The following is our review of the primary and most representative events in the misuse of Russia's anti-extremist legislation in April 2023.

Lawmaking

On April 28, Vladimir Putin signed a law that increases responsibility for sabotage and terrorist crimes and introduces a new legal norm into the Criminal Code against assisting foreign bodies that prosecute Russian officials and military personnel. The new law increases the penalties and mandatory minimum terms of incarceration under the following articles of the Criminal Code (CC): Article 205 (an act of terrorism), Article 205.1 (contributing to terrorist activity), Article 205.4 Part 2 (participating in a terrorist community), Article 275 (high treason – up to life imprisonment), Article 281 (sabotage), Article 360 (assaults on persons or institutions enjoying international protection; now also includes the threat of such an attack), and Article 361 (an act of international terrorism). “Assistance in carrying out decisions of foreign state bodies or international organizations, in which the Russian Federation does not participate, that involve criminal prosecution against government officials of the Russian Federation in connection with their official activities, or against other persons in connection with their military service or participation in volunteer formations that contribute to the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” will now be punishable under new Article 284.3 CC. At the same time, Article 280.4 CC (public calls for activities against state security) will apply to calls to commit a crime under Article 284.3 CC.

On the same day, the president also signed a new federal law “On Citizenship of the Russian Federation” adopted by the State Duma shortly before that. Among other things, this law clarifies and expands the grounds for terminating Russian citizenship acquired either by application or as a result of a federal constitutional law or an international treaty. The grounds include a court verdict under one of the Criminal Code articles specifically listed in the law, which has entered into legal force. The list was originally supposed to include such norms as Article 205.2 Part 2 (propaganda or justification of terrorism), Article 208 (organizing an illegal armed formation), Article 212 Part 1 (organizing mass riots), Article 282.1 (organizing or participating in an extremist community), Article 282.2 (organizing or participating in an extremist organization), Article 282.3 (financing extremist activities), Article 205.4 (organizing and participating in a terrorist community), Article 205.5 (organizing a terrorist organization), and Article 278 (forcible seizure of power). However, during the consideration of the bill in the Duma, this list was significantly expanded. Among other additional articles, it came to include Article 207.3 (“fakes” about the army), Article 212.1 (repeated violation of “the rally legislation”), Parts 1 and 2 of Article 239 (organising an association infringing upon the liberties and rights of individuals), Article 243.4 (destruction or damage to military graves), Article 280 (public calls for extremist activity), Article 280.1 (public calls for actions violating the territorial integrity of Russia), Article 280.2 (violating the territorial integrity Russia), Article 280.3 (discrediting the use of Russian armed forces and the activities of government agencies abroad), Article 282 (incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity), Article 284.1 (carrying out the activities of an organization recognized as undesirable), Article 284.2 (calling for sanctions against Russia, its citizens and organizations), Article 330.1 (avoidance of responsibilities stipulated by the legislation on foreign agents), Article 354.1 (rehabilitation of Nazism), and so on. “Committing actions that pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation” was also mentioned as a reason for termination of citizenship. The FSB is expected to provide the judgments that such actions took place without taking into account the amount of time that passed since their commission.

Thus, according to the new law, convicted offenders can be deprived of their acquired Russian citizenship under a very wide range of Criminal Code articles. Among these norms, in our opinion, there are some that should not have been introduced at all and some that have been poorly worded, some others are often applied inappropriately. We also believe that many crimes covered by the articles that were later added to the list do not pose sufficient danger to society to warrant depriving people, who committed them, of their acquired Russian citizenship. It should be noted that many people, who acquired Russian citizenship at some point in their lives, have no other citizenship at this point; some of them have lived in Russia since childhood. Separately, we should pay attention to the fact that the procedure for canceling the decision to grant citizenship will also apply to residents of territories recently annexed to Russia, who have received Russian citizenship, beginning with Crimea. As for the additional provision on the termination of citizenship for a threat to national security, it further develops the already existing practice of expelling people from Russia on the basis of undisclosed FSB orders. While earlier, such practices involved revoking temporary residence permits, now they will also pertain to citizenship. Such a norm reinforces the unchecked authority exercised by one department when dealing with an issue that affects basic human rights.

In addition, on April 27, the president signed a decree on the legal status of foreign citizens living in the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, the Zaporizhzhia Region, and the Kherson Region. According to this decree, in particular, citizens of Ukraine living in these territories, who did not apply for Russian citizenship, are considered foreigners. Such people, just as foreign citizens temporarily residing in these regions and foreigners who are considered temporary residents of Russia, can be deported, expelled, or deprived of refugee status, or have their residence permits canceled. The state authorities can deem their stay in Russia undesirable or shorten it. Such decisions can be made if these citizens are found to be in favor of “forcibly changing the foundations of the constitutional order,” finance or plan “terrorist (extremist) acts,” assist in their commission or commit them themselves, or undertake “other actions” that support “terrorist (extremist) activity.” Those who encroach on public order and security, including participating in “unpermitted” actions, will be subject to the same measures, in accordance with the decree.

Several new bills regulating the activities of non-profit organizations were submitted to the Duma. In accordance with them, the Ministry of Justice would deny registration in Russia for branches of foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) if their branches were removed from the corresponding list within the past three years. At the same time, the deputies plan to introduce a ban on participation in the activities of a foreign NGO that is not registered in Russia. A new norm, Article 19.34.2, has been proposed for the Code of Administrative Offenses (CAO) to punish the violation of this prohibition; a third such violation will trigger criminal responsibility under Part 1 of the new Article 330.3 CC with penalties up to two years of imprisonment. Those who previously had a criminal record under Article 284.1 CC (involvement in the activities of an organization recognized as undesirable in Russia) can now be prosecuted under this article, while those previously convicted under Article 330 can now be prosecuted under Article 284.1. Thus, the introduced bills establish liability for participation in the activities of any foreign NGOs that do not have branches in Russia, which is just as strict as the liability for participation in “undesirable organizations.” Under Article 330.3 Part 2 CC the organizers of the activities of a foreign NGO in Russia can face up to three years of imprisonment.

Two other bills deal with regulating the activities of “foreign agents.” The Ministry of Justice has received a mandate for control not only over foreign agents themselves but also over compliance with the “foreign agents” legislation in general. Any persons who, through their actions or inaction, contribute to a violation of this legislation can now receive a warning from the Ministry of Justice with a demand to eliminate the violations within a month. The bill’s authors propose to hold offenders, who fail to comply with the order of the Ministry of Justice, accountable under the new Part 40 of Article 19.5 CAO.

Sanctions for Statements against the Authorities

Justifying Terrorism

The Verkh-Isetsky District Court of Yekaterinburg detained activist and public relations specialist Yaroslav Shirshikov who is facing charges under Article 205.2 Part 2 CC (public justification of terrorism on the Internet). Apparently, his case was based on his posts in the Hussar Bravado (Gussarskaya Bravada) Telegram channel and the subsequent complaints filed by the Call of the People (Zov Naroda) movement. One of the posts discussed the recent death of military commander Maxim Fomin (Vladlen Tatarsky) as a result of a terrorist attack in St. Petersburg. Shirshikov said that he was against explosions in any cities, but the news of the death of the military commander did not upset him; he also wished Tatarsky and all the other attendees of the event “glassy ground” [a euphemism for “a hard time in the afterlife”]. Commenting on the news about the death of Darya Dugina as a result of a car bombing in 2022, Shirshikov noted that he felt sorry for the deceased, but did not feel sorry for her father, philosopher Alexander Dugin, who supported the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine. We believe that Shirshikov's posts did not contain a direct justification of terrorism. According to the note to Article 205.2 CC, public justification of terrorism is understood as a public statement recognizing the ideology and practice of terrorism as correct, in need of support and imitation. Shirshikov noted in his posts that he did not approve of such practices.

Inciting Hatred against the Authorities and “Disrespect for Authority”

In April, we recorded three people sanctioned under Article 20.3.1 CAO (incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity) for harsh statements about government officials that did not call for violence. We believe that the limits of acceptable criticism are wider for public officials than for private individuals, and law enforcement officers, in general, should be extremely tolerant of criticism, unless it involves a real threat of violence.

• As we learned in April, back on February 28, the Oktyabrsky District Court of Krasnoyarsk fined Elena Kareva 10,000 rubles for sharing on VKontakte Dmitry Glukhovsky’s text “This Is Not Our War,” as well as a certain text about the Russian authorities from her son’s page and certain “videos of Belarusian nationalists” fighting on the side of Ukraine. The experts found in her posts a negative assessment of a group of people “united on the basis of conducting professional activities in the state bodies of the Russian Federation,” implying the criticism of the activities of Russian president Vladimir Putin.
• On April 18, the Krasnoufimsky District Court of the Sverdlovsk Region fined Eduard Charov, a Pentecostal, 20,000 rubles under Article 20.3.1 CAO for some publications about Vladimir Putin and public officials. He was also fined 45,000 rubles under Article 20.3.3 Part 1 CAO (discrediting the use of the Russian armed forces).
• On April 19, the Neklinovsky District Court of the Rostov Region fined local resident Viktor Pozdnyakov 10,000 rubles. He was punished for his post in Odnoklassniki of a video titled “Protect the Putler from the People” and with the text “What is the Russian police for?” in the preview. The experts saw in it “a humiliation of the dignity of a group of persons on the basis of belonging to a social group (the police).”

In April, we learned about two cases filed under Article 20.1 Part 3 CAO (dissemination on the Internet of information expressing disrespect for society, the state, or government agencies in indecent form). We believe that this provision is redundant and clearly aimed at suppressing criticism of the actions of the authorities, which are sufficiently protected by other legislative mechanisms.

• On March 18, 2023, the Kievsky District Court of Simferopol fined Anastasia Bayramova, a resident of Alushta, 60,000 rubles under Article 20.1 Part 3 CAO. The case was based on a lip sync TikTok video, in which Bayramova stood in front of a page with search results for the query “Putin signed the law on the punishment of crime lords” and sang along to the song of the rap artist Boulevard Depo the words “He died young. It's a friendly fire – fire upon your own.” On the same day, the court fined Bayramova another 50,000 rubles under Article 20.3.3 Part 1 CAO (discrediting the use of the army) for videos posted on Instagram, which showed Bayramova in an embroidered Ukrainian shirt with her nails painted in the colors of the Ukrainian flag expressing her support for Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky.
• In April 2023, the Novoilinsky District Court of Novokuznetsk fined Ingvar (Igor) Gorlanov under Article 20.1 Part 3 CAO. The total amount of his fines reached 90 thousand rubles. One of the rulings – issued on April 6 – was published on the court's website, and, according to it, Gorlanov had posted a comment on VKontakte "with a negative assessment of the Russian Federation as a state” (for this comment, the court sentenced him to 30,000 rubles). Earlier, Gorlanov was repeatedly punished under Article 20.1 CAO, Article 20.3.1 CAO (inciting hatred) and others. In March 2023, a criminal case was also opened against him under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC (repeated incitement of hatred); we consider his prosecutions inappropriate.

Discrediting the Actions of the Russian Armed Forces or Government Agencies

We view as inappropriate the cases under the administrative Article 20.3.3 CAO for discrediting the use of the Russian armed forces and the activities of government agencies abroad as well as under the criminal Article 280.3 CC for repeatedly discrediting these entities, unless the relevant statements are accompanied by direct calls for violence.

The practice of opening criminal cases under Article 20.3.3 CAO continues. As before, people face sanctions for their offline and online statements, for displaying posters, for slogans on their clothes, for distribution of printed campaign materials, for graffiti on various buildings, and so on.

In April, we became aware of several new criminal cases initiated under Article 280.3 Part 1 of CC (repeatedly discrediting the use of the Russian armed forces).

• Back on February 28, a criminal case under Article 280.3 Part 1 CC was opened in Moscow against Nina Nesterova, who has left Russia. She had been previously fined under Article 20.3.3 Part 1 CAO for a picket with an anti-war poster. In February 2023, there was an attempt to punish Nesterova under Article 19.3 CAO (disobeying a lawful order of a police officer) after she was detained at the Arbatskaya metro station for yellow and blue ribbons and a rainbow-colored cow on her backpack. The court dismissed this case due to the absence of an offense in Nesterova's actions.
• In Naberezhnye Chelny, the court has already received a case against Dmitry Slabkovsky. The reason for his prosecution was not reported.
• In Crimea, a criminal case was opened against Dmitry Demchuk, a resident of Sudak, based on his social network posts. Earlier, he had faced administrative responsibility for his posts on Facebook.
• Sergei Buivol from Novomoskovsk was taken into custody in the Tula Region. He was charged under Article 280.3 CC (public actions aimed at discrediting the Russian armed forces and government agencies abroad) and Article 318 Part 2 CC (use of violence endangering the life and health of a representative of the authorities). On March 30, police officers attempted to detain him, but he behaved aggressively, resisted, and used violence against them. Earlier, Buivol had been fined for his post on Odnoklassniki criticizing the actions of the Russian military.

In addition, the second charge appeared in the case of Vasily Bolshakov from Kasimov of the Ryazan Region. The investigation found that Bolshakov was discrediting the armed forces in his comments, which called for sabotaging the mobilization, left under another user’s post on VKontakte on September 22, 2022. Earlier, he faced charges for his post, dated November 9, 2022 that contained a joke about the withdrawal of Russian troops from Kherson.

On April 14, the Belogorsk City Court of the Amur Region issued a verdict under Article 280.3 Part 1 CC against local resident Valentina Gamliy. She was sentenced to a fine of 100,000 rubles. The version of the investigation, upheld by the court, stated that Gamliy had registered an anonymous Telegram account and, on August 10, 2022, left some comments discrediting the actions of the armed forces during the special military operation in Ukraine under a post on the Blagmedia channel. When sentencing Gamliy, the court took into account the defendant's full admission of guilt, as well as the extenuating circumstances – her pregnancy and her minor child. Previously, Gamliy had been fined under Article 20.3.3 CAO for her social network comments criticizing the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine.

“Fakes about the Army” Motivated by Hatred

We disagree with the use of the motive of political hatred in libel cases, including in cases of spreading false information about the Russian army. The manifestation of political or ideological hatred, in and of itself, is not criminalized, and we believe that it is appropriate to classify this motive as an aggravating circumstance only in articles on crimes that pose a serious public danger, namely, in articles on the use of violence. We believe that the motive of political hatred in cases of military “fakes” is invoked inappropriately – people who publish information about military operations in Ukraine that differs from the official position most often ideologically and politically disagree with the course of the authorities, that is, in most of these cases it is a form of peaceful political criticism, which should not be limited. Therefore, we consider the persecution under paragraph “e” of Part 2 of Article 207.3 CC (disseminating knowingly false information about the use of the Russian armed forces motivated by political hatred) inappropriate, unless the incriminating statements contain incitement to violence.

We recorded three convictions on this charge in April.

• On April 17, the Rostov-on-Don Garrison Military Court sentenced Colonel Valery Kotovich of the Russian Guard to six years in prison under Paragraphs “a” and “e” of Article 207.3 Part 2 CC (dissemination of deliberately false information about the use of the Russian army using official position motivated by political hatred). The exact reason for the prosecution against Kotovich is not known, but colleagues allegedly reported to their superiors his verbal statements criticizing the actions of Russian troops. Until 2014, Kotovich served in the Internal Troops of Ukraine in Crimea.
• On the same day, the Moscow City Court sentenced politician and journalist Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in a maximum-security penal colony through the partial aggregation of sentences imposed under three articles – paragraph “e” of Article 207.3 Part 2 CC (seven years), Article 284.1 Part 1 CC on the activities of an “undesirable organization” (three years), and Article 275 CC on high treason (18 years). He was also sentenced to a fine of 400 thousand rubles, restriction of freedom for six months after his release from the colony, and a ban on journalism for seven years after serving his sentence. The case for spreading “fakes about the army” was based on Kara-Murza's speech in the Arizona House of Representatives in the United States on March 15, 2022, in which he said that Russian troops were committing war crimes on the territory of Ukraine.
• On April 24, the Perovsky District Court of Moscow sentenced Samiel Vedel (Sergei Klokov), a native of Irpin who worked as a technician in the reserve office of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow, to seven years in prison, finding him guilty under paragraphs. “a,” “b” and “e” of Article 207.3 Part 2 CC (dissemination of deliberately false information about the use of the Russian army using one's official position by a group of persons, motivated by political hatred). Vedel was also stripped of his Captain of the Internal Service rank and banned from holding jobs in government agencies for four years. The case against Vedel was based on the recordings of his telephone conversations with friends and colleagues, in which he claimed that Russia was evacuating the wounded Russian soldiers to Belarus and underreporting the death toll.

Vandalism Motivated by Hatred

We doubt the validity of imposing sanctions for vandalism motivated by political hatred, since, in most cases, these actions represent a form of political propaganda. As we said above, we believe that the motive of political hatred is only appropriate as an aggravating circumstance in the articles pertaining to crimes that pose significant public danger, specifically in the articles on the use of violence. Additionally, in our opinion, unless the property damage is significant, vandalism cases should be terminated for insignificance. In significant cases where the material damage was still relatively minor, we suggest introducing an article similar to Article 7.17 CAO that penalizes destruction or damage of other people's property or amending Article 7.17. Termination of the case with the appointment of a judicial fine also seems to us a reasonable compromise.

Last month, we became aware of three new criminal cases initiated under Article 214 Part 2 CC.

• On April 6, a search was conducted at the home of Kazan activist Mark Serov in connection with a case qualified under this article. According to the preliminary information, he has been charged with placing anti-war graffiti and some negative statements about president Vladimir Putin on a city's infrastructure object.
• On April 24, the Southern District Military Court considered the case of Igor Paskar, a resident of Volgograd. He faces charges under Article 205 Part 1 CC (terrorist attack) for attempting to set fire to the Krasnodar Federal Security Service and under Article 214 Part 2 CC for vandalism motivated by political hatred. The charges under Article 214 Part 2 CC are based on the fact that, on June 12, with intent to carry out an anti-war action on Russia’s Day, Pascar threw a Molotov cocktail at a banner decorated with the letter Z and the slogan “We Do Not Abandon Our Own” located near the Motherland Monument in the center of Krasnodar. This action went unnoticed, and it became known only after Paskar’s confession during the investigation of a different incident – the Molotov cocktail attack against the building of the Krasnodar FSB Directorate that set fire to a doormat (this act was qualified as a terrorist attack).
• On April 29, it became known that Stanislav Rumyantsev, a resident of the Ivanovo region, who has been a defendant since March in the case under Article 280.3 Part 1 CC, has also been charged under Article 214 Part 2 CC for writing statements on the building of the United Russia chairman's regional office and the regional office of the president.

The courts have completed their review of two cases.

• On April 3, a magistrate of Court District No. 8 in the Kirovsky District of Yekaterinburg sentenced artist Yegor Ledyakin, known as “Leonid Cherny,” to six months of restriction of freedom. His case was based on the anti-war slogans he wrote on unspecified objects in the city in March 2022.
• On April 24, a magistrate from Court District No. 123 in the Mozhaisk Judicial District of the Moscow Region committed Andrei Kizelvater to compulsory treatment in an inpatient psychiatric facility. The case was based on the fact that in April 2022, a banner adorned with the letter 'Z' in the colors of the St. George ribbon, which was displayed on the facade of the Mozhaisk Center of Culture and Leisure, had been vandalized with yellow and blue paint. The investigation maintained that this act resulted in damages to the institution amounting to 25,000 rubles.

Sanctions for Displaying Banned Symbols

In April, we recorded several cases, in which people faced administrative responsibility under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO for public display of Nazi symbols intended not to promote Nazism, but as a means of political criticism. We classify such cases as inappropriate.

• On April 18, the Kirovsky District Court of Omsk fined Ilya Mezhenny one thousand rubles for posting images with a swastika on his Telegram channel. According to the Omsk resident, he posted these pictures because he considers the Russian Federation similar to Nazi Germany.
• On April 19, the Chernovsky District Court of Chita fined Yulia Beloslyudtseva a thousand rubles for publishing in Odnoklassniki a picture depicting the Russian flag bearing the slogan “To defeat the Banderites we must first liberate the Kremlin from the Vlasovites!” with a yellow swastika to the left of the words. She was also fined 15,000 rubles under Article 20.3.3 Part 1 CAO. It is worth noting that Beloslyudtseva also published xenophobic content; she incurred another fine under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO for posting an image with a neo-pagan Svarog square and runes. We do not classify this fine as inappropriate.
• On April 20, the Volgodonsk District Court of the Rostov Region placed retiree Dmitry Lyagushin under arrest for seven days, because of the video found on his page. The video was originally published in 2019 on the “Soviet Television” YouTube channel (now it continues to work under the name Working Russia (Trudovaya Rossiya). The video consists of fragments from the stream of activist Mikhail Shendakov illustrated with various photographs and excerpts from other videos. Shendakov's speech criticizing the ways of celebrating Victory Day in Russia is accompanied, in particular, by a photograph of the famous sticker “1941–1945. We Can Do It Again” with a swastika, as well as a photo of a mannequin tied to the hood of a car dressed in swastika-decorated clothes. We emphasize that law enforcement agencies have every reason to prosecute Lyagushin for his other posts – he adheres to ultra-right views and xenophobic propaganda can be found on his page. He had previously been convicted under Article 282 CC.
• On April 24, the Oktyabrsky District Court of Tambov fined Pavel Samoilov 1,500 rubles for an image published a year earlier in the comments to a poll conducted by the “BT Tambov” group on VKontakte. It depicted three stick figures: a man and a woman with heads in the shape of the hammer and sickle and the swastika respectively, and their child with the head in the shape of the letter Z.

In April, we also learned about one more case – a numismatist who faced responsibility under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO. A report was filed in Saratov against Valery (last name was not reported), who published a photo of an antique Third Reich coin in the thematic group on Odnoklassniki. We believe that Article 20.3 CAO should be used primarily to punish manufacturers of modern items with Nazi and neo-Nazi symbols (badges, clothes, copies of weapons, etc.) rather than antique dealers or numismatists.

In two cases, we believe that the same article was used inappropriately to punish for displaying the Svarog Square, a symbol used by the Northern Brotherhood (an organization recognized as extremist). This symbol is popular among neo-pagans and is usually used with no intent to invoke the relatively obscure Northern Brotherhood. On March 29, the Moskovsky District Court of Ryazan fined Sergei Dolmatov, who, several years ago, attached a Svarog Square sticker to the windshield of his car; he said that he did not know that the symbol was connected to a banned organization. On April 28, the same court imposed a fine on Dmitry Nazarov, who published the Svarog Square on VKontakte.

Three cases are related to the slogan “Glory to Ukraine,” viewed by some Russian courts as an “established greeting” of organizations banned in Russia, that is, their attribute. In a number of cases, the courts indicate that this is a greeting of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). We consider this qualification inappropriate. Article 20.3 CAO penalizes displaying the symbols or attributes of banned organizations but not publishing their slogans. In addition, not the OUN in general but only the OUN Volunteer Movement was recognized in Russia as extremist. Finally, the slogan “Glory to Ukraine,” which came into use in the early 20th century, cannot be viewed solely as the motto of Ukrainian nationalist organizations banned in Russia. In recent years it has been ubiquitous in Ukraine and, since 2018, it has become an official greeting in the Ukrainian army and police.

• On April 10, the Lazarevsky District Court of Sochi arrested Armen Gasparyan for 15 days, for shouting “Glory to Ukraine!” during the inspection of his car by traffic police officers on March 24.
• On April 11, 2023, the Magadan City Court fined Sergei Vishnyakov, a student of the Mining and Construction College, a thousand rubles for shouting the slogan “Glory to Ukraine!” in the hallway of an unspecified building. The court recognized this slogan as a symbol of the OUN and added that Vishnyakov “committed a public display of Nazi symbols in a verbal format.”
• On April 19, the Tsentralny District Court of Sochi placed Ukrainian citizen Svetlana Matukhnova under arrest for five days after finding the slogan “Glory to Ukraine” (in English) on her Instagram page. Matukhnova also faced responsibility under Article 20.3.1 CAO (see below).

Two cases were related to pit bull head stickers. Law enforcement agencies and the court unreasonably interpreted them as symbols of the Krasnodar-based Nazi skinhead group Pit Bull recognized as an extremist organization in 2010. The pit bull head stickers have gained popularity among motorists after the appearance of racing computer video games created by the English company Pitbull. Syndicate Ltd. Meanwhile, the court decision on the ban of the Krasnodar group contains no information as to whether the group used this or any other symbols. On March 13, the Kizlyarsky District Court of Dagestan fined Magomedgadzhi Magomedov 1,000 rubles after finding such a sticker on his car. On April 5, the same court issued a similar decision against Shakhban Gadzhibagamedov.

Protecting Historical Memory and Traditional Values, “Enforcing Tolerance”

Sanctions for Inciting Hatred

On April 24, the Tsentralny District Court of Sochi placed Ukrainian citizen Svetlana Matukhnova under arrest for eight days. She had been punished previously under Article 20.3 CAO (see above). This time, she was found guilty under Article 20.3.1 CAO (inciting hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity). She posted on Instagram her photo in Ukrainian national clothes with yellow and blue ribbons in her hair. This post was accompanied by a caption in English, in which Matukhnova stated that she considers herself Ukrainian and “will never be Russian.” The expert linguist, whose opinion was upheld by the court, concluded that these words contrasted Ukrainians and Russians, and Matukhnova attributed negative characteristics to the latter forming an enemy image.

Sanctions for “Rehabilitating Nazism”

The investigating authorities opened several cases in April under Article 354.1 Part 3 CC (desecration of the symbols of Russia's military glory insulting the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland).

• On April 15, such a case was initiated against Vasily Zadorozhny, a 26-year-old resident of Syktyvkar with a court-ordered measure of restraint in the form of a ban on certain actions. According to investigators, on April 12, Zadorozhny, while under the influence of alcohol, approached the Eternal Glory memorial and extinguished the Eternal Flame by pouring lemonade on it.
• On April 18, investigators in the Sovetsky District of Krasnoyarsk opened a case against a 38-year-old local resident. Allegedly, on the night of April 14–15, while under the influence of alcohol, he used the Eternal Flame to burn flowers and other objects brought to the memorial near the Victory Memorial Museum.
• On April 28, the investigative department for the Tsentralny District of Krasnoyarsk opened a criminal case against a 43-year-old local resident. Once again at night and under the influence of alcohol, he ruined a street exhibition that was being prepared for Victory Day by tearing down 32 aluminum composite plates with photographs. According to the Krasnoyarsk resident, he thought that he should demonstrate his civic position and rip off the plates, since no one hangs official posters at night and, therefore, they were being placed there illegally.

In our opinion, such acts deserve condemnation and, at least in the latter case, criminal liability, but under a different legal norm, Article 214 Part 1 CC (vandalism), which provides for less severe penalties compared to Article 354.1 Part 3 CC. In addition, the list of symbols of military glory, whose desecration is punishable under this article, has not yet been defined by Russian law – only the St. George Ribbon has this status. As for insulting the memory of non-specified "defenders of the Fatherland," we believe that criminal prosecution for acts defined in such abstract categories fails to meet the international legal human rights standards.

Prosecution for “Insulting the Feelings of Believers”

It was reported on April 4 that a criminal case had been opened in Moscow under Article 148 Part 1 CC (public actions expressing clear disrespect for society and committed in order to insult the religious feelings of believers) against artist Veronika Polonskaya.

Back in the summer of 2022, a report was compiled against her under Article 5.26 Part 2 CAO (intentional public desecration of religious or liturgical symbols and attributes). The claims were based on four paintings by the artist that used the image of Jesus Christ: “Alice in Wonderland,” “Superstar,” “Our Father Who Art in Heaven, People, Won't You Help for God’s Sake, There Is Nothing to Eat” and “The Appearance of Christ before the People.” A magistrate in Moscow returned the case to the police due to a missing expert opinion. Likely, the expert examination eventually took place, and so the criminal case has been initiated.

We view the prosecution against Polonskaya under Article 148 Part 1 CC as inappropriate. The vague concept of “insulting the religious feelings of believers” in this article does not and cannot have a clear legal meaning. It must also be noted that the work of the artist contains no signs of inciting hatred towards Christians, otherwise, her actions could have been qualified under Article 20.3.1 CAO.

Another case pertains to Moscow resident Pavel Petryakov sentenced by the Solntsevsky District Court on March 9 under Article 5.26 Part 2 CAO with a fine of 30,000 rubles. In January 2023, Petryakov posted several images that, according to experts, contained signs of desecrating the cross (the image used it “in an obscene gesture” accompanied by a “mocking inscription”), as well as the cross of St. Peter (that is, the cross turned 180 degrees; the published image used it as a symbol of Satanism) and the Star of David (which was visually compared to the human immunodeficiency virus and the coronavirus). Apparently, the incriminating images were collages. In our opinion, posting such images online should not in itself be interpreted as a desecration of religious paraphernalia, since the publication of a collage does not imply any actions aimed at the actual objects of veneration. We also note that the legislation never defines the concept of “desecration” in any way.

Persecution against Religious Organizations and Believers

Jehovah's Witnesses

In April, prosecutions against Jehovah's Witnesses continued on the charges of involvement in the activities of local religious organizations banned as extremist. We believe that the decision to ban them had no legal grounds and consider it a manifestation of religious discrimination. It is worth reminding that the ECHR ruled on the Jehovah's Witnesses’ complaint in June 2022. The decision stated that the ban on Jehovah's Witnesses materials and organizations and sanctions against believers violated the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The ECHR demanded the end to the criminal cases under Article 282.2 CC against Jehovah's Witnesses and the release of imprisoned believers.

In April, courts in various regions passed seven sentences against 12 believers:

• On April 14, the Metallurgichesky District Court of Chelyabinsk issued a two-year suspended sentence under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC (participating in the activities of an extremist organization) to Olga Zhelavskaya.
• On April 25, the same court fined Irina Mikhailenko 120,000 rubles on a similar charge.
• On April 17, the Akhtubinsky District Court of the Astrakhan Region issued a verdict against Rinat Kiramov, Sergei Korolev, and Sergei Kosyanenko, charged with organizing the activities of an extremist organization (Article 282.2 Part 1 CC) and financing extremism (Article 282.3 Part 1 CC). Each of them was sentenced to seven years in prison.
• On April 18, the Nevinnomyssk City Court of the Stavropol Territory issued a six-year suspended sentence to Sergei Kuznetsov under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC.
• On April 26, the Leninsky District Court of Nizhny Novgorod issued a verdict against four Jehovah's Witnesses. Sergei Malyanov was found guilty under Article 282.2 Part 1 of CC and fined 700 thousand rubles. The rest were fined under Part 2 of the same article: Malyanov's daughter Svetlana in the amount of 545,000 rubles, Roman Zhivopulov – 500,000 rubles, and Oleg Konshin – 450,000 rubles.
• On April 27, the Pervorechensky District Court of Vladivostok sentenced Dmitry Barmakin to eight years in prison under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC. In 2021, he became the first Jehovah's Witness acquitted under Article 282.2, but the acquittal was later revoked and his case went back for a new trial.
• On April 28, the Asha City Court of the Chelyabinsk Region issued a six-year suspended sentence to Vadim Fedorov under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC.

In April, six new criminal cases were reported against at least seven Jehovah's Witnesses under various parts of Article 282.2 CC.

• In Lesosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Andrei Shiyan became a suspect under Part 1 of this article.
• In the Sverdlovsk Region, Andrei Bannykh, Pavel Loshchinin and Andrei Kozhushko from Nizhnyaya Tura also became suspects under Part 1.
• In the Pavlovsky District of Krasnodar Krai, a case under Part 2 and Part 1.1 of Article 282.2 CC (involvement of others in the activities of an extremist organization) was initiated against a 31-year-old Jehovah's Witness, whose name was not reported.
• In the Tambov Region, an unnamed 67-year-old believer became a suspect under Part 2.
• In the Chelyabinsk Region, a case under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC was initiated against a resident of the region, whose identity has not yet been disclosed.
• In Tatarstan, search raids related to a new case under Article 282.2 CC were carried out in Almetyevsk. There were no reports on any suspects or defendants in the case.

Hizb ut-Tahrir

On April 18, the Southern District Military Court sentenced Crimean Tatar Murat Mustafayev to four years in prison under Article 205.5 Part 2 CC (participating in the activities of a terrorist organization) and Article 278 with the use of Article 30 Part 1 CC (preparing for a violent seizure of power). As the investigation argued and the court agreed, Mustafayev became a supporter of the Hizb ut-Tahrir party (recognized as a terrorist organization in Russia) in 2015 and was spreading its ideology in Crimea. Mustafayev was detained in August 2022 as part of the “Dzhankoy group,” but the court has not yet issued a verdict on its five other members.

We believe that there were no sufficient grounds for banning Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization, since the party was never implicated in terrorist attacks. We view the charges against Hizb ut-Tahrir supporters under the “terrorist” articles of the Criminal Code, made solely based on their party activities (holding meetings, reading literature, etc.) as inappropriate. In our opinion, the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir preaches the idea of creating a worldwide Islamic caliphate, in and of itself, does not provide the grounds for charging its followers with planning a forcible seizure of power in Russia.

Banning Materials

On April 18, 2023, the Sixth Court of Cassation of General Jurisdiction overturned the decision to recognize as extremist materials the collections of hadiths Sahih al-Bukhari and Bulugh Al-Maram, as well as the first volume of the Methodical Interpretation of the Holy Quran by Abd ar-Rahman ibn Nasir as-Sa'di (Tafsir as-Sa’di). The case was returned to the court of first instance for a new trial.

These publications were banned in December 2021 by the Laishevsky District Court of the Republic of Tatarstan. In our opinion, there was no need to recognize these books as extremist, and attempts to ban collections of hadiths, including the most authoritative collection Sahih al-Bukhari, are an obvious mistake of the authorities, which discredits them in the eyes of Muslims. We believe that today's ideas of tolerance are inapplicable to medieval Islamic literature, since it describes the era of religious wars and the attitudes of that era. As for Tafsir as-Sa’di, written in 1923–1925, on the one hand, this is an authoritative interpretation of the Quran, and on the other hand, it does indeed contain repeated direct calls for an aggressive war against non-believers. Here we are faced with the imperfection of the mechanism for prohibiting materials, which does not consider the purpose and context of the publication. We believe that it is not the materials per se that should be suppressed, but the actions of propagandists who use a variety of tools, including religious literature, to justify xenophobic violence in the modern world.