (Article 152 of the Civil Code) after Egorov published an interview with artist Nika Kletsky; in the interview, the blogger called Annenkirche "a separatist association" and "a bit of an anti-Russian project." The parties reached an amicable agreement, Egorov promised to make a public apology, and the Vyborg District Court dismissed the case.
Insufficient Protection of Religious Minorities
The public activity of fighters against "sectarians" and other minorities was low last year, but we know of several examples of such activity, usually from right-wing radical organizations. For example, in January and March, the National Liberation Movement (NOD) held a series of pickets near the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Moscow. The reason for the pickets was the declaration published by the Vatican in 2023, allowing for the blessing of same-sex couples (but not of marriage). The picketers held signs accusing Catholics of supporting "sodomy," assaulting Russia’s sovereignty, etc. In addition to the NOD flags, the picketers held Soviet flags and portraits of Stalin. The head of the Moscow Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church, Archbishop Pavel Pezzi, was forced to appeal to Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin with a request to protect the religious organization from the actions of the NOD.In April, activists of Russian People's Militia demanded that an employee of the Novosibirsk pharmacy Melody of Health on Karl Marx Street remove her headscarf, because, in their opinion, the hijab was not a tradition of Russian Islam, but signalled wearer’s belonging to radical Islamic movements. After that, representatives of Militia appealed to the pharmacy manager demanding measures against the hijab-wearing employee. The pharmacy administration did not forbid the employee to wear a headscarf in the workplace.
Persecution of Clergy for Criticism of the Armed Conflict with Ukraine
As in the previous two years, clergy of various religious organizations publicly criticized the military conflict with Ukraine. Those who publicly criticized the actions of the Russian authorities and the army were sanctioned by the state, and sometimes by religious organizations.We are not aware of cases of clergymen being held administratively responsible for such statements, but we are aware of several cases of criminal prosecution. Thus, in Krasnodar Krai, 86-year-old Archbishop of Slavyansk and South Russia Viktor Pivovarov (Russian Orthodox Church) was found guilty under Part 1 of Article 2803 of the Criminal Code (repeated discrediting of the armed forces) and fined 150,000 rubles. In 2023, he was brought to administrative responsibility for anti-war preaching.
In May, a case was initiated against Eduard Charov, a preacher from Krasnoufimsk, who does not identify with any Christian denomination, under Part 1 of Article 2803 and Part 2 of Article 2052 of the Criminal Code (public justification of terrorism on the Internet). The article on the repeated discrediting of the army was used because of a repost of an image with arguments about patriotism, which said that a real patriot should not justify "poverty and corruption with imaginary greatness and spiritual bonds." And Charov’s positive comment under the news about the arson of the military enlistment office was qualified as a justification for terrorism.
A case was initiated against Ilya Vasilyev, rector of the religious association Moscow Zen Center, under Paragraph E of Part 2 of Article 2073 of the Criminal Code (public dissemination under the guise of reliable reports of deliberately false information containing data on the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, motivated by political, ideological, racial, national, or religious hatred or enmity). The reason for the case was two Facebook posts. Vasilyev has been in custody since June.
In October, a case under Article 2804 of the Criminal Code (public calls to carry out activities against the security of the state) was brought against Nikolai Romaniuk, pastor of the Holy Trinity Church of Christians of Evangelical Faith in Balashikha, for a sermon in which he criticized the idea of Pentecostals participating in the fighting in Ukraine. During the search, although he did not offer any resistance, the pastor was hit on the head with a rifle butt; he suffered a micro-stroke and became deaf in one ear. Searches took place at several other ministers and parishioners of this church, as well as at the house of prayer in Balashikha. The pastor has been in jail since October.
The former hieromonk of the Russian Orthodox Church John (Kurmoyarov), who was convicted in 2023 for "fakes about the army" and converted to the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, failed to challenge the court's decision. After serving his sentence, he left Russia in 2024.
As in 2023, priests were also punished for their anti-war position by their own religious organizations, and such cases are known to us only with regard to the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. Some were expelled from holy orders (we know of two such cases). Most of them were banned from serving (we know of seven cases). This, in particular, happened in June to the cleric of the Yekaterinodar and Kuban dioceses, Archpriest Andrey Drugai, who refused to recite the Prayer for Holy Russia, prescribed by the Patriarch, and signed a letter in support of the defrocked Moscow Archpriest Alexy Uminsky, which will be discussed below. After the ban, Drugai left Russia.
In March, the rector of the Trinity Church in Dmitrov near Moscow, Priest Alexander Vostrodymov, was banned from serving until Easter (May 5). Later, the ban, imposed for "incorrect statements on the Internet," was extended. It is known that Father Alexander signed the clergy's anti-war appeal in 2022.
In April, Priest Dimitri Safronov, a cleric of the Moscow Church of the Intercession of the Most Holy Theotokos on Lyshikovaya Gora, was banned from serving for three years by the Patriarch’s decree, also for refusing to say the Prayer for Holy Russia. In addition, on the fortieth day after the death of Alexei Navalny, he served a memorial service at the politician’s grave. The priest was sent to the church of St. Pimen the Great In Novye Vorotniki as a psalmist for the duration of the ban.
Another Moscow priest, a cleric of the Church of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross of the Patriarchal Compound in Mitin, Priest Konstantin Kokora, was banned for the same period of time for refusing to read the Prayer and was also appointed as a psalmist to another church.
Archpriest Vadim Perimenov, a cleric of the Kain Diocese of the Novosibirsk Metropolitan Area, for the same "offense" was first transferred to a rural parish and then banned from serving for a period of one year. In a letter to the ruling bishop, he explained that in his decision not to recite the prayer, he was “guided by the Holy Scriptures... and his conscience,” as he considers it “unacceptable for himself to pray for victory in the fratricidal war between Orthodox Christians.”
In September, the rector of the Chelyabinsk Church in honor of the martyr Peter, Metropolitan Krutitsky, Peter Ustinov was banned from serving. According to Ustinov, the main reason for the ban was his refusal to recite the Prayer for Holy Russia. In addition, the bishop was displeased with the priest reading some of the texts in Russian (and not in Church Slavonic) during the divine service and using disposable spoons for communion.
In March, the Holy Synod recalled Priest Dimitri Ostanin, who was serving in Norway, from Bergen for his anti-war position, and then the Patriarch’s decree banned him from serving.
In several cases, a ban on serving was followed by a more severe punishment of defrocking. In January, the Moscow diocesan court defrocked Archpriest Alexy Uminsky, by that time already removed from rectory of the Moscow Trinity Church in Khokhly, where he had served prayer services for peace, publicly disagreeing with the official position of the church regarding military operations in Ukraine and refusing to read the prescribed prayer. The official reason for the defrocking was a violation of the 25th Rule of the Holy Apostles, violation of the priestly oath. In February, this decision was approved by the Patriarch. It should be noted that the Patriarch appointed Archpriest Andrey Tkachev, known for his fundamentalist views and numerous scandalous statements on TV and on the Internet, to replace the rector of this generally liberal parish. Father Alexy left Russia and was soon reinstated in the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
In April, Priest Andrey Kudrin, a cleric of the Church of the Icon of the Virgin of Life-Giving Spring in Bibirevo, Moscow, was dismissed from his post and banned from priesthood. The official reason for the ban was not provided, but it was known that, since the beginning of the military conflict in Ukraine, Father Andrey was reciting a prayer for the reconciliation of the peoples of Russia and Ukraine instead of the Prayer for Holy Russia. In July, the church court of the Moscow diocese defrocked the priest, and in August the decision was approved by the Patriarch.
Vologda Hieromonk Tikhon (Sokolovsky), who was first banned by the ruling bishop from Internet activity, then from preaching, and in July 2024 from serving, was finally defrocked in 2025. By the time of his defrocking, Father Tikhon had converted to the Apostolic Orthodox Church.
[1] Olga Sibireva. Challenges to Freedom of Conscience in Russia in 2023 // SOVA Center. 2024. March 25 (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/religion/publications/2024/03/d47072/).
[2] First of them: Maria Kravchenko, Natalia Yudina. Prosecution under articles on administrative offenses of extremist nature in 2023-2024 // SOVA Center. 2025. April 25 [in Russian] (https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2025/04/d51469/).
Another one will be published on our website soon.
[3] Federal Law No. 401-FZ, dated November 23, 2024, "On Amendments to Article 6.21 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation" // System of Official Publication of Electronic Legal Acts. 2024. November 23 (http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202411230022?index=2)
[4] Due to the large volume of media inquiries regarding Order No. 32-n of the Ministry of Education and Youth Policy of the Vladimir region dated October 22, 2024, we consider it necessary to provide the following explanations // Ministry of Education and Youth Policy of the Vladimir region. 2024. October 26 (https://министерство.образование33.рф/pres-tsentr/news/76279/).
[5] The bill banning the wearing of face-concealing clothing is ready and has been submitted by me and my colleague Obukhov for official review by the Government of the Russian Federation.… // Mikhail Matveyev Komment Telegram channel. 2024. June 11 (https://t.me/matveevkomment/7835).
[6] Note to Bill No. 755625-8 // Legislative support system (SOZD). 2024. October 30 (https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/755625-8).
[7] Comment by the Head of the Legal Department on the legislative initiative aimed at prohibiting worship in residential premises // Patriarchia.ru. 2024. November 14 (http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6174671.html).
[8] The report will soon be published on our website.
[9] The Path to the Temple // Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM). 2024. June 18 (https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/doroga-k-khramu).
[10] Residents of Omsk oppose the construction of temples and mosques // Aktzenty. 2024. January 19 (https://akcent.site/novosti/28768).
[11] Residents of Kommunarka oppose the construction of an interfaith center // Telegram channel Tsargrad-TV. 2024. October 14 (https://t.me/tsargradtv/91062).
[12] During the year, 13 prayer houses were closed in the Moscow region. // Moskovskaya Oblast 24. 2025. January 16 (https://mo-24.ru/za-god-v-podmoskove-zakryli-13-molelnyh-domov/).
[13] The Ministry of Culture denied a media report about the transfer of the Decembrists’ Museum in Chita to the Russian Orthodox Church // Chita online. 2024. April 19 (https://www.chita.ru/text/culture/2024/04/19/73480499/).
[14] “Sentences are fewer but tougher.” Repression Against Jehovah's Witnesses: the Results of 2024 // Report by Jehovah's Witnesses. 2024. December 23.
[15] Court chooses preventive measure for the head of a local religious organization // Telegram Channel United Press Service of the Courts of Udmurtia. 2024. February 2 (https://t.me/sudUdm/704).
[16] Summary statistics on the activities of federal courts of general jurisdiction and magistrate judges for the first half of 2024 // Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (https://cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=8773).
[17] Case No. 5-564/2024 // Website of the Zelenodolsk City Court of the Republic of Tatarstan. 2024. July (https://zelenodolsky--tat.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_op=case&....
[18] For more details, see the soon-to-be-released report on criminal anti-extremist enforcement.
[19] Omsk Cossacks demand cancellation of the Rasputin ballet with Sergei Polunin // Omsk Online. 2024. March 31 (https://ngs55.ru/text/culture/2024/03/31/73404857/).
[20] “And Catholics approved.” Militia shut down a satanists’ bar in St. Petersburg // AiF – Sankt-Peterburg 2024. February 1 февраля (https://spb.aif.ru/society/a_katoliki_odobrili_druzhinniki_zakryli_v_peterburge_sataninskiy_bar).
[21] Dalnegorsk authorities refuse to remove an artifact depicting an alien after a local priest complained that it offended the feelings of believers // Podyom! 2024. December 18 (https://pdmnews.ru/39196/).
[22] Ossetian pork pies to be removed from a restaurant menu in St. Petersburg // TASS. 2024. September 13 (https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21861401).
[23] Security forces liquidate the activities of an extremist cell in the Nizhny Novgorod region // Nizhny Novgorod Online. 2024. July 2 (https://www.nn.ru/text/incidents/2024/07/02/73779845/).
[24] American sectarians from the “New Testament” have occupied the Perm Palace of Culture named after V.I. Lenin and are demanding 500 million rubles from the local administration for it // Mash Telegram channel. 2024. September 27 (https://t.me/mash/57940).
[25] Alexei Statsenko. Sects that have gone online // Sovershenno Sekretno. 2024. October 19 (https://www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/obshchestvo/sekty-ushedshie-v-set191024/).
[26] The seven most dangerous religious organizations in Russia and why people are attracted to them // Life.ru. 2024. September 23 (https://life.ru/p/1688808).
[3] Federal Law No. 401-FZ, dated November 23, 2024, "On Amendments to Article 6.21 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation" // System of Official Publication of Electronic Legal Acts. 2024. November 23 (http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202411230022?index=2)
[4] Due to the large volume of media inquiries regarding Order No. 32-n of the Ministry of Education and Youth Policy of the Vladimir region dated October 22, 2024, we consider it necessary to provide the following explanations // Ministry of Education and Youth Policy of the Vladimir region. 2024. October 26 (https://министерство.образование33.рф/pres-tsentr/news/76279/).
[5] The bill banning the wearing of face-concealing clothing is ready and has been submitted by me and my colleague Obukhov for official review by the Government of the Russian Federation.… // Mikhail Matveyev Komment Telegram channel. 2024. June 11 (https://t.me/matveevkomment/7835).
[6] Note to Bill No. 755625-8 // Legislative support system (SOZD). 2024. October 30 (https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/755625-8).
[7] Comment by the Head of the Legal Department on the legislative initiative aimed at prohibiting worship in residential premises // Patriarchia.ru. 2024. November 14 (http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6174671.html).
[8] The report will soon be published on our website.
[9] The Path to the Temple // Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM). 2024. June 18 (https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/doroga-k-khramu).
[10] Residents of Omsk oppose the construction of temples and mosques // Aktzenty. 2024. January 19 (https://akcent.site/novosti/28768).
[11] Residents of Kommunarka oppose the construction of an interfaith center // Telegram channel Tsargrad-TV. 2024. October 14 (https://t.me/tsargradtv/91062).
[12] During the year, 13 prayer houses were closed in the Moscow region. // Moskovskaya Oblast 24. 2025. January 16 (https://mo-24.ru/za-god-v-podmoskove-zakryli-13-molelnyh-domov/).
[13] The Ministry of Culture denied a media report about the transfer of the Decembrists’ Museum in Chita to the Russian Orthodox Church // Chita online. 2024. April 19 (https://www.chita.ru/text/culture/2024/04/19/73480499/).
[14] “Sentences are fewer but tougher.” Repression Against Jehovah's Witnesses: the Results of 2024 // Report by Jehovah's Witnesses. 2024. December 23.
[15] Court chooses preventive measure for the head of a local religious organization // Telegram Channel United Press Service of the Courts of Udmurtia. 2024. February 2 (https://t.me/sudUdm/704).
[16] Summary statistics on the activities of federal courts of general jurisdiction and magistrate judges for the first half of 2024 // Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (https://cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=8773).
[17] Case No. 5-564/2024 // Website of the Zelenodolsk City Court of the Republic of Tatarstan. 2024. July (https://zelenodolsky--tat.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_op=case&....
[18] For more details, see the soon-to-be-released report on criminal anti-extremist enforcement.
[19] Omsk Cossacks demand cancellation of the Rasputin ballet with Sergei Polunin // Omsk Online. 2024. March 31 (https://ngs55.ru/text/culture/2024/03/31/73404857/).
[20] “And Catholics approved.” Militia shut down a satanists’ bar in St. Petersburg // AiF – Sankt-Peterburg 2024. February 1 февраля (https://spb.aif.ru/society/a_katoliki_odobrili_druzhinniki_zakryli_v_peterburge_sataninskiy_bar).
[21] Dalnegorsk authorities refuse to remove an artifact depicting an alien after a local priest complained that it offended the feelings of believers // Podyom! 2024. December 18 (https://pdmnews.ru/39196/).
[22] Ossetian pork pies to be removed from a restaurant menu in St. Petersburg // TASS. 2024. September 13 (https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21861401).
[23] Security forces liquidate the activities of an extremist cell in the Nizhny Novgorod region // Nizhny Novgorod Online. 2024. July 2 (https://www.nn.ru/text/incidents/2024/07/02/73779845/).
[24] American sectarians from the “New Testament” have occupied the Perm Palace of Culture named after V.I. Lenin and are demanding 500 million rubles from the local administration for it // Mash Telegram channel. 2024. September 27 (https://t.me/mash/57940).
[25] Alexei Statsenko. Sects that have gone online // Sovershenno Sekretno. 2024. October 19 (https://www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/obshchestvo/sekty-ushedshie-v-set191024/).
[26] The seven most dangerous religious organizations in Russia and why people are attracted to them // Life.ru. 2024. September 23 (https://life.ru/p/1688808).
