Galina Kozhevnikova

Hate Language and Elections: Federal and Regional Levels

Based on the monitoring period Autumn-Winter 2007-2008

Editor: A. Verkhovsky

Moscow
September 2008

Contents

INTRODUCTION

This report is based on the findings of the seventh of a series of monitoring studies carried out as part of a coalition-based project, Hate Language in the Russian Mass Media. This project has been running since 2001 with support from the Open Society Institute and covers issues of ethno-religious intolerance.[1] This version of the report has been substantially abridged for translation into English; the full version is available in Russian from SOVA Center's website (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/213716E/21728E3/B2A44F2).

This monitoring was carried out between 1 September 2007 and March 2008, in two phases. Phase one (between 1 September and 1 December, 2007) coincided with the State Duma election campaign (based for the first time on party lists only). Phase two (between 1 December 2007 and 1 March 2008) coincided with the presidential election campaign. (At the same time, similar surveys

---

[1] This report was translated by Irina Savelieva

Currently the project is implemented by SOVA Center (http://sova-center.ru), the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations (http://cjes.ru), and the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (http://demokratia.ru).

The findings of previous monitoring phases are available only in Russian:

- *Iazyk moj… Problema e'tnicheskoj i religioznoj neterpimosti v rossijskikh SMI.* (M.: Panorama Center, 2002);

- Otchet po monitoringu, SOVA Center (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/213716E/21371EF/17B8FC0);

- G. Kozhevnikova. *Iazyk vrazhdy v predvybornoj agitatsii i vne ee*. (M.: SOVA Center, 2004); draft transaltion is avalable from SOVA web-site (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/files/xeno/hs03eng.pdf);

- Kozhevnikova. 'Iazyk vrazhdy v SMI posle Beslana: Poiski vraga i otvetstvennost' zhurnalistov' Responsibility', SOVA Center, *Nationalism and Xenophobia* (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/213716E/21728E3/492BB55;

– Kozhevnikova. 'Iazyk vrazhdy cherez god posle Beslana', *Monitoring diskriminatsii i natsional-e'kstremizma v Rossii. A collection of reports* (M.: the Foundation for Civil Society, 2006), pp. 22–54;

– Kozhevnikova. 'Iazyk vrazhdy: posle Kondopogi', *Iazyk vrazhdy protiv obshchestva* (M.: SOVA Center, 2007), pp.10–71.

were carried out in six Russian regions, but their findings are not included in the abridged version of the report).

Wherever possible and necessary, the findings were compared across all phases, starting from 2001.[2] We feel that our most valuable achievement has been making possible this comparison across different parts and phases of the monitoring effort, rather than simply providing absolute figures which may be questioned from various perspectives.[3]

We use the term *language of hate, or hate language* in a broader sense than that which is attached to the term *hate speech* in modern English. The monitors selected those publications/statements which literally fit the description of a certain type of hate language (see below), i.e. any intolerant pronouncements against an ethnic or religious group and/or its member, contributing to negative ethno-religious stereotypes. The monitors were instructed to check whether they would be offended by the same kind of statement about an ethnic or religious group they identified with. The selected materials were then categorized under a number of headings, mainly describing the types and targets of hate language and the journalist's attitude (positive, neutral or negative) towards the intolerant statement.

We use all terms describing the targets of hate language in italic, because strictly speaking, the targets are media-projected images of certain ethnic or religious groups, rather than the groups per se.

To facilitate analysis, we have used an 'aggregate' amount of hate language, i.e. the sum total of offensive statements reported by the media either neutrally or approvingly.

Before we report our findings, we should admit that we find our research methodology less accurate than before. It only documents formal expressions of intolerance or explicit xenophobia, but it does not allow us to categorize hatred expressed symbolically and/or by references to established ethno-religious stereotypes. It appears, however, that ethno-religious intolerance in the media has been shifting towards this type of hate language.

For example, *Literaturnaia Gazeta* published an article about the growth of food prices, where the author attributed the problem to "foreigners who control the markets." The article did not once mention the ethnicity of the criminal characters referred to.[4] Yet it was pretty obvious to the monitor that the author was referring to clearly ethnic stereotypes of "alien invaders of the marketplace" (implying, predominantly, natives of the Caucasus). Our methodology does not allow us to categorize such publications as expressions of hate language, which reduces our statistics and fails to reflect the actual xenophobic hostility in the sphere of information and communication.

Likewise, this methodology does not account for the serious "ethnization" of concepts which used to be ethnicity-neutral just a few years ago – such as citizenship (nationality) and place of origin. This obvious shift in perceptions caused us to include the term "migrant" under hate language at an earlier phase. However we did not regard the unwarranted mentioning of perpetrators' nationalities in the coverage of crime reports as expressions of ethnic hatred. Likewise, we did not consider attacks against Russia's foreign policy opponents as hate language, even though it was not always easy to distinguish between political and ethnic hate language, particularly when they targeted "Americans."

So we can say that our findings reflect the **minimum** level of ethno-religious aggressiveness manifested during the 2007 election campaign, while the actual level was subjectively perceived by project participants to be much higher. We now feel that our research methodology needs some serious updating and adjustment.

---

[2] After the first phase in 2001–2002, the methodology has been substantially modified. Currently some indicators cannot be reliably compared for technical reasons.

[3] For an overview of critical remarks about our methodology, see E. Ponarin, D. Dubrovskii, A. Tolkachova, R. Akifeva, 'Indeks (in)tolerantnosti pressy', *Iazyk vrazhdy protiv obshchestva*, pp. 80–86.

[4] Iuri Vigor, 'Kto otvetit za bazar?', *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 21 November 2007.

Types of Hate Language

A list of 17 distinct types of hate language below follows the same order as our statistics (except where specifically indicated otherwise).

A. calls to violence (i.e. with regard to a specific situation, indicating the target, and promoting violence as acceptable conduct; involves abstract calls, such as *Beat the Yids*!);

B. calls to discrimination, including blanket slogans;

C. veiled calls to violence and discrimination (promotion of historical or current examples of violence or discrimination; statements such as "it would be good to do so and so to someone", "it is high time…" etc.);

D. creating a negative image of an ethnic or religious group (rather than accusing them of anything in particular (see other types), the negative image is conveyed through the tone of a text or a passage);

E. justification of historical violence and discrimination (such as "Turks massacred Armenians in 1915 in self-defense");

F. publications and statements questioning historically established facts of violence and discrimination (for example, "Chechens were deported for siding with Hitler");

G. statements alleging inferiority, such as lack of cultural sophistication, intellectual abilities, lack of capacity for creative work with regard to a certain ethnic or religious group (such as "Azeris only trade in the market" [i.e. do nothing but]);

H. statements alleging historical crimes committed by a certain ethnic or religious group (such as "Poles have always plotted against Russians");

I. statements alleging the criminal nature of a certain ethnic or religious group (for example, "Roma are thieves")

J. statements alleging the moral deficiencies of a certain ethnic or religious group ("Jews are greedy"; it is important to distinguish this type from allegations of cultural or intellectual deficiency);

K. statements alleging disproportional superiority, i.e. that a certain ethnic or religious group is disproportionally represented among the wealthy, in government, in the media, etc;

L. statements alleging that a certain ethnic or religious group negatively affects society or the state ("diluting national [ethnic] identity"; "aliens [persons of non-Russian ethnicity] are turning Moscow into a non-Russian city");

M. mention of an ethnic or religious group or its members in a humiliating or offensive context (e.g. in crime reports);

N. appeals to prevent the settlement in a region (district, city, etc.) of migrants belonging to a certain ethnic or religious group (for example, protests against building a mosque in an "Orthodox city");

O. quoting radical xenophobic statements and texts without comments indicating that the journalist does not necessarily share the views of his/her interviewee; likewise, offering newspaper space to explicitly nationalist propaganda without editorial comments or polemics;

P. accusing a group of attempts to seize power or territory (literally; as distinct from appeals against their settlement in a region);

Q. denying nationality [citizenship] (i.e. describing Russian nationals of a certain ethnic identity as foreigners).

We have tentatively categorized these types of hate language based on how harsh they are:

Harsh:
- calls to violence
- calls to discrimination
- veiled calls to violence and discrimination
- appeals to prevent settlement in a region

Medium
- justification of historical violence and discrimination
- publications and statements questioning historically established facts of violence and discrimination
- statements alleging historical crimes committed by a certain ethnic or religious group in its entirety
- statements alleging the criminal nature of a certain ethnic or religious group
- statements alleging disproportional superiority of a certain ethnic or religious group
- statements alleging that a certain ethnic or religious group negatively affects society or the state
- accusing a group of attempts to seize power or territory
- denial of nationality

Mild
- creating a negative image of an ethnic or religious group
- statements alleging historical crimes committed by a certain ethnic or religious group
- statements alleging moral deficiencies of a certain ethnic or religious group
- mention of an ethnic or religious group or its members in a humiliating or offensive context
- quoting radical xenophobic statements and texts without comment

Targets of Hate Language

A list of 28 distinct targets of hate language has been made. As before, the targets will be listed in the same order as the relevant statistics below (except where specifically indicated otherwise).

1. Black [African] people
2. Americans
3. Western Europeans
4. Jews
5. Ukrainians
6. Russians
7. Roma
8. Tajiks
9. Chinese
10. Vietnamese
11. Chechens
12. Armenians
13. Azeris
14. Iraqis
15. Arabs (other than Iraqis)
16. Meskhetian Turks
17. other ethnicities of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia (other than Chechens, Armenians and Azeris)

18. Caucasus natives in general
19. Asians (in or outside the NIS, other than those explicitly mentioned);
20. other ethnic categories (i.e. more or less specific targets other than those listed above)
21. indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia (no specific target identified)
22. Orthodox Christians
23. Muslims
24. Catholics (and Uniates)
25. new and small religious groups
26. other religious categories
27. indiscriminate religious xenophobia (non-Orthodox, non-Christian, non-Muslim, etc.)
28. migrants

Sources

The list of monitored media included one daily and eight weekly TV shows, eight weekly and five daily newspapers, 22 print and broadcast media outlets in total.

Newspapers:
Daily:
1. *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*
2. *Moskovskii Komsomolets*
3. *Tvoi Den'*
4. *Gazeta*
5. *Izvestiia*
6. *Novye Izvestiia*
7. *Vremia Novostei*
8. *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*

Weekly:
9. *Russkii Kurier*
10. *Literaturnaia Gazeta*
11. *Argumenty i Fakty*
12. *Zhizn' za Vsiu Nedeliu*
13. *Rossiia*[5]

TV Shows
Daily:
1. TV debates (RTR, evening broadcast)[6]

Weekly:
2. Program Maximum (NTV)
3. Sudite Sami (First Channel)
4. K Barieru (NTV)
5. Postscriptum (TV Center)
6. Vesti Nedeli (Russia)
7. Nedelia (REN-TV)
8. Russkii Vzgliad (Moskovia)
9. 5th Studio (Russia)[7]

---

[5] Not published since 2008.

[6] Published in November 2007 and in February 2008.

[7] Not published in December 2007 and January 2008.

THE PERIOD OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Summary Findings

In total over the monitoring period, 356 entries were added to our database. This is slightly more than the total number of selected publications, because more than one entry was made for some articles to document more than one hate language type/target pair. Based on the attitude of the journalist towards the hate language s/he was reporting, the entries were distributed in the following way:

Position of the author	Support	%	Neutral	%	Disapprove	%	Total	%
Total items:	211	59.4	77	21.7	68	19.15	356	100
including discussion of the HL	2	0	3	0	11	0	16	0

Let us compare the monthly average amounts of hate language in the federal mass media at various monitoring phases: year 2002 – 192 entries per month; 2003 – 187, 2004 – 143, 2005 – 97, 2006 – 132, year 2007 – 119 entries (the monitoring was always carried out in autumn). We were surprised to find the amount of hate language slightly lower in 2007 than in 2006: we had expected the mass media, as well as political candidates, to use xenophobic rhetoric actively in the run-up to the elections.

On the other hand, in contrast to the previous year, in 2007 there were few serious factors to provoke xenophobic rhetoric – such as the Kondopoga riots and the anti-Georgian campaign in 2006.[8]

The only such factor was "the Penza recluses' case." It was reported in November 2007 that a group of doomsday believers from the village of Poganovka, Penza Oblast, had barricaded themselves in a cave to wait for judgment day which, according to the group's leader Pyotr Kuznetsov, would come in May 2008. The story triggered a hysterical reaction in the mass media and influenced hate language dynamics: usually, we observe the peak of hate language in October, but this time it occurred in November, triggered by the Poganovka case; 27 publications (i.e. 20% of all media reports containing hate language in November) were "anti-sectarian," while in previous months and at earlier monitoring phases their frequency had never exceeded 1 to 3 per month.

We have noted in previous years that a crisis (such as the hostage-taking in Moscow in 2002) usually provokes an outburst of hate language, which is not limited to targets directly relevant to the crisis, and after some decline immediately following the events, the overall level of hostility goes up and remains at a level higher than before the crisis. We can now see that in contrast to a spontaneous crisis, massive propaganda campaigns unleashed by the political leadership fail to produce the same effect: the media hysterics about Kondopoga and the anti-Georgian campaign did not increase the overall level of hate language in 2007. That said, the anti-Georgian

---

[8] In September 2006 a grassroots crime in Kondopoga, Karelia, triggered riots lasting over many days, with looting and arson attacks targeting properties of people from the Caucasus. The rioters effectively got away unpunished. The ultra-right regard the Kondopoga events as their victory in the "war against immigrants." They coined a slogan – Kondopoga is a Hero City – to encourage similar riots in other Russian regions. See details in Galina Kozhevnikova. Autumn – 2006: Under the Kondopoga Banner, SOVA-Center.ru (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/6BA2468/6BB4208/884A3C7#r2).

campaign caused hate language targeting Georgians to increase manifold in 2007, to a far higher level than in any period before 2006. In a similar way, the anti-Estonian campaign in May 2007 greatly increased the amount of hate language against Estonians.

There are grounds for moderate optimism in the dynamics of the journalists' disapproval of hate language:

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Disapproval of HL, %:	33.30	15.55	9.3	20.47	22.2	15.15	19.15

Admittedly, as we analyze the texts containing disapproval of hate language, we find that most of them are articles about xenophobia; while more such articles have appeared recently, we find hardly any disapproval of hate language elsewhere in the media.

Types of Hate Language

In the tables below, we highlight values higher than 20 and percentages higher than 5. Lines containing zero values have been removed for convenience. At this monitoring phase, we did not observe the following of the 17 hate language types: *justification of historical violence and discrimination*; statements *questioning historically established facts of violence and discrimination*; and *quoting radical xenophobic statements and texts without comment*. The observed types of hate language are listed in the tables below in decreasing order of the numbers of negative citations.

Absolute Values

HL Type:	Support	Neutral	Aggregate	Disapprove	Total
Mention in a humiliating or offensive context	**80**	**31**	**111**	14	**125**
Allege moral deficiency	**58**	13	**71**	9	**80**
Create a negative image of a group	**28**	12	**40**	6	**46**
Allege inherent criminality of a group	**23**	5	**28**	6	**34**
Allege inferiority	20	4	**24**	5	**29**
Accuse of negative influence	11	4	15	4	19
Appeal to prevent settlement in a region	9	4	13	1	14
Call to discrimination	2	3	5	8	13
Veiled calls to violence and discrimination	3	3	6	6	12
Denial of nationality	5	4	9	0	9
Allege disproportional superiority of a certain ethnic or religious group	4	2	6	3	9
Call to violence	0	1	1	8	9
Accuse a group of attempts to seize power or territory	2	2	4	1	5
Allege historical crimes of a group	2	0	2	2	4
Total	**247**	**88**	**335**	**73**	**408**

Percentages

HL Type:	Support	Neutral	Aggregate	Disapprove	Total
Mention in a humiliating or offensive context	**32.4**	**35.2**	**33.13**	**19.2**	**30.6**
Alleged moral deficiency	**23.5**	**14.8**	**21.19**	**12.3**	**19.6**
Create a negative image of a group	**11.3**	**13.6**	**11.94**	**8.22**	**11.3**
Allege inherent criminality of a group	**9.31**	**5.68**	**8.36**	**8.22**	**8.33**
Allege inferiority	**8.1**	4.55	**7.16**	**6.85**	**7.11**
Accuse of negative influence	4.45	4.55	4.48	**5.48**	4.66
Appeal to prevent settlement in a region	3.64	4.55	3.88	1.37	3.43
Call to discrimination	0.81	3.41	1.49	11	3.19
Veiled calls to violence and discrimination	1.21	3.41	1.79	**8.22**	2.94
Denial of nationality	2.02	4.55	2.69	0	2.21
Allege disproportional superiority of a certain ethnic or religious group	1.62	2.27	1.79	4.11	2.21
Call to violence	0	1.14	0.3	11	2.21
Accuse a group of attempts to seize power or territory	0.81	2.27	1.19	1.37	1.23
Allege historical crimes of a group	0.81	0	0.6	2.74	0.98
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

The most common type throughout all monitoring phases has been a tendency *to mention a group in a humiliating or offensive context* – often in the form of unnecessary emphasis on the ethnicity of participants in a criminal episode.

Mention in a humiliating or offensive context, by year, in %

	2002	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**
Aggregate	41.9	34.38	42.05	45.09	29.86	33.13
Total	38.48	32.57	37.33	35.59	28.4	30.6

The 2006 debates around a bill which would ban any mention of ethnicity in crime reports elicited a variety of responses from the media.[9]

Some publications, indeed, reduced unwarranted references to ethnicity. Our monitoring found such references to have dropped from 13 to 5 between 2007 and 2006 in *Gazeta* and from 32 to 15 in *Tvoi Den'*. Looking at the distribution of such references in *Tvoi Den'*, we assume that the commissioning editor plays a key role in deciding whether or not intolerant crime reports find their way to the press, because such reports appeared in the paper "in batches" over certain periods, usually after a long absence – for example, on September 24 and 27, and then on October 24 and 30, etc.

Moskovskii Komsomolets (MK) – the main producer of such crime reports – showed how a paper can get away with breaking this law, should it ever be adopted. Formerly, crime reports published in *MK* mentioned the suspect's ethnicity, but today they mention the country of origin, the name, and – so as to rule out any doubt – publish the suspect's photo. Between September and November 2007, 22 of the 166 published crime reports contained what could be regarded as ethnic markers, and all of these markers referred to "non-Slavs."

---

[9] See details in Galina Kozhevnikova, Alexander Verkhovsky, 'The Sowing Season in the Field of Russian Nationalism', SOVA-Center.ru (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/6BA2468/6BB4208/9845B8F#r4_1).

Differences in editorial policies showed very clearly that the inappropriate "ethnization" of crime reports was intentional. For example, on 23 September 2007 a driver shot and killed two road workers for damaging his car. On September 24, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, *Komsomol'skaia Pravda (KP)* and *Tvoi Den'* reported the incident emphasizing that the shooter was "a native of the Caucasus." On the following day, the first two papers published a photo fit of the shooter; even though the facial features did not resemble "a native of the Caucasus," *KP*, once again, emphasized the shooter's alleged origin. *MK* did not reiterate the allegation, but did not correct the original report either, and referred readers to it once again. A month later, the shooter was apprehended and turned out to have nothing to do with the Caucasus.[10]

The second most common type as revealed by the recent monitoring was *alleged moral deficiency*, the third was *creating a negative image of a group*, and the fourth was *alleged inherent criminality of a group*. These top four are pretty common for all phases of our monitoring, and the proportion of statements under these four headings increased between 2006 and 2007.

The reason for such an increase, and an important indicator of positive development, was a dramatic drop in harsher forms of hate language over the same period:

HL Type	Call to violence		Call to discrimination		Veiled call to violence and discrimination		Appeal to prevent settlement in a region	
	Number	%[11]	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
2002	35	3.29	39	3.67	22	2.07	49	4.61
2003	19	1.8	42	3.99	17	1.61	51	4.84
2004	10	4.01	11	5.07	7	3.23	12	5.53
2005	11	4.66	7	2.97	6	2.54	30	12.71
2006	23	3.55	45	6.94	42	6.48	31	4.78
2007	9	2.21	13	3.19	12	2.94	14	3.43

For the first time over years of observation, we report a drop in all harsh types of hate language, and the current rates are either the lowest or close to the lowest over the entire project period.

Admittedly, the above statistics include the statements made by ultra-nationalists quoted either with disapproval or neutrally, and the amount of such quoting dropped dramatically due to intentional and demonstrative absence of reports about the Russian March in the media.

For the sake of comparison, see below the dynamics reflecting journalists' attitudes towards harsh statements. Following a drop at the previous phase, the level of disapproval across three of the four harsher types either peaked or was about to peak; however, the most common type, which comes third in the table below and is summarized in a common Russian phrase "*Ponaekhali tut…*" [meaning 'they arrived over a period of time, in large enough numbers to become an annoyance'], met with virtually no disapproval, and its rates were the lowest over the years of our observations.

---

[10] See Khairbek Almakaev, 'Voditel' "Mersedesa" rasstrelial dorozhnykh rabochikh', *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, 24 September. Almakaev, 'Sostavlen fotorobot voditelia "mersa", rasstreliavshego dorozhnykh rabochikh, Ibid. 25 September. Almakaev, 'Poiman voditel', rasstreliavshii dorozhnykh rabochikh', Ibid. 26 October. 'Voditel' rasstrelial dorozhnykh rabochikh za userdie', *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, 24 October 2007. 'Moskovskikh rabochikh rasstrelial bezrabotnyi iz Sankt-Peterburga', Ibid. 26 October 2007.

[11] Of the total amount of hate language.

Disapproval of Harsh Types of Hate Language, %[12]

HL Type	Call to violence	Call to discrimination	Appeal to prevent settlement in a region	Veiled call to violence and discrimination
2001	80	59.22	59.03	24.32
2002	65.71	53.84	32.65	27.27
2003	52.63	52.38	13.72	17.64
2004	80	42.9	33.3	27.3
2005	72.7	70.3	60	66.7
2006	47.8	26.67	19.35	30.95
2007	88.89	61.54	7.14	50

Targets of Hate Language

Similarly to the tables listing the hate language types, below we highlight values higher than 20 and percentages higher than 5. Empty lines are omitted. At this phase of our monitoring a few ethnicities were not mentioned as hate language targets: Vietnamese, Iraqis and Meskhetian Turks. The observed targets of hate language are listed in the tables below in decreasing order of the numbers of negative citations.

Absolute Values

HL Target:	Support	Neutral	Aggregate	Disapprove	Total
Caucasus natives in general	**28**	8	**36**	8	**44**
Indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia	12	8	20	**21**	**41**
New and small religious groups	**21**	9	**30**	2	**32**
Migrants	15	9	**24**	5	**29**
Other ethnic categories	18	5	**23**	4	**27**
Western Europeans	16	4	20	4	**24**
Other ethnicities of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia (other than Chechens, Armenians and Azeris)	13	3	16	5	**21**
Chechens	13	5	18	2	20
Jews	9	4	13	7	20
Muslims	10	6	16	3	19
Tajiks	4	6	10	5	15
Russians	12	2	14	1	15
Americans	10	1	11	4	15
Asians (in or outside the NIS, other than those explicitly mentioned)	6	8	14		14
Black [African] people	4	5	9	3	12
Azeris	8	1	9	2	11
Ukrainians	3	3	6	5	11
Chinese	8	0	8	0	8
Roma	6	2	8	0	8
Armenians	4	0	4	1	5
Indiscriminate religious xenophobia	0	0	0	4	4
Arabs (other than Iraqis)	3	1	4	0	4
Other religious categories	0	0	0	2	2

---

[12] The total amount of hate language across these types is 100%.

Catholics (and Uniates)	1	1	2	0	2
Orthodox Christians	2	0	2	0	2
Total	**226**	**91**	**317**	**88**	**405**

Percentages

HL Target:	Support	Neutral	Aggregate	Disapprove	Total
Caucasus natives in general	**12.4**	**8.79**	**11.36**	**9.09**	**10.9**
Indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia	**5.31**	**8.79**	**6.31**	**23.9**	**10.1**
New and small religious groups	**9.29**	**9.89**	**9.46**	**2.27**	**7.9**
Migrants	**6.64**	**9.89**	**7.57**	**5.68**	**7.16**
Other ethnic categories	**7.96**	**5.49**	**7.26**	4.55	**6.67**
Western Europeans	**7.08**	4.4	**6.31**	4.55	**5.93**
Other ethnicities of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia (other than Chechens, Armenians and Azeris)	**5.75**	3.3	**5.05**	**5.68**	**5.19**
Chechens	**5.75**	**5.49**	**5.68**	2.27	4.94
Jews	3.98	4.4	4.1	**7.95**	4.94
Muslims	4.42	**6.59**	**5.05**	3.41	4.69
Tajiks	1.77	**6.59**	3.15	**5.68**	3.7
Russians	**5.31**	2.2	4.42	1.14	3.7
Americans	4.42	1.1	3.47	4.55	3.7
Asians (in or outside the NIS, other than those explicitly mentioned)	2.65	**8.79**	4.42	0	3.46
Black [African] people	1.77	**5.49**	2.84	3.41	2.96
Azeris	3.54	1.1	2.84	2.27	2.72
Ukrainians	1.33	3.3	1.89	**5.68**	2.72
Chinese	3.54	0	2.52	0	1.98
Roma	2.65	2.2	2.52	0	1.98
Armenians	1.77	0	1.26	1.14	1.23
Indiscriminate religious xenophobia	0	0	0	4.55	0.99
Arabs (other than Iraqis)	1.33	1.1	1.26	0	0.99
Other religious categories	0	0	0	2.27	0.49
Catholics (and Uniates)	0.44	1.1	0.63	0	0.49
Orthodox Christians	0.88	0	0.63	0	0.49
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

Since the previous phase, the relative distribution of hate language targets has changed substantially. Just one year before, six of the 24 observed targets attracted more than 70% of the xenophobic statements,[13] whereas during the most recent phase, only two targets – *Caucasus natives* and *indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia* – had crossed the 10% threshold, and the overall distribution of hate statements was more equal.

The 2006 top target – *indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia* – was surpassed by *Caucasus natives* in 2007, whereas their relative proportions dropped from 15.3 % and 14.6 % to 10.1% and 10.9%, respectively.

---

[13] Indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia; Caucasus natives in general; other ethnicities of the Caucasus; Chechens; migrants; and Muslims.

Caucasus-related targets

% of the total amount of HL	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Caucasus natives in general	7.54	8.77	11.7	10	14.67	10.9
Other ethnicities of the Caucasus…	3.61	4.67	13.14[14]	1.82	13.35	5.19
Meskhetian Turks	0.21	0.57	0.49	0.91	0	0
Azeris	2.34	4.86	2.93	2.27	2.86	2.72
Armenians	1.49	2.00	1.95	1.36	1.9	1.23
Chechens	23.14	5.43	28.8	8.64	10.65	4.94
Sum total of anti-Caucasus statements	**38.33**	**26.3**	**59.01**	**25**	**43.43**	**24.98**

It is pretty clear why the *Chechens* and *other ethnicities of the Caucasus* were targeted less often. Under the latter heading, ethnic *Georgians* were most often targeted in 2006, but the anti-Georgian campaign was over by 2007. As to the former, the official coverage of Chechnya is now emphatically positive, and Chechenophobic rhetoric has been banished from the public arena, although we have no reason to believe that there is less Chechenophobia in society.

Interestingly, the overall level of anti-Caucasus rhetoric dropped in the run-up to important elections (in 2005, the elections to the Moscow City Duma were an important focus for the federal press).

There has also been a change in the indicators for the target *indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia*, which has been top of the list since 2005, when we first observed the phenomenon of replacing a concrete "enemy image" in the media (*Chechen, Muslim,* etc.) with an abstract one (*non-Russian*).

Hate Language dynamics: indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia, in %[15]

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Total	2.34	5.72	3.41	20	15.26	10.1
Aggregate	1.91	4.64	1.91	12.21	12.38	6.3
Aggregate HL/HL Disapproval Rate	68.19/ 31.81	71.67/ 28.33	42.86/ 57. 14	47.73/ 52.27	69.8/ 30.2	48.79/ 51.21

The downward trend in percentage terms, in our opinion, is partially due to the fact that the term *migrant* has in recent years increasingly been used to describe an abstract "non-Russian" (and became a separate monitoring category in 2006). This category also skillfully used by propaganda campaigns to accommodate various targets (such as *Estonians*, because in autumn 2007 traces of the anti-Estonian campaign were still noticeable) and is affected by whether or not journalists cite nationalist slogans (in 2007, in contrast to other years, the mass media remained silent about the annual November Russian March).

The distribution of other hate language targets has changed as well.

Excluding collective terms such as other *ethnicities of the Caucasus* or *other ethnic categories* from our comparison, we find that *new and small religious groups* come third (7. 9 %), and *migrants* come fourth (7.16% of all statements).

---

[14] Including the *Ingushis*, considered separately in 2003 due to the events in Beslan.

[15] The total number of statements referring to this target is 100%.

We began to include *migrants* as an ethnic target in our monitoring only in 2006, when the mass media had virtually stopped using this term other than in an ethnic context. This category immediately made it to the top in terms of the number of negative statements. Our monitoring over the two most recent years constantly finds anti-migrant rhetoric, even though the percentage of negative statements against *migrants* dropped from 10.15% to 7.16 %.

Increased hostility against *new religious groups* was clearly provoked by the Penza recluses' case.

We did not find statements describing the recluses as "sectarians" and Kuznetsov's group as a "sect", etc., to be hate language. Regardless of the clearly negative meaning recently attached to the term "sect" in Russia, we find the choice of this term reasonable, if not for official or legal language, then at least for common usage and mass media reporting.[16] Likewise, we did not consider personal attacks against members of the group as hate language. However, regrettably, many mass media outlets found it hard to stay within these boundaries. Reporters used the Penza recluses' story as a pretext to demand less freedom of religion and to describe sects as "harmful", usually with reference to ancient stories which had no connection at all to the Penza case. At the same time, disapproval of such "anti-sectarian" hate language was among the lowest observed throughout our monitoring, all targets included.

As is often the case, an unusual situation without precedents in the recent media coverage provoked an aggressive, unprofessional reaction, an outburst of xenophobic rhetoric against the alleged "culprits". Admittedly, the above characteristics do not apply to some of the monitored media: *Gazeta*, *Vremia Novostei* and *Novye Izvestiia* limited their coverage to well-balanced articles about problems associated with religious sects, and didn't make a scandal of the issue. In contrast, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, *Izvestiia*, *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, *Tvoi Den',* and to some extent *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, clearly demonstrated the tactics used effectively by the Russian media to discredit sects.

The first and particularly emotionally charged tactic was to allege poor treatment of children (*they are keeping them as hostages, children are getting ill but the recluses refuse all medication)* and pets (*"they left a kitten outside"* etc.).

The second tactic was to allege aggressiveness, proneness to violent crime (*"drawings made in human blood were found in the home of the sect's leader"* etc.).

And finally, the third tactic was to accuse the recluses of undermining national security (*"the sect's legs grow from abroad"* [alleged foreign influence], [young male] recluses are trying to avoid military service, one of the female recluses used to have access to classified defense documents).

However, the hostility gradually decreased (while the Penza recluses continued to make headlines until late January 2008), from comparing the recluses to Wahhabi and accusing them of undermining the nation, to dismissing them as "sick people" and using derogatory epithets.

The proportion of antisemitic statements at this phase of the monitoring, even though it was not particularly high, reached its maximum since 2003, when *Vecherniaia Ryazan* – a newspaper where antisemitism was official editorial policy – was added to the monitored media.

The bulk of antisemitic statements which did not trigger journalists' disapproval consisted of jokes, notably more numerous at this monitoring phase than before. However, there were some explicitly antisemitic publications other than jokes – in *Literaturnaia Gazeta*.[17]

---

[16] The precise academic usage of the term *sect* lies outside the scope of our media monitoring.

[17] Lev Pirogov, 'Ispravleniye oshibok', *Literaturnaia Gazeta*. 28 November 2007; Georgi Dobysh, 'Otriakhnulis' ot starogo mira', Ibid., 5 September 2007.

Proportion of antisemitic statements, by year

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Aggregate	5.1	6.48	1.27	2.91	1.66	4.1
Total	7.75	7.53	1.95	4.55	2.54	4.94

While at this phase we note a relatively high level of disapproval towards hate language, some significant targets never elicit any sympathy from journalists; as in the previous year, these are *Chinese* and *Roma*.

Disapproval of hate language, by main targets[18]

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia	31.81	28.33	57.14	52.27	30.2	51.22
Migrants	–	–	-	-	6.25	17.86
Chechens	11	10.53	22.03	5.21	5.97	10
Caucasus natives in general	35.2	8.71	29.15	9.09	14.13	21.05
Some total of anti-Caucasus statements	17.45	9.78	28.92	5.5	10.98	19.35

Hate Language aggregate tables

Type/target table

Hereafter, where the journalists' attitudes to hate language are not broken down, aggregate indicators of *support* or *neutral* are used. In the table below, we highlight values higher than 5.

Lines and columns with zero values have been deleted, including targets such as *Vietnamese, Iraqis, Meskhetian Turks, other religious categories,* and *indiscriminate religious xenophobia*; and hate language types such as *justification of historical violence and discrimination*; statements *questioning historically established facts of violence and discrimination*; and *quoting radical xenophobic statements and texts without comment*.

A	B	C	D	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	P	Q	Total
Black [African] people														
0	0	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	5	1	0	1	**12**
Americans														
0	0	0	1	4	0	0	5	0	1	2	0	0	0	**13**
Western Europeans														
0	0	0	1	2	0	1	**12**	0	3	4	0	0	0	**23**
Jews														
1	0	0	2	0	1	0	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	**14**
Ukrainians														
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	0	0	**7**
Russians														
0	2	0	1	1	0	0	**9**	0	0	1	0	0	0	**14**
Roma														
0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	**6**	0	0	0	**9**
Tajiks														

---

[18] The total number of statements referring to this target is 100%.

														Total
0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	1	**11**
Chinese														
0	0	0	5	1	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	**11**
Chechens														
0	0	0	1	0	0	7	2	0	0	**8**	0	0	1	**19**
Armenians														
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	4
Azeris														
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	**6**	0	1	0	**10**
Arabs (other than Iraqis)														
0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	**6**
Other ethnicities of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia (other than Chechens, Armenians and Azeris)														
0	0	0	2	2	0	1	5	0	0	**10**	0	0	0	**20**
Caucasus natives in general														
0	0	0	2	0	0	3	2	4	0	**27**	0	0	4	**42**
Asians (in or outside the NIS, other than those explicitly mentioned)														
0	0	0	1	2	0	0	4	1	0	5	2	0	1	**16**
Other ethnic categories														
0	0	0	2	7	0	2	**8**	1	0	3	0	0	1	**24**
Indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia														
0	2	**6**	2	0	2	0	5	0	0	5	2	1	2	**27**
Orthodox Christians														
0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Muslims														
0	0	0	2	0	0	3	4	0	0	7	4	0	0	**20**
Catholics (and Uniates)														
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
New and small religious groups														
0	1	0	**8**	3	0	4	4	0	**10**	9	1	1	0	**41**
Migrants														
0	0	0	7	2	0	**6**	5	0	2	2	4	0	2	**30**
Total														
1	5	**6**	44	27	3	33	82	7	16	117	17	4	14	**377**

The table above shows the ethnic and religious stereotypes present in the Russian mass media. Besides mention *in a humiliating or offensive context* applicable to most of the monitored targets, we find a major redistribution of negative references as compared to the previous year.

While back in 2006 *moral deficiency* was mostly attributed to *natives of the Caucasus* and *migrants*, at this phase of the monitoring such attacks targeted *Western Europeans* (12 statements) and *Russians* (nine). It should be noted that *Russians*, like *Jews*, mainly feature in jokes. Jokes about *Russians* often mention alcohol in some way or another.

Most statements *alleging inferiority* refer to *other ethnic groups* in the form of jokes; six of the seven make fun of the alleged sluggishness of *Estonians / natives of the Baltic region*. No group was targeted by such statements during the previous monitoring phase.

New religious groups are most often accused of *negative influence*, while at earlier phases *migrants* were targeted by this type of hate language.

Just two findings remain unchanged since 2006.

Chechens continue to be accused of *criminality* (seven statements), but less than before. Again, as in earlier monitoring phases, we can see how strong the terrorist stereotype is: any explosion (even of household gas) reported in Russia causes the journalists to suggest a Chechen

connection as their first theory. This monitoring phase (covering the explosion of a bus in Togliatti on 31 October) was no exception.[19]

As to *veiled calls to violence and discrimination* (in other words, slogans like *Kondopoga is a Hero City)*, these usually refer to no one in particular and fall under *indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia.* This time all such statements without exception are listed under this target.

Denial of nationality based on ethnicity and expressed as broad hints often – but not always – targets *Caucasus natives in general.* An article in *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* contained an exotic passage about *illegals*: *"Even the illegals have clear caste distinctions. The highest [caste] are **Russians** with Slavic facial features…"* [20] (emphasis added, ***G. K.***). The journalist uses the terms *illegals, migrant workers* and *immigrants* as synonyms, randomly and interchangeably throughout the text, creating a shocking impression.

We should mention a sharp (from 18 to seven) drop in cases of *mentioning in a humiliating or offensive context* with regard to Muslims. This means, in practical terms, that five years after the Nord-Ost hostage-taking crisis, and two years after the secret ban on the use of certain terms "to report events in the North Caucasus"[21] – the term *shakhidka,* or female Islamist suicide bomber, is going out of use.

Tables of generalized categories

Traditionally, we analyze intolerant statements based on generalized types and targets of hate language. Above, we described groups of hate language types based on how harsh they are. The targets are grouped as follows:

Natives of Asian countries outside the NIS:
- Chinese
- Vietnamese
- Iraqis
- Arabs (other than Iraqis)

Natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia:
- Tajiks
- Chechens
- Armenians
- Azeris
- Meskhetian Turks
- other ethnicities of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia
- Caucasus natives in general

The target *Asians in and outside the NIS* is equally divided between the two generalized categories above; therefore, the table contains fractions.

The **West** group includes *Americans* and *Western Europeans*.

The **migrants** group is treated separately since the term has multiple meanings, and it is not always possible to distinguish between its ethnic and religious components in a specific text. We treat the target **Jews** separately for the same reason.

The rest of ethnic targets are treated under **Others**:
- Black [African] people
- Ukrainians
- Russians

[19] 'Sleduiuschaia ostanovka – terror', *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, 1 October 2007.

[20] Evgenia Suprychova, 'Kak ia byla gastarbaiterom v Moskve', *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, 19 September 2007.

[21] 'Tsenzura ili etika? Gosudarstvennomu TV – gosudarstvennuiu politkorrektnost', SOVA Center, *Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia*, 9 November 2005 (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/213716E/21398CB/659A02B).

- Roma
- Other ethnic categories
- Indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia

All targets defined by religion are included under **religious groups**.

Absolute aggregate values

	Natives of Asian countries outside the NIS	Natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia	West	Jews	Others	Religious groups	Migrants	Total
Harsh	3	2	0	1	13	6	4	29
Medium	5	24	5	1	13	19	10	77
Mild	17	88	31	12	67	40	16	271
Total	25	114	36	14	93	65	30	377

In percentages by type

	Natives of Asian countries outside the NIS	Natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia	West	Jews	Others	Religious groups	Migrants	Total
Harsh	10.34	6.9	0	3.45	44.83	20.69	13.79	100
Medium	6.49	31.17	6.49	1.3	16.88	24.68	12.99	100
Mild	6.27	32.47	11.44	4.43	24.72	14.76	5.904	100
Total	6.63	30.2	9.55	3.71	24.7	17.2	7.96	100

In percentages by target

	Natives of Asian countries outside the NIS	Natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia	West	Jews	Others	Religious groups	Migrants	Total
Harsh	12	1.75	0	7.14	13.98	9.231	13.33	7.69
Medium	20	21.05	13.89	7.14	13.98	29.23	33.33	20.42
Mild	68	77.19	86.11	85.71	72.04	61.54	53.33	71.88
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The tables above reveal the degree of hostility against relatively homogeneous groups of targets.

In general proportions of different hate language types throughout the monitoring phases are as follows:

Hate language intensity, by year, in %[22]

%	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Harsh	10	11.61	11.31	12.63	10.71	18.72	7.69
Medium	40	22.19	19.21	20.53	17.86	32.95	20.42
Mild	49	66.2	69.48	66.84	71.43	48.33	71.88

[22] The total number of negative statements accepted without disapproval is 100%.

We observe only minor variations by year, with the exception of the unusual statistics in 2006. The only visible trend is the aforementioned drop in harsher hate language.

We suspect though, that the dramatic drop in hate language intensity between 2006 and 2007 had nothing to do with tolerance in Russian society. Firstly, in the run-up to elections, access to mass media was often denied to non-mainstream politicians, including those prone to xenophobic slogans, and secondly, media were probably scared of potential sanctions for extremism.[23]

Aggregate targets, by year[24]

%	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Natives of Asian countries outside the NIS	9.74	12.39	4.21	8.16	3.7	6.63
Natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia	40.36	31.60	54.74	37.24	48.26	30.2
West	11.89	10.77	3.68	7.14	3.19	9.55
Jews	4.87	7.45	1.05	4.59	1.31	3.71
Others	22.85	29.44	12.11	31.63	23.51	24.7
Religious groups	10.30	8.35	24.21	11.22	7.55	17.2
Migrants	-	-	-	-	12.48	7.96

As we can see, the trends vary within each group, and the 2007 statistics are different from those of other years, although we see some similarities with 2003 and 2005, i.e. run-ups to earlier federal and Moscow city elections.

Despite the fluctuations across all years, *natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia* top the list every time, due, of course, to *Caucasophobia*. It is worth noting that, in this period, the percentage for this category is the lowest since the project began.

It is important to note that, until 2005, natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia were targeted by harsher hate language more often than any other group. Following the 2005 riots in a Paris suburb – reported by the Russian media from a racist, rather than a social perspective – anti-migrant rhetoric ensured that more than half (52%) of harsher hate language was directed against the target *others*. From that moment on, the proportion of hate language targeted against *others* and *migrants* began to exceed (and substantially) that targeted against *natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia* and *natives of Asia outside the NIS*:

Harsher forms of hate language, by target, by year

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia and natives of Asia outside the NIS	61.29	52.38	50	33.34	37.98	17.24
Others and migrants	24.19	30.16	25	52.38	52.72	58.6

The category *others* comes second since 2005 due to stronger emphasis on *indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia*.

---

[23] See details of unwarranted anti-extremist sanctions against mass media in Galina Kozhevnikova, Autumn 2007: Nazi Raids, Russian Marches, and Putin as Schtirlitz, SOVA-Center.ru (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/6BA2468/6BB4208/A886251#r4).

[24] 2001 is excluded from the comparison, because the grouping of generalized targets was different.

Attitudes to other *aliens* vary depending on the situation. For example, *religious groups* were targeted more often than others in 2004 after Beslan (mostly with anti-Islamic rhetoric), and today their share of attacks (16.5%) is due to the Penza recluses' crisis.

Hate Language in the run-up to elections

In tandem with our standard monitoring, we carried out a separate study of hate language in the context of election campaigning, both in the media selected for the broader monitoring, and beyond.

We mostly used the same headings as in our study of the hate language in the run-up to the 2003 parliamentary elections, but where the statistics were insignificant, we dropped the headings.

Our broader, standard monitoring revealed just 32 election campaign-related publications containing hate language, out of a total of 356 hate language cases (i.e. hate language specifically related to the elections accounted for 8.99% of all documented cases). Back in 2003, the proportion of election campaign hate language was higher – 12.15% of all entries.[25] However, a significant difference was that the Communist Party mouthpiece *Sovetskaia Rossiia* was monitored in 2003, but not in 2007.

Articles relevant to the elections	Support	Neutral	Aggregate	Disapprove	Total
2007	12	11	23	9	32
2003	47	19	66	31	97

The share of disapproval concerning hate language in the run-up to the elections is about the same: 28.1% in 2007 vs. 26.77% in 2003.

We conclude that in 2007, as in 2003, intolerant statements related to the election campaign did not contribute substantially to the overall level of media hostility.

Hate Language in the media in the run-up to the elections[26]

	Support		Neutral		Disapprove		Total	
	2003	2007	2003	2007	2003	2007	2003	2007
HL is used by a candidate or a member of a political party	38	5	13	3	23	4	74	13
HL is used against a candidate or a member of a political party	7	0	0	0	4	0	11	0
A candidate or a party member is mentioned in association with HL	9	2	3	2	5	4	17	8
The media report is about the forthcoming elections, but does not mention any candidates or party members	19	6	5	6	4	3	28	15
Total	73	13	21	11	36	11	130	35

We can observe from the table above that candidates and party members significantly reduced their use of hate language: their speech accounted for over half of all campaign-related hate language in 2003, while in 2007 it accounted for slightly more than one third. The growth

---

[25] The findings of the federal monitoring, without a regional component.

[26] Since more than one item could be included under one heading, the total exceeds the overall number of materials.

rate of hate language followed the same general trajectory in both years, rising steadily and peaking just before the election.

Hate Language rates in the run-up to the elections

	September	October	November	1–7 December
2003	1	22	34	12
2007	3	12	16	-

The low absolute figures were due to less campaigning in 2007 as compared to 2003: the overwhelmingly dominant United Russia Party simply did not need to rely on the voters' xenophobic sentiments, whilst other parties and candidates either stayed away from campaigning altogether, or avoided the government-controlled media.

Where it was possible to determine the party affiliation of the hate language source, we found that in nine cases the source was United Russia, in three cases the LDPR, in three cases right-wing radicals – the People's Union (*Narodnyi soyuz*) and the Russian Patriots party (*Patrioty Rossii*) – in two cases from A Just Russia (*Spravedlivaia Rossiia*) and in one case from the Union of Right Forces (*Soiuz pravykh sil*). The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) hardly appealed to xenophobic sentiments at all, in sharp contrast to their 2003 campaign.

Surprisingly, in 2007 journalists disapproved of three out of nine intolerant statements made by United Russia members, while in 2003 they had only disapproved of one United Russia hate statement out of nine.

The numbers are too small for quantitative analysis, so we can only report that politicians, including members of the 'ruling party', used hate language against a range of targets, the top three triggers being migrantophobia, hostility towards the West (such as rants about "Europe's excessive materialism" [lack of spirituality, *bezdukhovnost'*]), and indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia.

Black [African] people came fourth on the list of hate language targets; in this case, as a variation of anti-migrant rhetoric, as with statements made against Arabs. Most racist statements were made by writer Anatoly Gladilin, who shared his perspective on immigration in France in the context of the Russian elections, reiterating the racist theory of the 2005 Paris riots and verbally attacking French nationals of African origin.

The only anti-Russian statement was voiced by a United Russia member, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, who expressed disapproval of mixed Russian-Chechen marriages in a press interview.

The Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPR), in 2007 as in 2003, once again campaigned to "protect the Russian people". This time, they abandoned their 2003 slogan *We Are for the Poor, We Are for the Russians* – which, reportedly, had seriously undermined their reputation in Russia's ethnic republics – replacing it by *Good for Russians, Good for All*. We did not consider the new slogan to be hate language, but the rest of their campaign content remained unchanged. Specifically, an issue of the *LDPR* newspaper featured a keynote article by Vladimir Zhirinovskii entitled *Russian Power* and containing a series of discriminatory statements (including the slogan We *Are for the Poor, We Are for the Russians*) and references to xenophobic myths.

We note, however, that Zhirinovskii's 2007 campaign had clearly been designed to appeal to diverse audiences. As a result, their campaign messages were inconsistent and often contradictory: for example, their newspaper *Zhirinovskii's Time* (*Vremia Zhirinovskogo*) published a surprisingly sober and rational article by the LDPR leader about the need to revise Russia's immigration policies to facilitate the integration of immigrants, whose contribution is vital for Russia, and help them develop the identity of Russian citizens.[27] This reasonable article,

---

[27] 'Dlia russkikh ne byvaet chuzikh detei', *Vremia Zhirinovskogo*, 29 October 2007.

though, was buried within the newspaper, while the front page featured the slogan *We're Running for the Duma to Give Russia back to the Russians,* and a host of ethnocentric quotations.

Xenophobic verbal attacks targeted the opposition party Union of Right Forces (SPS)[28] in the run-up to the elections (reminding us of a similar practice of using 'anti-fascist' rhetoric to discredit political protesters). Specifically, an article in *Tvoi Den'* alleged that SPS campaigners were "illegal foreigners," some of them "with a criminal history," concluding: *"like SPS candidates – like their campaigners."*[29]

And finally, we can see that – compared to our findings in the broader monitoring – hate language associated with election campaigning tends towards harsher forms.

	Harsh	%	Medium	%	Mild	%	Total
Total over the period	29	7.69	77	20.42	271	71.88	377
In the run-up to elections	12	24	15	30	23	46	50

---

[28] We are not analyzing the media campaign to discredit SPS in the run-up to the elections, because it lies outside the scope of our research.

[29] Anton Stepanov, 'Kriminal'ny vybor SPS', *Tvoi Den'*, 30 November 2007.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Summary Findings

The monitoring phase between 2 December 2007 and 1 March 2008 corresponded to the presidential campaign. The lengthy winter holidays and a carefully cleansed information space during the run-up to the presidential election resulted in findings which radically differed from what we have observed before for many years during the same period in autumn. We have reason to believe that by now, after the elections, the usual pattern has returned; our next monitoring round in the autumn of 2008 will show whether or not this is the case.

A total of 202 entries were made over the three months of monitoring, and the summary findings look as follows:

Position of the author	Support	%	Neutral	%	Disapprove	%	Total
Total items:	135	66.83	52	25.74	15	7.43	202
including discussion of the HL	1	0	0	0	3	0	4

As opposed to the parliamentary phase, a downward trend was observed during the presidential campaign, taking into account almost two weeks of mass media silence in January:

Month	1st month	2nd month	3d month
Parliamentary campaign (autumn 2007)	91	128	136
Presidential campaign (winter 2007–2008)	80	48	73

Furthermore, researchers who conducted the monitoring shared a subjective impression that as the presidential elections approached, media reports progressively lost any substance or emotion, and were reduced to "good news in a period of stability." The only discordant note was the Penza recluses' story, keeping the public interested through February. During the run-up to the presidential elections, 20 of the 202 intolerant statements were about the Penza recluses.

The rates of disapproval of hate language dropped to one third of that observed during the run-up to the parliamentary elections: from 19. 5% to 6.5%, the lowest observed throughout the entire period of our research.

Types of Hate Language

In the run-up to the presidential elections, hate language, if not massive, was rather diverse: of the 17 hate language types described above just one was not observed, namely *quoting radical xenophobic statements and texts without comment*.

Absolute Values

HL Type:	Support	Neutral	Aggregate	Disapprove	Total
Mention in a humiliating or offensive context	**77**	**27**	**104**	1	**105**
Allege moral deficiency	**29**	7	**36**	0	**36**
Allege inherent criminality of a group	14	0	14	0	14
Create a negative image of a group	6	7	13	2	15
Allege inferiority	8	5	13	0	13
Allege disproportional superiority of a certain ethnic or religious group	7	1	8	3	11
Accuse of negative influence	8	0	8	0	8

	Support	Neutral	Aggregate	Disapprove	Total
Accuse a group of attempts to seize power or territory	3	3	6	3	9
Veiled calls to violence and discrimination	3	1	4	4	8
Appeal to prevent settlement in a region	2	1	3	2	5
Denial of nationality	1	1	2	0	2
Call to violence	1	0	1	2	3
Call to discrimination	1	0	1	1	2
Allege historical crimes of a group	1	0	1	0	1
Justify historical violence and discrimination	0	1	1	0	1
Publications and statements questioning historically established facts of violence and discrimination	0	0	0	1	1
Total	**161**	**54**	**215**	**19**	**234**

Percentages

HL Type:	Support	Neutral	Aggregate	Disapprove	Total
Mention in a humiliating or offensive context	**47.83**	**50**	**48.37**	**5.26**	**44.87**
Allege moral deficiency	**18.01**	**13**	**16.74**	**0**	**15.38**
Allege inherent criminality of a group	**8.7**	0	**6.51**	0	**5.98**
Create a negative image of a group	3.73	**13**	**6.05**	**10.53**	**6.41**
Allege inferiority	4.97	**9.26**	**6.05**	0	**5.56**
Allege disproportional superiority of a certain ethnic or religious group	4.35	1.85	3.72	**15.79**	4.70
Accuse of negative influence	4.97	0	3.72	0	3.42
Accuse a group of attempts to seize power or territory	1.86	**5.56**	2.79	**15.79**	3.85
Veiled calls to violence and discrimination	1.86	1.85	1.86	**21.05**	3.42
Appeal to prevent settlement in a region	1.24	1.85	1.39	**10.53**	2.14
Denial of nationality	0.62	1.85	0.93	0	0.85
Call to violence	0.62	0	0.47	**10.53**	1.28
Call to discrimination	0.62	0	0.47	**5.26**	0.85
Allege historical crimes of a group	0.62	0	0.47	0	0.4
Justify historical violence and discrimination	0	1.85	0.47	0	0.43
Publications and statements questioning historically established facts of violence and discrimination	0	0	0	**5.26**	0.43
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

The top four were the same as before the parliamentary elections, but two items – *alleging inherent criminality of a group* and *creating a negative image* – swapped places.

Almost half of all hate language was *mention in a negative context*, reaching the highest level ever observed in our monitoring for this type. It may be related to the season's holidays: the number of features (interviews, analytical reports, debates, etc.) decreased, while news reporting (including crime reports) continued to be published at the same rate or even higher.

Targets of Hate Language

At this phase, we did not observe any intolerant statements against *Iraqis*, *Arabs*, *Meskhetian Turks*, *Orthodox Christians*, *Catholics and Uniates*, and *other religious groups*.

HL Target	Support	Neutral	Aggregate	Disapprove	Total
Migrants	20	6	**26**	1	**27**
New and small religious groups	16	4	20	0	20
Caucasus natives in general	14	5	19	0	19
Indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia	9	2	11	7	18
Other ethnic categories	10	6	16	0	16
Tajiks	10	2	12	0	12
Western Europeans	9	2	11	1	12
Other ethnicities of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia (other than Chechens, Armenians and Azeris)	9	2	11	0	11
Americans	8	2	10	0	10
Asians (in or outside the NIS, other than those explicitly mentioned)	5	4	9	0	9
Roma	6	3	9	0	9
Ukrainians	7	1	8	0	8
Jews	0	2	2	6	8
Chechens	3	4	7	0	7
Chinese	6	1	7	0	7
Russians	4	3	7	0	7
Azeris	3	3	6	1	7
Muslims	3	2	5	1	6
Black [African] people	5	0	5	0	5
Vietnamese	3	0	3	0	3
Armenians	1	1	2	0	2
Indiscriminate religious xenophobia	0	0	0	1	1
Total	**151**	**55**	**206**	**18**	**224**

Percentages

HL Target:	Support	Neutral	Aggregate	Disapprove	Total
Migrants	**13.25**	**10.91**	**12.62**	**5.56**	**12.05**
New and small religious groups	**10.6**	**7.27**	**9.71**	0	**8.93**
Caucasus natives in general	**9.27**	**9.09**	**9.22**	0	**8.48**
Indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia	**5.96**	3.64	**5.34**	38.9	**8.04**
Other ethnic categories	**6.62**	**10.91**	**7.77**	0	**7.14**
Tajiks	**6.62**	3.64	**5.82**	0	**5.36**
Other ethnicities of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia (other than Chechens, Armenians and Azeris)	**5.96**	3.64	**5.34**	**5.56**	**5.36**
Western Europeans	**5.96**	3.64	**5.34**	0	4.91
Americans	**5.3**	3.64	4.85	0	4.46
Asians (in or outside the NIS, other than those explicitly mentioned)	3.31	**7.27**	4.37	0	4.02
Roma	3.97	**5.45**	4.37	0	4.02
Ukrainians	4.64	1.82	3.88	0	3.57
Armenians	0.66	3.64	0.97	**33.3**	3.57
Chechens	1.99	**7.27**	3.4	0	3.12
Chinese	3.97	1.82	3.4	0	3.12
Russians	2.65	**5.45**	3.4	0	3.12

Azeris	1.99	**5.45**	2.91	**5.56**	3.12
Muslims	1.99	3.64	2.43	**5.56**	2.68
Black [African] people	3.31	0	2.43	0	2.23
Vietnamese	1.99	0	1.46	0	1.34
Jews	0	1.82	0.97	0	0.89
Indiscriminate religious xenophobia	0	0	0	**5.56**	0.45
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

The distribution of hate language targets changed somewhat, but the top few remained the same, only swapped positions. Notably, *migrants* top the list for the first time. Not surprisingly, *new religious groups* come second; given the virtual lack of news following the Duma elections, before and after the New Year holidays, *Tvoi Den'* and *Moskovskii Komsomolets* maintained their focus on the Penza recluses, and the journalists used them as a pretext to rant on about the "harm caused by sects" in general.

As a common trait of election campaigns (as seen from our 2003-04[30] and 2007 findings), top hate targets are limited to those which, from a politician's perspective, may be dissociated from Russian voters. The targets include *migrants*, some abstract *natives of the Caucasus* (one can always assume nationals of Transcaucasia), and equally abstract *non-Russians*, plus a small, by definition, group of *sectarians* and *other ethnic categories*, which this time includes people from the Baltic countries, Moldova, Brazil, and Kosovo.

Disapproval of hate language was low. In this phase, journalists mainly disapproved of verbal attacks against *Jews* and abstract *non-Russians* – six and seven, respectively, of the 18 publications disapproving of hate language. Admittedly, the disapproval (just as in our autumn findings) is only found in certain media reports which quote racist statement to illustrate the problem of xenophobia – for example, in reports about a criminal verdict against Boris Mironov, a known antisemite, or in an article about xenophobia in Russian schools.

Hate Language aggregate tables

Type/target table
The table is based on aggregate values, i.e. it includes those statements which elicit *supportive* or *neutral* attitudes in journalists. Lines and columns with zero values have been deleted.

A few targets are not included: *indiscriminate religious xenophobia*, *other religious categories*, *Catholics (and Uniates), Orthodox Christians, Meskhetian Turks, Arabs*, and *Iraqis*.

This time, we did not find certain hate language types, namely, *questioning historically established facts of violence and discrimination* and *quoting radical xenophobic statements and texts without any comments*.

As in the tables above, we highlight values higher than 5.

A	B	C	D	E	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	P	Q	Total
New and small religious groups															
0	0	0	2	0	3	0	3	4	0	**6**	**10**	0	0	0	**28**
Muslims															
0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	5
Indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia															
0	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	3	1	0	1	**13**
Other ethnic categories															
0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	2	0	0	**11**	0	2	0	**18**
Asians (in or outside the NIS, other than those explicitly mentioned)															
0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	5	0	1	0	**11**
Caucasus natives in general															

---

[30] See: G. Kozhevnikova, *Hate Language in Election Campaigns and Beyond…* pp. 59–61.

Category															Total
	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	0	**15**	0	1	0	**23**
Other ethnicities of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia (other than Chechens, Armenians and Azeris)																
	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	**8**	0	0	0	**11**
Azeris																
	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	**7**
Armenians																
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	3
Chechens																
	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	0	0	**8**
Vietnamese																
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	4
Chinese																
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	4	1	1	0	**8**
Tajiks																
	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	**7**	0	1	0	**13**
Roma																
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	**8**	0	0	0	**9**
Russians																
	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	**7**
Ukrainians																
	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	3	0	0	0	**8**
Jews																
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Western Europeans																
	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	**6**	0	1	5	0	0	0	**14**
Americans																
	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	**6**	0	1	1	0	0	0	**13**
Black [African] people																
	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	**6**
Migrants																
	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	7	4	3	0	**10**	1	2	0	**32**
Total	**1**	**1**	**8**	**14**	**1**	**13**	**2**	**17**	**41**	**9**	**11**	**111**	**3**	**9**	**2**	**243**

In the winter of 2008, we found the same stereotypes we have observed in the mass media over many years. If you choose to believe the Russian press, you will learn that *migrants* are inherently criminal, *Americans* and *Western Europeans* are materialistic double-dealers, and crime reports feature everyone but ethnic *Russians*, who are apparently too busy drinking.

The stereotype of criminal migrants is partially based on misunderstanding and inaccurate reporting of police statements – even though law enforcement agents are not always consistent. For example, see below extracts from two interviews on the same subject given by the Chief of Moscow police, Vladimir Pronin, to two different papers and published two days apart:

18 February 2008, *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*	20 February 2008, *Izvestiia*
Reporter (R): *Many Muscovites are convinced that visitors and migrants commit most of the crimes in Moscow. Is this true?*	"Numbers are stubborn things: almost 43% crimes in Moscow are committed by 'aliens'.
Pronin (P): Moscow does not need so many migrants, it is true. Of those who come [to Moscow], just about one third get a formal job…. As a result, 43% – i.e. around 35,000 – of all solved crimes were committed by newcomers last year. Moreover, the number of offenses committed by non-residents in	In 2007, nationals of neighboring [former USSR] countries committed 14,161 crimes in Moscow – 2% more than last year, according to the police chief…At the same time, newcomers from neighboring countries were affected by 5,439 crimes over the same period (by the way, many

Moscow is growing. Last year, for example, migrants committed more than 300 serious crimes.

R: *Some people say that natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia commit most of the crimes, [is this true]?*

P. Not at all! Most crimes are committed by visitors from nearby Russian regions... A fellow has served in prison 10–15 years, comes back home, no job, the [local] factory has closed; his parents live on subsistence farming. He doesn't want to plant potatoes any more, so he goes to Moscow…[31]

crimes – about 1,000 – targeted nationals of Uzbekistan).

This proportion, according to Pronin, is significant, and the angry ethnic diasporas should see the log in their own eye, not just the speck in another's."[32]

A reader of *Izvestiia* who has not read *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* will never know that 14,161 crimes is not 43%, but 2.5 times less. The *Izvestiia* reporter paraphrases General Pronin's words and, in quoting the 43%, transforms non-Muscovites into foreigners. In *Komsomol'skaia Pravda,* General Pronin clearly dispels the ethnic stereotype, but it is unclear from *Izvestiia*'s interpretation what exactly the General said and how much weight he attached to the culprit's ethnicity, and where, on the other hand, the reporter's lack of professionalism and personal bias played a role.

Tables of generalized categories

Absolute Values

	Natives of Asian countries outside the NIS	Natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia	West	Jews	Others	Religious groups	Migrants	Total
Harsh	1.5	3.5	0	0	5	0	3	13
Medium	3.5	11.5	4	0	9	11	12	51
Mild	12.5	55.5	23	2	47	22	17	179
Total	17.5	70.5	27	2	61	33	32	243

In percentages by type

	Natives of Asian countries outside the NIS	Natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia	West	Jews	Others	Religious groups	Migrants	Total
Harsh	11.5	26.9	0	0	38.5	0	23.1	100
Medium	6.86	22.55	7.84	0	17.65	21.57	23.53	100
Mild	6.98	31.01	12.85	1.12	26.26	12.29	9.50	100
Total	7.20	29.01	11.11	0.82	25.1	13.58	13.17	100

---

[31] Nikita Mironov, 'Dlia nas glavnoe – zashchitit' grazhdan v liubykh situatsiiakh….'

[32] Natalia Davydova, 'Seichas ne do Navruza!', *Izvestiia*, 20 February 2008.

In percentages by target

	Natives of Asian countries outside the NIS	Natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia	West	Jews	Others	Religious groups	Migrants	Total
Harsh	8.57	4.96	0	0	8.2	0	9.38	5.35
Medium	20	16.31	14.81	0	14.75	33.33	37.5	20.99
Mild	71.43	78.72	85.19	100	77.05	66.67	53.13	73.66
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

We observed a further drop in harsher forms of hate language: from 7.69% of all statements in the autumn of 2007 to just 5.35%, the lowest ever since the beginning of our research. Possible reasons, as we suggested above, may include fear of repression; the media attention focused almost exclusively on United Russia, V. Putin and D. Medvedev; lack of alternative perspectives in media reports; and 'festive' sentiments.

It is clear, however, that different types of hate language have changed focus since the autumn campaign: while in the autumn of 2007 harsher statements related to *indiscriminate ethnic xenophobia* and *sects*, since then negative attitudes towards various religious groups have been mostly expressed through defamation, while harsher hate language has targeted *migrants* (increase from 14% to 23%) and *natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia* (increase from 6. 9% to 26.9 %).

Hate Language in the run-up to elections

During the presidential campaign, the overall amount of publications relevant to the elections and containing hate language dropped even further in comparison with the parliamentary campaign. In fact, there was hardly any campaigning or debates in the press.

Articles relevant to the elections	Support	Neutral	Aggregate	Disapprove	Total
2008	8	2	10	5	15
2007	12	11	23	9	32
2003	47	19	66	31	97

As for presidential candidates, only the KPRF leader Gennadii Ziuganov made intolerant statements during his presidential campaign, tentatively adopting the Russian nationalist role which the KPRF had avoided in its parliamentary campaign. To achieve this, Gennadii Ziuganov just slightly modified his five-year-old campaign messages.

year 2003	year 2008
Gennadii Ziuganov, Power is Responsibility for the Country "Russians as a people are on the verge of disaster. They die out faster… Evidently, the current authorities are afraid of the Russian spirit, the Russian will, the ability to brace up and face the challenge. This is why [ethnic] Russians are being squeezed out of the key spheres, such as business, finance, governance, and the mass media."[33]	**Gennadii Ziuganov, Russians Bear Particular Responsibility for the Country.** "However, even in Russia a war is waged against [ethnic] Russians to suppress them. Russophobia is oozing out of all pores of the current government. Russians are being squeezed out of the key spheres, such as governance, communication, finance, and trade. Very often, you do not see a single [ethnic]

---

[33] Gennadii Ziuganov, 'Vlast' – eto otvetstvennost' za stranu: Vstrechi Ziuganova s izbirateliami Podmoskov'ia', *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 12 August 2003.

	Russian face there. The official television is explicitly Russophobe."[34]

Campaigning was not particularly active outside the mass media either. Even in the run-up to the parliamentary elections the political parties (except United Russia) were not very active in disseminating their campaign materials, but during the presidential campaign in winter they were making hardly any effort at all, apparently due to the predetermined outcome of the elections. All presidential candidates appeared to be going through the motions and did not even pretend to be equal competitors in the presidential race.

Only the KPRF and LDPR leaders were visible in the campaign due to their xenophobic statements.

Touring the country, Gennadii Ziuganov reiterated his concern about the "dominance of non-Russians",[35] and at least one campaign-related issue of *Pravda* repeated the statement.[36]

Vladimir Zhirinovskii, apparently to spite the Communist Ziuganov, argued that there was no such thing as "friendship of the peoples" in Soviet times, and engaged in political ranting to mask his dislike of Transcaucasian ethnicities: *"After all, even the Soviet Union was destroyed by the South; there was always a gray, shadow economy there. I have been there, personally, I have lived there, seen it all. ...There was no government, total corruption, no one studied Marxism there, no one worked. ... [only ethnic] Russians worked. [There are] no Russians [there now]; where is the plant, the Kutaisi Automobile Plant, where is it?"[37]*

But most voters and observers failed to notice any of it. We can say that it was the least noticeable election campaign in the history of post-Soviet Russia.

---

[34] Gennadii Ziuganov, 'Na russkikh lezhit osobaia otvetstvennost' za stranu', *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 20 February 2008.

[35] See, for example, 'Kandidat v prezidenty Rossii Gennadii Ziuganov: Na russkom narode lezhit osobaia otvetstvennost' za budushchee nashei strany', The website of the Novosibirsk Chapter of KPRF, 10 February 2008 (http://kprfnsk.ru/inform/news/2786_zhuganov_president/).

[36] 'Na russkikh kak gosudarstvoobrazuiushchem narode lezhit osobaia otvetstvennost',' *Pravda*, 12–15 February 2008 (http://www.gazeta-pravda.ru/pravda/pravda%20015.html).

[37] Cited from: Press Conference at *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, LDPR official website, [February]2008 (http://www.ldpr.ru/leader/smi_o_lidere/2135/).

FROM STATISTICS TO CONTENT

It is not accidental that some publications are mentioned above more often than others. It corresponds to the amount of hate language found on their pages during our monitoring.

Of the print media, *Moskovskii Komsomolets* and *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* were absolute 'leaders' in terms of hate language in autumn – 83 and 79 entries in the database of aggregate indicators (28.8 and 28.3% of the print publications) respectively (for the first time since 2003 KP does not top the list), followed by *Izvestiia* (24/8.3 %), *Tvoi Den'* (19/6. 6%), and *Argumenty i Fakty* (17/5. 9 %). It is not always possible to compare print media with TV programs due to tougher governmental control over the latter, and simply because the amounts of text are substantially different; in autumn, the TV programs most prone to hate language included Postscriptum (5 incidents recorded) and Russkii Vzgliad (3 incidents).[38]

In winter, the publications most susceptible to using hate language included *MK* (aggregate indicator – 76 entries, 40.6%, the highest ever in our monitoring); *KP* (38/20.3%, aggregate), *Tvoi Den'* (35/18.7 %), and *Literaturnaia Gazeta* (14/7.5%). In contrast, TV programs used no hate language: apparently, the degree of governmental control over broadcasting was at its maximum in the run-up to the presidential elections, and the TV shows were completely devoid of any controversy.

The share of hate language in TV shows in % of the monitored print and broadcast media total

HL on TV	2002	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Total	13.1	5.1	15.5	13.3	2.8	0
Aggregate indicator	11.2	6.3	15.5	12.9	3.4	0

As we have mentioned, journalists tend to disapprove of hate language more often, but their disapproving comments do not necessarily indicate a shift in perspective. For example, four of the nine articles in *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* containing disapproval of hate language were authored by a female journalist who had pretended to be an immigrant from Ukraine looking for a job in Moscow; she was indignant at being called 'Khokhlushka', a pejorative term for a Ukrainian, and at Ukraine being called 'Khokhlandia'. Nonetheless, in this and other reports the same journalist did not think twice about using other xenophobic terms and phrases as offensive as 'Khokhlandia'.

In *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, disapproval of hate language was in most cases limited to reports of nationalist offenses (such as the Russian March slogans consistently criticized by journalists since 2005; racist language accompanying violent attacks, and discriminatory police practices), i.e. their disapproval was triggered only by extreme incidents.

A total lack of media coverage of the Russian March on 4 November 2007 can be described as large-scale political manipulation. Radical nationalists were rarely given access to the media in 2007 in comparison to 2006 anyway, but the 2007 Russian March, a major event in the 'street policies' of the period, was completely ignored by most media, including almost all TV channels and major print media such as *Izvestiia*.

Novye Izvestiia, Gazeta, Vremia Novostei, and *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* published, in our opinion, appropriate reports of the Russian March. *Moskovskii Komsomolets, Tvoi Den'* and *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, alongside brief and vague reports (which raised doubts as to whether the authors had actually witnessed the event) the papers focused on political opposition in general and linked the ultra-right to the Other Russia and Boris Berezovsky.[39]

---

[38] As of late 2006, Russkii Vzgliad has been transformed from an analytical program subscribing to Orthodox Christian and anti-American views into a talk show which by the second half of 2007 had lost all political features.

[39] Max Fadeikov, 'Potkin, marsh k Berezovskomu!' *Tvoi Den'*, 9 October 2007. Daniil Borisov, 'Nesoglasie optom i v roznitsu: V Peterburge proshli srazu dva marsha oppozitsii', *Nezavisimaia Gazeta,* 7 November 2007; Egor Kolyvanov, '"Russkii marsh" prevratilsia v piknik', *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, 6 November 2007.

During our most recent monitoring phase we found 21 publications which addressed in one way or another the problem of hate language in the mass media, i.e. discussed the journalists' language and questioned whether xenophobic rhetoric is permissible in the press and in the public arena. 16 such articles were published in the run-up to the parliamentary elections.

Gazeta appeared to be more interested than other papers in discussing the hatred projected by the media, and also the journalism vs. propaganda dilemma. One fourth of all articles discussing hate language were published in *Gazeta*: they referred to the lack of political correctness in the Russian media and the fact that the media's function had changed from public communication to propaganda relying on negative ethno-religious stereotypes and often linking them to "national security."[40]

Komsomol'skaia Pravda published an interesting discussion of Nasha Rasha, a TV comedy featuring migrant workers Dzhamshud and Ravshan. The show had triggered a negative reaction of official Tajikistan.[41] Fortunately, the discussion in *KP* was not limited to the comedy show, but raised broader issues, such as the lack of political correctness and the problem of "ethnic humor" in general, in an appropriate manner and with reasonable arguments.[42]

We note an article in *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* by Iakov Gilinskii, Director, Center of Deviantology (Sociology of Deviance and Social Control), Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences. He discusses the nature of xenophobia and xenophobic political discourse, emphasizing that populist politicians often resort to the tried and true tactics of urging society to search for "internal enemies." At the moment, he writes, massive grassroots xenophobia readily targets any 'alien' as an enemy. In particular, Gilinskii criticizes president Putin and his rhetoric: *"In 1999, the slogan about "killing [terrorists] in the toilet" gained massive approval and popular support for the Russian presidential candidate. Admittedly, the slogan led to tens of thousands of casualties on both sides – of Chechens and federal troops.[43] However, as many people's favorite song goes, "there is no price we won't pay"… Today's populist statements by politicians, the president "throwing in" a term "native population," proposed bills to introduce immigrant quotas (17–20% of immigrants resident in a region), to prohibit migrants from engaging in certain occupations (trade) etc. cannot but fuel xenophobic, nationalist sentiments, just one step away from hate crimes."[44]* Another reason why this article is so important is that United Russia's hate language was hardly ever criticized in the media during both election campaigns.

Sometimes hate language is a result of mere lack of professionalism. TV critic Konstantin Kovaliov offered a relevant example in *Literaturnaia Gazeta*: *"The other day the First Channel aired a news report of insects sent to space to orbit the Earth for research purposes. Then two U.S. astronauts were shown working in open space outside the space station. At this moment a happy voice behind the screen blurted out: "These are the best known cockroaches today!"[45]*

---

[40] See, for example, Nadezhda Kevorkova, 'Maslo kupleno', *Gazeta*, 4 September 2007; Dmitrii Bal'burov, 'Zhelanie byt' patriotom', *Gazeta*, 7 November 2007.

[41] 'Tadzhikskie deputaty protiv "Nashei Russia"', Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia, SOVA Center. 29 September 2007 (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/213716E/21398CB/9E5F1CA).

[42] The pathos of this humorous story lies in the fact that the two Tajik construction workers (who know nothing about building work) appear to be highly educated people who evidently held academic posts in their home country, but due to their life circumstances have to earn a living in Russia performing unskilled work they are not trained to do. In Russia, many viewers consider the program offers a positive portrayal of these Tajik migrants. Tajik government officials, however, found it offensive.

[43] Putin's statement about terrorists has often been interpreted as anti-Chechen. See, for example, G. Kozhevnikova, *Hate Language in Election Campaigns and Beyond*, p. 91.

[44] Iakov Gilinskii, 'Ot tsivilizovannosti k varvarstvu', *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 14 December 2007.

[45] Konstantin Kovalev, 'Zamorozki i zamorochki ekrana', *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 12 December 2007.

CONCLUSIONS

As we sum up our hate language monitoring phase seven, we conclude the following.

Contrary to our expectations, the number of documented incidents of hate language did not increase, but instead dropped slightly in comparison with the previous phase. However, the professionalism or tolerance of Russian journalists does not appear to be the reason; rather, intolerance in the mass media is taking new forms. Hate language is disguised as social concerns and refers to ethno-religious stereotypes established over the recent years without naming them directly. Our current methodology of hate language monitoring has certain limitations and is incapable of revealing the actual level of xenophobia in the Russian mass media. Therefore, our findings presented here correspond to the minimum level of intolerance.

In the run-up to the parliamentary and particularly to the presidential elections, public information was strictly limited, resulting in less campaigning in general and less access to the mass media for non-mainstream, including right-wing radical, candidates and activists. Other factors included the absolute dominance of the "ruling party" in the public arena and the understandable fear of abusive enforcement of anti-extremist legislation in a situation of fuzzy criteria and boundaries.[46]

As a result, most of the earlier observed trends in hate language are distorted. Some of our observations are not comparable with any previous findings and do not match the "xenophobic preferences" reported earlier, even though the pre-election years 2003 and 2005 are closest to the most recent findings.

Most general traits and trends of the hate language continue, including Caucasophobia, fuzziness of targets, and veiled hostility rather than direct attacks. Nothing has changed in the way journalists react to unusual situations: at first, we observe uninformed hysteria in the media, replaced after a while by more reasonable analysis.

The main positive finding is a sharp decline in harsher forms of hate language, even though we are not sure whether this is sustainable and whether or not it is due to censorship. Likewise, we have serious doubts about the other positive development – the reduction in Chechenophobia, since the majority of publications on the Chechen 'theme' appear too loyal to the current Chechen leadership.

Unfortunately, it was only under the threat of censorship that some publications agreed to change their policy of mentioning ethnicity in crime reports; however, it is a positive development, particularly for some publications which have adopted a new approach for the long term. On the other hand, publications prone to intolerance show just how easy it is to bypass the ban by suggesting ethnicity indirectly.

Just as in previous years, blame campaigns against Russia's opponents in the international arena are not limited to political rhetoric. We observed it in the anti-Georgian and anti-Estonian campaigns in previous monitoring periods, and now we see it in the hate language against *Western Europeans*.

As before, political campaigners avoid hate language. During the run-up to the most recent parliamentary elections, hate language in the mass media was similar to that in the autumn of 2003, but virtually no hate language was associated with the presidential campaign. Wherever hate language was used, it did not refer to potential voters, but rather to some abstract targets (*migrants*) or to those who could not be Russian voters by definition (*Western Europeans*).

The media were more accepting of intolerant ethno-religious statements by some candidates than others; unsurprisingly, they were more likely to approve of intolerance voiced by the United Russia Party.

---

[46] See details in: Alexander Verkhovsky, 'Anti-Extremist Legislation, its Use and Misuse', in *Xenophobia, Freedom of Conscience and Anti-Extremism in Russia in 2007* (Moscow: SOVA Center, 2008), pp. 45-79.

We note the virtual absence of hate language in the regional media monitored, with the exception of Krasnodar Krai's media, where the overall situation with hate language did not change much between 2001 and 2008, and our observations suggest that the hate language aired by the mass media in Krasnodar is either promoted or condoned by the regional authorities. The same applies to a lesser extent to the Saratov mass media whose attitudes to hate language are directly linked to their relations with United Russia.

This monitoring has shown that media now use 'anti-fascist' rhetoric to discredit political opponents to the current regime: back in 2005, this practice emerged in the pro-Kremlin youth movements, then it was adopted by politicians and statespersons, and eventually by the federal and regional mass media. A similar tactic of discrediting political opponents relies on 'migrantophobia': the opponents are accused of using "criminal illegal immigrants" for their own purposes.

The above proves that while hate language continues to be a professional problem for the Russian media, it is increasingly employed as propaganda for political ends and is being used to maintain and legitimize the already high level of xenophobia in the Russian society.