We publish the English translation of our new report which was presented on June 20, 2007, in Moscow. The report describes radical nationalism and resistance against it in the spring of 2007.
Summary
Manifestations оf Radical Nationalism : Violence : Activities of Organized Right-Wing Groups : Nationalism as an Electoral Resource : The Anti-Estonian Campaign: from Politics to Discrimination
Counteraction to Radical Nationalism : Efforts by NGOs and Civil Society Activists : Lawmaking : Criminal Prosecution of the Right-Wing Radicals
Excessive and Unfounded Actions aAgainst Extremism : Lawmaking : Persecution of NGOs and Civil Society Activists : Anti-extremist Rhetoric Used to Discredit Political Opponents /A>
Appendixes. Statistics (Word, ZIP)
Appendix 1. Consolidates Statistics of Racist and Neo-Nazi Attacks between 1 January and May, 31 2007 (by the city)
Appendix 2. Consolidated Statistics of Racist and Neo-Nazi Attacks in 2004-2007 (by the season)
Appendix 3. Consolidates Statistics of Racist and Neo-Nazi Attacks in 2004 and 2007 (by the object of attack)
Appendix 4. Statistics of Convictions Taking into Account the Racial Hate Motive of Violent Crimes in 2004-2007 (May, 31)
Appendix 5. Statistics of Convictions for Hate Propaganda in 2004-2007 (May, 31)
SUMMARY
The spring of 2007 was an eventful season, but most new developments have followed the same trends as we have described before.
Neo-Nazi and racist violence continued to grow. Public events initiated by right-wing radical groups were increasingly numerous and intense. The right-wing has learned a lot from its own and its opponents' experiences. Nationalists are striving to organize themselves as the elections approach, even amidst internal clashes and splits.
It is increasingly obvious that mainstream political parties, alongside right-wing radicals, will tap into ethno-nationalist sentiments of voters during the campaign season - and some are actually doing it now.
These xenophobic sentiments in Russian society have provided domestic support for Russia's, from our view, inappropriately aggressive attitudes towards its neighbors, while the government has failed to take a clear stance on domestic outbreaks of ethnic discrimination, fueled by the resulting international scandals.
The government itself increasingly has enforced anti-extremist legislation against specifically the political opposition. To facilitate this harassment, relevant legal provisions are being modified and specific instructions given to police and prosecutors. Selective enforcement against political opposition further confuses the public as to what extremism is and also legitimizes discriminatory and blatantly neo-Nazi practices by allowing perpetrators to go unpunished.
On a positive note, last spring was marked by substantial progress in the criminal prosecution of hate propaganda (prompt investigations, fewer probational releases and also fewer unjustified prison terms, etc.). It remains to be seen whether this trend will last.
MANIFESTATIONS OF RADICAL NATIONALISM
Violence
In the spring of 2007, radical violence continued to grow. Over the three spring months, xenophobic and neo-Nazi attacks affected at least 137 people, killing 18. [1] This 14% growth rate vs. the same period last year (at least 120 attacked, 15 killed in the spring of 2006) is somewhat lower than the average (we usually observe 25-30% higher rates of violence for each subsequent year), but there are no reasons yet to report improvement.
Spring has always been a period of increased skinhead activity, due to a number of dates celebrated by Russian neo-Nazis, particularly (but not only) April 20, Hitler's birthday. Even though law enforcement agencies traditionally seek to suppress skinhead activity on the eve of Hitler's birthday each year, their efforts are often insufficient and cannot stem the violence. Instead, authorities tend to deny the scope of hate crime. Comparing SOVA's spring 2006 report[2] and today's figures, the number of known victims has increased from 87 to 120, i.e. almost a 50% increase! We can hardly expect this year to be any different, especially given the surprising :decrease; of officially reported skinhead attacks in May. Before 5 May, we documented 10 or 11 new victims each week, but we know of only 13 victims attacked between 6 and 31 May. [3] We find this hard to believe, given particularly that May in Moscow was marked by a series of large-scale skinhead actions usually associated with violent incidents (commonly shortly before or after, but not during the rally). In addition, 18 May is the anniversary of the death of Dmitry Borovikov - the former leader of St. Petersburg's most aggressive skinhead group. Last year in Moscow, at least five racist attacks marked the 40 day anniversary of his death, and we cannot believe that things were any different this spring. In the lead-up to this anniversary, right-wing radical websites themselves reported preparations for attacks.
Apparently, two reasons why we have seen fewer incidents of specifically skinhead attacks in May are either that assaults were combined with robbery[4] or because the reporting of these crimes never found its way into newspapers. [5] The latter scenario is particularly dangerous, because underreporting distorts the already vague knowledge of the scope of racist and neo-Nazi violence in Russia. Moreover, the ultra-right takes advantage of this lack of accurate reporting. Russian public opinion perceives skinheads as dangerous and powerful, [6] so rumors and panic spread fast when there are no accurate reports of such crimes, let alone reports of their prosecution and punishment.
Shortly before 20 April 2007, at least three cities in Russia - Belgorod, Ryazan and Izhevsk - were struck by panic amidst rumors of a forthcoming surge of skinheads coming in from other cities to engage in mass fighting and other offences (the neo-Nazis themselves were behind many such rumors). In fact, similar rumors were reported in previous years, but never before have they produced such mass hysteria. Parents did not allow their children to go to school and teachers endorsed absenteeism, while the police were overwhelmed by the number of anxious calls. As a result, the local media, law enforcement authorities, and the local government were forced to address the situation. [7]
A high-profile crime in the spring of 2007 was the death of 17-year-old skater Stanislav Korepanov, fatally wounded by local skinheads. It was this murder that triggered these rumors of :a skinhead invasion.; For some reason, a local independent newspaper - Dyen - was blamed for spreading all the rumors, even though the paper only provided consistent coverage of the events and insisted all the while that skinheads were behind the killing.
More often than ever before, members of the left-wing and various youth subcultures reported experiencing skinhead violence - almost half of all victims we know about (61 of 136) belonged to this category. However, even though some skinheads indeed target the "Antifa' and :informal; youth in particular, the real reason behind such heightened reporting is that the victims are active, online, and involved in social networks, increasing the probability that such crimes will be covered in the media.
Over the three spring months, we documented at least 20 incidents of vandalism against places of worship, cemeteries and memorials, due to apparently nationalist motives. As in the past, the most common targets were installations which belonged to the Jewish community (7 attacks), Protestant Christians (6 attacks), and :ideological; sites, such as the World War II memorial in Kazan and others (4 attacks).
A high-profile case of religious vandalism was reported in Saratov Oblast on 5 and 6 May. Over the span of 24 hours, vandals attacked a cemetery in the village of Rybushka and an Adventist prayer house in Engels, and made an attempt to blow up a synagogue in Saratov. Another notable case of :ideological; vandalism occurred in Kemerovo, where assailants attacked a local Communist Party office in May, painted swastikas on the walls, destroyed furniture and equipment, and even shot off firearms in the office.
Activities of Organized Right-Wing Groups
The spring of 2007 was also marked by increased public activity by organized right-wing radical groups - which clearly is connected with the forthcoming elections.
Public Events
The Russian ultra-right were able to organize a substantial number of large-scale public events in the spring. Rallies, pickets and marches, while they did not reach a national scale (unlike the 2006 Russian March or the action in support of political prisoners on 28 January 2007) were nevertheless high-profile events.
What strikes observers is not the frequency or attendance of right-wing rallies and marches, but instead the authorities' exaggerated tolerance of such incidents. The question is not about banning rallies and marches - we have stated on many occasions that a preventive ban would be unlawful. That being said, right-wing radicals have increasingly given the police every reason to intervene lawfully.
On 1 May, an ultra-right coalition headed by the Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) led the "1st of May March' outside VDNKh Metro Station in Moscow - their first officially permitted public event since 4 November 2005. Neither the xenophobic slogans, nor the obscenities which, as many witnesses report, they chanted loudly as they marched, nor even the Nazi salutes attracted police attention. Likewise, police failed to pay attention to the 26 May rally staged by neo-Nazis under the slogan :Liberalism leads to degradation, National-Socialism means a healthy nation" - featuring fairly explicit incitement to violence ("Russia will be Russian or unpopulated... Good hunting, wolves"). Rallies held to mark Hitler's birthday featured 200 ultra-right activists of the National-Socialist Society (NSO) and similar groups raising their arms in a Nazi salutation outside the Presidential Administration Offices in Staraya Square, while their :competitors; DPNI and Slavic Union (SS) did the same in Pushkin Square.
At the same time, the political opposition had its events banned or suppressed with excessive cruelty - for example, Marches of the Dissenters in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The obvious difference in the treatment of peaceful oppositional marches and provocative neo-Nazi gatherings showed that notwithstanding numerous declarations, Russian authorities are not willing to control unlawful ultra-right manifestations. This inaction helps to confirm a popular perception (however true it may be) that these groups enjoy high-level political support.
The same assumption was confirmed by other incidents, such as the attack against another failed Gay Pride march in Moscow on 27 May. As opposed to last year, preparation for this year's event was not as provocative, and the venue of the Gay Pride march - or, rather, a picket against homophobia - was known in advance, certainly helpful for protecting the participants (even though the protection was far from sufficient). However, skinhead attackers were certainly aware of the numerous homophobic statements made by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and State Duma members from across the political spectrum (some not only urged the authorities to ban Gay Pride, but explicitly justified homophobic violence[8]). Attackers interpreted these signals as tacit approval of violence by the police, and they were proved right in the end. According to witnesses, police often allowed violent homophobic individuals to beat victims before arresting the attackers.
Provocation of Mass Public Disturbances
Over the period analyzed in this report, right-wing radicals have skillfully applied their prior experience of provoking mass public disturbances. Once having discovered the following working model, the ultra-right now applies it whenever they can.
First, right-wing activists mobilize after every major conflict which involves serious injuries or death and people of different ethnicities. The conflict is then refigured as an interethnic conflict and evidence of :outrageous behavior by non-Russians who seek to exterminate ethnic Russians." The local community is flooded by right-wing radical activists (particularly DPNI members) from neighboring cities, and even from Moscow. Provocative, discriminatory leaflets (anti-Caucasus, anti-immigrant, etc.) are widely distributed throughout the area. Usually, right-wing activists then convene a "popular gathering; which doesn't require official permission, as opposed to a meeting or a rally. In case of a death, they time the "popular gathering" to coincide with the funeral ceremony, when propganda can be constructed on the strong emotions of loss and grief. DPNI or other right-wing web forums are used the whole time to coordinate activities. During the :popular gathering,; a pre-written resolution is adopted by the masses, followed by riots and violent clashes with police.
We should note, however, that this action has not been fully implemented since the events in Kondopoga last year, because police and local governments have become aware of its working and been successful in preventing the resultant violence.
For example, such preventive actions occurred in Krasnoarmeysk, Saratov Oblast, when radicals attempted to provoke a riot following a fight between local Azeri and ethnic Russian entrepreneurs - two traditionally antagonistic groups. An ethnic Russian involved in the fighting was killed. The ultra-right immediately thereafter arrived in Krasnoarmeysk and disseminated their :anti-Caucasian; leaflets. However before the day of the funeral, more police forces were called into the city and the most active propagandists were arrested (later to be identified as members of the Popular Unity Party led by Baburin).
At the end of May, a similar scenario began to unfold in Stavropol after a row of mass fighting between Caucasian and ethnic Russian youths. However, we won't go into too much detail here, because the key events took place in June (outside the scope of this report). We mention it here only to highlight the efficiency of municipal services in preventing a conflict from developing into "another Kondopoga."
Another reason why the incident in Saratov Oblast is remarkable: upon suppressing the riot, local authorities stopped there and did nothing to prevent future incidents. Indeed, the authorities did not even attempt to charge anyone with inciting riots, and the only :punishment; faced by the Popular Union activists was to be expelled from the area. This response - or, rather, lack of response - reaffirms the impunity of right-wing radicals and encourages them to seek even more ingenious ways to get round the tactical barriers created by administrations and law enforcement agencies. Moreover, every time the authorities agree to some of the discriminatory demands put forward by a "popular gathering,; they contribute to instability and legitimize discriminatory practices.
Coalitions and Splits
In our winter-2007 report we noted increased party building efforts in the anticipation of the pivotal 2007/2008 election season. Of course, as elections near, the internal party-building process unravels, amidst splits and scandals surrounding the fight for leadership.
At the end of March, Sergey Baburin's Narodnaya Volya (Popular Will) Party held its 7th congress, adopting a resolution to rename the party as the Popular Union[9] and to strengthen it by merging with :13 kindred patriotic organizations; (the Union of Orthodox Gonfalon Carriers, L. Simonovich's Union of Orthodox Fraternities, N. Kuryanovich's St. Sergius' Union of Russian People, Igor Artyomov's Russian All-National Union (RONS), and others). The Popular Union declared its intention to explore and cultivate :the field of Russian nationalism; - allegedly the only space yet unoccupied on the Russian political spectrum (apparently, they mean by formally registered political parties). The new party adopted a slogan - :Long Live Russia!; - and a manifesto, entitled The Unification Act of Russia's National and Popular Patriotic Forces which mentions the :nation-forming role of the [ethic] Russian people who have built a great power based on Orthodox Christian values.;
On May 6, 2007, the Great Russia Party held its founding congress, electing an official leader - Andrei Savelyev, a State Duma member of Rogozin's Rodina party known for his ultra-right views. The new party ostensibly copied its founding documents and program from those of the Fair Russia Party, but virtually all of the new party's initiators are open about their party being explicitly ultra-right. At the same time, little is known about its membership. It was reported that the Central Council secretary is Sergei Pykhtin (D. Rogozin's and A. Savelyev's associate in the Congress of Russian Communities), and the Secretary of the Central Council Presidium is ex-member of the Moscow City Duma Yuri Popov known for his discriminatory draft laws. However, member of the Organizing Committee D. Rogozin has not joined the new party on the grounds that his formal involvement might be a barrier to its official registration. Similarly, it is unknown whether another OC member, A. Belov, has formally joined the party. [10]
As new coalitions emerge, older nationalist coalitions are being increasingly fragmented by squabbles and quarrels.
In May, the split in the Union of Russian People (SRN) was formalized. The group was originally established in 2005 to bring together a broad spectrum of Orthodox and Monarchist nationalists, some of them more radical than others. As expected, the death of SRN leader Vyacheslav Klykov was immediately followed by internal conflicts. Although the Second Congress in November 2006 avoided undergoing a formal split, very soon after, radicals led by Konstantin Dushenov (St. Petersburg), Mikhail Nazarov (Moscow) and Alexander Turik (Irkutsk) refused to accept the new leader, General Ivashov, dismissing his election as a :provocation staged by security agents; and "a takeover.; A shadow third SRN congress was convened in Irkutsk in May to formalize the split of the radical arm from General Ivashov's :moderate; SRN.
Similarly, the National Bolshevik Front has split in two. Back in early 2007, activists of the Moscow NBF branch led by Ivan Strukov participated in events held by DPNI and associated groups on behalf of NBF (displaying the party symbols). On May 12, 2007, in Moscow, they held a so-called Second Congress of the National Bolshevik Front[11]. The congress decided to rename the group (into the Russian National Bolshevik Front), elected an Executive Committee (Ivan Strukov, Roman Golovkin, Roman Kisselyov, Yakov Gorbunov), and adopted new program documents emphasizing the group's ultra-right, racist outlook (not accidentally, Ivan Strukov called the 12 May event :a congress of the National-Socialist Front; in his blog). An announcement came on the next day that the :congress; was illegitimate, and Strukov's associates were separatists ousted from NBF. Interestingly enough, this formal announcement was made by the Eurasian Youth Union (ESM) which is associated with the former members of Limonov's party, rather than by NBF's formal leaders (Alexei Golubovich and Maxim Zhurkin).
The "Russian March; Organizing Committee (OC) - which Andrei Savelyev had planned to use as a basis for his Great Russia Party - was also torn apart by quarrels. Three groups left the OC - the Russian Unifying Movement (ROD), the Russian Order, and Revenge. The remaining OC members are DPNI, Pamyat National Patriotic Front, the Slav Union, the Russian All-National Union (RONS), the National Imperial Party of Russia (NDPR), M. Nazarov's Moscow SRN branch, N. Kuryanovich's St. Sergius' SRN, and the mentioned NBF arm led by I. Strukov.
There was also a final split between DPNI and the neo-Nazi NSO (Dmitry Rumyantsev) and Format-18 (Maxim :Tesak; Martsinkevich) groups. Apparently, the split was caused by a struggle for leadership and by suspicions that DPNI leader Belov might be an agent-provocateur (these suspicions were reconfirmed in February 2007 after DPNI announced a rally in Stavropol to protest against the killing of local Cossack leader Andrei Khanin, but never showed up at the rally). The conflict culminated in violence - on 7 March 2007, during a right-wing radical gathering, Rumyantsev and Belov both accused each other of being agent-provocateurs. Film cameras caught Rumyantsev hitting Belov rather violently, all the while being observed by the public (incidentally, physical violence has been reported in regions as well as political rivalries escalate: for example, in early May in Stavropol, RONS activists physically attacked a leader, or :high priest,; of local right-wing Pagans). NSO has been reported partnering up with the Rus' Party established by RNE veterans. The Rus' Party is not well-known, because they have not organized any real public events, while still filing for official registration. However, in March they were denied this registration and proceeded to organize neo-Nazi rallies on 21 April and 26 May in Moscow.
Nationalism as an Electoral Resource
Right-wing radicals are not the only ones who are looking forward to exploiting nationalist sentiments in the forthcoming elections. Most political parties have displayed this inclination in the spring of 2007 - including some which are not normally considered nationalist.
In particular, addressing the Central Committee plenary session on 24 March, Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov declared an intention :to raise the [ethnic] Russian issue in a broad aspect.; He also reminded the audience that the Communist Party :placed [this issue] on the agenda back in 1991; and has consistently returned to it ever since. [12] Zyuganov also said that the Communist Party :must not allow anyone - from United Russia to the most reactionary forces - to freeride on the Russian issue.; The Communist leader urged his party to advocate for the [ethnic] Russian culture, to develop the concept of :[ethnic] Russian socialism; and to take up more challenges in the future, such as :breakthrough to the Baltic Sea, bringing together the Russian lands, and reaching the Black Sea,; etc.
In April, Oleg Paschenko of the Fair Russia Party - known in Krasnodar Krai for getting away with his anti-Semitism remarks - was elected to the local parliament in spite of numerous attempts to sue him for incitement to ethnic hatred. [13] His election endured both a scandal, and the fact that Fair Russia leader Sergey Mironov assured the public that the party would deny support to this candidate. A month before, another :Fair Russian; - Sergey Andreyev of St. Petersburg - attempted to play on anti-Georgian sentiments by accusing his political opponent, figure skater Anton Sikharulidze of United Russia Party, of having falsified the voting results with the help of :young Georgians.;
Likewise, the party in power did not stay away from "the field of Russian nationalism." On May 16, 2007, the Russian Project website was finally launched, announced by the United Russia back in February. If anyone had any doubts as to how explicitly ethno-nationalist the project would be, these should immediately disappear just by looking at the website. Moreover, while some people had expressed concerns that by picking up :the Russian issue,; the United Russia Party could promote ethno-xenophobic sentiments without actively engaging in them, it is now clear that the most odious right-wing radical ideas and resources find themselves legitimized under the UR aegis. In particular, the UR website takes its news feed from the so-called Russian Network (their banners are displayed at the bottom of the home page). The Russian Network includes, alongside mainstream publications such as Moscow News and RBC, Konstantin Dushenov's Rus Pravoslavnaya (Orthodox Russia), a paper officially positioned as :anti-Semitic, "Black Hundred'-inspired newspaper of Russian nationalists (Dushenov currently faces criminal charges under art. 282 of the Criminal Code); right-wing radical paper Russian Spetsnaz; Zolotoi Lev (Golden Lion) magazine whose editorial board is chaired by Andrei Savelyev and Sergey Pykhtin, leaders of the recently established Great Russia Party - the magazine publishes explicitly racist articles; the webpage of the Russian Doctrine containing discriminatory statements with regard to non-Russian ethnicities and non-Orthodox believers and adopted by the Great Russia Party leaders as their program document; websites of the Eurasian Youth Union and Eurasia associated with Alexander Dugin - currently playing the role of a respectable expert, but better known as an ideologist and promoter of proto-fascist, fascist and :new right; ideas in Russia; and other, equally odious resources[14].
The Anti-Estonian Campaign: from Politics to Discrimination
The spring of 2007 also featured an anti-Estonian campaign triggered by the relocation of a memorial to Soviet soldiers from the center of Tallinn to a military memorial cemetery. We will not discuss here any ethical or political issues concerning the preservation of World War II memorials in Russia, Estonia and other countries, but we note that just like in the autumn of 2006, the political campaign promptly developed into a campaign of ethnic discrimination, fortunately, without human casualties, unlike the previous anti-Georgian campaign.
The picketing, or rather the siege, of the Estonian Embassy in Moscow not only involved vandalism and threats to foreign diplomats, but nearly resulted in violence against the Estonian Ambassador to the Russian Federation Marina Kaljurand, when she was attacked at a May 2nd press conference by pro-Kremlin youth groups - the Locals, Nashi, the Young Russia, the New People. These groups were able to start trouble by breaking into the office of the Argumenty i Fakty newspaper. [15]
At the end of April, offensive and discriminatory signs could be seen on the walls of some Russian cities. In Yaroslavl, a local cafe put up a sign that read :Estonians and dogs not allowed.; In Murmansk, a poster ad inviting the public to a Victory Day celebration in a local club read :Balts and Poles need not bother; - and was displayed at bus stops all over the city. Similar posters were seen in Moscow and Kostroma.
In April 2007 in Stavropol, Cossack ataman (leader) Mikhail Serkov published a statement in the local media that :Cossacks will campaign to expose Estonians in Stavropol Krai and create extremely unfavorable conditions for them to stay in Russia, engage in business or other activity." Local civil society activists sought to have the ataman prosecuted for incitement to ethnic hatred, but failed, because the Prosecutor's Office did not find the statement to be either provocative or threatening.
In early May, the Dukhovnoye Nasledye (Spiritual Heritage) news agency in St. Petersburg (Director Anton Vuyma) [16] announced a contest to create a monument to the Dumb Estonian and a transnational PR campaign :to discredit Estonians' intellectual abilities around the world.; The statement (which was not, however, published on the agency's website) invited :any ideas of a monument showing the low intellectual ability of Estonians and the extreme sluggishness of Estonians as a nation.; [17] We do not know yet of any law enforcement responses to calls by human rights defenders in St. Petersburg who have urged the authorities to prosecute the agency.
COUNTERACTION TO RADICAL NATIONALISM
Efforts by NGOs and Civil Society Activists
In the spring of 2007, Russian NGOs and civil society activists focused mainly on their current educational, awareness-raising and information-sharing projects. Maybe the most interesting of them was a series of events held in St. Petersburg in March 2007. Prepared by different organizations, often without coordination, they effectively unfolded into a festival of public actions against xenophobia for diverse target audiences. These included a public discussion of hate speech, an international interdisciplinary conference on right-wing radical trends among youth, the Open Your Eyes! anti-fascist film festival, a series of photo exhibitions, and some other events.
Lawmaking
The central area of lawmaking in the spring of 2007 was the toughening of anti-extremism legislation apparently designed also to give authorities even more opportunities to suppress civil society activists and political opposition. Therefore we discuss many lawmaking developments under Unlawful Anti-Extremism below.
Here, we note that on May 10, 2007, amendments to the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offenses - initiated by the Government back in 2006 - came into force. The amendments add a :hate motive; to article 214 (:vandalism;) of the Criminal Code, punishable by up to three years of prison; toughen the penalty for cemetery vandalism (art. 244, now punishable by up to 5 years of prison); and add to art. 20.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences the offense of production and marketing of Nazi symbols, in addition to the existing offense of their public demonstration.
Secondly, at the end of April 2007, a presidential draft law was tabled in the State Duma; the draft was designed to resolve the legal confusion caused by the 2004 administrative reform. Before 2004, Rosregistration as part of the Ministry of Justice (and therefore, "a body of justice;) was supposed to maintain a register of extremist materials and warn organizations enganged in extremist activity. Since 2004, Rosregistration - a.k.a. the Federal Registration Service (FRS) - is no longer part of the ministry and so it is not formally "a body of justice." FRS interpreted it to mean that they are no longer empowered to issue warnings or maintain a register of extremist materials. The proposed amendments will restore these functions to FRS.
Criminal Prosecution of the Right-Wing Radicals
Violence
In the spring of 2007, at least 4 trials of violent offenders charged with hate crimes ended in convictions: in Moscow, Omsk, North Ossetia, and Stavropol. In total, at least 10 offenders have been convicted for this type of crimes since the beginning of the year.
Certainly, the most important was the judgment concerning the 12 June 2005 Grozny-Moscow train blast attack case. The lengthy proceedings unfolded amidst high-profile scandals. In particular, the first jury was dismissed when it returned a non-guilty verdict in November 2006 for right-wing radicals Mikhail Klevachov and Vladimir Vlassov. This incident, undoubtedly, brings up the question of the fairness of the guilty verdict returned on 21 March by another jury and the 10 April sentence given to Klevachov of 22 years and to Vlassov of 20 years of prison for attempted murder motivated by ethnic hatred, for terrorism, and for unlawful acquisition and possession of explosives.
Propaganda and Campaigning
Notably, the criminal prosecution of hate promoters improved. Firstly, it is clearly more active now than before. At least 9 offenders were convicted for violent crimes over the three spring months: two in Syktyvkar, one each in Kirov, Kurgan, Kaliningrad, Chelyabinsk, Novosibirsk, and Ulyanovsk. [18]
Notably, we now see meaningful efforts to prosecute anti-Semitic propaganda. Until recently, hardly anyone was punished for this type of propaganda. It is well known, however, that anti-Semitic ideology is actively adopted by right-wing radicals - especially those of the :old school; - and often used as a basis for developing other lines of xenophobic propaganda. [19] In the spring, the leader of the Edinenye Conceptual Party, Kirov chapter, Valery Goncharov and Vologda-based neo-Pagan activist Igor Bazanov were both convicted for distributing anti-Semitic propaganda. Offensive, expressly anti-Semitic materials disseminated by leader of NDPR Chelyabinsk chapter Vladimir Sutormin also led to a conviction of the accused.
Other positive developments include a few examples of successful prosecution for hate propaganda on the Web, such as Kaliningrad DPNI leader Alexey Safin being convicted for his group's offensive website publications, and Kurgan Skinhead group activist being convicted for creating an offensive web resource. These enforcement practices continued from previous years (we know of at least five similar cases over the past three years[20]), but still do not support the argument - often used by advocates of specific laws to regulate the Web - that the existing policy framework is not sufficient for suppressing internet-based propaganda.
Another important development was the increased prosecution of leaders, rather than rank-and-file members of regional right-wing radical groups. Three of the nine convicted offenders were in the top ranks, including the above-mentioned V. Goncharov, V.Sutormin, and A.Safin. Currently under investigation is leader of Yekaterinburg Popular National Party (NNP) chapter Sergey Kotov and leader of Amur Union of Russian People Igor Terekhov, while leader of Komi NDPR and DPNI chapters Yuri Yekishev and leader of Astrakhan NNP chapter Igor Mogilyov are in prison. To summarize, we have observed a positive trend in the criminal prosecution of right-wing radical leaders in the regions. Admittedly, it has only affected the regions, rather than the federal center.
Nevertheless, :chieftains; of upper ranks continue to avoid liability. Of course, it is not surprising that criminal charges brought by the Karelia Republic prosecutor's office against A. Belov (Potkin) were eventually dropped: the case was weak, and apparently there was no intention of a thorough investigation in the first place. What we find really disturbing is that DPNI, while explicitly provoking and coordinating most large-scale ethnic conflicts in Russian regions, has escaped the attention of the Russian law enforcement.
However, a plausible theory exists that multiple, well coordinated DDoS attacks against DPNI servers and related websites were either implemented or facilitated by Russian security agencies[21]: the timing of such attacks was linked to public events involving DPNI. Ironically, it means that the State is avoiding taking legal action against right-wing radicals, but prefers to :hinder; their activity by hacker attacks. This action legimitizes both the ultra-right activity and the hacking.
Only two convicted offenders got away with probational sentences without further sanctions (A. Safin and a teen in Ulyanovsk who attacked a local synagogue twice in late 2006). The others sentences, except one meted out to a solder in Novosibirsk which we will describe below, involved substantial penalties other than imprisonment, such as fines and correctional labor. Equally relevant, an offender in Chelyabinsk was temporarily banned from serving as a journalist. We welcome this as amazing progress in the law enforcement practices aimed at combating hate propaganda.
The case of a soldier in Novosibirsk, ending on 27 April 2007, deserves a special mention. A conscript from Dagestan faced trial for a false terrorist alert, robbery, and incitement to ethnic hatred (i.e. frequent, public calls "to kill those [ethnic] Russians"). These charges combined resulted in a 5-year prison sentence.
This is the first case known to us where an army conscript was convicted. The fact that the Russian army is secretive and avoids disclosing what is going on in the barracks prevents us from learning more about the rate of xenophobia among servicemen, even though rumors of ethnic conflicts abound. We can only rely on indirect evidence of how bad things are, such as brief news updates: :in January 2007 federal security agents revealed what they described as "a violent interethnic conflict in a military unit', whereas in February, a massive fight was reported in a firefighter school between students from southern and central Russia." [22] Unfortunately, it is usually impossible to acquire further details of such incidents. We can only hope that the Novosibirsk soldier case will raise awareness of xenophobia in the armed forces.
Extremist Materials
Incrementally, Russian courts have developed a body of case-law to label certain materials as extremist.
On 18 April, 2007, the city court in Chita found to be extremist a commentary on the Kondopoga events published on Narodny Kontrol website[23] and then reprinted in Russkoye Zabaikalye paper[24]. Notably, finding a material extremist in administrative (rather than criminal) proceedings means that the court does not need to identify and prosecute specific offenders. It solves a problem often faced by courts as they attempt to prosecute right-wing radical publishers. Some publishers have avoided criminal prosecution or at least delayed the proceedings by arguing that they only reprinted offensive materials from a website. But this time, the argument did not work, because the court judged the text, rather than the publisher.
A case from Novosibirsk was even more remarkable. On 23 May 2007, a court in the Sovietsky District, Novosibirsk, restricted access to four websites after finding them extremist, Islamist, and separatist. These included the Kavkaz-Center, Chechen Press, Daimokhk, and Alani (Karachaevo-Balkar) News Agency, whose publications, as noted by the prosecutor's office of Sovietsky District in their submission to the court dated 13 March 2007, contained :propaganda of war, incitement to ethnic, racial or religious hatred and animosity.; All the above websites are hosted outside Russia, and the Russian law enforcement authorities cannot close them without appealing to international mechanisms.
Instead, they ordered a local internet provider in Novosibirsk to block access to the websites deemed extremist. Proceedings are currently pending that would force force three other internet providers to block access to the offendsive websites.
Under the Law on Combating Extremist Activity, such activity also includes :assistance such as ...provision of phone, fax and other communication facilities and information services...; However, we do not see how it applies to internet access providers who cannot be held responsible for the content of websites on the internet (some of which is, indeed, extremist). Similarly, finding a website extremist should not automatically obligate all internet access providers to block access to such a website: the law prohibits dissemination of extremist materials, but providers do not disseminate - just as a telephone company does not disseminate any specific content. Consequently, providers cannot be held legally responsible for :extremist; content. So any subsequent judgments with regard to each individual internet access provider within this court's jurisdiction will serve to enforce the main judgment, i.e. finding certain content extremist.
This is the first judgment of this type that we are aware of in Russia. The solution that came about in Novosibirsk is relatively effective in banishing offensive websites hosted outside Russia in the absence of other, more efficient, mechanisms. (It is a different matter that restrictions imposed on the freedom of expression in Russia are clearly too tough).
Other Forms of Suppressing Right-wing Radicals
Authorities have increasingly used other, less common forms of enforcement against right-wing radicals.
On a few occasions in the spring of 2007, they imposed criminal liability for display of Nazi symbols or their look-alikes. We only know of three such cases this spring (in Yekaterinburg, Amur and Tyumen Oblasts), but the actual number must be higher. For example, the prosecutor's office of Sverdlovsk Oblast alone has initiated five administrative proceedings under art. 20.3 of the Code of Administrative Offenses in 2007, and six cases of this type have been reported in the Komi Republic.
Admittedly, neo-Nazis often use different symbols from those of the Third Reich, but skinheads and observers perceive these symbols as neo-Nazi attributes. It gives rise to legal confusion like that reported during a soccer match in Yaroslavl on 31 March. A group of fans displayed a homemade Celtic cross banner rightly perceived by police as a neo-Nazi symbol. Police officers forcefully removed the banner, but their use of excessive force caused one of the fans - known as a local skinhead involved in a number of racist attacks - to report police abuse. We should give credit to Yaroslavl police who did not press charges under art. 20.3 of the Code of Administrative Offenses, but said that they had removed the banner (subsequently returned to the owner) in order to prevent violence that it could have provoked - i.e. they mentioned law enforcement considerations, rather than the neo-Nazi nature of the symbol.
Rosokhrancultura - the federal agency in charge of protecting cultural heritage - was fairly active in the spring of 2007 and issued 13 warnings[25] for publications which the agency found "extremist".[26] Notably, at least one such warning issued by Rosokhrancultura triggered criminal charges against the publisher of Za Very, Tsarya i Otechestvo! paper in Buzuluk, while the prosecutor's office in Omsk has since launched an investigation into another warned paper - Russki Rubezh Sibirskikh Kazakov.
New legal requirements led to a massive scrutinizing of political parties which, among other things, resulted in the liquidation of two right-wing radical organizations known for xenophobic (particularly anti-Semitic) campaign rhetoric. On 16 April, 2007, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rosregistration and liquidated the Popular Patriotic Party of Russia headed by former Minister of Defense and subsequent member of the State Duma Igor Rodionov and national-patriot Vladimir Miloserdov. On 15 May, a similar judgment was put forth against the Yedinenye Conceptual Party led by Konstantin Petrov (remembered by many voters for his 2003 election campaign featuring stories about "the dead water; and an emphatic statement :There is God!;). However, both organizations were liquidated on formal grounds, rather than for their extremism, so they were not banned and may just as well carry on as NGOs or informal groups.
EXCESSIVE AND UNFOUNDED ACTIONS AGAINST EXTREMISM
Lawmaking
Spring was marked by substantial anti-extremist activity by the Russian lawmakers. Even though we consider the draft laws described above to be reasonable and appropriate, some other lawmaking initiatives were either ambiguous or raised suspicions that they may target political opposition and civil society activists, rather than ultra-nationalists and other dangerous groups.
On 16 May 2007, the State Duma adopted the first reading of a bill amending the Criminal Code, the Code of Administrative Offenses, and the Law on Combating Extremist Activity. Some of the proposed amendments are reasonable, including proposals to publish lists of organizations banned for extremism, or adding riots to the inventory of extremist crimes.
The draft law also adds the "hate motive' to the list of aggravating circumstances under art. 212 (riots) and 213 (hooliganism), which as many experts have argued, is the right thing to do,. These criminal articles carry substantial penalties already, so the qualifying circumstance serves to raise awareness of the "hate motive' and send an appropriate signal to the public, rather than just toughen the punishment. Of course, a similar aggravating circumstance already mentioned in art. 63 of the Criminal Code should have been sufficient, but practice has shown that it is rarely, if ever, applied, as opposed to those written directly in the respective articles.
On the other hand, the draft law has some obvious defects which raise serious concerns.
Traditionally in this type of legislation, lawmakers tend to toughen penalties; for example, the drafters of the bill proposed that involving minors in extremist crimes should carry the same punishment as involving them in very serious crimes (art. 150 of the Criminal Code). However, the change may not be relevant, as this article rarely if ever covers hate offences.
More appropriate is a slight increase of penalties under art. 282, 282-1 and 282-2, apparently intended to reclassify these offences as more serious and extend the statute of limitations from 2 to 5 years, because the Russian law enforcement system is too slow and often takes more than two years to investigate an offensive publication. Of course, efforts could have been made to improve the law enforcement and judicial systems making them more efficient, but the lawmakers appear to have lost any hope of success in this area.
Art. 280 of the Criminal Code ("public appeals to extremist activity") was modified by the drafters to state :public appeals to extremist activity and public justification of such activity,; with the maximum punishment increased from three to six years of prison. There is a note in the draft saying that :public justification of extremist activity must be interpreted as a public statement to the effect that extremist activity is appropriate, deserves support and should be emulated.;
There is a similar clarification in art. 205-2 of the Criminal Code, dealing with terrorism, and it is appropriate. The definition of extremism, however, is much broader than that of terrorism and includes certain actions which are not considered illegal or even wrong by many - e.g. statements of religious supremacy. Should the above amendments be adopted and enforced, one would face criminal punishment both for saying that one's religion is exceptional (see the Tanakov case below) and for supporting others' right to say so.
More broadly, someone who verbally supports an illegal activity should not face tougher (or even the same) criminal sanctions than someone who engages in such illegal activity, which appears to be the case when we compare art. 280 of the Criminal Code with many elements of the :extremist activity; definition. Since 2002, art. 280 of the Criminal Code has endangered civil liberties, as an excessively vague definition of :extremism; makes it too easy to hold someone liable for :appeals to extremism.; Broader definitions and tougher sanctions make this danger even worse.
The legal definition of extremism (art. 1 of the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity) includes :libel against a public official;; the draft seeks to replace it by :publicized, knowingly false accusations against a federal or regional official in their official capacity, alleging that they have committed acts listed in this article as illegal.; So the amendment makes it unnecessary to prove the libel claim in court. A direct reference to the :libel; article of the Criminal Code will be replaced by a definition of libel borrowed from the same article, i.e. :publicized, knowingly false accusations...; This strange and suspicious substitution clearly increases one's risk of facing criminal charges for critical remarks against bureaucrats.
And finally, the draft law adds something totally new to art. 212 and 213, and also for some reason to the articles dealing with vandalism against monuments and cemeteries (art.243 and 244 of the Criminal Code): ideological and political hatred are added to the current legal inventory of hate motives. This novelty requires careful consideration.
We cannot say that crimes motivated by ideological hatred are rare. They include, inter alia, attacks against political or ideological opponents, and in this sense the amendment of art. 212 and 213 is reasonable, just as similar amendments of other articles against violent crimes would be reasonable. Currently neo-Nazi violence against anti-fascists is judged without consideration of the motive; these attacks are presented to society as :simple; attacks or murders. It was also the case with rioters in Manezhnaya Square in 2002 - many people then thought that we were dealing with a serious hole in Russian law.
But is it really necessary to fill the hole?
Tougher sanctions for ideologically and politically motivated crimes are not based on the same rationale as tougher sanctions for hate crimes against certain ethnic, etc. groups. In the latter case, the entire (ethnic, etc.) group is targeted, as the victim is perceived as a member of the group. Should ideological or political hatred imply tougher punishment of the attacker, society will effectively protect a certain ideological or political sphere - rather than a certain group of people - from criminal attacks.
Such protection is appropriate, but do we really believe that extra measures are necessary on top of the existing provisions of the Criminal Code? They might be necessary in a situation where politically motivated criminal attacks and riots continue in spite of consistent and tough enforcement of relevant criminal laws. In Russia today, we see more and more political and ideological attacks, but we do not see consistent and tough enforcement or adequate sentencing. We therefore have concluded that the potential of existing Criminal Code provisions remains largely untapped in combating riots or politically-motivated violence.
On the other hand, the public and political sphere in Russia today suffers less from political hooliganism, riots and vandalism - deplorable as such incidents are - than from excessive administrative pressure and over-regulation. The proposed amendments of the Criminal Code will make it even worse.
We should also consider the risk of erroneous or abusive enforcement, including misinterpretation of "ideological motives.; For example, if a policeman is physically attacked during a "dissenters' march" or another oppositional meeting, the entire gathering will be considered a riot under art. 212 of the Criminal Code. Even peaceful participants will face criminal charges and up to six years of prison, should the proposed amendments be adopted. The same is true for activists who paint a politically offensive slogan on a monument (which we consider to be excessive punishment for this kind of vandalism).
In view of the above, we believe that it is inadvisable to qualify ideological and political hatred as an aggravating motive of violent crimes.
On 23 May 2007, the State Duma adopted another draft law in the first reading: among other things, it seeks to bar :extremists; from the Public Chamber. Accoding to the draft initiated by MPs from the United Russia, groups facing a warning for extremist activity (the period extends one year after the warning, unless overruled by court) or suspended under the anti-extremism law cannot nominate members to the Public Chamber.
The draft law (eventually adopted in the third reading on 15 June) does not make any practical sense, because members are not elected, but selected and appointed to the Public Chamber by authorities. (Moreover, a group legally suspended from operation cannot nominate a candidate anyway). This example clearly illustrates how :anti-extremism; is used by some politicians and public figures to emphasize their loyalty.
The biggest lawmaking scandal this spring was the draft law amending article 4 of the Federal Law on Mass Media launched in the State Duma on 16 March 2007. The draft initiated by the Moscow City Duma discourages mentioning "in mass media and on the Internet any details concerning the ethnicity, race or religion of the victims, perpetrators, suspects and accused of crimes.; Even though the drafters acted with the best of intentions, we believe that prohibiting journalists from mentioning ethnicity in their reporting of crime is not a viable solution. Firstly, the restriction can be easily overcome by using euphemisms. Secondly, withholding the victim's ethnicity is counterproductive, because the public will be denied (already scarce) information concerning the scope of hate crime. Thirdly, in some cases ethnicity or other aspects of the perpetrator's identity are relevant to the case. [27] We hope that reason will prevail and the draft law will be discarded by the Duma. Issues of this kind should be addressed by society and the media community in particular; repressive instruments used by the state are not appropriate in such cases.
In the spring of 2007, more "anti-extremist" amendments of the electoral law came into force, but these were mostly technical amendments pursuant to the prior radical changes of the Federal Law on Main Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in a Referendum, and of the Civil Procedure Code, effective since December 2006 (see our comment on SOVA's website[28]). Apparently, their prompt and quiet adoption had something to do with their merely technical nature. The first reading of the draft law[29] was on the 9 March; on 6 April the Duma adopted a finalized version; on 26 April it was signed into law by the President, and on 11 May it was officially published. Among the numerous technical articles, art. 5 is of interest, as it amends the Federal Laws on Elections of the Russian President and on Elections of Members to the State Duma of the Russian Federal Assembly by banning candidates with previous unresolved criminal convictions for extremist crimes and unresolved administrative liability under art. 20.3 of the Code of Administrative Offenses. These provisions apply to extremist offences committed over four years prior to the election day. [30]
Persecution of NGOs and Civil Society Activists
Most incidents of unlawful :anti-extremist; pressure against NGOs and civil society activists in the spring of 2007 were associated with the United Civic Front (UCF) and the Other Russia activities. Police confiscated entire print-runs of newspapers printed in preparation to the Dissenters' Marches "to be reviewed for extremism; (sic! the entire print-runs, rather than a sample). The Echo Moscow radio station came under prosecutorial scrutiny for giving airtime to NBP leader Edouard Limonov and UCF leader Garry Kasparov. Along the same lines, the Yabloko Party chapter in Krasnodar was warned for disseminating books written by political scientist A. Piontkovsky. Leaving aside the question of whether Andrei Piontkovsky is an extremist, we should note that the same books continue to be sold in retail bookstores across the country.
Organizers faced :anti-extremist; warnings[31] for permitting NBP activists to attend their events and display their party's :extremist; symbols; NBP's flag resembles the Nazi flag, but is also different, so it is not covered by the direct ban imposed by art. 1 of the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity. The case of NBP activist Dmitry Isusov from Arzamas serves as an illustration. In the spring of 2006, he was arrested together with 12 other NBP members for participating in the Anti-Capitalism 2006 march and sentenced under three articles of the Code of Administrative Offenses - 20.2 (non-compliance with an established procedure of holding a rally); 20.3 (propaganda and public demonstration of Nazi attributes or symbols), and 19.3 (defiance of police orders) - to a 1,000 ruble fine. D. Isusov appealed and had the ruling reversed, by obtaining a court finding that NBP's flag was not "similar to a Nazi flag.; Moreover, in April 2007, he claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage and was awarded 2,000 rubles.
On 19 April, 2007, the Moscow City Court found the National Bolshevik Party (NBP) an extremist organization and banned its activity in Russia. The grounds of this judgment are not entirely clear[32], but the prosecutor's case was based on three prior warnings issued to NBP. One of the warnings was, indeed, triggered by offensive publications in one of NBP's newspapers, but the authors targeted by the warning, alongside many other stern nationalists, had already left NBP. Two other warnings were triggered by petty political hooliganism, such as disrupting a session of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly and a meeting of the Moscow Area Electoral Board by entering the premises, shouting slogans and scattering leaflets, without any use of violence. Criminal investigations are underway into the incidents, but they are hardly serious enough for the entire organization to be banned.
The judgment has not come into force yet, still pending before a court of appeal. If NBP loses the appeal, a dangerous situation will emerge, where a large-scale public movement will be forced either to stop all activity (which is unlikely), or have anyone acting on behalf of NBP face criminal charges under art.282-2 of the Criminal Code, even in absence of formal evidence of the defendant's links with NBP. This, in turn, may lead to massive reprisals, excessive penalties, selective enforcement, and gross procedural violations, if any forms of collaboration with NBP members can be interpreted as support of their banned activity.
On 21 March 2007, the Moscow Prosecutor's Office suspended NBP activities pending the judicial proceedings. But it is also worth noting that the recent efforts of the law enforcement and administrative authorities to ban NBP's pickets and rallies are not based on the prosecutorial ban - the only legal document warranting sanctions against NBP activists[33] - but instead, refer to the 2005 judgment of the Moscow City Court liquidating the NBP chapter in Moscow Oblast, which did not ban the party, but only stripped it of its legal entity status.
Another judgment was passed in the spring 2007, which we find extremely dangerous and likely to encourage and radicalize the religious underground. On 21 May 2007, Koptevsky District Court in Moscow, presided over by Judge S.V.Mitushov, found Russian translations of 14 books by Turkish theologian and philosopher Said Nursi to be extremist. It is unclear why Nursi's papers came under judicial scrutiny in Russia. There is no evidence that Nursi's followers have been involved in violence based on their beliefs. Ironically, Nursi's papers are not banned in Turkey, regardless of his sharp criticism of the Turkish authorities.
Similar to the case of NBP, the judgment has not yet come into force. If the appeal fails, any distribution of Nuri's Russian translations will be deemed "extremist activity,; so anyone involved in such distribution will face administrative or criminal charges.
To remind the reader, unfounded charges of religious intolerance also affect religious followers other than Moslems. On 21 March, the Supreme Court upheld the sentence under art. 282 of the Criminal Code against Vitali Tanakov, an ethnic Mari pagan priest. [34]
The anti-extremist legislation continues to be used as an instrument of pressure against mass media, even in cases where it does not make sense to accuse a publication or a journalist of extremism. For example, the Roskhrancultura Office of Mid-Volga region warned the editors of Novye Vremena in Saratov paper for a publication entitled Triumph of the Will. The article criticized the administration of Saratov University and was illustrated by a collage including pictures from the University Academic Board session and Hitler's National-Socialist Party congress. The author drew a parallel (maybe, unreasonably) between the university administration and Nazi leaders, but it was clear throughout the article that the connotation was negative. Rosokhrancultura, however, failed to see it.
Pressure against Zyryanskaya Zhizn paper continued. [35] On 24 May, the city court in Syktyvkar upheld the unlawful decision to impose a fine on the editors for maintaining their website without registering it as a mass media outlet. [36] (Notably, the paper won the main case against it; on 5 June the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic overruled the order to close the paper).
A similar case of :anti-extremism; involved Esquire Magazine. In the end of April, the magazine carried a photo from the Dissenters' March in St. Petersburg showing a fully equipped riot policeman (OMON) with his back to the camera. Two zigzags on his helmet looked like symbols of the Nazi SS troops. This photo (authentic, according to most experts; other photos are also available of the same helmet from a different perspective) offended members the State Duma. But instead of launching an investigation into the riot police who dispersed the marchers, Deputy Chief of the State Duma Security Committee Mikhail Grishankov accused the magazine of illegally ;displaying the Nazi attributes; and pressed for an investigation into the publication.
To add to the list of sadly absurd cases, on 18 April 2007, the Federal Registration Service upheld the scandalous decision of their colleagues in Tyumen, who had denied registration to a gay and lesbian group, finding it extremist on the part of gays and lesbians to refuse to contribute to the country's demographic growth and by doing so, jeopardizing national security.
Anti-extremist Rhetoric Used to Discredit Political Opponents
Blame campaigns designed to discredit oppositional politicians and civil society activists by labeling them :extremist; or "fascist" continued.
The pro-Kremlin Nashi movement consistently described UCF as :an immoral alliance of fascists and pseudo-liberals, financed by fugitive criminals and visiting diplomats, bound by their hatred towards Putin and their desire to come back and continue to rob the country. [37]; Importantly, Nashi have recently added a note of ethno-nationalism to their traditional :anti-fascist; rhetoric: now they describe political opposition not only as :fascists,; but also as :Russophobes/Putinophobes.; Kreml.org portal published an article by Razhap Musayev, whose position is described as Federal Curator of the Nashi movement experts, with the following reference to the Dissenters' Marches: :The marchers are sick. [Their disease is] advanced paranoiac Russophobia. Let us call it Putinophobia[38].;
The United Russia Young Guard added their voices to Nashi's "anti-fascist; campaigning: :Naturally, he (a :non-conformist; youth - G.K.) joins the Other Russia if he does not end up among the [neo-]Nazi (like DPNI), or - even worse, among skinheads...; :They (anarchists and non-conformists - G.K.) are the Other Russia's "storm troopers', similar to the SA storm troopers.;
Statements of this kind have become so common in Russia that no one really cares. New developments in the spring of 2007 were the police allegations that skinheads had been behind the Dissenters' Marches, [39] and a reaction to Edouard Limonov's interview in Gazeta in early April 2007. Shortly after its publication, the websites of United Russia, SPS, LDPR and :Civil Force; (Mikhail Barschevsky) denounced the article as :giving column space to an extremist; (notably, politicians referred to the Anti-Fascist Pact, a declaration signed in early 2006 and hardly ever mentioned since).
Eventually, representatives of the political parties, except United Russia, disowned their statements explaining them as errors of their press officers. However, only LDPR actually removed the :anti-Limonov; statement from their website, [40] but again, did not stop Sergey Abeltsev from LDPR from sending a parliamentary enquiry to the Prosecutor General Office, urging them "to take a closer look; at the interview published in Gazeta.
The :anti-extremist; hysteria was also demonstrated during some international events. On 29 March 2007, at the OSCE Meeting on the Freedom of Assembly, Association and Expression in Vienna, the Russian Government representative expressed official indignation at the presence of the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS), which the diplomat described as "extremist organization.; Well-known Russian political scientist Sergey Markov, who came to the meeting with the official delegation strongly criticized the RCFS's attendance of the meeting, claiming that the group was not just :extremist,; but also :had links with terrorists.; Markov made such statements during a plenary discussion, and also during a briefing on the situation with civil liberties in Russia, organized by SOVA Center with participation of the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights and Yurix NGO.
It should be emphasized that OSCE meetings are open to all NGOs which apply, as long as they are not involved in political violence (as the EU spokesman noted). Moreover, RCFS was liquidated, but was not formally found an :extremist; organization. Plus, any allegations that it had :links; with terrorists are legally unfounded.
[1] The overall number of victims over the first five months of 2007 was 245, of them 32 were killed.
[2] We reported then the first drop of assault statistics over several years of our monitoring. Galina Kozhevnikova. Spring-2006: Skinhead Promotional Campaign // SOVA Center. Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia. 2006. 28 June (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/29481C8/78A0D48).
[3] Other than participants of the gay march attacked on 27 May.
[4] As always, we do not include acquisitive crimes in our statistics, unless the hate motive of such crimes is recognized by the law enforcement authorities.
[5] More reports and indirect evidence of attacks can be found on the internet, but we do not use this evidence, unless we can corroborate it.
[6] See, for example, Leonid Sedov. Opposition. Criticism of Government. Extremism (findings of December surveys) // Levada Center. 2007. 15 January (http://www.levada.ru/press/2007011504.html
[7] See, for example, Residents Concerned over Skinhead Gang Rumors // BelMedia.ru. 2007. 20 April (http://belmedia.ru/newspage/id/7579.html); Ivan Loginov. Big panic raised by a small hoax // Golos Belogorya. 2007. 26 April (http://golosbelog.livejournal.com/5472.html); Lessons of the :Skinhead Case; // Den News Agency (Udmurtia). 2007. 26 April (http://www.dayudm.ru/lenta.php?id=20092).
[8] For example, Alexander Khinshtein of United Russia suggested that the Gay Pride should be held on the same date as the Border Guard Day and the Airborne Forces Day, emphasizing that the servicemen will face no charges for whatever they may do. Alexander Khinshtein Proposes Holding Gay Pride on Border Guard Day in the Gorky Park // Regions.ru. 2007. 30 April (http://www.regions.ru/news/2078528/).
[9] Not to be confused with Alexey Romanov's dwarfish National Union.
[10] The secrecy continues at the time of this writing - for more than a month, neither the CRC website, currently the party's official mouthpiece, nor A. Savelyev's personal website have given any indication of the OC or governing bodies' membership.
[11] The first congress was held on 25 August 2006.
[12] We recall, for example, Zuganov's scandalous anti-Semitic brochure titled Sacred Russia and Koschey's Kingdom, but recently CPRF has employed the xenophobic rhetoric less frequently.
[13] The elections were held on 15 October 2007.
[14] The Russian Project. Official website. (http://www.rus-proekt.ru/).
[15] Eleven Arrested for Breaking into AiF Office // RIA Novosti news agency, 2007. 2 May (http://www.rian.ru/politics/russia/20070502/64765181.html).
[16] Not to be confused with Alexey Podberyozkin's Spiritual Heritage Movement. The agency focuses on covering :the fight against teaching Darwin's theory in schools.;
[17] Cited from: Ruslan Linkov presses charges against Spiritual Heritage news agency for incitement to ethnic hatred // ZAKS.ru. 2007. 3 May (http://www.zaks.ru/a0/ru/archive/view.thtml?i=29499&p=0).
[18] In Pyatigorsk, local imam Anton Stepanenko was convicted, inter alia, under art. 282, but was released from punishment due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. We do not include him in our statistics of :propaganda; cases, because we have not yet determined whether the prosecution was well-founded.
[19] Victor Shnirelman. Mass Media, Ethnic Crime and Migrant Phobia // Hate Speech against Society. М., 2007. P. 142. Cf. also the :Jewish ritual killing; theories and the stories from Kondopoga and Stavropol about victims being beheaded or their ears slashed off.
[20] Besides those already mentioned, these were the cases in Kemerovo in 2006, and also in Kemerovo and Syktyvkar in 2005.
[21] Known DDoS attacks against the political opposition servers have followed the same scenario. The suspicion that authorities are behind such attacks is corroborated by a prior incident of a hack attack against Estonian servers by a Nashi activist. See details in: A Nashi commissar is banned from entering EU and US for hack attacks against Estonian websites // Novaya Gazeta. News, 2007, 31 May (http://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/110804.html).
[22] Interethnic conflicts shake universities and military units // Moye (Voronezh) 2007. 5 June (http://www.moe.kpv.ru/view/text.shtml?24570).
[23] Website of an organization associated with DPNI, initiator of anti-Azeri rallies in Moscow. Currently the website is down for unknown reasons.
[24] The judgment has not yet come into force.
[25] Unfortunately, summary tables published on their website do not indicate dates of the issued warnings. We can only get some idea of timing from their updates. In early March, they mentioned 4 warnings, and in mid-May, 17 warnings. We conclude that a total of 13 may have been issued in spring.
[26] The information currently available to us is not sufficient for assessing whether the warnings against two papers - Listok in Mountainous Altai and Provinitsialnye Vesti in Ufa - were well-founded.
[27] See, for example, A. Verkhovsky's comments in: Alexander Yelisov. They should watch their language. Journalists have been found to use many politically incorrect terms // Gazeta. 2007. 30 May
[28] Alexander Verkhovsky. The anti-extremist finale of the Duma session is a radical attack against voting rights // SOVA Center. Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia. 2006. 10 July (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/29481C8/799D3C5).
[29] Full name of the Law: The Federal Law of the Russian Federation dated 26 April 2007 (N 64-FZ) :On amending certain legal acts of the Russian Federation pursuant to the adoption of the Federal Law on Main Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in a Referendum and of the Civil Procedure Code to ensure the implementation of the Russian legislation on elections and referenda; // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 2007. 11 May (http://rg.ru/2007/05/11/vybory-dok.html).
[30] Ibid.
[31] An important clarification - warnings issued to specific individuals (in this case, to the event organizers) do not carry the same legal implications as, for example, :anti-extremist; warnings issued to organizations and mass media: the latter may eventually lead to liquidation.
[32] In violation of procedure, six weeks after the judgment, its explanatory part was not yet made available to the party's attorney.
[33] Nor even to the mentioned judgment of the Moscow Cit y Court of 19 April - it would have been unlawful, but at least logical.
[34] See details in: High Priest sentenced in Marii El // SOVA Center. Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia. 2006. 26 December (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/89CCE27/89CD1C9/878F999).
[35] We covered it in: Galina Kozhevnikova. Winter Maneuvers of the Ultra-Right: Explosions, Congresses and Trials // SOVA Center. Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia. 2007. 29 April (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/29481C8/91C343B).
[36] See expert comment on the issue in: M. A. Fedotov. An opinion on the legal nature of websites // Union of Russian Journalists website, 2007. 26 February (http://www.ruj.ru/news/070301.html).
[37] Who is the fascist in Russia? // Echo of Moscow. 2007. 11 April (http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/exit/50939/).
[38] R. Musayev, Russia for the Americans! // Kreml.org, 2007. 16 April (http://www.kreml.org/opinions/147217099).
[39]:Dissenters; faced these allegations in Nizhny Novgorod and in Samara. Skinheads were also mentioned in the reports covering the suppressed marches in Moscow and in St. Petersburg on 14 and 15 April, respectively.
[40] See, for example, Promoters of extremism and xenophobia must remain irrelevant and marginal // Civil Force. 2007. 6 April (http://www.gr-sila.ru/document_id3037.html); Statement of the Union of Right-wing Forces (SPS) Party press office concerning E. Limonov's interview to Gazeta. // SPS Party official website. 2007. 6 April (http://sps.ru/?id=219825).
