Summary
Systematic Racist and Neo-Nazi Violence
Attacks Against “Ethnic Outsiders”
Attacks Against Ideological Opponents
Attacks Against the LGBT+ and in “Defense of Morality”
Religious Xenophobia
Crimes Against Property
Criminal Prosecution for Violence
Criminal Prosecution for Crimes Against Property

This report by SOVA Center focuses on the phenomenon of hate crimes, that is, criminal offenses committed on the grounds of ethnic, religious, or similar hostility or prejudice[1], and on the state’s countermeasures to such crimes.

Russian legislation also classifies crimes motivated by political and ideological enmity as hate crimes. The inclusion of these types of enmity in the definition of hate crime is quite rare in democratic countries and remains controversial. We do not consider such crimes in our report unless they are committed by groups oriented toward committing hate crimes in general, for xenophobic motives.

Summary

The results of the past year are alarming. Since the spring of 2023, we have recorded a rapid increase in racist violence, and this growth continued at a rapid pace in the first half of 2024 until the end of spring, although it has slowed down since summer. It is primarily youth bands that engage in this kind of violence, reviving the traditions of the Nazi skinhead autonomous groups of the 2000s. These new “Nazi-autonomists” target both traditional victim groups, perceived by them as “ethnic outsiders,” and the most vulnerable and defenseless, such as the homeless or drunks. No one, including women and children, is immune from attacks and subsequent public humiliation following the publication of the videos of the attacks. The far-right seems to be reviving all the forms of violence developed in the 2000s, including attacks “by association” against people dating the wrong kind of partner. The level of brutality towards the victims is also increasing.

The number of attacks against material objects and property has seen a less marked increase. Especially concerning, however, is the growing share of the most serious acts, such as arson and explosions.

The number of convictions for hate crimes has also increased. Law enforcement has demonstrated willingness to prosecute such attacks, and the number of the apprehended perpetrators is on the rise. Long prison terms were given to members of both new and old far-right gangs. But not only to them: in particular, the first group of participants in the anti-Semitic pogrom at the Makhachkala airport went to prison at the end of the year.

However, law enforcement officers are, unfortunately, clearly not keeping up with the increasing rates of violence.

Systematic Racist and Neo-Nazi Violence

According to SOVA Center’s monitoring data, in 2024, ideologically motivated violence affected 259 people, one of whom died. In addition, three people received serious death threats. Thus, the increase in the number of ideologically motivated attacks recorded a year ago continued and even accelerated: in 2023, we have reported 123 victims and one death threat[2]. According to our data, the level of violence has returned to that of 2011 (243 victims). And we should also keep in mind that the data for last year are not final, as we learn about many attacks with a delay[3].

Our data on hate crimes in Russia cannot be compared with any other statistics, since no other open statistics exist. And we are unable to include any data on the republics of the North Caucasus in our calculations as our methodology does not work there[4]. We also know very little about incidents between different minority groups motivated by ethnic hatred. As a result, our data are incomplete and can in no way reflect the level of racist violence in Russia. But we can assess the dynamics and major trends at least to some extent, because our methodology has not changed since 2004.

We have repeatedly reported on the difficulties associated with collecting information[5]. Monitoring based on the media and social networks and reports of victims' appeals to human rights organizations and the police remains difficult. But since the spring of 2023, newly emerging neo-Nazi autonomous youth groups have returned to the practice of telling the stories of their “exploits” by posting videos of “direct action” online, and the lion's share of our statistics comes from our monitoring of far-right Telegram channels[6].

Judging by reports and data on the detainees, most of the attackers are very young people, often 13-14 years old, who are stylistically copying their predecessors of the early 2000s. This continuity can also be seen in the names of the new wave groups, directly repeating the old acronyms (the new NS/WP[7], Sparrows Crew, etc.).

According to the anti-fascist Nazi Video Monitoring Project, which records not only serious hate crimes, but also smaller incidents not included in our counts, 61 videos showing 42 attacks were published in the far-right channels in December 2024 alone; 58 videos of 58 attacks in November, and 54 videos of 64 attacks in October[8].

Most of the attacks occurred in the spring. Judging by the introductions to videos in Telegram channels, the far-right is reviving the tradition of attacks commemorating significant dates: some were timed to coincide with Hitler's birthday on April 20, the “day of hatred and revenge” on May 5, once set for 40th day since the death of the famous neo-Nazi Maxim Bazylev (Adolf), and the day of memory of another ultra-right cult figure, the leader of the St. Petersburg neo-Nazi Combat Terrorist Organization, Dmitry Borovikov, shot dead during his arrest on May 19, 2006. In addition, at least four major attacks in March were declared revenge for the March 22 terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall[9]. The summer saw a noticeable decline in the activity of neo-Nazi militant groups, only partially offset by the intensification in the fall.

In 2023, we wrote that the attacks perpetrated by the new autonomous groups did not seem particularly brutal[10] and the vast majority of the episodes were more like hooligan antics rather than dangerous violence. At the same time, we also expressed concerns that the brutality of attacks would inevitably increase. Unfortunately, our fears were justified: already in the winter of 2024, despite the decrease in the total number of videos of attacks, the number of serious group beatings with hammers and brass knuckles gradually began to grow. Fortunately, so far the “direct action” has resulted in almost no murders.

Unfortunately, it can be very difficult to determine where exactly the attack took place. Often we cannot even identify the region. Based on fragmented data, we have recorded attacks in 19 regions of the country in the past year (26 regions in 2023). Moscow is leading in terms of the level of violence, replacing St. Petersburg, which was number one for the two previous years. It is followed by the Moscow, the Novosibirsk, and the Kostroma regions and Krasnoyarsk Krai. In addition to Moscow and St. Petersburg, attacks were carried out for the second consecutive year in the Volgograd, the Moscow, the Nizhny Novgorod, the Novosibirsk, the Tyumen, the Chelyabinsk, and the Yaroslavl regions, in Krasnoyarsk Krai, and in Stavropol Krai.

Attacks Against “Ethnic Outsiders”

In 2024, we recorded 163 ethnically motivated attacks, that is, attacks against those whom the attackers visually perceived as ethnic outsiders. And that's more than double the number from a year earlier (69 assaults).

Victims in this category include natives of Central Asia and the Caucasus, dark-skinned people, and people of unidentified “non-Slavic appearance.”

As is traditionally the case, those beaten “by association” were also among the victims. For example, in October, a group of ultra-right-wingers beat up a teenage boy for dating a “Tajik girl.”

2024 saw several attacks against young children of “non-Slavic appearance,” including against children playing in the sandpit on a playground[11].

We learned about most of these attacks from far-right Telegram feeds about attacks carried out by organized groups of Nazi autonomists.

Also present were cases of routine xenophobia displayed by ordinary citizens in routine disputes, including on public transport.

According to Levada Center data published in May 2024, hostility toward migrants from Central Asia has increased in connection with the terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall. Only 22% of respondents were willing to see them in their inner circle, and another 17% - among residents of the Russian Federation (in 2021, 23% and 22% respectively), while 56% said that they would let migrants into Russia only temporarily or would ban them from entry altogether.

One of the highest indicators of the level of social distance is observed toward the Roma. Hostility toward this group has been recorded for a long time. And whereas earlier this indicator was slightly decreasing, in 2024 it increased significantly: 39% of respondents were not willing to allow Roma into Russia, and 13% were prepared to ban them from entry altogether (in April 2022, 30% and 16% respectively)[12]. A vivid example of these attitudes was the violent pogrom against the local Roma in the town of Korkino, the Chelyabinsk region, after a local taxi driver was murdered in October 2024.

There are also attacks motivated by ethnic hatred against ethnic Russians. We are aware of two such assaults in 2024 (six in 2023). Both of these incidents took place in Belgorod and came to light after a video posted online by a group of teenagers calling themselves Combat Bumblebees and led by 17-year-old Emil Gafarov.

The military action in Ukraine is contributing to the overall picture of xenophobically motivated violence. Thus, on the night of August 10, a resident of St. Petersburg shot his neighbor in the eye with a gas pistol through the unscrewed peephole of the front door, believing that she was from Ukraine (in fact, she turned out to be a native of St. Petersburg). However, Ukrainians are almost never among the victims in our statistics. Probably, the reason is that they are visually difficult to identify.

Attacks Against Ideological Opponents

The number of attacks by the ultra-right against their political, ideological, or “stylistic” opponents remained approximately the same – 14 beaten (15 in 2023)[13]. Among the victims were non-political non-conformists (punks, anime fans, emo and Redan[14] subculture fans etc.), ideological opponents (Communists, anti-fascists, or those who have merely been mistaken for such) and simply those who publicly expressed outrage over racist slogans.

The two cases that gained media notoriety were the November 16 attack in Kostroma, where two young men returning from a film screening about murdered anti-fascist Ivan Khutorskoy were assaulted by members of the neo-Nazi Made With Hate organization, resulting in one of the victims losing an eye, and the January 12 attack against communist Ruslan Radul and his companions in the center of Rybinsk, the Yaroslavl region.

Attacks Against the LGBT+ and in “Defense of Morality”

Compared to 2023, the number of attacks against LGBT+ people decreased and returned to the levels of 2022. SOVA Center has recorded 7 victims (19 in 2023, 6 in 2022). But the only murder victim known to us was among them. It was a 44-year-old handicapped man beaten to death on a fake date in Tula by a group of teenagers calling themselves neo-Nazis[15].

The attacks, seen as a “cleansing” of elements that undermine the “moral level of the nation” is, regrettably, one of the most popular types of far-right violence. Ethnically, such victims may also be “one’s own,” although “outsiders” are certainly favored. The far-right often refer to this category of victims as “biowaste” or “human garbage.” These are, first of all, the homeless[16], as well as the drunk and alcoholics, drug users, and drug dealers[17]. Since the Occupy-Pedophiliay project was founded in the 2010s by the well-known neo-Nazi Maksim (Tesak) Martsinkevich[18], this group of victims also included alleged pedophiles; they have turned out to be the largest victim group in this segment. And the popularity of such attacks is growing, apparently due to the high vulnerability of the victims.

Collecting information on this category of victims is particularly difficult due to the antisocial nature of many victims. Nevertheless, in 2024, we found out about 62 such attacks[19] (15 in 2023). And this represents the second largest group of victims in our sad statistics.

Religious Xenophobia

Violence motivated by religious xenophobia in Russia is far less common than that motivated by ethnic xenophobia. Although, for example, Muslims as a religious group represent a constant target of hostility on far-right Internet resources, xenophobic attacks against them as members of a religious group rather than as ethnic "outsiders" are rare.

In the past year, however, we have come across several such cases. In July, at the Kolomenskaya metro station in Moscow, a female passenger attacked another female passenger wearing a hijab with a knife and pepper spray. In September, a video emerged of a far-right activist who sprayed gas at a woman wearing a hijab, who was outside with her two children and a stroller.

Crimes Against Property

Crimes against property include damage to cemeteries, monuments, various cultural objects, and various property in general. The Criminal Code qualifies these cases under different articles, but law enforcement in this sense is not always consistent. Such actions are usually referred to as vandalism, but for several years now we have preferred not to use this term, since the concept of “vandalism,” not only in the Criminal Code, but also in everyday language, clearly does not describe all possible types of damage to material objects.

The number of property crimes motivated by religious, ethnic or ideological hatred, recorded by SOVA Center has increased: for 2024, we know of 21 cases in nine regions of the country; for 2023, 15 cases in 13 regions.

Our statistics does not include isolated cases of neo-Nazi graffiti and drawings on buildings and fences, but it does include serial graffiti.

As with violent crimes, we do not include in our counts attacks on material objects for political or ideological reasons (which have become particularly numerous since 2022), unless these ideological reasons are themselves linked to xenophobia. Neither do we include episodes qualified as attacks on a material object, such as the “Eternal Flame,” in which material damage was not inflicted[20].

These statistics also do not include insignificant incidents, including those committed by the ultra-right, such as damage to cars with license plates from the Caucasus regions (tire punctures, broken windows, arson), attacks on retail outlets that employ people with “non-Slavic appearance” (broken windows, damaged goods), broken windows in construction trailers, and so on. According to the Nazi Video Monitoring Project, the numbers of such acts were as follows: 50 in December, 27 in November, 17 in October, and 16 in September[21].

According to the SOVA Center, in 2024, 11 sites were targeted for ideological rather than religious reasons (including hostility to ethnic groups or LGBT+), which is more than a year earlier (eight in 2023). As usual, the Lenin monument and monuments to the heroes of the Great Patriotic War were among the targeted sites. In addition, the grave of Mikhail (Gorshok) Gorsheniov, lead singer of the punk band Korol i Shut, was desecrated in St. Petersburg, in Yekaterinburg the mass grave of tourists from the Dyatlov group was desecrated twice[22], and in Volgograd a makeshift memorial, erected on January 19 to commemorate the lawyer Stanislav Markelov and journalist Anastasia Baburova, murdered by the neo-Nazis, was broken down.

In February in Volgograd, ultra-right-wing members of the Orthodox Wolves of Votan group set fire to a private house allegedly inhabited by Roma; and in June, another group set fire to a house where migrants were living. In July, a video emerged of a teenager burning a Russian passport stolen from a native of Tajikistan.

Religious sites were targeted in nearly half of the attacks. In 2024, their number (10) was higher than in the previous year (7). Five Orthodox and five Muslim sites were desecrated (in 2023, four and two, respectively).

The share of the most dangerous acts – arson and explosions – also increased: four arsons and one explosion (in 2023, two arsons and one explosion). Thus, the share of such acts increased slightly and reached 25% (in 2023, 20%).

The regional distribution changed again in the last year. In 2024, such crimes occurred in five new regions (12 in 2023). At the same time, eight regions from 2023 did not make it into our statistics in 2024 (vs. 11 regions in 2023).

For the second consecutive year, the geography of the acts of violence (19 regions) was noticeably wider than that of the vandals' crimes (9 regions); for four years in a row prior to 2023 the opposite was true. Both types of crimes were recorded in five regions (seven in 2023): Moscow and St. Petersburg, the Volgograd, the Moscow, and the Tyumen regions. But given the significant incompleteness of violent crime location data, the geography of violence is probably substantially broader than that.

Criminal Prosecution for Violence

In 2024, the number of those convicted of violent hate crimes known to us was twice as high as a year earlier. Not less than 22 guilty verdicts where the hate motive was officially recognized by courts were issued in 12 regions. 70 suspects were found guilty in these trials[23] (35 in 2023). Official statistics on sentences with hate motive are not available, as this qualifying characteristic does not constitute part of an article of the Criminal Code, but only a paragraph, and the sentencing statistics are published by the Supreme Court by parts of articles.

Racist violence was categorized under the following articles containing hate motive as a categorizing attribute: Murder (Paragraph K of Part 2, Art. 105), Intentional Infliction of Injury to Health of Average Gravity (Paragraph F of Part 2, Art. 112), Intentional Infliction of Light Injury to Health (Paragraph B of Part 2, 115), Battery (Part 2, Art. 116), Hooliganism (Part 2, Art. 213), Death Threat (Part 2, Art. 119). This set is repeated practically every year.

We are also aware of one verdict in which Article 282 of the Criminal Code (incitement to hatred; a year earlier we were not aware of such verdicts) was applied to a violent crime in 2024, although it did not concern public statements. In May, a court in Stavropol Krai sentenced two brothers under Paragraph A of Part 2 of Article 282 of the Criminal Code for a verbal dispute during a roadside conflict, where the defendants hit a young man several times while shouting xenophobic insults.

The application of Art. 282 in this type of cases is allowed: as the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 11 “On judicial practice in criminal cases of extremist crimes” of June 28, 2011[24] states, Art. 282 of the CC the article may be applied to violent crimes if they are aimed at inciting hatred in third parties, for example, in the case of a public and demonstrative ideologically motivated attack.

Almost half of the convicts we know of, 34 people, are participants in the anti-Semitic pogrom at the Makhachkala airport in October 2023[25]. They were convicted in late 2024 in Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai under Part 2 of Article 212 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass riots accompanied by violence, pogroms, destruction of property, use of objects that pose a danger to others, as well as armed resistance to a representative of the authorities)[26]. The group trials of the riot participants have continued since the beginning of 2025.

In addition to the above, we can mention the sentence issued in St. Petersburg for the beating of a 17-year-old man: the victim was approached by the attackers, who claimed to be “skinheads” and “keeping everyone in fear” and asked him whether he “supported the Russian World.” Before the victim was able to respond, they beat him with a stun gun, sprayed gas in his face, and shot him with a rocket launcher. Notably, no hate motive was included in the charges (under Art. 115 and 213).

In addition, we do not know whether the hate motive was taken into account in the sentence of imprisonment under Articles 111 and 213 of the Criminal Code given in January in Orenburg to two teenagers from the ultra-right Cheerful Boots Squad for beating people with “non-Slavic appearance” while shouting racist slogans.

Penalties for violent acts were distributed as follows:

• 1 person sentenced to 17 years in prison;
• 3 persons sentenced to terms of up to 15 years in prison;
• 40 persons sentenced to terms of up to 10 years in prison;
• 7 persons sentenced to terms of up to 5 years in prison;
• 9 persons sentenced to terms of up to 3 years in prison;
• 1 person – up to 1 year in prison;
• 2 persons sentenced to forced labor;
• 1 person sentenced to compulsory labor;
• 4 persons received suspended sentences;
• 2 persons – sentences unknown.

Thus, only 6% were sentenced to suspended sentences. The share of suspended sentences for violent hate crimes fell sharply compared to the previous year, when we reported 32%. And this is a positive trend: over the years of monitoring, we have repeatedly seen that suspended sentences for violence are not perceived by the convicted as punishment and fail to stop them from committing similar acts in the future.

In some cases we find the motivation of the court understandable and such decisions acceptable. It is likely that in the two sentences in St. Petersburg, one for pepper-spraying a passerby while shouting xenophobic insults and another for a pepper-spray assault with homophobic slurs, such mild sentences can be explained by the fact that the attackers were minors and the victim was only slightly injured. It is also likely that the above-mentioned young participant in the roadside conflict in Stavropol Krai, who was hit and insulted several times “on the basis of ethnicity,” was not seriously hurt.

Punishments for compulsory and forced labor are rare in sentences for violent crimes. But last year there were three such sentences. One of them is Alexei (Monakhov) Malevanyi, a well-known far-right activist from Volgograd, who was sentenced to 300 hours of compulsory labor under Paragraph B of Part 2 of Article 115 of the Criminal Code for attacking a teenager who reprimanded neo-Nazis for shouting Nazi slogans and doing a Nazi salute.

The two forced labor sentences were given for Russophobic attacks to an underage participant of a group assault against Russians in Khabarovsk and a pit bull owner in Naberezhnye Chelny. The latter set his dog on a passerby, hit the victim with the leash, and shouted insults against the Russians. The mild punishment is probably explained by the fact that during the trial, the accused admitted his guilt, apologized to the victim, offered to pay for medical treatment, and said that the dog was handed over to an acquaintance to be shot. We can only hope that he did not follow through on his promise and the dog was not harmed.

Most of the other offenders were sentenced to prison terms of various lengths.

In particular, brothers Maxim Matyash and Mikhail Velhovoy were convicted in the Yaroslavl region for a 2006 murder: they were sentenced to long prison terms for the murder of a person of “non-Slavic appearance” on the grounds of ethnic hatred, committed in Uglich. After the murder, the brothers fled to Ukraine and were imprisoned there for another premeditated murder. The two wanted men (or at least Matyash) were found behind bars in the town of Volnovakha when it was occupied by Russian troops and were taken to the Yaroslavl region for trial.

A court in St. Petersburg sentenced three former members of the banned neo-Nazi Combat Terrorist Organization Andrei (Marduk) Romanov, Denis (Parry) Burakov (Kharchev), and Roman Orlov (Kostrachenkov) to prison terms for old murders and attempted murders committed back in 2003.

Among those sentenced to various prison terms were also members of other, newer, far-right gangs, including those carrying old names.

In Novocherkassk, the Rostov region, members of a community calling themselves members of the neo-Nazi terrorist organization National Socialism/White Power (NS/WP) were given prison terms between two and six and a half years for committing two hate-motivated attacks in Novocherkassk and Rostov-on-Don, disfiguring the face of one of the victims.

In Krasnoyarsk, far-right activists responsible for several attacks, including on anti-fascists and a 17-year-old Kyrgyz citizen, were sentenced to imprisonment.

Unfortunately, we do not know what punishment was given to Denis Gubin and his minor accomplice from the above-mentioned band of Combat Bumblebees in Belgorod region.

According to our incomplete data, a total of 67 people were prosecuted for ideologically motivated violence in the past year (33 in 2023).

In particular, among the initiated cases, the neo-Nazi gang Made With Hate (MWH) from Kostroma and its 17-year-old leader, nicknamed Buchenwald, are being investigated under Paragraph F of Part 2 of Article 111, Part 2 of Article 213 and Part 1 of Article 282¹ of the Criminal Code (creation of an extremist community) for the aforementioned attack on two young men returning from a film screening about the murdered antifascist Khutorskoy, and several other attacks on non-conformists, homeless people, and migrants.

Criminal Prosecution for Crimes Against Property

In 2024, we learned of seven convictions for crimes against property where we believe a hate motive was imputed lawfully or we have doubts about the lawfulness. A total of seven people were convicted (10 in 2023).

In total, for 2024, we know of 33 convictions against 41 people for property crimes classified as ideologically motivated (44 convicted in 2023). That is, wrongful convictions, in our opinion, clearly dominate in this category.

As in the case of violent hate crimes, we cannot rely on official data, as the statistics of sentences published by the Supreme Court do not allow us to isolate the data we need: in Article 244 of the Criminal Code on cemetery vandalism, the hate motive is a paragraph, not a part of the article, and in Article 214 of the Criminal Code (vandalism) it is a part of the article, but together with an act committed by a group.

Beginning in 2023, we changed the way we account for the sentences for statements made directly on material objects[27]. Such acts may have signs of both vandalism and statements, and law enforcement in this sense is not always consistent: the same acts (for example, drawing swastikas or writing slogans on the walls of residential buildings) may be qualified both under Art. 214 of the Criminal Code and under the articles on statements. Previously, we followed the judicial qualification, and therefore some of the substantially similar sentences were included in the hate crime report and some in the report on prosecution for statements. But starting from 2023, we classify all sentences for crimes against property (damage to monuments, various cultural objects, and property) as sentences for crimes against property, not for public statements, even if the sentence uses one of the articles of the Criminal Code for statements (for example, Article 280 of the Criminal Code (public calls for extremist activity) or Article 148 of the Criminal Code (insulting the religious feelings of believers)).

Thus, in 2024, we learned about two convictions under Article 148. Both were related to attacks on Orthodox churches. In the Tula region, a local resident was sentenced to a fine of 300,000 roubles for unruly conduct at the Dormition Monastery[28], and in the Moscow region a local resident received 240 hours of compulsory labor for trashing a Zelenograd church.

In other cases, Article 214 was applied and all of the convicted were sentenced to imprisonment, but this article was not the only one in their sentences.

The above-mentioned ultra-right from Novocherkassk had Article 214 in their sentence for throwing bottles with a flammable mixture at the signboard of a cafe in the town of Shakhty.

Other sentences were related to the events in Ukraine. For example, in Moscow, a storekeeper from Saratov was sentenced to imprisonment under a number of articles of the Criminal Code[29]. A slogan glorifying the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), recognized as terrorist, and calling for the murder of police officers, written in marker on the wall of a grocery store, was interpreted as vandalism under Article 214. In St. Petersburg, a local resident was convicted under Part 2 of Art. 214[30] for writing and painting a stylized heart on the walls of houses “as a sign of love and respect for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Chief of the Intelligence Committee of Ukraine, Kyrylo Budanov.” In both cases, the actual damage to property was so insignificant that we have serious doubts as to whether the criminal offence of vandalism should be applied.

In addition, we are aware of nine new criminal cases for defacing material objects and property, brought against 11 people (up from five in 2023).

[1] Hate Crime Law: A Practical Guide. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2009 (available on the website of the OSCE in several languages: http://www.osce.org/odihr/36426).

Verkhovsky Alexander. Criminal Law on Hate Crime, Incitement to Hatred and Hate Speech in OSCE Participating States. The Hague, 2015 (available on the website of SOVA Center: https://www.sova-center.ru/upload/iblock/49b/osce-laws-eng-16.pdf).

[2] Here and below, the data are provided as of February 17, 2025.

[3] Compare, for example, to the data of the previous report: Yudina N. The New Generation of the Far-Right and Their Victims. Hate Crimes and Counteraction to Them in Russia in 2023 // SOVA Center. 2024. 14 February (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2024/02/d47069/).

[4] All the more so, the four regions of Ukraine included in the Russian jurisdiction in the fall of 2023 are not taken into account. But Crimea is: the real regime there in recent years is already very similar to that of the regions of southern Russia.

[5] See: Yudina N. The State Has Taken Up Racist Violence Again. Hate Crimes and Counteraction to Them in Russia in 2021 // SOVA Center. 2022. 10 February (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2022/02/d45774/).

[6] For more on this see: Alperovich Vera. Nationalists “tame” and “wild”. Public activity of far-right groups, summer-fall 2023 // SOVA Center. 2024. 12 January (https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2024/01/d49146/).

[7] The Supreme Court recognized NS/WP as a terrorist organization // SOVA Center. 2021. 21 May (https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2021/05/d44261/).

[8] Advanced attack statistics // Telegram channel Nazi Video Monitoring Project. 2023. 29 November (https://nvmproject.com/advanced-stats).

[9] On the nationalists' reaction to the terrorist attack, see: Far-right publishes scenes of torture during the detention of alleged terrorists and calls for xenophobic attacks // SOVA Center. 2024. 25 March (https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2024/03/d49524/).

[10] Minor episodes of violence were not included in our calculations.

[11] See: Racism and Xenophobia in September 2024 // SOVA Center. 2024. 11 October (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/news-releases/2024/10/d47094/).

[12] The Level of Xenophobia and Ethnic Tension, Attitudes Toward Immigrants // Levada Center. 2024. 13 May (https://www.levada.ru/2024/05/14/uroven-ksenofobii-i-mezhnatsionalnoj-napryazhennosti-otnoshenie-k-p....

[13] Attacks of this type peaked in 2007 (7 killed, 118 injured); the numbers have since been steadily declining. After 2013, trends have been unstable.

[14] For more on the Redan subculture, see the chapter “Attacks on Ideological Opponents” in Yudina N. The New Generation of the Far Right…

[15] In Tula, a crowd of teenage nationalists killed a disabled man for his non-traditional orientation // Myslo Telegram channel. 2024. 3 October (https://t.me/mysloru/18553).

[16] For more on the causes of attacks on the homeless, see, for example: Alperovich V., Yudina N. The Ultra-Right on the Streets: with a Pro-Democracy Poster in Their Hands or a Knife in Their Pocket: Xenophobia and Radical Nationalism in Russia, and Efforts to Counteract Them in 2012 // SOVA Center. 2013. 26 April (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2013/04/d26972/).

[17] The degree of hatred is amplified by reports on far-right resources alleging that the business of transportation, possession, and distribution of drugs is carried out mostly by people from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Africa and Roma people.

[18] Maxim “Tesak” Martsinkevich in Brief // SOVA Center. 2020. 1 October (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/news-releases/2020/10/d42991/).

[19] Mostly from videos posted by the far-right themselves.

[20] The Eternal Flame may have been put out with snowballs, or used as a bonfire for domestic needs, or someone danced around it. Such incidents are often qualified under Article 354.1 of the Criminal Code (rehabilitation of Nazism).

[21] Advanced attack statistics // Nazi Video Monitoring Project. 2024. 29 January (https://nvmproject.com/advanced-stats).

[22] The photo of Semyon Zolotarev, who, according to one version, is believed to be a member of special services, embedded in a group of tourists, was desecrated.

[23] Only the verdicts where a hate motive was officially recognized are included in this count.

[24] Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 11 “On judicial practice in criminal cases of extremist crimes” of June 28, 2011 // Website of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 2011. 29 June (http://www.supcourt.ru/Show_pdf.php?Id=7315).

[25] For more details see Anti-Semitic Acts in the North Caucasus // SOVA Center. 2023. 31 October (https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2023/10/d48837/).

[26] And under Part 3 of Art. 263.1 of the CC (Failure to comply with the requirements for compliance with transport security at transport infrastructure facilities and vehicles, if this act has caused major damage by negligence, committed by a group of persons by prior conspiracy).

[27] See a detailed explanation in: Yudina N. Along the Beaten Track. Anti-extremism law enforcement in Russia in 2023 with regard to countering public statements and organized activity, including radical nationalism // SOVA Center. 2024. 1 April (https://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2024/04/d47074/).

[28] He broke some icon frames, overturned the lectern, and insulted the believers. Art. 213 of the Criminal Code was also applied in the verdict.

[29] Including Part 1 of Art. 205² of the Criminal Code (public calls for terrorist activities), Part 2 of Art. 282 of the Criminal Code (incitement to ethnic hatred).

[30] The sentence also included Part 1 of Art. 222 of the Criminal Code (illegal storage of ammunition).