The following is our review of the primary and most representative events in the misuse of Russia's anti-extremist legislation in February 2024.

The Practice of the European Court of Human Rights

On February 13, 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) published a ruling on the complaint of Barnaul resident Anton Podchasov regarding the measures taken by the Russian authorities against Telegram Messenger as part of their implementation of the “Yarovaya package” provisions.

In 2017, the FSB demanded that Telegram provide its user encryption keys. For failure to comply with this requirement, Telegram was fined 800 thousand rubles. In April 2018, the court decided to limit access to the messenger until it complied with the FSB’s request. The challenge against this decision was rejected (Podchasov, as a Telegram user, was among those who mounted the challenge). In June 2020, Russian authorities unblocked the messenger on an expedited basis without reviewing the relevant court decisions.

The Strasbourg court ruled that the requirement for long-term storage of all user communications (messages, calls) stipulated by the Yarovaya package in combination with the authorities’ ability to gain access to these communications, and Telegram’s obligation to ensure their decryption, constituted a violation of Podchasov’s rights.

The ECHR noted that the requirement to store every single user communication for six months, with no temporal or territorial gradation, and store metadata for a year was unprecedentedly broad. At the same time, the fact that the FSB is under no obligation to share the texts of court decisions authorizing access to user communications with information dissemination organizers, combined with the legal and procedural norms that require information dissemination organizers to install the FSB equipment, points to the absence of any abuse prevention mechanisms.

As for the requirement to provide individual users’ encryption keys, according to the ECHR, this measure creates the risk of weakening the encryption mechanism for all users. The ECHR noted that various international bodies called for the development of legislative and technological ways to combat the use of encryption by criminals without weakening data protection mechanisms.

As a result, the ECHR decided that neither the provisions of the law on storing all user communications nor the requirement to provide the FSB with user end-to-end encryption keys could be considered necessary in a democratic society, since they infringe on the very essence of the right to privacy. Consequently, the Strasbourg court indicated that Russia had exceeded all possible discretion for limiting this right and violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court ruled against awarding Podchasov material compensation from Russia for non-pecuniary damages.

It is worth reminding that Russia has withdrawn from the Council of Europe and does not comply with ECHR decisions adopted after March 15, 2022. The court believes that all decisions relating to events that took place before September 16, 2022 must be executed.

Lawmaking

The order of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs changing the instructions for the community police inspectors, signed on November 28, 2023, was published on February 2. The innovations included imposing on district police officers the responsibility to carry out individual preventive work with citizens who have committed administrative offenses under Article 20.3 (public display of Nazi symbols or symbols of a banned organization) and Article 20.3.3 (discrediting the use of the Russian armed forces or the exercise by government agencies of their powers abroad) of the Code of Administrative Offenses (CAO). Those facing responsibility for offenses that infringe on the order of governance, committed during public and sports events, will also be subject to preventive efforts. The explanatory note to the draft order indicates that the legislation primarily affects Article 19.3 CAO (disobeying a lawful order of a police officer). Previously, those who faced justice under the “rally” Article 20.2 CAO or “soccer fan” Article 20.31 CAO were subject to prevention measures.

On February 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed several laws changing the procedure for recognizing materials as extremist and expanding the list of criminal articles that provide for the confiscation of property and loss of titles and awards.

Under the first of them, the courts of the Federation’s constituent entities will now consider cases of declaring materials extremist. Copyright holders, publishers, authors of works, and (or) translations of materials, if they are known, will be involved in the process. They will be interested parties rather than defendants and thus will incur no legal costs unless their actions “caused” the claim. If the claim pertains to a publication of a “religious nature,” the court will need to involve an expert “with special knowledge of the relevant religion.” In our opinion, all these provisions of the bill are justified. However, in general, we also believe that problems with the composition and use of the Federal List of Extremist Materials will remain, since the very mechanism for recognizing materials as extremist is ineffective and leads to inappropriate sanctions.

The second law amended the Criminal Code (CC). First, qualifying signs of committing a crime for mercenary motives (paragraph “d”) or “motivated by political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity or by hatred or hostility towards any social group” (paragraph “e”) were added to Article 280.4 Part 2 CC (public calls for activities directed against the security of the state).

Next, changes were introduced into Article 48 CC, which provides for the possibility of depriving an offender of a special, military, or honorary title, class rank, and state awards upon conviction for committing a grave or especially grave crime. Now the court will also have the authority to revoke titles and awards for individuals convicted of non-grave crimes covered by Article 207.3 Part 1, Article 280, Article 280.1, Article 280.3 Part 1, Article 280.4 Part 1, Article 282 Part 1, Article 282.4, Article 284.1 Parts 1 and 2, Article 284.2, Article 284.3, and Article 354.1 CC.

Finally, the amendments expand the list of situations in which property can be confiscated from convicted offenders (Article 104.1 CC). On the one hand, the list now includes the property obtained as a result of committing crimes under Article 207.3 and Article 280.4 CC – but only in cases where these crimes were committed for material gain. On the other hand, property used or received for activities directed against the state security will also be subject to confiscation. Furthermore, changes to the Criminal-Procedural Code allow courts to arrest such property during an investigation. The final version of the law moved the list of crimes, the commission of which is understood as activity against state security, from Article 280.4 to Article 104.1 CC and expanded it adding new articles on sabotage.

If the property subject to confiscation has been sold by the time of the verdict, the corresponding amount of money may be confiscated. If a convicted offender does not have sufficient monetary funds, the penalty can be applied to other property, excluding primary residence, household items, etc.

On February 20, deputies from the Just Russia – Patriots – For Truth faction, led by Sergei Mironov, introduced a package of bills on the “genocide of the multinational Russian people” to the State Duma. They proposed adopting a new federal law on this issue, arguing that it was needed because, since 2020, the courts of 13 constituent entities of Russia have established the facts of such genocide during the Great Patriotic War. The court decisions refer to the genocide of the Soviet people, but the deputies believe that it was the “multinational people of Russia” who were subjected to genocide – that is, citizens of the USSR who lived on the territory of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic during the war. The deputies propose a ban on public denial of this genocide – not just any denial, but the one expressed in “public speeches, publicly displayed works or the media,” as well as on the Internet. Their proposal amends the criminal article on the rehabilitation of Nazism accordingly by adding the prohibition described above to Article 354.1 Part 1.

Sanctions for Anti-Government Statements and Activities

Discrediting the Use of the Armed Forces or Activities of Government Agencies

According to the OVD-Info project, the number of defendants in criminal cases initiated under Article 280.3 CC has exceeded 163. Our calculations indicate that the courts have already sentenced 79 of them.

In addition, on February 19, the Tula Regional Court, when reconsidering the appeal against the sentence of Alexei Moskalyov from Yefremov, slightly reduced his term of imprisonment from two years to a year and ten months.

“Fakes about the Army” Motivated by Hatred

We consider sanctions under paragraph “e” of Article 207.3 Part 2 CC (dissemination of deliberately false information about the use of the Russian army on the grounds of political hatred) inappropriate unless the imputed statements contain calls for violence.

Justifying Terrorism

All the sentences noted below were issued under Article 205.2 Part 2 CC for publicly justifying terrorism or calling for it on the Internet.

On February 13, the Military Court of Appeal considered the prosecutorial appeal against the verdict issued on December 2023 to left-wing publicist and political scientist Boris Kagarlitsky, the editor-in-chief of the Rabkor media. The court increased the punishment imposed on Kagarlitsky from a fine of 600 thousand rubles to five years in prison. He was taken into custody in the courtroom.

We would like to reiterate that Kagarlitsky was convicted for posting, on October 19, 2022, a video dedicated to the explosion on the Crimean Bridge. The video titled “Explosive Congratulations of Bridgie (Mostik) the Cat: Nervous People and Events, Strikes against Infrastructure” was posted on the Rabkor YouTube channel, as well as on VKontakte and Telegram. The contention arose primarily from the video's title, which mentioned the cat Mostik – the live mascot of the bridge builders, on whose behalf a recent post was made online shortly before the explosion.

We believe that the verdict is inappropriate, because in the video, which served as the basis for the prosecution, Kagarlitsky only discussed the circumstances, military-strategic significance, and political consequences of the explosion on the bridge but did not express his approval of it. In our opinion, neither the video nor its title contains any statement “recognizing the ideology and practice of terrorism as correct, in need of support and imitation” (the definition of “justification of terrorism,” in the note to Article 205.2 CC).

On February 15, the 1st Western District Military Court sentenced Igor Schenkov, an electrical and gas welder from Vologda, to a fine of 450 thousand rubles (reduced to 300 thousand taking his pre-trial detention into account) with a two-year ban on administering Internet resources.

The criminal case against Schenkov was initiated in September 2023. It was based on a post by another blogger, which Schenkov shared in April on his Telegram channels “Vologodsky Govorun” (under 300 subscribers) and “Obozerskaya Online” (under 100 subscribers). The post was dedicated to the adoption of the law on electronic delivery of military draft notices. The author called for “millions to take to the streets” to “remove” the government, namely “Putin and his gang.”

We see no basis for qualifying Schenkov’s actions under Article 205.2 CC. The post contained no calls for terrorist activities. The proposal to take to the streets to protest is not, in and of itself, illegal, and the call to “remove” the government does not necessarily imply violent methods of changing it.

On February 27, the Central District Military Court sentenced Yekaterinburg activist and PR agent Yaroslav Shirshikov to two years in a minimum-security penal colony with a two-year ban on administering Telegram channels.

The case against him was opened in April 2023 based on his posts on the “Gussarskaya Bravada” Telegram channel. They attracted the attention of the nationalist movement Call of the People (Zov Naroda), whose activists complained to the Investigative Committee and prosecutors. The nationalists objected to Shirshikov’s posts that discussed the killing of military commander Maxim Fomin (Vladlen Tatarsky) and Darya Dugina, daughter of philosopher Alexander Dugin. As far as we know, the charges only pertain to the post about Tatarsky. In the post, Shirshikov stated that he was against explosions in any city, but the news about the death of the military correspondent did not upset him. In the publication, he wished Tatarsky and all participants in the creative evening “glass wool instead of ground.”

We believe that Shirshikov's posts did not contain a direct justification of terrorism. According to the note to Article 205.2 CC, public justification of terrorism is understood as a public statement recognizing the ideology and practice of terrorism as correct, in need of support and imitation. Shirshikov noted in his posts that he did not approve of such practices but at the same time, felt no sympathy for the victims’ relatives.

Inciting Hatred towards the Authorities and Their Supporters

On February 28, the Investigative Committee announced the initiation of a criminal case on incitement of hatred (Article 282 CC Part 1) based on the actions of a coffee shop owner, Alyona Polyakevich, who kicked a special military operation veteran out of her establishment in Lyubertsy near Moscow. She spoke about the incident on social networks on February 24. According to her, visitors and employees were unhappy with the behavior of the military man, who had recently returned from the frontlines. Polyakevich noted that she had previously been able to kick the homeless out of her coffee shop. Nationalist activists and the media drew attention to Polyakevich’s messages. In particular, activists of the Russian Community (Russkaya Obschina) stated that they came to the coffee shop, were also refused service, and lodged a police complaint.

The Russian Community also appealed to the head of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, calling on him to investigate the activities of Polyakevich. After this, the Lyubertsy City Court fined Polyakevich 45 thousand rubles under the article on discrediting the army (Article 20.3.3 Part 1 CAO).

The criminal case is based on Polyakevich’s statements on social networks. We saw no signs of incitement to hatred in the published screenshots of her messages. In addition, only the offenders sanctioned under the related Article, 20.3.1 CAO within a year can be liable under Article 282 Part 1 CC. We found no information on Polyakevich ever facing responsibility under this administrative article.

Disorderly Conduct Motivated by Hatred

On February 15, the Leninsky District Court of Vladivostok issued a one-year suspended sentence to Maxim Chikhunov, a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and an ex-candidate for the Artyom City Duma. He was found guilty under paragraph “b” of Article 213 Part 1 CC (hooliganism motivated by political hatred).

The criminal charges were based on a video published by Chikhunov in October 2022. It was recorded at night near a plaque commemorating the centenary of the Zemsky Sobor of the Amur Region convened by the White Army General Mikhail Diterikhs (at the Sobor, an attempt was made to restore the monarchy in Russia). In the video, Chikhunov holds in his hands a grenade launcher tube, declares that he will smash the board “to smithereens,” and presses the trigger with an audible click.

Following this action, a case was opened against Chikhunov under Article 213 Part 2 CC, since it was viewed as a crime committed with the help of a weapon. Next, the charge was reclassified to Article 213 Part 1 but later Chikhunov was, once again, charged under Part 2. When issuing the verdict, the court reclassified the charge again – to paragraph “b” of Article 213 Part 1 CC. The prosecutor's office has appealed the verdict demanding five years of imprisonment for Chikhunov under Part 2.

We doubt the appropriateness of prosecuting Chikhunov under Article 213 Part 2 CC. Hooliganism is defined in the Criminal Code as a gross violation of public order expressing clear disrespect for society. A gross violation of public order in judicial practice means such actions that lead to an infringement upon the public right to work and leisure, the work of institutions, and so on. However, Chikhunov's action, as far as we know, resulted in no such consequences. It took place late in the day and, based on the video, there were no witnesses. In our opinion, Chikhunov's actions should not be interpreted as expressing obvious disrespect for society – his motive was to express his political position, not antagonize others.

Another case under paragraph “b” of Article 213 Part 1 CC was opened in St. Petersburg. The suspect is Yevgeny Smirnov, who on February 16, the day the news of Alexei Navalny’s death became public, wrote an “inaccurate inscription” on a fence near a bus stop alleging that Vladimir Putin had killed the opposition leader. On February 18, the court took Smirnov into custody. We believe the action in question was not hooliganism but peaceful political propaganda.

Vandalism Motivated by Hatred

In other similar cases, St. Petersburg residents faced charges under Article 214 Part 2 CC (vandalism motivated by political hatred).

On February 19, the court took former police officer Konstantin Podoshvelev into custody. He was charged under Article 214 Part 2 CC and Article 243 Part 1 CC (destruction or damage to monuments of history and culture). According to investigators, on January 21, Podoshvelev wrote “University Supports Murderers” on the wall of the Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University and “ROC Supports Murderers” on the wall of the Intercession Church at the university. Both buildings have been recognized as cultural heritage sites. On the same day, the defendant also left the graffiti “ROC Supports Murderers” on the Church of the Tenderness Icon of the Mother of God. We do not consider the charge under Article 243 CC inappropriate, unlike the charge under Article 214 CC.

Dmitry Blinov was arrested on February 22 on suspicion that, no later than February 18, he wrote an “inaccurate inscription” about Russian President Vladimir Putin on a transformer booth.

A verdict in yet another similar case was reached on February 21. The Krasnogvardeysky District Court of St. Petersburg issued a three-year suspended sentence to Oleg Pronin under Article 214 Part 2 CC (vandalism motivated by political or ethnic hatred) and Article 222 Part 1 CC (illegal storage of ammunition). On October 12, 2023, Pronin spray-painted a stylized heart and certain slogans in black on two buildings. Allegedly, he did it to express his love and respect for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the head of the State Intelligence Service of Ukraine, Kirill Budanov. Since we do not know exactly what slogan Pronin wrote on the buildings, we cannot assess the legality of classifying his actions as motivated by specifically ethnic hatred.

Organized Anti-Government Activities

On February 22, 2024, the Khabarovsk Regional Court granted the administrative claim of the regional prosecutor’s office to recognize the I/WE Sergei Furgal (YA/MY Sergei Furgal) interregional public movement as an extremist organization. The prosecutor's office stated that the “extremist ideology” of the movement was that of “inciting hatred and hostility towards representatives of government institutions” and seeking to destroy “the legal foundations and values of society.” The prosecutor’s office believes that the movement’s goal is “to create conditions for changing the foundations of the constitutional system” and “changing the regime in the country by force.” To achieve these goals, the movement allegedly “calls for carrying out extremist and terrorist activities, organizing mass riots, and committing violent acts against government officials, etc.” The prosecutors emphasized that the movement’s participants had repeatedly faced administrative and criminal liability. In addition, the prosecutor's office accused the movement of using “various political technologies to influence governmental decision making, such as organizing and holding mass public events without permits.” It was also noted that the movement acted “in active coordination” with centers abroad that carry out “destructive actions against Russia.”

The prosecutor's office did not specify which associations of Furgal’s supporters they had in mind as the I/WE Sergei Furgal interregional social movement. However, based on the wording used by the prosecutors, we can assume that the lawsuit pertained to all forms of activity by supporters of the convicted ex-governor. We have no data that would confirm the intentions of Furgal’s supporters to overthrow the government by force or their general involvement in the systematic dissemination of calls for violence. Several activists and journalists who covered their activities faced charges under Article 20.3 CAO, Article 20.3.1 CAO, and Article 20.1 Part 3, CAO, however, we consider all these cases inappropriate. We are not aware of any criminal cases against Furgal’s supporters under “extremist” articles. Ex-governor’s supporters did hold protests without permits (mainly in 2020), but they were generally peaceful. There have been only three cases of criminal prosecution against Khabarovsk activists under Article 212.1 CC for repeated violations of the regulations for holding public events (and one of them was dismissed) and one case under Article 318 CC on the use of violence against a government official that was already tried in court. Thus, we are inclined to view the ban against the movement as unjustified.

A series of criminal and administrative cases in February targeted followers of Alexei Navalny, an opposition leader, who died in custody on February 16.

On February 22, the Rybinsk City Court of the Yaroslavl Region sentenced Sergei Streknyov to three and a half years in a minimum-security penal colony, finding him guilty under Article 214 Part 2 CC and either under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC (participating in the activities of an extremist organization) or under Article 282.1 Part 2 CC (participating in an extremist community), according to different sources. The investigation stated and the court agreed that, on June 4, the day of actions in honor of the politician’s birthday, the defendant painted graffiti in support of Navalny’s structures – the Anti-Corruption Foundation and the Navalny Headquarters – on public buildings and structures, as well as public transport stops. According to local media, the graffiti included the slogan “Freedom for political prisoners” and an anti-war slogan. Judging by the video, the graffiti was placed, among other objects, on the pedestal and landing gear of the Tu-104 aircraft on Skomorokhova Mountain in Rybinsk.

We also know of new criminal cases under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC. On February 13, Mikhail Sharygin was detained in Nizhny Novgorod, and a court took him into custody two days later. According to investigators, Sharygin was involved in the “underground headquarters” of Alexei Navalny. “Directed by the anti-Russian centers' leadership from abroad,” he planned to involve residents of the Nizhny Novgorod Region in the activities of an extremist organization to “destabilize the socio-political situation” on the eve of the Russian presidential elections. In particular, he “shared a post from a banned community” and “called on subscribers to join a group” associated with “underground headquarters.” Notably, in 2020, Sharygin was convicted under Article 205.2 CC Part 2 for his comment with a suggestion to blow up a construction site fence. From our point of view, his statement was qualified as a call for terrorism inappropriately.

On February 28, it was reported that a case under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC was initiated in the Kaluga Region against Irina Chernikova from Obninsk, also known as Lopanova. In 2023, a case was opened against her under Article 280.3 Part 1 CC while she was reportedly outside Russia. According to the materials of the new case, the Obninsk resident published links on VKontakte to the FBK project “Russia without Putin 2024,” the “Team Navalny” Telegram channel, and the Navalny Live YouTube channel. She also shared a link to a Telegram post from the banned Vesna movement, which contained an appeal to Putin from women of The Way Home (Put’ domoi) organization asking to bring mobilized soldiers back home, along with links to a cloud storage location with Vesna leaflets. It is still unclear which banned organization Chernikova is accused of involvement in – FBK or Vesna.

One sentence related to the activities of Navalny’s supporters was issued under Article 282.3 Part 1 CC (financing extremist activities). On February 7, the Syktyvkar City Court of the Komi Republic sentenced Vyacheslav Khertsberg to a fine of 300 thousand rubles for a money transfer to the banned FBK.

Another similar case was opened in the Moscow Region. On February 27, FSB officers entered the apartment of Podolsk resident Vladislav Moroz and inspected his home as part of a criminal case initiated under Article 282.3 Part 1 CC. As the security forces told Moroz, they had information that he had transferred money to FBK. Moroz's procedural status is still unknown.

In addition, on February 25, the police in Ulyanovsk compiled a report under Article 13.15 Part 2 CAO (mentioning an extremist organization without indicating its status) against Vitaly Akhmerov, an author of the local Telegram channel “Simbirsk Shugozhor.” The police claims were based on two publications dated February 19, in which Akhmerov mentioned actions in memory of Alexei Navalny. According to law enforcement agencies, Navalny’s “name and surname (personality)” are widely recognizable and directly associated with the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), the Foundation for the Defense of Citizens' Rights (FZPG), and the Navalny Headquarters, so Akhmerov had to indicate that these organizations are recognized as extremist.

Displaying Banned Symbols

In one case, the sanctions were related to displaying a Ukrainian trident (trizub). On February 5, the Nikolaevsky District Court of the Volgograd Region fined Sergei Lomako one thousand rubles for posting an image of two crossed flags – of Ukraine and self-proclaimed Ichkeria – in his WhatsApp messenger status. A trident was visible in the corner of the Ukrainian flag.

In another case, the song “Chervona Kalyna” was once again classified as an extremist symbol. On February 16, the Kievsky District Court of Simferopol placed Angela Kosterina under arrest for eight days for posting several video clips with different versions of “Chervona Kalyna” on her social network page.

As we learned in February, on January 22, the Volgodonsky District Court of the Rostov Region fined Elizaveta Kravchenko one thousand rubles. She had posted an image with a swastika in the Partner Yoga community on VKontakte. If an image with a swastika published in a community dedicated to yoga was meant as an ancient Indo-Iranian symbol with no purpose of promoting Nazism, then in our opinion, there were no reasons to sanction the Volgodonsk resident.

One man was punished in February for displaying a pit bull sticker. On February 27, the Sovetsky District Court of Makhachkala fined Shamil Omarov one thousand rubles after police officers found the sticker on his car.

We also view as inappropriate the criminal prosecution of Krasnoyarsk artist Vasily Slonov under Article 282.4 Part 1 CC (repeated demonstration of symbols of an extremist organization). The case was based on a photograph of his creation published on VKontakte – a tumbler toy decorated with prison tattoos including an eight-pointed star. This star is considered a symbol of the AUE movement, recognized as an extremist organization. In 2023, Slonov was already fined under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO for displaying a similar tumbler toy at an exhibition. On February 8, the artist was detained while trying to fly to Kazakhstan. On February 10, the court chose house arrest as a preventive measure for Slonov despite the investigation’s request to take him into custody. In our opinion, Slonov did not promote criminal ideology but used prison tattoos for artistic expression. There are no sufficient grounds for sanctions against him.

Protecting Historical Memory and Traditional Values

“Rehabilitating Nazism”

On February 27, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea issued a verdict against Dzhankoy resident Yevgeny Shved. The court found him guilty under paragraph “c” of Article 354.1 Parts 2 and 4 CC (dissemination of deliberately false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War; dissemination on the Internet of information about the days of military glory expressing clear disrespect for society). Shved was sentenced to two and a half years of imprisonment in a minimum-security penal colony. The Dzhankoy resident’s criminal case was based on his post on the “Why fckn Not” Telegram channel. The post characterized the Victory Day celebration as a “victory frenzy,” and called May 9 a “pseudo-holiday.” Shved also argued that both Hitler and Stalin started the Great Patriotic War.

One acquittal was issued under this article. On February 13, the Bryansk Regional Court found Alexander Koshechko not guilty under Article 354.1 Part 3 CC. The investigation alleged that on March 7, 2023, while in the village of Netyinka, Koshechko tore the St. George ribbon off a serviceman’s jacket and desecrated this symbol of military glory by trampling it into the mud. The court, however, found that there was no St. George ribbon on the serviceman’s jacket to begin with, that is, the crime never took place. We believe that even if the prosecutorial version of the events were true, bringing the troublemaker to administrative responsibility for disorderly conduct would have been sufficient.

“Insulting the Feelings of Believers”

It was reported on February 19 that a magistrate court in Volgodonsk sentenced blogger Yuri Kravtsov under Article 148 Part 1 CC (insulting the religious feelings of believers). The court imposed on him a fine in the amount of 80 thousand rubles. Kravtsov, also known as Yurets Kravets, was prosecuted over a video of him made in October 2023, which showed him being tied to a cross and lifted into the air during preparations for a Halloween show at a city restaurant. According to the investigation, whose position was upheld by the court, Kravtsov showed clear disrespect for society and offended the religious feelings of believers “by mockingly demonstrating his own crucifixion on a wooden cross in a public place.”

On February 27, the Visaitovsky District Court in Grozny issued a verdict against Nikita Zhuravel under Article 148 Part 2 CC (insulting the religious feelings of believers, committed in places specially designed for religious services) and Article 213 Part 2 CC (hooliganism committed by an organized group by prior conspiracy based on religious hatred and enmity). He was sentenced to three and a half years of imprisonment. In May 2023, Zhuravel burned the Quran in front of a mosque in Volgograd and filmed the action. Later the video was published on the “Morning Dagestan” Telegram channel with the caption “Volgograd!! May Allah break your back – the country of Islamophobes!!!” During his interrogation, Zhuravel stated that he had burned the Quran at the instigation of Ukrainian intelligence services for a reward of ten thousand rubles and then handed over the recording to a representative of the Security Service of Ukraine.

We believe that Zhuravel should have been punished for burning the Quran not under Article 148 CC but under administrative Article 5.26 Part 2 CAO (deliberate public desecration of religious or liturgical literature). In addition, the grounds, on which Zhuravel’s act was qualified as committed “in places specially designed for religious services,” are unclear, because he recorded his video at a significant distance from the mosque. At the same time, since the video of the Quran burning was published with a comment aimed at inciting hostility, we believe that he could also be punished under Article 20.3.1 CAO – or under paragraph “c” of Article 282 Part 2 CC, if he acted as part of an organized group. The qualification of his actions under Article 213 CC is, in our opinion, inappropriate, since public order was not violated during the book burning.

In Serov of the Sverdlovsk Region, a new case was opened under Article 148 Part 1 CC. On February 8, a search was conducted at Nikolai Pozharuk’s home. According to investigators, a 73-year-old native of Ivano-Frankivsk, writing under the nickname “Augean Stables Cleaner,” left comments on VKontakte that offended the religious feelings of Orthodox Christians. Notably, Pozharuk had faced responsibility not long before that for comments on the social network. In 2022, he was fined 45 thousand rubles under Article 20.3.3 CAO for discrediting the army.

On February 17, we were informed of a case initiated under the same article against tattoo artist Daria Krichker from St. Petersburg. The case was based on a photograph depicting a tattoo “Jesus at the moment of orgasm.” Krichker, the tattoo’s author, later published the image on social networks. Representatives of the Forty Times Forty (Sorok Sorokov) Orthodox movement drew attention to Krichker’s work and called for filing complaints with the Investigative Committee against her, demanding that a criminal case be opened. Prior to this, Sorok Sorokov also complained about tattoos with religious symbols made by Krichker’s colleague Nina Karmysh.

Persecution against Religious Organizations and Believers

Hizb ut-Tahrir

On February 5, the Vakhitovsky District Court of Kazan took into custody Adalbert Bagautdinov and Vasil Gafurov from Naberezhnye Chelny suspected under Article 205.5 Part 1 CC (organizing the activities of a terrorist organization), as well as Rishat Bagautdinov from Yelabuga charged under Article 205.5 Part 2 CC (participating in the activities of a terrorist organization). According to investigators, from July 2021 to February 2, 2024, Bagautdinov and Gafurov organized the activities of a cell of the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir party and later recruited the third defendant to participate in it.

On February 13, the Central District Military Court, when re-examining the case, sentenced Hizb ut-Tahrir followers Radik Khairutdinov and Elmar Mamedov from Tolyatti to 11 and 12 years in a maximum-security penal colony, respectively. Mamedov was found guilty under Article 205.5 Part 2 CC and Article 205.2 Part 2 CC. Khairutdinov was convicted only under Article 205.5 Part 2 CC. The court already imposed the same prison terms on them in 2021, but the sentence was later overturned.

It is also worth noting that on February 22, reports were compiled against Crimean activist Lutfiye Zudieva under Article 13.15 Parts 2 and 2.1 for abusing the freedom of media. The claims were based on her Facebook post published in 2021 about actions in support of those affected by the Hizb ut-Tahrir “Belogorsk case.” The post failed to indicate that this radical Islamic party was recognized as a terrorist organization in Russia. Two other posts contained references to Radio Liberty without indicating that it was included on the register of foreign agents.

Jehovah's Witnesses

In February, In December, Jehovah's Witnesses continued to be prosecuted on charges of involvement in local religious organizations that were deemed extremist and banned.

In addition, on February 1, the Zelenogorsk City Court of Krasnoyarsk Krai decided to return to the prosecutor the case of Alexander Kabanov, a Jehovah's Witness charged under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC. In 2022, he received a two-year suspended sentence, but the regional court overturned it and sent the case for a new trial.

It should also be noted that on February 8, the Sverdlovsk Regional Court considered the case of Alexander Pryanikov, Venera Dulova, and Daria Dulova for the fourth time. The court generally confirmed the sentence it issued in 2021 under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC. Alexander Pryanikov and Venera Dulova received suspended sentences of two and a half and two years respectively. Daria Dulova, as a minor at the time of the crime, was exempted from punishment due to the expiry of the limitation period for prosecution. The case against the believers was initiated back in 2018. The first verdict on it was issued in 2020, then the case was sent for review. The court announced another guilty verdict in 2021. In 2022, the regional court overturned it fully acquitting the defendants. The Supreme Court overturned this decision, and then the regional court returned the case to the prosecutor. The cassation instance did not agree with this, and the regional court had to consider the case again.