SOVA’s Mission and Principles Behind Its Work

SOVA Research Center focuses on the following issues:

— The Russian nationalist movement as a political phenomenon;

— Hate crimes and efforts to counter them;

— Conflicts surrounding the public practice of religion in a largely secular Russian society;

— Issues related to restrictions on propaganda and organizational activities that incite ethnic, religious, and other similar forms of hatred or promote ideologically motivated violence for any purpose;

— Abuses and misconceptions by the state and society in regulatory policies across these areas.

While these topics often overlap in practice, they should not be viewed as different facets of a single overarching issue.

Our research spans all of Russia, although we acknowledge regional differences, which we may not always have the resources to address fully.

Internationally, our work follows two directions: «Western» and «Eastern.» In the Western direction, we participate in discussions on general issues (as both Europeans and representatives of Russia — a testing ground for problematic practices) and highlight Russian-specific concerns. In the Eastern direction, we share our experiences, particularly with countries adopting controversial or clearly harmful practices from Russia.

A common thread underlies all topics in our sphere of interest: ideologically motivated groups, regardless of size, can pose varying degrees of threat to society in pursuit of their goals. Society, independently or more often through state action, counters these threats through debate, preventive measures, social reforms, and penalties. We focus particularly on the adequacy and appropriateness of regulatory measures, especially those of a repressive nature.

We realize that reality is more nuanced: certain groups may appear dangerous to some observers, beneficial to others, and a nonconcern to yet others. Opinions on the most effective methods to counter perceived threats also vary, if such countermeasures are deemed relevant at all. Nevertheless, a prevailing view on these contentious issues often emerges and typically aligns with state policy. This shapes the policy on addressing public threats, whether we consider them more or less genuine. We evaluate this policy and propose adjustments.

From a legal standpoint, we are addressing a set of legal (or quasi-legal) norms and practices that largely fall under anti-extremist legislation or are related to it, although this is less applicable in the spheres of religion or Internet regulation.

The following principles are of primary importance to us in the order listed below:

— respect for fundamental civil and political rights,

— a democratic political system;

— protecting the rights of vulnerable minorities;

— the need to protect these principles from attacks, even at the cost of restricting certain rights. In critical situations that threaten the very existence of a regime adhering to these principles, this protection may extend to limiting or suspending democratic mechanisms.

This approach is enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and two subsequent global conventions fundamental to our framework, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which not only affirm rights and freedoms but also establish necessary limitations on them for certain particularly important purposes.

While we do not consider these documents perfect, they accurately reflect the approach outlined above and serve as the generally accepted legal basis in our area of interest. In Russia, according to the Constitution, they take precedence over national legislation (we believe Russia’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe should not significantly affect our approach). We acknowledge that these documents, adopted over half a century ago, may seem outdated in some respects. However, reality still falls short of meeting the standards set forth in these conventions, even in countries more successful in this area than Russia. Therefore, we generally adhere to these «old» norms, allowing for possible disagreements on other grounds. In this sense, we can be considered conservative.

The principles outlined above are fundamental to post-World War II political regimes often described as liberal democracies. However, our general agreement with these principles does not equate to declaring SOVA Research Center a liberal organization. Liberalism is a broader concept, and SOVA does not presume unanimity regarding its other aspects. Moreover, SOVA is not a political organization, not only because it does not seek political power in any form, but also because our activities are not aimed at supporting any specific political or ideological project.

We share the understanding that when facing challenges related to security, incitement of hatred, and discrimination, the state and society in today’s Russia often resort to excessively harsh solutions that contradict the principles mentioned above. Consequently, our approach to the situation in Russia is not conservative — we advocate for changes that bring our country closer to the values enshrined in the Convention and our own Constitution.

There are more complex issues — such as the regulation of social networks, prevention of certain forms of intolerance, and cooperation between the state and religious associations — for which there is no proven path. When confronted with these topics, we must not rush to make recommendations. We believe the most productive approach is to initiate high-quality discussions on these issues, drawing on the experience of societies more advanced in these areas.

Our work has two strategic objectives.

Our first strategic objective relates to the increasing repressiveness of the state and society. While we cannot single-handedly halt this trend, we can analyze it, make it more comprehensible to everyone, and contribute to its deceleration or mitigation. In this endeavor, we strive to avoid excessive generalizations, slogans, and appeals, instead focusing on exploring and explaining nuances. Recognizing our limitations and managing our expectations, we focus on leveraging our analytical products to inform the reform of state and public mechanisms and institutions. This task naturally involves dialogue and occasional cooperation — and therefore compromise —with a diverse range of actors. These may include pragmatic «statesmen» from government agencies or libertarians, advocates of consistent secularization, or representatives of religious movements.

Our second strategic objective stems from the recognition that the current political regime will inevitably change, sooner or later, in one way or another. While this change isn’t guaranteed to be for the better, the transition period — characterized by greater variability — will likely create demand for analytical results and ready-made proposals to achieve necessary changes. The more distant this period, the more crucial it becomes to preserve pockets of adherence to the values enshrined in the Convention, including within our area of expertise.

Tactically, our tasks involve assessing societal threats through monitoring (within our sphere of competence) and evaluating specific actions of public groups and the state. Specifically, we assess:

— activities of radical nationalist, Islamist, and other dangerous groups and movements. Currently, our limited resources focus our study primarily on Russian nationalism, though SOVA could potentially expand its interest to any radical movements;

— activities of various public groups and organizations in our area of interest that either support or oppose the values of the Convention. This requires the ability to distinguish between these groups and their goals and to differentiate between actions inconsistent with these values and direct aggression against them";

— state activity in our area of interest.

We understand that our assessments are not flawless, and factual errors are possible. We are always open to meaningful discussions.

We strive to avoid evaluating the activities of various groups and the state in a deliberately negative or positive light. For instance, we acknowledge that state actions may be aimed at addressing real threats, yet they can also unduly restrict civil rights and freedoms. Conversely, some of those actions may target threats we deem non-existent but still remain within the framework of the Convention.

Our goal is to delve into details and address nuances, even if many may view such analysis as excessive.

The content on this website reflects our activities. The primary body of information is published in Russian, while most reports, selected news items, presentations, and other publications are translated into English. Each section of the English version includes a description of the content and the way it is organized. You may also consult our open databases and analytics, including books and major periodic reports.