Edited by Alexander Verkhovsky
Wе publish our seasonal report on radical nationalism and counteraction to it in autumn 2007. As usual, the report is based on the results of the SOVA Center daily monitoring.
Summary
Manifestations of Radical Nationalism : Violence : Activities of Radical Nationalist Organizations : Xenophobia on Behalf of the State
Counteractions to Radical Nationalism : Activities of Non-Governmental Organizations : Criminal Prosecution of the Right-Wing Radicals
Excessive and Unfounded Actions against Extremism
Summary
Most of the trends which we have described earlier continued in the autumn of 2007.
Racist and neo-Nazi violence were both on the rise, and by the end of November the number of victims had exceeded that which was reported in 2006.
Nationalist organizations were slightly less active than expected. Apparently, this may have been caused by serious conflicts among the ultra-right, which escalated as elections approached. However, these conflicts - only a small fraction of which were visible to outsiders - did not stop the ultra-right from conducting the Russian March almost on a national scale on 4 November, covering at least 20 different regions of the country.
Pro-Kremlin youth movements (particularly :Mestnye; - :The Locals;) increasingly appealed to xenophobic sentiments towards the Russian public, and authorities appeared quite willing to use the youngsters' racist practices to further their own agendas.
In the period covered by this report, ethnic xenophobia was utilized as an electoral resource, although to a much lesser degree than was expected. The :xenophobic resource; was not universally used by all candidates, but instructively all four political parties which reached the State Duma made some use of it.
Ultra-nationalists appeared rather weak during the election campaign. Admittedly, the percentage of votes for the only party list in which radicals were represented was comparable (if adjusted for "administrative influence") to results achieved by SPS and Yabloko parties.
Similarly, earlier trends continued in the sphere of counteractions to radical nationalism.
NGOs did not go beyond their traditional activities, while public events under anti-fascist slogans failed to steer clear of partisan bias.
Criminal prosecution of nationalist and neo-Nazi violence decreased in comparison to previous years; it was obvious that by the end of 2007 the number of convictions for racist crimes was not going to double that of the previous year (which had been the trend before), but rather, the convictions would be fewer than in 2006.
In contract, some positive developments in suppressing racist propaganda - observed in the spring and summer of 2007 - continued into autumn. Rates of prosecution targeting hate promoters were maintained, while most sentences were adequate to the seriousness of offenses.
The practices of declaring certain materials extremist and punishing media outlets for xenophobic publications continued to evolve. However, in many cases of the labeling of materials as extremist, and particularly in cases of media publications being warned for extremism, authorities excessively limited the legitimate freedom of expression. Obviously, such unlawful enforcements were politically motivated, but we do not know of a single case where abusive authorities were punished for manipulating the law.
Unfortunately, counteracting radical nationalism and xenophobia is not yet seen as a priority, particularly by the government, and very often it appeared that the main reason for enforcement was not due to the danger of unlawful acts, but as a reaction to disloyalty to the current political regime. This selective enforcement created a sense of impunity among radical groups which did not act in opposition to the government.
Manifestations of Radical Nationalism
Violence
In the autumn of 2007, at least 138 people were affected by racist and neo-Nazi motivated violence, and 12 of them were killed. [1] This was an 11% increase compared to the same period of 2006 (then at least 124 people were affected, 14 of them killed). [2]
The victims reported in the first 11 months of 2007 totaled 573; 57 of them were killed. In 2006 over a similar period, 501 victims, including 52 deaths, were reported.
The hotbeds of violence continued to include Moscow (8 killed, 66 injured in the autumn months), and St. Petersburg (1 person killed, 23 injured). In addition, in the autumn of 2007 racist crimes were reported in Vladimir, Volgograd, Voronezh, Yekaterinburg, Krasnodar, Nerungri, Nizhny Novgorod, Stavropol, Tver, and Chelyabinsk.
We need to remind the reader that the figures only reflect the availability of relevant information in certain cities, rather than the actual crime rates. Thus, for example, a local legislator in Irkutsk Oblast mentioned a few fights apparently triggered by ethnic hatred in the Irkutsk Agricultural Academy, which occurred soon after reports about ethnic riots in Kytsygirovka during the summer. [3] However, we could not find any additional details of the incidents or about the number of victims. Similarly, law enforcement officials speaking at their regional meetings consistently mention numerous cases of neo-Nazi/skinhead-provoked fights across Russian regions, but we have not been able to find any details for many of these incidents.
Most racist attacks between September and November 2007 were conducted by neo-Nazi skinheads. Their methods of violence are increasingly cruel and well-organized. Thus, for example, on 20 October, a neo-Nazi :raid; was organized in Moscow which was the most talked about crime last autumn.
To remind the reader, the evening of 20 October three attacks (including one killing) were reported in the southwest of Moscow, and two days later, more attacks were reported, including two killings. Initial police statements denied racist motives; however, the Moscow Prosecutor's Office contested the statements and soon revealed that the incidents had been part of a well-organized :raid;. Prosecutors even stated the officially registered number of victims - 27 people. The actual number of victims may, in fact, be higher, [4] but it is an unprecedented case in the Russian prosecutorial practice to reveal the number of victims (much higher than that reported by mass media) without any outside pressure.
Neo-Nazis continued to stage their actions to mark certain dates, important to them for reasons which are not always known to an outsider. Thus, on the night following the last day of the trial of the killing of Stanislav Korepanov in Izhevsk (8 November), numerous swastika graffiti appeared on the local Jewish center for the first time in years. A series of attacks in Moscow in early and mid-October may also have been scheduled to coincide with other trials of the ultra-right: on 10 October, a court considered extending the pre-trial detention of Maxim (Tesak) Martsinkevich, and in the last week of October, trials of racist attacks were held in several courts in Moscow.
In fact, anyone who does not look like "a standard Slav" may fall victim to Nazi-skinheads. But this autumn a large proportion of attacks targeted people with dark skin, not unexpectedly for the beginning of a new academic year, when many new foreign students come to Russia unprepared to face the local context.
As before, members of alternative youth subcultures were frequent targets of Nazi skinhead attacks, which were notably better organized. Thus, police prevented attacks against fans of the Tokyo Hotel music group by physically escorting the fans from the concert venue to the metro station, because there was no other way to ensure their safety. In St. Petersburg, neo-Nazis staged yet another - the fourth in 2007 - attempted terrorist attack: during a concert in Rocks Club, a bag was found containing an explosive device, which, fortunately, did not explode. Before the same concert, Nazi-skinheads provoked a series of fights outside the club, resulting in at least 10 victims. Soon after the incident in St. Petersburg, a false alarm about an explosive planted in the local Integral Punk Club in Izhevsk disrupted a hardcore concert.
Admittedly, some violent incidents were not attributable to only neo-Nazi activities, but rather to the overall high prevalence of xenophobia in the country.
The most outrageous of such incidents occurred in Voronezh and Archangelsk Oblasts. In Voronezh Oblast, on 1st September 2007, a first-grade student, the son of the local Protestant priest, was attacked and beaten by other kids in his class (while the teacher watched) for refusing to take part in an Orthodox prayer marking the Day of Knowledge (first day of school). The prayer was led by an Orthodox priest whose son was also a first-grader in the same class. On 27 September, in a village outside Archangelsk, a drunk general of Rosspetsstroi (a federal service for military construction) opened fire in a street, yelling racist insults. He mortally wounded a local resident who appeared "non-Russian" to the general.
We noted that last autumn, apparently, the unofficial restriction of publications about ultra-right attacks was partially lifted; this development was as unexpected and hard to explain as the onset of such a practice (to remind the reader, we observed a sudden interruption of the information flow in the first decade of May). The increased number of reports of racist violence in the media produced a real shock, because the rates of such violence apparently had not decreased. The public had not seen any reports for a while, so people incorrectly assumed a sudden exponential growth of ultra-right attacks.
Activities of Radical Nationalist Organizations
In early autumn 2007, ultra-right groups made a few attempts to mark the anniversary of the Kondopoga events. DPNI, in particular, attempted to organize a meeting in this Karelian city. However, Alexander Belov was stopped by police in Petrozavodsk, the capital of Karelia, and sentenced to 5 days of arrest for using offensive language against police officers who checked his ID. [5]
Even though the efforts to organize a nationwide street action to support participants of an anti-Azeri riot in Kharagun who faced trial (the action was scheduled to coincide with the beginning of the trial) were successful - pickets carrying Freedom to the Kharagun People were held in six Russian cities - they never reached the scale sought by the organizers.
Earlier, in September, one of the best known neo-Nazi groups, the National Socialist Society (NSO), split into two. Following the arrest, in the summer of 2007, of Format 18 Group leader Maxim Martsinkevich who had been a close ally of NSO, power struggles escalated in the Society, ending in a split between supporters of NSO leader Dmitry Rumyantsev (who retained control of the organization's official website) and supporters of Sergey (Malyuta) Korotkikh.
Elections
In the summer of 2007, following the first denial of registration for elections to the Great Russia Party which sought to bring together ultra-right activists, it was already obvious that radical nationalists would not be able to put together a single list of candidates for the elections. There was little doubt that the Great Russia Party's attempt to appeal its denial of registration would also fail (indeed, registration was denied to Great Russia again on 21 September 2007).
As a result, a large part of ultra-right activists from the Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), the "Rus" Party in Defense of the Russian Constitution (PZRK), the Union of Russian People (SRN), etc. joined the party list of Sergey Baburin's Popular Union, while some others - particularly those who had sought regional leadership with the would-be Great Russia Party - joined Gennady Semigin's Russian Patriots.
This "dispersion; of the ultra-right forces between the two party lists aggravated the existing conflicts among them, triggered mutual accusations of causing the split, and provoked a certain degree of jealousy and competition in preparing for the Russian March. Given that the Great Russia supporters and the Russian All-National Union (RONS) with Baburin's supporters were on different party candidate lists, they found it inappropriate to cooperate and share the Russian March, because each side suspected the other one (and rightly so!) of seeking to use the march as part of their own election campaign.
On 28 October, the Popular Union was denied registration of its candidate list, because some of the signatures were found to be fake; on 2 November the ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court. It may have been expected that the ultra-right members of the Russian Patriots would do their best to engage those voters who shared in their xenophobic sentiments, but it never happened. Neither Andrei Savelyev, nor some of the lesser known radicals were visible in the month before elections. The Great Russia website was stagnant, there was virtually no campaigning, and towards the end of the election campaign period, Savelyev, alongside other ultra-right activists, urged his supporters to stay away from voting booths. Apparently, Savelyev and others were aware that they were unlikely to score a visible victory (and boost their political power), not to mention cross the seven percent barrier to make it into the Duma. Indeed, on December 2nd the Patriots received a negligible 0.9% of the vote.
The Russian March
In contrast, the right-wing radicals were much more concerned with the preparation of their traditional march on 4 November. The preparations unfolded amidst numerous clashes, scandals and splits, resulting in the announcement of three separate ultra-right actions on 4 November in Moscow (organized by DPNI, Nikolay Kuryanovich and Sergey Baburin), two of which were announced as the Russian March. All three gatherings were permitted by the Moscow City Government.
The most prominent event of the day was definitely the DPNI march. In addition to attracting around 2.5-3 thousand marchers, it was attended - regardless of serious conflicts among leaders - by all active ultra-right groups in Moscow.
Officially, participants of the march included DPNI, the National Imperial Party of Russia (NDPR), the Russian Order Group, the Slavic Union (SS), the "Rus" Party in Defense of the Russian Constitution (PZRK), the National Socialist Society, the Union of Orthodox Gonfalon Carriers, the Union of Russian People (SRN), the Colonel Kvachkov Support Group, the Russian National Bolshevik Front (Ivan Strukov's RNBF), the Pamyat National Patriotic Front, the National Union, the Russian Community of the Crimea, the Lukashenko-2008 Group, and the Russian Public Movement (ROD). Unofficially, the march was attended by members of other groups, including supporters of N. Kuryanovich and RONS.
However, the mere fact that the event was officially permitted and the authorities did not attempt to prevent or stop it, as well as also the choice of venue (a fairly isolated embankment), reduced the impact of the event and weakened the aura of sacrifice and heroism felt in the previous year. The organizers (particularly DPNI) tried to keep the passion alive by alleging preventive arrests, and even presented a somewhat strange story of DPNI leader A. Belov's attempted arrest and subsequent hospitalization with a heart attack - but they did not achieve much. [6] In fact, the number of participants attracted by the Russian March on 4 November 2007 may be the limit of how many supporters the ultra-right can potentially mobilize in Moscow City and Oblast.
In fact, it was not the march of right-wing radicals in Moscow that demonstrated a high xenophobic potential of the 4 November Day, but the nationwide scale of xenophobic actions on that day. One way or another, the 2007 Russian March was held in at least 20 Russian cities. In two cities (St. Petersburg and Samara) it was associated with violent attacks, while in Tver, the right-wing radicals marched as part of the officially organized city-wide manifestation. In at least two other cities, Voronezh and Krasnodar, authorities pressured the organizers into cancelling the events. But even from this perspective, it would be wrong to say that the marches were more successful than the previous year, because the actions in different cities were not coordinated. The marches and rallies were organized by different groups, some of them competing for supporters or audiences. As a result, even the ultra-right themselves were unable to provide a full list of cities where actions were held.
So a drive towards consolidation and coordination among ultra-right groups observed between the autumn of 2006 and the winter of 2007 dwindled towards the end of 2007 due to internal conflicts aggravated by the elections season.
Xenophobia on Behalf of the State
Xenophobia as electoral resource
In fact, xenophobic slogans were used as electoral resource on a much smaller scale than expected. At least at the federal level such practices were not as visible as in 2003. It was not surprising though, as the United Russia Party dominated the political scene, while promotional materials of other parties were virtually absent and political debates weak.
In particular, in addition to the Popular Union and Russian Patriots, xenophobic candidates were included in at least three other party candidate lists: CPRF (their list contained a few signatories of the anti-Semitic "letter of the 500;), LDPR (they, having dumped N. Kuryanovich, kept on their candidate lists such people as Sergey Ivanov, a collaborator of NSO, and Ivan Musatov, member of the 2006 Russian March Board), and somewhat unexpectedly - the Fair Russia Party with at least 12 candidates who had in one way or another demonstrated their xenophobic attitudes, such as Oleg Paschenko known in Krasnoyarsk Krai for his anti-Semitism, whom Fair Russia leader Sergey Mironov had promised to oust from the party much earlier, before Paschenko's election to the regional legislature. The United Russia Party, as expected, used the Russian Project website as their "nationalist" resource. We should note though that after the December 2nd elections, the xenophobic potential in the State Duma was substantially weakened. [7]
Throughout the election campaign period, the SOVA Center monitored the use of hate speech by the campaigning candidates. We have not processed our findings yet, but it is clear by now that hate speech was used to some extent by each of the four political parties which made it to the new State Duma.
Other Actions
An increasing concern is the activity of pro-Kremlin youth groups with their racist practices, in particular The Locals - :Mestnye; - known for their anti-immigrant actions.
In September 2007, yet another scandal unfolded in connection with the group's practices. On 15 September 2007, with Mestnye's support, the Federal Migration Service used provocative methods to detect illegal immigrants: allegedly, some Mestnye activists :hired; 80 immigrants and reported them to the FMS, which then arrested 72 of the immigrants. Mestnye displayed a banner depicting airplanes and a caption: Time to Fly South!
On 17 September 2007, the FMS Director Konstantin Romodanovsky thanked Mestnye for its assistance and announced the FMS intention to continue using Mestnye in their operation :as community-based helpers... Of course, Mestnye are not always easy to deal with, - sometimes their attitudes are very aggressive. But they can be helpful if used reasonably," Romodanovsky said. :If we compare Mestnye with nationalists from the Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), I would prefer Mestnye. They are more reasonable,; the FMS chief added.
The frame-up and particularly the statement which revealed that the FMS was prepared to condone racist practices as long as the group was loyal to authorities caused profound indignation in the human rights community. However, the FMS never denied or disowned the original statement by their chief.
It was revealed a month later that the Moscow city police had revived a practice used a year before of requesting Moscow-based schools to provide lists of students with Georgian names. This time, Moskovsky Komsomolets reports, some schools in Khimky - a town outside Moscow - received requests from police to report students from the Caucasus and Central Asia under the pretext of the war against terrorism. We do not know of any official comments on this information.
Counteractions to Radical Nationalism
Activities of Non-Governmental Organizations
In the autumn of 2007, the activity of non-governmental organizations addressing racism and xenophobia rarely went beyond traditional types of projects (educational and awareness-raising).
Some of the significant events worth mentioning are the already traditional March against Hatred held in St. Petersburg on 28 October, and the All-Russian Week against Hatred.
The March Against Hatred dedicated to the memory of researcher Nikolay Girenko killed by neo-Nazi in 2004 was held in St. Petersburg for the fifth time and attracted, by various estimates, between 500 and 800 participants. Unfortunately, the organizers failed to make it a non-partisan event, which gave rise to a series of conflicts caused, in particular, by the pro-Kremlin Young Guard's attempt to get involved in the march and confronted with a ban on using their party symbols - as opposed to SPS and Yabloko participating in the rally.
Another event - a Meeting against Fascism and Xenophobia organized by Yabloko Party on 4 November in Bolotnaya Square in Moscow was even more partisan. Similar to the march in St. Petersburg, it attracted between 500 and 800 people.
Another annual event which has become a tradition - a Week against Hatred - was held by youth organizations (primarily by the Youth Human Rights Movement) under the aegis of the UNITED network between 9 and 16 November in a dozen and a half Russian regions. The activities organized by youth activists during the week included festivals, discussions and public events aimed at raising public awareness of intolerance in the Russian society.
The Public Chamber
In autumn 2007, radical nationalist sentiments in the Russian public were one of the issues addressed by the Public Chamber, which we mention under non-governmental organizations based on formal criteria.
On 22 November, the Public Chamber Commission on Tolerance and Freedom of Expression (chaired by Valery Tishkov) approved a report on xenophobia prepared by a Subcommission for Counteraction to Extremism and Xenophobia (chaired by Mavlit Bazhayev). The report contained recommendations - mainly urging for more guidelines and legislation to address interethnic relations. As an alarming development, the Chamber endorsed a recommendation to adopt a legal ban on mentioning ethnicity in mass media. To remind the reader, a discussion of draft legislation to this effect (criticized by many, including members of the Public Chamber) was postponed on several occasions. [8]
Either way, the report and its recommendations are merely declarative, because the Chamber's legal status is still undefined. Therefore, it is unclear whether and how the recommendations will be promoted or acted upon.
Criminal Prosecution of the Right-Wing Radicals
Violence
In the autumn of 2007, there were at least four trials leading to convictions for violent hate crimes, and at least 10 persons were sentenced. Three such trials were held in Moscow, [9] and one in Yekaterinburg. Since the beginning of 2007, at least 20 people have been convicted in Russia for racist and neo-Nazi violence (where the hate motive was taken into account in sentencing).
We should note an obvious change of attitude in the Moscow Prosecutor's Office. While in 2006 we know of only five trials in Moscow leading to convictions for racist violence - and four of them were high-profile, showcase trials - between the beginning of the year 2007 and the autumn season, at least five trials ended in convictions, none of which were high-profile cases. [10] Another piece of evidence revealing that the Moscow Prosecutor's Office might have changed its treatment of violent hate crimes was that they did not only reveal that the events on 20 October had been an organized racist "raid,; but announced the number of victims. Such openness was unprecedented for prosecutors in Russia. It is quite possible that consistent efforts of the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office along the same lines in the future may curb the spread of ultra-right violence in the city.
In addition, there were two other trials of neo-Nazi offenders leading to convictions, where the hate motive was not recognized - and, apparently, for a good reason. In Moscow Oblast, teenagers who described themselves as skinheads were convicted for killing homeless people, while in Izhevsk two young men were convicted on charges of killing Stanislav Korepanov, a teenage skater, in the spring of 2007.
The Korepanov case was one of the high-profile cases involving Russian neo-Nazis. To remind the reader, on 27 March 2007, Stanislav Korepanov was brutally beaten by a group of neo-Nazi skinheads who had planned to attack local anti-fascists, but targeted the victim who was not an antifascist. A few days later Korepanov died in hospital. Police arrested two of the attackers who were found guilty of killing the boy "out of hooligan motives" and sentenced each to 13 years of prison. The victim's family insisted that the hate motive against a social group (skaters) be recognized in the sentence; however, the court denied the motion and we believe it to be the right decision. In this case, the crime, indeed, was motivated by the attackers' neo-Nazi attitudes; however, the crime was committed in March, whereas the aggravating circumstance of ideological hatred was added to the Criminal Code later - in August 2007.
We should also mention another conviction, formally for promoting racist violence. At the end of November, in Obninsk (Kaluga Oblast), eight neo-Nazi skinheads faced trial and were convicted for posting videos of racist attacks on the web. This trial was unprecedented, because for the first time of all such cases known to us, the actual attackers (or those who acted out the attacks) were detected - as opposed to those who simply uploaded the videos onto the web (very often the latter do not even share the attackers' attitudes). But the investigation failed to identify the victims who may have not reported the attacks, or may have been rejected when they tried to complain, which is a common practice. In the absence of victims, the Prosecutor's Office could not charge the youngsters with a violent offence, so they prosecuted (and the court agreed) under an article - which we believe to have been the only appropriate thing to do given the circumstances - criminalizing the incitement to ethnic hatred perpetrated by a group or involving violence. All defendants were sentenced to real, rather than probational, terms of 18 months.
Propaganda and Campaigning
Even though the rates of conviction for racist violence fell behind those observed in the previous year, hate propaganda was punished as actively as before. At least four convictions for hate propaganda were passed in the autumn of 2007. Yuri Yekishev was convicted for a second time in Syktyvkar; in Barnaul, a member of NDPR was sentenced for disseminating ultra-right propaganda leaflets during the Victory Day celebrations; [11] in Blagoveschensk, a local SRN leader was convicted; and finally, a student from Adygeya was sentenced on charges of posting onto the web the infamous video with a racist double murder in August 2007 - although we believe that the latter judgment was not quite legally sound. In total, between the beginning of the year 2007 and the autumn of the same year, at least 23 trials of hate promoters ended in convictions in Russia. For the sake of comparison, we should indicate that there were just seventeen such convictions over the entire year 2006.
We should also mention a somewhat landmark event: in the autumn of 2007, criminal proceedings were launched against NSO leader Dmitry Rumyantsev for racist propaganda. Notably, the criminal case was not opened by the Moscow Prosecutor's Office, even though most of Rumyantsev's activity occurred in the capital; rather, the decision to prosecute was made by the Prosecutor's Office in Voronezh after Rumyantsev's speech at a national-patriotic rally organized by the Voronezh Union of Russian People, which is a far more moderate group than NSO. [12] The prospects of the case are not clear yet, but the mere fact of his prosecution in the context of increasing impunity felt by high-profile leaders of ultra-right groups caused some fear and confusion in the ranks of Russian neo-Nazis.
For the first time in the autumn of 2007, Hizb ut-Tahrir members were sentenced on charges of incitement to ethnic hatred (art. 282) and participation in an extremist community (art. 282.2). The sentence was meted out in Chuvashia on 19 September 2007. Four members of the organization were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms ranging between four months and four years and four months. We note that it was the first and so far the only conviction known to us where Hizb ut-Tahrir members were punished for actual xenophobic propaganda, rather than for alleged terrorist attacks (which were probably a myth) or for their membership in the organization.
Extremist Materials
Authorities continued their efforts to determine which materials should be considered extremist.
On 24 October, Rosregistration published its second, and on 15 December - its third federal list of extremist materials, including, respectively, 16 and 31 items. Today the official federal list contains 61 items of various extremis propaganda.
In addition to the federal list, a series of judicial proceedings found some other materials extremist; between September and November 2007, songs of Cyclon B, a neo-Nazi music group which had broken up a while ago, were found extremist. However, we do not consider some of these judgments legitimate or appropriate, particularly with regard to 14 Russian translations of Turkish theologian Said Nursi's books (see below).
Other Practices
The autumn of 2007 marked the end of nearly two years of judicial proceedings triggered by Rossvyazokhrankultura's request to close Duel' (The Duel) newspaper. In the course of the proceedings, the paper was warned two more times - and the warnings, certainly, played a role in the final judgment. Duel' was the second periodical banned :for extremism; in 2007 and the third (minus the dubious case of General'naya Liniya - the mouthpiece of NBP which was not yet banned at the time - and the obviously unlawful ban of Pravo-Zaschita paper) banned since the recent version of anti-extremist legislation came into force.
Rossvyazokhrankultura continued to issue warnings - we note, however, that most of their warnings issued in autumn were not legally sound (see below).
Nothing is known yet about warnings issued to mass media and other organizations by regional prosecutorial offices, but we assume warnings were issued regionally as well.
That being said, we should mention the only regional prosecutorial warning issued in the autumn 2007 for xenophobic propaganda which we know of.
On 5 October 2007, the local Prosecutor's Office in Nerungry issued an :anti-extremist; warning to Larissa Sharovarina, editor-in-chief of paper Prosto Nyurka, for illustrating an article entitled :Extremism Spurted out of the Chimney; with copies of :extremist leaflets.; Nevertheless, the Prosecutor's Office refused to open a criminal case against the editor under art. 282 of the Criminal Code. The situation with Prosto Nuyrka shows clearly how a journalist's negligence may contribute to xenophobia and what may be the prosecutor's assessment of this involuntary misconduct by the media. The article, accompanied by photos which attracted the prosecutor's attention, had in fact intended to discourage ethnic hatred. However, the prosecutorial office took account of the situation in the city at the time of the publication - namely, the fact that since the summer of 2007 anti-Chinese sentiments were running high, after a local company hired migrant workers from China, disregarding the high unemployment in the city. By the time of the publication, two arsons and two attacks explicitly targeting the Chinese population had occurred in Nerungry. The leaflets which illustrated the article in question contained thinly veiled anti-Chinese wording (rather than appeals to hold the employers accountable), plus the contact information of DPNI and the Russian Community of Yakutia clearly readable on the photos. Apparently it had never occurred to the editors to consider the potential consequences of the publication - in particular, the fact that they had involuntarily disseminated the nationalists' contact details. We believe that by issuing a warning but refusing to consider the incident an intentional offense the Prosecutor's Office responded appropriately.
Excessive and Unfounded Actions against Extremism
Most cases of abusive anti-extremist enforcement in the autumn of 2007 were linked to the election campaign. Political parties such as SPS, Fair Russia and CPRF faced accusations of extremism and, in particular, of incitement to social hatred. Air time was denied to election campaign clips of SPS and Fair Russia just because the TV channel editors were afraid of consequences. Very often "suspicions of extremism" were later dropped; for example, a few million campaign leaflets confiscated a weak before the election day were returned to SPS after the campaign - this extremely cynical trick had been practiced numerous times before on opposition leaders and activist groups.
In addition, sanctions for "extremism" targeted some formally non-partisan publications which criticized the United Russia Party or promoted views oppositional to the current regime. We find that the worst example of such harassment was the attempted liquidation of Saratovsky Reporter paper. Two warnings were issued to the paper within two days. One of the materials which triggered a warning depicted President Putin as Von Schtirlitz [a character from a very popular series Seventeen Moments of Spring from the 1970s about a Soviet spy in the Nazi high echelons of power] - Rossvyazokhrankultura found it to be propaganda of Nazi symbols. The second publication targeted by a warning was titled Do not Beat a Yid - Russia Is Saved [paraphrasing an anti-Semitic slogan Beat Yids and Save Russia], just as the first one, contained - as we believe - nothing inappropriate. The editorial office received the warnings together with a summons to court since the authorities requested closure of the paper. The editors challenged both warnings, and the proceedings are likely to continue for a long time. [13]
Another striking example of abusive enforcement was the attempt to close the New Petersburg paper in St. Petersburg. Two warnings were issued to the paper within a period of several days. Unfortunately, we cannot judge the lawfulness of one warning, but the other warning was issued for an unpublished article encouraging people to take part in the Dissenters' March. After the two warnings, the Prosecutor's Office could formally request a court to close the paper. The court - before considering the case on the merits - issued an indictment which suspended the publication pending the final judgment, even though mass media, as opposed to NGOs, cannot be legally suspended under such circumstances.
This case vividly demonstrated the authorities' attitudes to extremism and xenophobia, on the one hand, and to political opposition, on the other. New Petersburg is one of the most odious periodicals in the region, and a mouthpiece of ultra-right organizations; explicitly xenophobic articles consistently appeared on its pages. The Prosecutor's Office had multiple reasons to warn the paper on perfectly legal grounds. However, all previous publications had been overlooked, even though human rights activists had urged the authorities to take action. But a single unpublished article, which was oppositional to the current regime, immediately triggered a prosecutorial response.
Bans of public events organized by political opposition under the pretext that extremist statements might potentially be pronounced have become a systematic practice.
We do not know of a single case where an official was punished for abusive enforcement, even though the abuse was obvious (such as entire print runs of materials being confiscated for :review; and then returned).
But abusive enforcement of anti-extremist law was not limited to suppression of the United Russia Party opponents.
What caused us the biggest concern was the coming into force of a judgment labeling 14 Russian translations of books by Turkish theologian Said Nursi as extremist. On 18 September, the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of the Koptevsky Court in Moscow of 21 May 2007. Human rights defenders filed a relevant application with the European Court of Human Rights, but it may take a long time for the Court to consider the application, while Nursi's followers in Russia are under threat of official persecution.
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[1] As before, our monitoring does not cover the North Caucasus (which includes Ingushetia, where a series of obviously racist killings were committed in the autumn of 2007), because we believe that the situation there merits a separate full-fledged research effort. As before, we do not include in our statistics victims of homophobic violence, massive fights, and attacks against homeless people.
[2] However, one should bear in mind that we learn about many attacks with a considerable delay. For example, in 2007 we learned about 30 victims of attacks committed in the autumn of 2006, which increased our 2006 statistics by 30% (cf. http://xeno.sova-center.ru/29481C8/883BB9D).
[3] To remind, in August the village was rioted by attackers (apparently, ethnic Buryats) shouting nationalist slogans.
[4] The ultra-right claim 54 victims.
[5] We should also mention that in contrast to usually practiced preventive arrests under far-fetched pretexts, this time the reason appears plausible, because Belov has recently been observed to use strong language, in particular at public events.
[6] It is still unclear why authorities would want to arrest Belov. According to DPNI, the arrest was a follow-up to his detention in Karelia, but in September Belov had already served his five days for the incident in Karelia.
[7] See: The New State Duma: its xenophobic potential// SOVA Center. Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia. 2007. 26 December (xeno.sova-center.ru/29481C8/A59EF07).
[8] Most recently, this discussion was rescheduled from 16 October 2007 :to a later date.;
[9] In addition, we know of three other :racist; cases heard in Moscow district courts, but we are not sure what the judgments were.
[10] We know that in the summer and autumn of 2007, courts in Moscow passed three more judgments in cases of racist killings, but we are not sure of the criminal episodes in question and whether the defendants were convicted.
[11] Incidentally, even facing investigation, he probably attempted to organize a fundraiser to support a group of neo-Nazis detained by local police on suspicion of several racist attacks.
[12] The original press release issued by the Voronezh Prosecutor's Office described Rumyantsev as the leader of local SRN.
[13] We are thankful to editor-in-chief Sergey Mikhailov for the materials provided to our Center.
