Summer 2012: Back to Lessons Learned

Настоящий материал (информация) произведен и (или) распространен иностранным агентом РОО Центр «Сова» либо касается деятельности иностранного агента РОО Центр «Сова».
Edited by Alexander Verkhovsky

Criminal manifestations of racism and xenophobia : Violence : Vandalism
The public activity of the of the ultra-right : Rallies and marches : "Kondopoga technology" : Development of major party projects : Other activities of the ultra-right groups
Counteraction to xenophobia and radical nationalism : Criminal prosecution for violence and vandalism : Criminal prosecution for propaganda : Federal lists of extremist materials and organizations : Other administrative measures
Appendix. Statistics of Crime and Punishment (in word format)[1]



The main achievement of previous years – the reduction of racist- and neo-Nazi-motivated violence – is clearly lost. We can say already that the number of victims in 2012 will be not lower than in 2011. Nor did the expected summer reduction take place; the number of victims from June to August was even higher than in spring or last summer. The ‘informals’ (members of informal youth organizations) and antifascists remain primary targets. Attacks based on ethnic hate have not stopped either. The number of acts of xenophobic vandalism increased significantly, and the rise was only partly caused by the attacks against Orthodox objects due to the sentencing of members of Pussy Riot in August.


This summer, nationalist political leaders faced a decline in protest activity and a reduction of the number of people at general oppositional events. Nationalist organizations still took part in these actions, but their relationship with other representatives of the opposition took a backseat.

The main ultra-right movements used this break to develop their parties. They spent time opening new regional departments, establishing contacts with local rightwing radical groups and advertised themselves in the regions by holding minor public actions or social campaigns. However, one cannot say yet that the nationalists succeeded in increasing their public support. The number of new departments of their various parties is not very high so far, and their activity has not yet taken on a wide scale.

Nationalists made a lot of efforts to keep ethnic politics topical in general. These efforts were clearly aimed not only at preserving a high level of mobilization for their own adherents but also at attaining new ones. The protest movement theoretically could be a ground for this. This summer, nationalists used the time-proven ‘Kondopoga technology’ method by laboriously co-opting and promoting a number of real, fake and potential violent incidents. Although speculations about such conflicts have fortunately not led to wide unrest on ethnic grounds, nationalists were able to consistently keep the subject of interethnic conflicts on the agenda.

However, as a general movement, nationalist leaders did not achieve visible success. This became evident at the September 15 March of Millions.


Criminal prosecutions for racist violence during this period drew public attention. The members of the ultra-right group Orel Partisans (Orlovskie partizany) and the leader of the St. Petersburg neo-Nazi group NS/WP Georgii Timofeev were convicted. Several participants of the row on Manezhnaya Square on December 11, 2010 (not counting those who had already been convicted) and the murder of a man from Kyrgyzstan the day after the unrest faced court sentences.

The number of sentences for propaganda continued to rise by leaps and bounds but the quality of law enforcement still leaves something to be desired, as the main target in this area is mostly users of the social network Vkontakte ( who are prosecuted for reposts, links to videos and replicas in groups.

The Federal List of Extremist Materials is still being supplemented, becoming more and more senseless, the more so as only a few items of the list are really used for criminal and administrative sanctions. The “fight against extremism” on the web is clearly becoming more active. In summer, the number of law enforcement requests to providers asking them to block access to this or that website or individual materials grew sharply. Some such requests are appropriate, while some are not; the same goes for the efficiency of their fulfillment.

It seems that law enforcement activity continues to have trouble keeping up with the development of ultra-right activities.





In summer 2012, the expected drop in racist and neo-Nazi violence did not occur. According to our data, at least 46 persons suffered during the three months in question, with six of them killed. This is slightly fewer than in spring (three persons killed, 54 beaten) but the summer data are not final and are being supplemented with a big delay, so the number of victims could, unfortunately, increase.[2] In summer 2011, at least 38 persons suffered, with six of them killed, which is fewer than this summer. In all, during eight months of 2012, at least 139 persons suffered, and eleven of them were killed. One person received a serious death threat.

Attacks from June to August 2012 took place in 11 regions of the country: Moscow and the Moscow region, St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region, the Orel, Orenburg and Samara regions, Primorye Krai, and the republics of Bashkiria, Komi and Tatarstan. It is worthy of note that in both spring and summer, Bashkiria, which had not been among the leaders of the list in the past, occupied the second place (eight persons suffered). St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region remained in third place. Moscow and the Moscow region are the perennial leaders in this sad category.

Just as in winter and spring, the main victims of the ultra-right were representatives of youth and informal groups first of all (18 persons beaten). In addition to antifascists and visitors to oppositional rallies, this group also includes people who faced random attack. Among other groups of victims are people from the Caucasus (two were killed, three beaten) and Central Asia (four beaten), dark-skinned people (four beaten), the homeless (three killed, one beaten), LGBT representatives (four beaten) and representatives of religious groups (two beaten). Other victims of ultra-right attacks in summer were Novye Izvestia journalist Dmitrii Alyaev, who had expressed disagreement with the slogan “Russia for the Russians!” that nationalists had shouted in a suburban train,[3] and an intoxicated woman in a Metro coach (as the Nazi straight edge subculture has been growing, the list of victims has started to be supplemented by people whose way of life is unhealthy, according to the attackers’ point of view).

Traditionally, the summer victims include those who faced attacks during the celebration of the Paratrooper Day on August 2. On that day, racist incidents were registered in at least four regions of the country, and at least five people suffered from strolling paratroopers who attacked them.

We should remind readers here that we do not mention people who suffered in the republics of the North Caucasus or the victims of mass brawls.

The ultra-right’s subversive and terrorist activity was also remarkable. For instance, in Moscow, on Ordzhonikidze Street, unidentified masked young people Molotov cocktails and a burning fuse at the Zhi Est’[4] restaurant, which serves Caucasian cuisine. A restaurant administrator was wounded during the attack. Shortly before that, unknown persons drew a swastika on a fence near the restaurant and wrote the word “instigate.”

Expressions of racism among football fans did not cease during summer months. In particular, in St. Petersburg fans of FC Zenit hung a banner in the city several times saying “There is no black among the colors of Zenit.” In August, Zenit fans attacked fans of FC Anzhi (a Dagestani football club) in St. Petersburg. According to unverified data, one of the groups of Zenit ultras, the Snake City Firm, is suspected to have been involved in the attack. Two persons from Dagestan who were going to Moscow to watch an Anzhi match faced attack (according to another version, there were three) and were taken to hospital. Fans of Anzhi claim that the attack was Zenit fans’ revenge for August 19. On that day, two fans from St. Petersburg had been beaten by the police, and one of the leaders of the city’s fan movement had been taken to hospital. In Moscow, where Anzhi played against a team from the Netherlands at the Lokomotiv stadium, ultra-right fans hung a xenophobic banner. During the match itself, people who were sitting in the “anti-Dagestan” section of the stands shouted racist slogans and insulted people from Dagestan.



From June to August 2012, Sova Center registered at least 37 acts of xenophobic vandalism in 20 regions of the country. During previous months, the activity of xenophobic vandals was significantly lower. In spring 2012, we registered only 17 ideologically motivated acts. In summer 2011, 26 such acts were committed.

As in spring, St. Petersburg topped the list where vandalism was registered (five cases) followed by Chelyabinsk, Irkutsk and Sverdlovsk regions (three cases in each).

During summer 2012, at least 12 acts of vandalism were committed against Orthodox objects. Most of them took place after the August 7 announcement of the verdict in the Pussy Riot case. In August, Orthodox churches and standing wooden crosses suffered from vandals in the Arkhangelsk, Chelyabinsk, Kaliningrad, Pskov and Sverdlovsk regions. Apart from that, a significant part of xenophobic vandalism was aimed at “ideological” monuments (at least nine acts). At least four of them took place in St. Petersburg: Lenin’s monument and memorial plaque, chairman of the Baltic Navy Revolutionary Fleet Vladimir Trefolev’s memorial plaque, and chairman of the Petrograd Cheka (early Soviet state security organization) Moisei Uritskii’s memorial plaque. In the latter case, Nikolai Bondarik’s Russian Party (Russkaya partiya) spread a statement claiming it “utterly and fully” assumed “moral responsibility” for the crime because Uritskii was “a butcher, under the direction of whom thousands of Petersburgers were killed.”[5]

Apart from that, buildings of Jehovah’s Witnesses (five acts), Jewish (four), Protestant (three), Muslim (three), and Catholic objects (one) were desecrated from June to August.

In all, from the beginning of the year, Sova Center has registered at least 63 acts of neo-Nazi and xenophobic vandalism in 30 regions of the country.



Rallies and marches

The ultra-right spent summer in a state of comparative political calm. In winter and spring, their main efforts were focused on establishing relationship with representatives of other oppositional forces and holding joint actions, whereas in summer, this activity became less realistic because political forces across the board became less active.

During the summer months, only two more or less major common oppositional actions were held: the March of Millions on June 12 and the action of July 26 in support of people arrested under the case of the unrest on Bolotnaya Square on May 6.


According to Sova Center’s calculation, about 550 nationalists gathered at the March of Millions in Moscow.[6] Among the nationalist organizations that participated in the action were the Ethnopolitical Association “Russians” (Etnopoliticheskoe ob”edinenie (EPO) “Russkie”), Valerii Solovei’s New Force (Novaya sila) party, Konstantin Krylov’s National Democratic Party (NDP, Natsional-demokraticheskaya partiya) and Anton Susov’s Russian Civil Union (RGS, Russkii grazhdanskii soyuz) and the Common Case (Obshchee delo) that are close to it, as well as Andrei Savelyev’s Great Russia (Velikaya Rossiya), Alexei Mikhailov’s Russian Image (Russkii obraz), the Russian Jogging (Russkaya probezhka), Russia’s Public Union (ROS, Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soyuz), Yurii Mukhin’s adherents, Maria Butina’s Right to Bear Arms (Pravo na oruzhie), and several minor groups. The speaker at the rally who represented nationalists was well-known ultra-right social activist Ivan Mironov, one of the former suspects in the case of attempted murder of then-head of the electric power monopoly RAO UES Anatoly Chubais; he was acquitted in September 2010. Mironov read out a letter by the leader of the Moscow Defense League (Liga oborony Moskvy) Daniil Konstantinov, who is in custody under suspicion of murder.[7]

The march could not take place without the conflicts that have become part and parcel of the participation of nationalists. The ultra-right started to make their way to the stage actively, knocking down participants of the rally. Their vanguard succeeded and, headed by Alexander Belov, attempted at bursting through the railing before the stage. First, it turned out well for them, but then order was restored. Later, nationalists shouted obscenities at some speakers on the stage, including liberal leaders Boris Nemtsov and Mikhail Kasyanov, former convict Sergei Mokhnatkin and writer Dmitrii Bykov, and jumped at the railing attempting to rush the stage again.

Simultaneously, another column of nationalists under imperial flags attempted to join their “comrades” near the stage. Not far from the railing, they were hampered by a group of rally members who chanted “Fascism will not do!” and blocked the way. Someone seized an imperial flag and threw it on the asphalt. The clash was suppressed by other members of the rally who stood between the sides of the fight. The rally members who stood near the stage shouted at the nationalists who attempted climb the railing, calling them provocateurs.

In the end of the rally, nationalists attacked a group of Pussy Riot supporters, breaking the nose of one of them.

The March of Millions led to discord among the nationalists themselves as well. There was a small scandal around the demarche of the Great Russia column that defiantly left the march while processing down the boulevards. The party leader, Andrei Savelyev, explained this by his party’s unwillingness to take part in the “liberal” rally, accused other nationalists of “having a deal with the liberals” and later issued an article where he “unmasked” two leaders of the EPO “Russians,” Dmitrii Demushkin and Alexander Belov. Savelyev said when and under what circumstances he had cooperated with them, described “dubious” episodes of biographies of both, and concluded that both were not gifted “in serious work and political struggle” because they were only aimed at rallies and marches, that is, working a crowd. By all appearances, this step was needed to draw the sympathy of the autonomous ultra-right, however the latter did not estimate Savelyev’s intention and declared (at least, most of them) that he was no better than the other two.


Actions in other cities attracted far fewer people than in Moscow and faced no incidents. The share of nationalists among such demonstrations was not high.

The only exception was St. Petersburg, where the role of the ultra-right was even more noticeable than in Moscow. As in the capital, here the event could not do without conflicts. Right radicals attacked LGBT activists twice, beating them and dispersing gas. As a result, two nationalists were detained.

The March of Millions showed once again that the antagonism between the ultra-right and other oppositionists has not passed. The share of nationalists remains extremely low due to the unwillingness of most autonomous right radicals to cooperate with liberals and to the bad reputations of major ultra-right movements, which hamper their bids to gain adherents. Apart from that, almost every major joint event cannot do without attacks and clashes between nationalists and representatives of other oppositional groups, provoked by the ultra-right.


This summer’s other common oppositional action, in support of people charged with organizing and taking part in the unrest on Bolotnaya Square on May 6, was not very successful for the nationalists. On July 26, the number of ultra-right activists who gathered for the rally was not high; they attended the event almost without any political symbols (only Anton Susov’s RGS hoisted flags). As a result, the role of the ultra-right was almost unnoticeable even for the participants of the action. Nationalists presented Ilya Konstantinov, Daniil Konstantinov’s father, as the speaker on their behalf. No one from the ultra-right entered the stage. In St. Petersburg, nationalists were unlikely to take part in the action at all.

The failure was painful also because in order to take part in this action, nationalists refused to hold a separate traditional public event on the day of the Right Political Prisoner on July 25, which they have commemorated for several years already.

This year, among the organizations that took part in holding actions on July 25 were EPO “Russians” (Belov and Demushkin), ROD (Russkoe obshchestvennoe dvizhenie) human rights center (PTs “ROD”, Pravozashchitnyi tsentr “ROD” Nataliya Kholmogorova), Russian Verdict (Russkii verdict, Alexei Baranovskii), Russian Aid foundation (Russkaya pomoshch; established by the National Socialist Initiative (NSI, Natsional-sotsialisticheskaya initsiativa, Dmitrii Bobrov), Phoenix (Fenix, Maxim “Hatchet” (Tesak) Martsinkevich), the Right League (Pravaya liga, Alexei Samsonov), NDP (Krylov), Free Rein (Vol’nitsa, Kirill Barantsev), Heroes of Will (Geroi voli) and Russian Protest – Anti 282 (Russkii protest – Anti 282) websites. Organizers called their adherents to gather money for imprisoned nationalists, send them packages and hold events in the regions. As a result, minor actions took place in 22 cities of Russia and several cities of Ukraine and Belarus, most of which consisted of sticking, drawing graffiti and hanging banners. During some of the actions, organizers succeeded in holding small pickets with spreading leaflets or sports events for a narrow circle of adherents. As in the previous year, major ultra-right organizations concentrated their attention on gathering money, but in summer 2012 they somehow failed in this field as well. The sum gathered by all the main movements turned out to be even smaller than that of the previous year gathered by Krylov alone.


In the end of summer, the common oppositional activity recovered. The election campaign of the opposition’s Coordinating Council started, with nationalists, as well as leftists and liberals, being allotted their own “curia” with a quota of five people. Apart from that, contrary to the Civil Council elected in winter (which has already been forgotten), nationalists (including representatives of the ultra-right political movements), along with representatives of other “curiae,” are able to run for the Coordinating Council in the common civil list, not only in the list of their “curia.” Many well-known ultra-right leaders immediately declared their will to run for the council, including Krylov (NDP), Vladimir Tor (NDP), Andrei Kuznetsov (NDP in St. Petersburg), Kholmogorova (PTs “ROD”), Belov (“Russians”), Demushkin (“Russians”) and others.

The movement called Russia Will Become Free with Our Own Hands (RONS, Rossiya osvoboditsya nashimi salami; this is simply the new name of the banned organization Russian All-National Union (Russkii obshchenatsional’nyi soyuz) led by Igor Artemov) expressed its own point of view of the elections to the Coordinating Council.[8] It proposed to nominate “right political prisoners” for five nationalist chairs (“they will not even be able to attend the sessions.”) The movement’s candidates were Daniil Konstantinov (leader of the Moscow Defense League, charged with murder), Vladimir Kvachkov (leader of the Minin and Pozharsky All-Russian People’s Militia (NOMP, Vserossiiskoe narodnoe opolchenie imeni Minina i Pozharskogo), charged with preparing an armed riot and involving others in terrorist activity),[9] Maxim Kalinichenko (leader of Russian Joggings in St. Petersburg, charged with attacking policemen), Alexander Dzikovitskii (editor-in-chief of the Cossack’s View (Kazachii vzglyad) newspaper, sentenced under article 282),[10] Alexei Kutalo (RONS activist, charged under article 2822 (participation in an extremist organization).[11]) Leaders of ultra-right organizations were given the option to nominate themselves in the common civil list. This initiative was likely to be rejected by other nationalists because not only leaders of other ultra-right movements are nominated mostly with their curia, but also the leader of RONS, Igor Artemov himself, was nominated there as well.

In one of his speeches, Belov expressed his view on the nationalists’ role in the general structures of the opposition movement. He declared that nationalists undoubtedly had to take part in them, but that only respectable nationalist leaders should be nominated as candidates, as opposed to simply anyone, as doing the latter led to the scattering of votes. He also said that one should not aim at a high share of ultra-right figures in the leadership of such a structure because in that case it could lose legitimacy in the eyes of other oppositionists.[12]

Thereby, one can note that the last item is out of tune with the traditional position of the ultra-right, which has previously been aimed at global expansion in all spheres and insistence on that in public. Perhaps Belov made this new conclusion based on his experience communicating with other oppositionists. However it is not less probable that he was forced to make such a statement by the serious competition among nationalists for chairs in the curia. The main events related to the Coordinating Council are happening in autumn, and they will show how nationalists will build their relationship with other oppositionists and each other in terms of competence.


“Kondopoga technology”

In the gap between the major common oppositional marches, nationalists fell back again upon the time-proven “Kondopoga technology.” During three summer months, they repeatedly caused an outcry in the media over various local violent conflicts between Russians and “non-Russians.”

The loudest one was probably the conflict in the village of Demyanovo, Kirov region. It was provoked by a private quarrel that took place on June 20 in a café between an owner of a local sawmill who was from Dagestan and his nephew who had come to visit him, on one side, and a local inhabitant on the other. After the quarrel, unidentified persons beat the business owner on the street. Several dozen acquaintances and relatives of the owner of the sawmill, came to the village on June 22 to support their countryman. That day afternoon, about 50 local inhabitants, aged from 18 to 35, gathered near the sawmill to deal with the business owner’s family and acquaintances. The territory of the sawmill was cordoned off by police. This however did not save the situation from several skirmishes. One can hear shooting on the recording of the incident. Witnesses claim that it was the people from the Caucasus who opened fire. On the evening of June 23, a spontaneous rally took place in the village, with 300 inhabitants attending, as well as the deputy head of the regional government, Alexander Galitskikh. It seems that after that, the conflict settled down.

The ultra-right began actively promoting the conflict from the very beginning, representing it as an interethnic one, overestimating the number of victims, spreading information that criminal cases were instigated against local inhabitants only, that the latter faced pressure, etc. However, after the conflict had been settled, less hardline nationalists lost interest in it, even in spite of the attempts of major nationalist movements to preserve its momentum (Krylov’s ROD, for instance.)

Ultra-right attention was also drawn by the information of a mass brawl between inhabitants of the village of Krotovka, Samara region, and Roma residents on August 19. This information was actively spread on almost all nationalist resources. The conflict was represented as an interethnic one, as usual, although it was not, in spite of some manifestations of xenophobia. The conflict started between Russians and Roma living in neighboring private houses due to a fire that damaged constructions on both parcels. While the fire was being put out, the neighbors started to insult each other, leading to a brawl. The nationalist and near-nationalist segment of the Web was full of reports mentioning an unbelievable number of people who had taken part in the brawl (up to 250), and this information spread to other media. Real data appeared much later, and only then it became clear that the significance of the event was heavily overstated.

In addition to misrepresenting data on real conflicts, nationalists also informed their audience this summer of an incident that apparently had not happened at all. Thus, Yurii Ekishev (“Parabellum” movement, close to NOMP) and the NOMP resource Storm News (Shturm novosti) spread a report that in the town of Buzuluk, Orenburg region, on the night of June 27 to 28, an interethnic conflict had taken place because of which a young girl had been killed, several men had been taken to hospital with gunshot wounds, and three cafes had been burnt. It was also reported that there were many armed services representatives in the town who attempted to conceal information on the conflict.[13] There was no report in the media on the events in Buzuluk, except for a blog report at Fontanka.Ru, which was removed. On June 29, representatives of the police department of the greater Buzuluk area and editor of Buzuluk newspaper Russian Province (Rossiiskaya provintsiya) Natalya Tolmacheva claimed there had been no murder and no further disturbances.

We should also mention the case where there was no conflict but nationalists attempted to make it by themselves. On June 14, a meeting took place in Krasnodar near the RIP (electronic test equipment) plant between local inhabitants and police officials. Nationalists actively spread the recording of this meeting on the Web, commenting that “a new Kondopoga” was “ripening” in Krasnodar. Local inhabitants heard on the recording complain to the police that migrant workers are living in a neighboring house not built to the end, that they are not receiving salaries, and the number of criminal incidents has gone up in the region as a result. It can be seen in the video that the most active person among those who spoke to the police was Maxim Petrenko, a nationalist and assistant to Duma deputy Vladimir Ovsyannikov, one of coordinators of Russian Joggings – Krasnodar and of the local Russian March. It was he, not other inhabitants, who represented these events as interethnic confrontations, provoked a conflict with the police, called local inhabitants to fight against migrants by themselves and join ultra-right organizations. However, as we can see, all the efforts of the Krasnodar nationalist failed.

Apart from constructing “potential Kondopogas,” this summer nationalists actively spread information on various conflicts with local inhabitants that had led to xenophobic escapades. For instance, news was spread on ultra-right websites on the events in the village of Pobeda, Vyborg district, Leningrad region. It was reported that a person from Uzbekistan had beaten and violated a young girl who lived there on the night of August 9. A day later, the inhabitants of the village (about 150 people) blocked the local road, expressing protest to the management of the factory where the criminal had worked. During an inspection, a department of the Federal Migration Service detained about 40 undocumented migrant workers from Central Asia. Although the crime itself was immediately revealed and the guilty person was found, this did not prevent local inhabitants from catching “illegals” in the forest by themselves, beating them and presenting them to the police.[14] According to tradition, nationalists use such incidents in their rhetoric as a positive example of the self-organization of local inhabitants against the “ethnic retreat.”

The ultra-right did not overlook the flooding disaster in Krasnodar Krai. Here, they also attempted to boost the story of interethnic conflict.

In the beginning, nationalists, as well as many other oppositionists, actively reported news on blogs and websites speaking of the carelessness of local and regional authorities, claiming that the inhabitants had not been informed about a possible flood, that the real number of victims was far higher than in the official data, and that the water from Neberdzhaev reservoir had been discharged intentionally, provoking the catastrophe.

Quite soon, major ultra-right organizations began to report that they also had started helping people who had suffered from the flood. The “Russians,” NDP and NOMP announced the collection of money for inhabitants of the city of Krymsk, which had suffered most of all, while the New Force (Novaya sila) and the People’s Council (Narodnyi sobor) reported on organizing their own help centers.

When the topicality of the disaster began to recede, nationalists started actively spreading various news on their websites that were intended to add an ethno-political tinge to the situation in Krymsk, and bring the topic back to the agenda. For instance, on the “Russians”’ website, the local activist of the organization Miroslav Valkovich reported that there had been a conflict in Krymsk initiated by Roma, Meskhetian Turks and Kurds who had allegedly took food and water out of humanitarian aid centers and resold them to the victims of the flood.[15] Similar news have made the rounds on ultra-right websites for a rather long time, but none of them has roused anyone to action.


Summing up, we can say that in spite of all the efforts of the ultra-right, they failed to make any of the aforementioned conflicts (or of some other, minor incidents in the period under report) “shoot.” We have mentioned on numerous occasions, though, that even if the “Kondopoga technology” does not work, it serves for nationalists as a means to mobilize their adherents – a method that has become most useful this summer under the circumstances of a certain reduction of political activity.


Development of major party projects

Nationalists continued to form parties, the establishment of which had been declared in winter and spring.


On June 15, 2012, the first nationalist party was registered officially. It was Sergei Baburin’s Russia’s Public Union (ROS). Its major gain was Roman Zentsov, leader of the Resistance (Soprotivlenie) movement, respected in ultra-right circles, who joined the party and was given the post of deputy chairman. We should remind readers that another deputy chairman of the ROS is the well-known nationalist Ivan Mironov, who is also popular among the autonomous ultra-right. Thus, in spite of Baburin’s relative moderateness, ROS is so far the only nationalist party project really able to struggle for the sympathies of the “autonomous.”

The party started communicating with competing projects rather actively and joining new coalitions. On June 21, Mironov held a meeting of nationalists attended by Belov, Georgii Borovikov, Anton Severnyi, Elena Denezhkina (all from the EPO “Russians”), Kholmogorova (PTs ROD), Krylov and Tor (NDP). Kholmogorova advanced a proposal at the meeting to establish a “common human rights association in order that all parties and movements of the Russian people take part in its work.”[16] Although the proposal had been received very favorably, two organizations instead of a unified one appeared in a short period of time. First, ROS and the “Russians” announced the establishment of a joint legal service “Russian Lawyer” (Russkii advokat), and shortly thereafter, PTs ROD also declared it was starting a joint project with Alexei Baranovskii’s Russian Verdict (Russkii verdikt) on making a common database of lawyers and “human rights activists.” The latter noted the appearance of the “Russian Lawyer” quite negatively, saying in particular that Mironov should not connect with the “Russians” because their legal work was very bad. Thus, ROS, which has stood apart from all other organizations before, is beginning consequently to get mixed into the squabble that is so traditional for the ultra-right political community.


Valery Solovei’s New Force (Novaya sila) registered documents with the executive committee at the Justice Ministry on June 7, 2012. The party formation in summer came first of all to the establishment of regional departments and holding minor actions by newly formed party cells in order to unite new adherents and to assert itself to the inhabitants of the region.

Over the course of the whole summer, New Force organized and held small pickets in several regions, often with no more than five people taking part. As a rule, regardless of topic, the main goal of the actions was to spread party leaflets among passers-by and glue stickers with the party’s title and its website’s URL. For instance, on June 13, the party department in Krasnodar held an information action called “South of Russia is not the Caucasus” that consisted of gluing leaflets around the city with the same slogan. A similar action was held a month later in the town of Mineralnye Vody. Additionally, New Force uses anti-Bolshevik topics and held actions in several regions commemorating the victims of the Red Terror by laying flowers to memorial plates or monuments.

Aside from holding public actions, the party attempted to attract people in other ways, for instance actively cooperating with actor Anatolii Pashinin, who took part in various party actions. Pashinin is likely to be made the face of the New Force. Solovei also published an article in summer entitled “This Autumn, the Spiral Will Start to Straighten Up,” where he proved – as one can see by the title – that Russians should expect revolution this autumn. However, nationalists treated the article without any special attention. Those who had read it considered the perspectives described in the article as unrealistic, in general.

It is worth noting separately that the Murmansk department of the New Force was headed by the organizer of local Russian Marches, leader of the ultra-right Pan-Slavic National Volunteer Association (PNVA, Panslavyanskoe natsional’noe dobrovol’cheskoe ob”edinenie) Alexander Valov. Thus, the New Force began improving relations with minor regional nationalist movements. As we have noted before, under the circumstances of the move to the party slate, which proposes participation in regional elections, nationalists are generally interested in gaining the sympathy of minor local ultra-right organizations that have already bolstered the number of adherents and won the sympathies of a part of the population. Earlier, major nationalist organizations paid far less attention to regional politics because their main activity was in the capitals. Other newly formed right radical parties also took part in the bid for the sympathies of regional right radical organizations, as it is shown below.


The Ethnopolitical Association “Russians” began to form regional departments of its Party of Nationalists far later than the New Force, only in August (and declared it officially.) There was no report on local cells in summer. Nothing was invested into the development of the brand of the party itself. Its representatives went on positioning themselves as leaders of the “Russians” association, not the Party of Nationalists. It is possible that the “Russians” simply do not really believe they will be allowed to register their party.

The organization continued to develop and struggle for the sympathies of its potential associates. The main efforts of the “Russians” in summer went towards holding their ground in the common political agenda under the relative calm.

During summer, the association repeatedly presented relatively remarkable initiatives, which helped attract media attention. For instance, the “Russians” applied for membership in the presidential Human Rights Council. Their candidates were Demushkin and former Duma deputy from the infamous Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) Nikolai Kuryanovich; both are known for their xenophobic and occasionally explicitly racist rhetoric. Their chances to join the council were certainly close to zero, but this step not only allowed the “Russians” to draw attention to themselves one more time, but also became a reason for the usual speculation on the oppression of Russian nationalists.

Another remarkable initiative was the campaign for the removal of Lenin’s body from the Mausoleum on Red Square, led by Demushkin. It began with a letter sent to Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika. Later, even the All-Russian Organizational Committee “For Lenin’s Removal!” was established, comprising representatives of Cossacks, Orthodox believers, and members of nationalist organizations including Demushkin himself, of course. In an interview, he said he was going to handle “all the legal work for preparing complaints and claims of citizens to courts and prosecutor’s offices on Lenin’s removal.”[17]

The fact that the anti-Bolshevik subject unexpectedly appeared in the agenda of two ultra-right organizations at once (the “Russians” and the New Force) is rather remarkable in and of itself. There is no doubt that most of the ultra-right has always held extremely negative views of the Soviet past; the revolution of 1917 is always called “anti-Russian” and “Jewish” in these circles. But the issue of the Communist past has never become so significant as to hold a series of actions. These campaigns are likely aimed at attracting the attention of the media and autonomous ultra-right activists who share hatred of Communism. Average Russian citizens are either indifferent or even inclined to idealize the Soviet past. Autonomous nationalists, though, have not been very much involved with those campaigns. They virtually have not noticed that of the New Force, and considered Demushkin’s as self-advertizing.

A rather remarkable news item of this summer was Demushkin’s nomination for mayor of Kaliningrad. On August 29 he submitted documents for registration, including the necessary number of signatures in support collected by his campaign office. This step is one more attempt by the “Russians” to come out of its marginal position and gain a legitimate niche on the political field in the eyes of the society.

As we have said so many times before, one of nationalists’ main points in the strategy of political demarginalization is the creation of an image of “nationalists with a human face” which, among other things, foresees distance from ultra-radical nationalists. However, as before, the EPO “Russians” are inconsistent here. One of the examples of this in summer was the picket held on August 31 in Moscow under leadership of one of the leaders of the “Russians,” Borovikov, in support of Nikolai Korolev, neo-Nazi who had been given life imprisonment for racist murders and the organization of the explosion at the Cherkizovsky market in Moscow.

Just as before, this inconsistency is explained by the fact that the association had been unable to decide who to focus on: other oppositionists and people not involved in the ultra-right community, or autonomous right radicals. The support of the undisguised neo-Nazi Korolev clearly portends to draw the sympathy of the latter. On the other hand, Demushkin’s latest visit to Chechnya, undertaken this summer, was with no doubt aimed to demonstrate the ability of the ultra-right to hold a civilized dialogue with Chechen leaders, which corresponds to the image of “civilized nationalists.” But, as before, it causes an extremely negative reaction among the “autonomous” ultra-right.

To all appearances, the “Russians” can see the inconsistency of their tactics themselves and attempt at softening the consequences by creating a sort of a system of role distribution. Belov and Demushkin are “working” for the support of a common xenophobic Russian citizen and aim to take part in the legal political process, whereas less public Borovikov and Bobrov (who continues the regular fundraising for convicted neo-Nazis) focus mostly on the “autonomous.” These tactics, though, have not borne any remarkable fruit so far. The “Russians” have not achieved the desired response from either target groups.

The “Russians” and the New Force have begun to adjust their cooperation with minor regional nationalist organizations. On June 4, the Yermolov March dedicated to General Alexei Yermolov (the chief commander of the Russian forces during the 19th-century war in the Caucasus) took place in the city of Orel. Belov was expected to visit the action, but apparently was unable to come due to the preparation of the March of Millions. However, along with the organizers of the action, the Orel Front (Orlovskii front), adherents of the Slavic Force (Slavyanskaya sila), took part in it (Alexander Petrakov and Viktor Kon’shin). In all, about 40 people participated in the action. To all appearances, the “Russians” association will continue its cooperation with the Orel Front.

As a whole, the “Russians” party project is developing very slowly. This is likely explained by the lack of unanimity among its leaders concerning which target group the organization should focus on. Apart from that, the leaders’ efforts are aimed at promoting themselves first of all, and not their party.


Konstantin Krylov also continued to develop his own party project. During summer, several new regional departments of his National Democratic Party (NDP) appeared. One of them, in the Republic of Komi, is headed by Alexei Kolegov, the leader of the ultra-right movement North Border (Rubezh Severa). The leader of the movement Resistance – Komi (Soprotivlenie – Komi) Gennadii Lungor also attended the constituent conference, which means that the NDP has also joined the struggle for the sympathies of regional nationalists. As it has been mentioned before, Krylov’s project had a certain advantage in this field over its competitors because the ROD association, on which ground the party is being formed, already has rather active and self-reliant regional departments.

As opposed to the New Force, the NDP not only paid attention to forming its regional departments in summer but also continued to adjust the relationship with representatives of other opposition movements. Thus, it was declared in June that the NDP would take an active part in forming the Committee of May 6 (Komitet 6 maya) that would handle the investigation of the unrest on Bolotnaya Square and the rendering of aid to the suspects of the organization of the unrest. Apart from nationalists, the committee comprises representatives of Other Russia (Drugaya Rossiya), Autonomous Activity (Avtonomnoe deistvie (a general antifascist group)), Solidarity (Solidanost’), Russia’s Socialist Movement (RSD, Rossiiskoe sotsialisticheskoe dvizhenie), White Ribbon (Belaya lenta), the Left Front (Levyi front), etc. As a whole, this step corresponds with the declared urge to produce an image of “respectable nationalists.” The NDP seems to stick to this image somewhat better than the “Russians” association. To a large extent, this was probably helped by the fact that the criminal case against Krylov was actively investigated in summer, and the NDP leader abstained from provocative declarations or actions.

The formation of a respectable image is also very much aided by the fact that most of the actions held by regional departments of the NDP had a social, not a political direction (these actions will be described below.)


Other activities of the ultra-right groups

The fact that the main ultra-right movements started to organize social actions in summer with twice the normal force can be explained by a widespread theory that the protest movement would first of all become social beginning in autumn.

Nationalist-organized social actions are not new. But previously, nationalists held mostly minor, targeted events (helping children's homes, organizing sporting grounds, fundraising, etc.). But now certain organizations are showing interest in more major projects, primarily those that are not political, but socially meaningful. In some cases, they join actions organized by other movements. Otherwise, they organize the actions themselves. These actions are not only meant to improve their image, but also, due to their larger scale, they allow these groups to gain access to wider audiences, establish contact with other movements and declare themselves in the region.

As before, the most active here is Krylov’s NDP, and first of all its Novosibirsk department, led by Rostislav Antonov. In the beginning of July, the NDP held an ecological auto race in Novosibirsk dedicated to the defense of the Zalesovo wildlife preserve, where mining operations are planned. Apart from the NDP, the Federation of Car Owners of Russia (FAR, Federatsiya avtovladel’tsev Rossii), the Siberian Ecological Center (Sibirskii ekologicheskii tsentr), the Barnaul department of the Decembrists movement (Dekabristy), and the Ecological Squad (Ekologicheskaya druzhina) of the city of Novokuznetsk took part in the event. Antonov’s organization, the Civil Patrol (Grazhdanskii patrul’), continued its regular inspections of shops searching for expired food.

The New Force party joined in on the organization of social actions this summer. It took part in a July 18 rally together with Voronezh ecologists and activists, protesting against the development of nickel in the region. Apart from that, the party initiated its own social campaign in Novosibirsk, entitled “Youth Against Stone Ghetto.” The party is going to stand up for building low-rise dwellings in the region.

The New Force has also picked up the initiative of catching undocumented immigrants (similar to the inspections held by Igor Mangushev’s Bright Rus (Svetlaya Rus’)). Thus, the St. Petersburg department of Valerii Solovei’s party has formed a People’s Control (Narodnyi kontrol’) movement, made up of volunteer squads whose goal is the “civil self-organization of Russian society and resistance to criminals, paying attention especially to the criminal activity that presents the biggest threat to the society.”[18] It can be seen by several actions held by the squad that the People’s Control is intended only to interfere in situations where migrants are involved, apparently considering their presence as “the biggest threat to society.” So far, the raids are held like this: after a person’s complaint of the apparently unlawful behavior of a migrant, the police are called and a squad of the People’s Control comes to the place. Before the police arrive, the squad behaves like an armed group that has come for a showdown with its rivals. So far there have not been any violent incidents, but they are quite likely in such situations because the arrival of nationalists is provocative, and pushes the border of legality. We consider such raids as simply inadmissible.

An example of how nationalist raids start turn violent could be the aforementioned Bright Rus movement, which switched focus in summer from raids at illegal migrant dwellings to the “hunt for pedophiles” that has become fashionable in the ultra-right community. Thus, in the middle of July, a video appeared on the Web where Ivan Krylov, a leader of the movement, and a group of activists were seen beating a man they suspected of pedophilia. First, they lured him to a meeting on behalf of one of the female activists of the movement, then they beat him severely at the meeting and filmed it.

Neo-Nazi Maxim Martsinkevich also continued his “hunt for pedophiles.” Like many other “hunters,” he films people suspected of pedophilia and then publishes his videos on the Web. Even if the violence committed during this hunt is not taken into account, the efficiency of this activity almost comes to naught. It does not lead to any legal consequences for a supposed pedophile and does not serve as a warning for possible victims because Martsinkevich’s videos are only watched by his nationalist comrades. In some cases, one can even earn money for such actions. For instance, in summer Martsinkevich proposed that anyone interested take part in the “pedophile safari” for 300 rubles, declaring that the money would serve for the development of “catches” in the regions.


Apart from organizing social actions, nationalists rather actively held summer gatherings and camps for their activists. The main goal of such activities is the support of the “operational readiness” of companions-in-arms, and that is why the program of gatherings and camps usually includes training for various methods of fighting. For instance, one of the activists of the former Slavic Union (Slavyanskii soyuz), Dmitrii Bakharev, held a gathering in summer that included running through the forest, as well as training in knife fighting, traumatic weapons and shotgun shooting.

The EPO “Russians” organized the camp “Young Russian Leader” in the Moscow region in August under the leadership of Borovikov. It is remarkable that the camp’s program included not only martial and sport events (strikeball, throwing knives, hand-to-hand fighting, etc.) but also lectures on history, politics and other academic topics. On August 10, the camp was driven away by riot police. It was reported later that additional events took place in a different location, but it is unknown where and how many people the organizers could gather. Bobrov held similar gatherings for St. Petersburg nationalists on an island of Ladoga Lake on August 25–26.

RONS organized its camp in the middle of August in the south of Russia. It was attended by representatives of main RONS departments from Siberia, the Volga district, and Southern and Central parts of Russia. It is reported that representatives of Russian nationalist movements and Cossacks from Ukraine and Belarus also came. In all, about 25 people participated.

Apart from the organization of camps, nationalists also visited the opposition camp “Center” in the Khimki forest. On August 25–26, activists of the “Russians” association, NDP, ROS and other organizations gathered there. Their whole number was about 25–30 people. Their activity did not differ in any case from the programs of other camps: “wall-on-wall” fighting (traditional fist fighting between two lines of people), hand-to-hand fighting lessons and lectures. Among leaders, the camp was attended by Belov, Borovikov, Severnyi (“Russians”), Tor (NDP), and Mironov (ROS.)

As a whole, these trips to the countryside are aimed at recruiting new adherents, getting the existing ones together, and making them feel like targets of the fight, first of all, against people of other ethnicities and the state. However, summing up the results of summer, these camps, contrary to our misgivings, did not become mass events, which means they hardly bore any desired fruit for the organizers.



Criminal prosecution for violence and vandalism

Criminal prosecution for violence where courts found the hate motive was rather high when compared to the spring period. During summer, at least six sentences were passed in six regions, with 23 people convicted. In all, from the beginning of 2012, 15 sentences have been passed in 11 regions against 42 people.


Qualification of crimes as racist violence in the period in question fell under Article 105, Part 2, Item “k” (political, ideological, race, national or religious hate-motivated murder of two or more people); Article 30, Part 3 and Article 105, Part 2, Items “g”, “k” (attempted national hate-motivated murder); Article 112, Part 2, Item “f” (hate-motivated causing average damage to health); and Article 116, Part 2, Items “a”, “b” (beating). Article 282 (incitement of national hatred) was mentioned in two sentences. In one case (the sentence in the case of the leader of NS/WP), the defendant was charged with it only for certain propaganda acts. In the other (the case of humiliating servicemen in the Altai Krai), it was combined with Article 335, Part 2, Item “b” (violation of the relationship between servicepersons related with humiliation), which seems justified to us because Article 335 has no qualifying indication of hate, and there was clearly a xenophobic motive in the incident. One sentence (in the case of Orel Partisans) mentioned Article 280 (public calls for extremist activity), also for separate activities.

Punishments were allocated as follows:

  • Two persons received suspended sentences without additional sanctions;
  • One person was sentenced to 20 years of deprivation of freedom;
  • Four persons were sentenced to terms varying from 10 to 15 years of deprivation of freedom;
  • Two persons were sentenced to terms varying from five to 10 years of deprivation of freedom;
  • Two persons were sentenced to terms varying from three to five years of deprivation of freedom;
  • Eight persons were sentenced to terms varying up to three years of deprivation of freedom;
  • One person was sentenced to correctional labor;
  • Two persons were sentenced to obligatory labor;
  • One person was found guilty but released from punishment “following the expiry of a statute of limitations;”
  • One person was acquitted.

Most of this summer’s convicts were sentenced to real prison terms. This is not surprising. Members of two major racist gangs were convicted. In June, the Third District Military Court in Orel sentenced members of the ultra-right gang “Orel Partisans.” And in July, the St. Petersburg City Court issued a sentence against leader of the neo-Nazi gang NS/WP, Georgii Timofeev. Only gang members whose direct participation in violent crimes could not be proven received suspended sentences.

Prosecutors’ offices started to report more often on measures like compensation for moral damage to victims. In summer, we became aware of only one such court ruling that we can welcome, because the victims surely have the right to compensation for moral damages as a whole, and for paying for their medical treatments in particular.

In the period under report, two sentences were issued related to the unrest on Manezhnaya Square in Moscow on December 11, 2010 and the attacks that followed.

In July, the Simovsky court of Moscow issued a sentence in the case of murder of a Kyrgyz national on Sudostroitelnaya Street on December 12, 2010. Ilya Kurbakov, who was 14 when the crime was committed, was found guilty. The court sentenced him to three years in a juvenile correctional facility.[19] Two other attackers also received various prison terms in a general regime colony. Unfortunately, we are completely unaware of any other sentences for other (and they are numerous) racist attacks in December 2010 – January 2011 on Manezhnaya Square and later. The only exception is the sentence of February 2 to Sergei Vnenk and Denis Fomin for murdering a 22-year-old man from Uzbekistan, Damir Karshiev, but in this case the hate motive could not be proven.[20]

In August, Moscow’s Tverskoi court issued the second set of sentences to the participants of the unrest on the square itself. Four people charged with mass disorder, hooliganism and violence against representatives of the authorities received various sentences, from a suspended two-year sentence to three years of deprivation of freedom. Only one sentence mentioned Article 282 Part 1. Contrary to the first set of sentences, where three of five defendants were members of the unregistered Other Russia party, this time all the convicts were young people with no relation to any party, among them football fans. It is obvious that in both cases, it was not the instigators of the unrest that were convicted. Besides, there were far more potential convicts, to say the least. Perhaps, there will be more than these two court hearings but so far we are unaware of any other cases.


We know only about one sentence for xenophobic vandalism issued in summer. The Kaliningrad regional court sentenced a 20-year-old local inhabitant, a welder in a private firm who attempted in November 2011 at blowing up a mosque that was being built in Kaliningrad, with two containers of propane and oxygen. He was found guilty of Article 30 and 205 (attempted terrorist attack) and sentenced to three years in a general regime colony.


Criminal prosecution for propaganda

In summer, at least 20 guilty verdicts for xenophobic propaganda were issued against 29 people. Sentences were issued in 15 regions of Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, Irkutsk, Kursk, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Orel, Samara, Rostov, Tyumen, and Vologda regions, republics of Bashkiria, North Ossetia–Alania, and Udmurtia). From the beginning of 2012, 56 such sentences were issued in 36 regions of Russia, and 69 people were convicted.

Beginning in winter, we have been watching the tendency of prosecutions for propaganda to overtake prosecutions for violence. This tendency has become even stronger. In summer, the number of sentences for propaganda was almost three times that for violence. Such a change of focus is clearly premature, because the amount of racist attacks remains very big.

Most of the sentences (19 of 20) mentioned Article 282 Part 1, as usual. In one case, it was used together with Article 280. Apart from that, the aforementioned sentence to the “Orel Partisans” was also taken into account by the statistics given below because one of the convicts had been charged not only with violent crimes but also with public calls for extremist activity (Article 280 Part 1).

Court rulings for propaganda were allocated as follows:

  • 11 persons were sentenced to deprivation of freedom;
  • Five persons were given suspended sentences without additional sanctions;
  • Two persons were sentenced to various fines;
  • Five persons were sentenced to correctional labor;
  • Six persons were sentenced to obligatory labor;
  • Two persons were acquitted.

It is important to note that the tendency to issue suspended sentences for propaganda is breaking gradually because such sentences have already proven their inefficiency. In summer, 13 people were sentenced to correctional and obligatory labor, and minor fines as well, which significantly exceeds the number of people given suspended sentences (five). As for sentences for deprivation of freedom, they were issued against people in whose cases articles on propaganda were clearly not the main ones. Those were the aforementioned sentences to members of NS/WP and “Orel Partisans,” as well as a participant of the unrest on Manezhnaya Square.

However, the tendency to mostly prosecute users of the Vkontakne social network for republications and replicas in groups began to take shape in 2010. This summer, these sentences made up 14 of 20. Although these actions are xenophobic, they represent no real social treat.


Federal lists of extremist materials and organizations

During summer, the Federal List of Extremist Materials was updated 18 times and supplemented by items 1199 through 1426.

The list was supplemented by:

— Xenophobic materials including texts and brochures linked to RONS and the Russian Liberation Front “Memory” (Russkii front osvobozhdeniya (RFO) “Pamyat” ), a book by the leader of the new Union of the Russian People (Soyuz russkogo naroda) from Minsk, videos from Vkontakte social network, letter sent via e-mail to the fuel, energy and tariffs regulation department of the Yaroslavl region, certain files of anti-Tatar and anti-Russian content also spread via e-mail, books of the pagan Alexei Dobrovol’skii (Dobroslav), songs of the band Kolovrat, article by blogger ogurcova on a conflict in a children’s camp “Don,” Orthodox Rus (Rus’ pravoslavnaya) newspaper ,[21] the book “Russian Orthodox Church and the Contemporary Pre-Antichrist Era,” publications from the website “Rehabilitation of the Swastika. For People of Good Will,” and an article from the Cossack View (Kazachii vzglyad) newspaper;

— Anti-American article by Alexander Dugin, where the author calls for a declaration of war on the United States and other Western countries, as well as to kill Americans and Europeans;

— Picture by Alexander Savko from the “Banned Art 2006” exhibition;[22]

— Oppositional leaflets with calls for violent activities against the authorities;

— Various Muslim materials, from propaganda by Islamist militants to quite innocent religious texts, including commentary and articles from websites of adherents of military jihad, the website of the Azerbaijani Islamic Independent Informational Edition, lectures by Irek Khamidullin, ideologist of the Takfir wal-Hijra, various religious texts seized during searches on the banned organization Tablighi Jamaat in Sol-Iletsk and Astrakhan, including even research publications by the medieval theologian Al-Ghazali;

— Materials of folk healers: a book “Back from the Future” by Svetlana Ziyarova and several issues of the Star of the Niverse (sic) (Zvezda Selennoi) magazine.

There are numerous bans whose appropriateness is not possible to determine. It can only be said that the share of evidently inappropriate bans remains high.

Wholly speaking, it is still impossible to use the list as a real instrument of legal bans. First, its quality remains poor, and beyond that, materials are still implemented with bibliographical and grammatical errors, courts add materials that already exist in the list but with other output data or published on other websites if the material is on the Web. Second, the list grows by leaps and bounds (at the moment the report was being written, it consisted of 1454 items already) and will inevitably be supplemented even more because the number of materials deemed extremist, with or without reason, does not diminish.[23]


In spite of an incident[24] in summer, the list of extremist organizations published on the Ministry of Justice website was supplemented as well.[25] The International Association “Blood and Honour” (“Blood and Honour/Combat18”, “B&H”, “BandH”), which had been deemed extremist by the Supreme Court on May 29, was added to the list. Thus, there are 29 organizations on the list now.

In August, the Moscow City Court deemed extremist the interregional social association “The Northern Brotherhood,” “Direct Hit” (V desyatku) and “The Big Game Break the System’” (Bol’shaya igra “Slomai sistemu”). The court ruling has not yet come into force, and “The Northern Brotherhood” has not yet been added to the list.


Other administrative measures

In summer, the Federal Service for the Supervision of Information Technologies and Communications (Roskomnadzor) reported on three anti-extremist warnings to editorial staff. We consider one of these warnings inappropriate: the one sent to the editorial staff of “Region 46. Fresh News” (Region 46. Svezhie izvestiya) for the article “One More Show for the Patriarch” in the issue #31 of July 3, mentioning the visit of the Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, to Ukraine and the protest action of FEMEN activists related to his visit. In one more case, we cannot judge whether the warning was appropriate or not because the text of the articles was not accessible (the warning was sent to the editorial staff of the Birsk Newspaper (Birskaya gazeta) for articles “Political Forecast” in the issue #1 (134) of January 9, 2011, and “And I Will Tell” in issues #2 (135) of January 25, 2011 and #3 (136) of February 12, 2011). In the third case, it is evident that the warning was issued appropriately. It was sent to the editorial staff of the electronic periodical Useful Newspaper Tatarstan (Poleznaya gazeta Tatarstan) for spreading the video “Mujahidin of Tatarstan Pledge Allegiance to Doku Umarov.” That means that the efficiency of the agency remains on the same level as before: we wrote in spring on two inappropriate and one dubious of five warnings.


Prosecution for various articles of the Administrative Code was rather active in summer. We are aware of at least six appropriate sentences issued under Article 20.29 (mass distribution of extremist materials included in the published Federal List of Extremist Materials) and three under Article 20.3 (propaganda and public demonstration of Nazi attributes or symbols) in Kirov, Kursk, Lipetsk and Samara regions, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk and Perm Krai and he Republic of Kalmykia. We should mention that the subjects of law enforcement attention concerning the application of Article 20.29 are the same materials as before, that is, songs of the band Kolovrat and the bard of the Chechen clandestine armed groups Timur Mutsuraev, the book “Stroke of the Russian Gods” by Vladimir Istarkhov and the video “Russian Resistance.” All defendants under these articles were sentenced to fines, except for an inhabitant of Sochi who was sentenced to 15 days of administrative arrest with confiscation of materials for “storage and distribution of extremist materials.”

In one more case, a policemen in the town of Kalach, Voronezh region, decided not to instigate criminal proceedings under Article 20.3 for a swastika on a web page in one of the social networks against a 16-year-old student, but confined themselves to a “preventive” talk with the adolescent.

Apart from that, prosecutors continued to fight swastikas on walls and fences by issuing warnings to workers of public utilities. However, in summer this activity by prosecutors was not very active. We are aware only of two such warnings.

Prosecutors’ offices continued to punish the administrators of educational establishments for the absence of a system of content filters on computers. We have written on numerous occasions already[26] that any filter can be evaded if a user wishes to evade it, and that it is impossible in principle to make a full list of addresses and keywords. As it turned out after numerous checks, the computer program sent by the Federal Agency for Education (Rosobrazovanie) to Russian schools fails to fulfill the task. The number of warnings to schools, though, was not high: we are aware of only four cases.

However the number of warnings issued by prosecutors’ offices to local Web providers demanding they block access to “extremist” websites has significantly increased. By “extremist” websites they mean websites with materials from the Federal List of Extremist Materials. For today this is the main way of fighting “extremism” on the Web. The number of such warnings sharply rose in 2012. We are aware of at least 25 appropriate warnings only in summer. During all of 2011, only such 14 warnings were issued. We should make it clear that we consider blocking access to a website unlawful if there is no court ruling deeming the website or materials on it extremist. Apart from that, we consider blocking access to a whole website inadmissible if only some materials on it are instigatory.[27]


We have used the materials of Sova Center’s daily monitoring (including that performed in several regions). The monitoring was held with state support allocated as grants according to the Direction of the President of Russian Federation #127-rp of March 2, 2011.

[1] The data was registered up to September 21, 2012.

[2] For instance, we wrote about 44 persons suffered and two killed in the spring report; the real number is actually one third higher.

[3] Alexander Kolesnichenko. Skinkhedy napali na korrespondenta “NI” // New Information . 2012. 10 July (

[4] A set expression common in the republic of Dagestan .

[5] V Peterburge unichtozhili memorial’nuyu dosku Moiseyu Uritskomu // The Right View (Praviy vzglyad) . 2012. June 18.

[6] See further in : Uchastie natsionalistov v “Marshe millionov-2” v Moskve // Sova Center . 2012. 12 July (

[7] See further in : V Moskve zaderzhan lider ul’trapravoi organizatsii “Liga oborony Moskvy” // Sova Center . 2012. March 22 (

[8] See further in : Vladimirskii oblastnoi sud priznal RONS ekstremistskoi organizatsiei // Sova Center . 2011. June 6 (

[9] See further in : Pred”yavleno obvinenie rukovoditelyu NOMP Vladimiru Kvachkovu // Sova Center . 2011. January 21 (

[10] See further in : V Obninske vynesen prigovor po delu redaktora gazety “Kazachii vzglyad” // Sova Center . 2012. April 19 (

[11] See further in : A. Verkhovsky. Ob obrashchenii pisatelei v zashchitu trekh natsionalistov // Sova Center . 2012. September 6 (

[12] Belov on the Coordinating Council. Speech in the “Center” camp. // DPNI website . 2012. August 2 5.

[13] Shturm novosti. Srochno! O stolknoveniyakh v Buzuluke s mesta sobytii. Est’ ranenye // Yu. Ekishev’s vara . 2012. June 29.

[14] Rasizm i xenofobiya v Rossii. Itogi avgusta 2012. // Sova Center. 2012. September 5 (

[15] V Krymske mozhet razgoret’sya mezhnatsional’nyi konflikt // The Russians Alliance website . 2012. July 16.

[16] After the materials in right radical blogs.

[17] See further in : Pravoslavnye i natsionalisticheskie organizatsii voshli v sostav komiteta “Za vynos Lenina!” // Sova Center . 2012. 19 July (

[18] “Novaya sila” boretsya s prestupnost’yu – zdes’ i seichas! // The New Force website . 2012. August 19.

[19] There is doubt however that it was really Kurbakov who made a fatal blow. See: Egor Skovoroda. Istoriya odnogo mal’chika Final // 2012. August 16 (

[20] See further in : Natalia Yudina, Vera Alperovich. Winter 2011—2012: style='mso-spacerun:yes'>  Protest and Party Building. // Sova Center . 2012. May 7 (

[21] Its editor-in-chief was Konstantin Dushenov, sentenced in February 2010 to three years of deprivation of freedom under Article 282 Part 2.

[22] It has to be mentioned that there are very few examples of fine art in the list (not including drawings in social networks and leaflets) compared to other materials (video and audio files, texts). Savko’s picture for today is almost the only banned piece of fine art.

[23] For instance, one can look at the materials deemed extremist during summer but not put in the list yet: the book “Numbers of Righteousness” by Nikolai Korolev, several articles from the Emirate Caucasus website, books “Errors Made Concerning Tawheed” by Abdul-Azeez Ar-Rayyis, “The Future Belongs to Islam” by Sayyid Qutb, “The Last Voyage. Gift for a Muslim Girl”, “Muhammad – The Natural Successor to Christ” and “Clarifications to the Book of Tawheed by Muhammad ibn Sulayman at-Tamimi”, audio recording “Horss-Action.mp3”, video “Zlaya Rossiya.240.mp4”, articles “Airat Dilmukhametov Continues His Fight in the Siberian Prison” and “Address to Bashkirs and Not Only” from the website of the Bashkir social movement Kuk bure, material “To the Last Drop of Blood!” from the forum of the NS/WP website, “Address of the Emir of Emirate Caucasus, Dokku Abu Usman to the People and Government of Turkey”, Konstantin Dushenov’s film “Way to the WORLD, or the Truth of Life”, books “Skinheads: Rus Is Awaking” by Dmitrii Nesterov and “Hunter”  by Andrew Macdonald, videos “Shaykh Sayid of Buryatia “Answer to Critics” and “Shaykh Al-Albani on Jihad”, articles “The Story of an Uzbek Guest Worker”, “Scenario of the Slaughter of Russians from an Old Uzbek. Afterword”, “Ban of Using Foreign Labor Force on the Territory of the RF” from various nationalist websites .

[24] See : Minyust pereputal spiski // Sova Center . 2012. July 18 (

[25] The full title is “The list of social and religious association, other non-profit organizations concerning which there is a court ruling that has entered into its force on the liquidation or ban of activity on grounds foreseen in the Federal Law ‘On Combating Extremist Activity.’”

[26] See : Vera Alperovich, Alexander Verkhovsky, Natalia Yudina. Between Manezhnaya and Bolotnaya: Xenophobia and Radical Nationalism in Russia, and Efforts to Counteract Them in 2011 // Sova Center . 2012. April 1 (

[27] See further on inappropriate warnings in : Sanktsii v otnoshenii internet-provaiderov // Sova Center . 2012. [ September 20] (