

Xenophobia, Freedom of Conscience and Anti-Extremism in Russia in 2013

**A collection of annual reports
by the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis**

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This collection of reports summarizes all the major areas of work addressed by the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis in 2013, in a similar fashion to collections in previous years.

There are three reports on themes which have become traditional for the SOVA Center in this collection: The first report addresses radical nationalism and hate crime, and the efforts of government and society to combat these phenomena. The second report addresses problems relating to freedom of conscience in contemporary Russia. The third report addresses the misuse and abuse of ‘anti-extremism’ measures. The reports are updated versions of original texts on the SOVA Center website.

The appendix provides details about hate crimes and the prosecution of such crimes. All data were compiled at the end of January 2014.

This translation of the published Russian text uses a modified Library of Congress system of transliteration for names and publications, except where there is an established alternative spelling (e.g. Yeltsin, not El'tsin, Yabloko, not Iabloko).

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The Ultra-Right Shrugged: Xenophobia and Radical Nationalism in Russia, and Efforts to Counteract Them in 2013

Summary

The results of 2013¹ are extremely disappointing for the Russian society as a whole, and only nationalists have reasons to feel optimistic.

The decline in street racist violence, which lasted from 2009 to 2012, evidently came to an end. The past year was characterized by a notable surge in ethnic violence, evident even to casual observers. A real persecution was unleashed against migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus. People suffered from organized attacks as well as from casual xenophobic violence; weapons were used in some cases. In particular, there was an increase in the number of attacks on board of subway cars and suburban trains (“white cars”). In October, we witnessed unprecedented group raids against Tajikistan-bound trains. Combined with increasingly frequent semi-legal raids by ultra-right groups against migrants’ places of residence and employment, these events create an overall atmosphere of violence.

The number of local conflicts, which, with various degrees of success, were fueled and/or publicly presented as “ethnic” by the ultra-right increase in 2013. The most significant among such conflicts were the riots in Pugachev and Arzamas and the Moscow district of Biryulyovo.

A large-scale anti-migrant campaign was initiated by the authorities back in the spring and intensified in the summer in the wake of the Pugachev events and in connection with the electoral campaign.

As a result, the statistics on ethnic intolerance and support for nationalist slogans in the mainstream society grew to unprecedented levels.

These factors created a very favorable context for nationalists. Against this background, their initiative – a campaign for introducing the visa regime with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, and a series of rallies against “ethnic crime” – attracted a much greater public and media attention than

¹ This report was prepared as part of the project, implemented using the state support grants per Decree No. 115rp of the President of the Russian Federation, issued on March 29, 2013

their similar initiatives of recent past. However, we can't claim that this level of attention resulted in a substantial increase in the nationalists' political weight or in significant growth in numbers of their followers – they never managed to assume the leadership of any such protest, or to deliberately provoke one.

On the other hand, a shift in the government policies inspired the ultra-right to utilize more open and aggressive tactics against migrants. The incidence of raids with the purpose of searching for “illegal immigrants,” which occasionally turned into pogroms, grew to unprecedented proportions and became a principal tool of the nationalist movement. In the fall, the authorities indicated that such vigilantism would not be tolerated, and initiated criminal proceedings against several well-known ultra-right activists, thus forcing the rest to quiet down. However, on the other hand, the police and the Federal Migration Service cooperate with the ultra-right to a greater extent than ever, involving the latter in their raids and inspections in the course of the fight against “illegal immigration.”

Note that the autonomous neo-Nazis, the foot-soldiers of the radical militant Russian nationalist movement, have been much more active in taking to the streets in order to participate in meetings, rallies, pickets or raids. In turn, major nationalist organizations began to drift toward greater radicalism, moving away from their attempts to create the image of “nationalists with a human face,” undertaken in recent years. However, since they haven't entirely abandoned their intent to legally enter the “big politics,” the nationalist organizations continue their attempts to register parties and participate in elections. So far, they have been almost entirely unsuccessful.

Thus, the potential support for the far-right movement has grown quite significantly in 2013, but the movement itself obviously took a step back to existence as a network of semi-legal radical cells. Considering this development, the right-wing segment is unlikely to attract a really significant number of new supporters among xenophobically-inclined Russians, but it becomes more appealing to the most active supporters of the radical nationalist ideology.

The federal authorities continue their traditional line of rhetorical confrontation against ethnic nationalists in general and violent manifestations of ethnic xenophobia in particular. This policy underwent no significant changes.

Criminal prosecutions of racist violence remained at about the same level as in the preceding year. Similarly to 2012, the convicted offenders include members of several dangerous gangs.

Meanwhile, the number of sentences for xenophobic propaganda increased dramatically, especially when compared to sentences for all other types of “crimes of an extremist nature.” Unfortunately, the quality of the prosecution in propaganda cases remains consistently low; the “extremists” were mostly

identified via *Vkontakte* social network. The majority of people, found guilty of inciting hatred, had indeed published racist remarks, but they possessed no notable reputation among the ultra-right, and their audience tended to be small, so that the rationale for the rapid growth in their criminal sentencing is questionable. To be fair, the punishments were usually adequate – the courts practically abandoned the use of prison terms for “words only” as well as suspended sentences; the offenders were mostly sentenced to mandatory or corrective labor.

We see gradual reorientation of the law enforcement agencies focus from racist violence to racist propaganda as the main reason for the end of the decline in racist violence on the streets.

Ever-accelerating growth of the Federal List of Extremist Materials makes its uselessness increasingly apparent; it definitely has no effect on manifestations of intolerance in society, but instead causes considerable social harm, and remains a target of indignant and sarcastic comments. We would like to reiterate that it is not practically possible to correct the List's various and numerous errors, and there is no justification for the existence of this cumbersome and inefficient mechanism.

Thus, in 2013 the achievements of previous years were gradually lost, and the problems were compounded. Moreover, we see these negative trends continuing in 2014.

Criminal Manifestations of Racism and Xenophobia

Systematic Racist and Neo-Nazi Violence

In 2013, according to our data, 21 people died and 178 were injured as a result of racist and neo-Nazi violence, 9 people received credible murder threats. Our data does not include victims of mass brawls and victims in the republics of the North Caucasus. As of January 20, 2014, we know of 19 people killed and 191 wounded in 2012; two persons received death threats. Thus, racist violence is no longer declining – the number of murders motivated by hatred have already exceeded the corresponding number of the preceding year, while the number of wounded is, for now, a bit smaller, but, taking our annual data adjustments into account,² the level of violence has actually increased.

² In our 2012 report we reported 19 dead, 187 injured and 2 murder threats. See: Vera Alperovich, Natalia Yudina, *The Ultra-Right on the Streets with a Pro-Democracy Poster in Their Hands or a Knife in Their Pocket: Xenophobia and Radical Nationalism in Russia, and Efforts to Counteract Them in 2012* // *Xenophobia, Freedom of conscience and Anti-extremism in Russia in 2012*. Moscow: SOVA Center, 2013. P. 5-60.

It is important to clarify that our statistics does not reflect the real level of racist violence, since we manage to identify only a small part of relevant incidents, even in cases of murder. We are even unable to estimate the ratio of the known cases to the total number of incidents. We can only state that, given that our methodology remains unchanged, we can estimate the dynamics of such violence according to certain parameters.

In the past year, attacks occurred in 32 regions of the country (compared to 31 regions in 2012). As before, Moscow (8 killed, 53 injured) and St. Petersburg (3 killed, 32 injured) top the list. Many people fell victims to attacks in the Lipetsk Region (4 killed, 15 injured),³ the Moscow Region (8 injured), the Chelyabinsk Region (8 injured), the Krasnodar Region (7 injured, traditionally a hotbed of ethnic tensions due to its mixed population), the Voronezh Region⁴ (6 injured), the Sverdlovsk Region (6 injured). In addition, a significant number of victims were observed in the Novosibirsk Region (5 injured), the Omsk Region (5 injured), the Samara Region (4 injured), and the Komi Republic (4 injured). The Samara Region and the Sverdlovsk Region were featured in our previous annual report as well. On the other hand, the situation in the Republic of Bashkortostan and in the Primorye Region, which had previously reported a significant number of victims, has since improved. The statistics for other regions have remained practically unchanged.

Attacks on Ethnic “Others”

The largest group of victims is traditionally those, perceived by the attackers as “ethnic outsiders.” We recorded the total of 136 victims of ethnically-motivated attacks. There were 115 such cases in 2012, up from 112 cases in 2011. Thus, the growth of ethnically motivated xenophobic violence is evident. Furthermore, this increase was observed despite the difficulties associated with collecting information on this particular group. The victims of such attacks usually shy away from publicity and rarely contact the police, community organizations or the media. In addition, the media tends to be selective about reporting such incidents. In most cases, even the names of the victims remain unknown. The exception are the attacks that target famous people, as was the case in the November 11, 2013 attack in Moscow, when Mais Kurbanov, the leader of Russian Federation of Migrants, sustained a stun gun wound.⁵

³ An ultra-right youth group focused on systematic attacks against migrants became active in Lipetsk in the past year.

⁴ The Voronezh Region also topped this sorry list in 2005, 2007 and 2008.

⁵ The leader of Migrants Federation was wounded in Moscow // SOVA Center. 2013. 11 November (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2013/11/d28392/>).

Usually ethnic attacks occurred as part of organized violence, but casual xenophobic violence, i.e. violence that is spontaneous and situational, continued as well. However, the dynamics of the latter kind of violence is impossible to trace, since such cases usually don't come to public attention, and, when they do, they are usually qualified by media and law enforcement agencies as mere hooliganism. Based on circumstantial evidence, the incidence of such violence did not drop. In addition, the Levada Center surveys indicated a sharp rise in ethnic xenophobia in 2013;⁶ this development couldn't fail to influence the level of casual ethnic violence. Every year, we record at least a dozen such cases (but don't label it as such in our statistics).

The largest group of victims were migrants from Central Asia – 13 killed, 45 injured (vs. 7 killed, 36 injured in 2012). The number of casualties from the Caucasus increased significantly – 3 killed, 26 injured (vs. 4 killed and 14 injured in 2012). In addition, 29 victims (1 killed, 28 wounded) were of unspecified “non-Slavic” appearance, often described as “Asian”, so most likely, migrants from Central Asia constitute the vast majority of this group as well. A year earlier the corresponding figure was 16 (1 killed, 15 wounded).

If we analyze the number of attacks on these three groups of victims (natives of Central Asia, the Caucasus and “non-whites”) grouping them by month, the greatest number of attacks occurred in April (12 people), July (12 people), August (16 people) October (25 people), and November (19 people). The number of victims rose above average in April due to the soccer match schedules (many of those, attacked in April were fans of the soccer clubs from the Caucasus, FC Terek and FC Anzhi, who fell victims to xenophobia of the local football fans) and also due to the anniversary of Adolf Hitler's birthday on April 20. The increase in the number of attacks in July and August was a consequence of the events in the town of Pugachev and of an “anti-migrant campaign”, unleashed by the authorities, which peaked in the summer and triggered, among other actions, a number of anti-immigrant raids organized by nationalists. In addition, the August featured traditional xenophobic attacks by drunken paratroopers, celebrating the Airborne Forces Day on August 2.⁷ An even more pronounced increase in attacks in October (in particular!) and November was definitely associated with a mass riot in the Biryulyovo Zapadnoe District of Moscow and yet another ensuing hunt for migrants. The Russian March on November 4 further aggravated the situation in November.

⁶ Russians on migration and ethnic tensions // Levada Center. 2013. 5 November (<http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti>).

⁷ At least 10 people in 5 regions suffered from the racist attacks by the paratroopers on August 2, 2013 (compared to 5 people in 2012).

The number of attacks against dark-skinned people has dropped significantly (5 wounded in 2013 vs. 25 in 2012). These attacks have been systematically tracked by the Moscow Protestant Chaplaincy. Interestingly, according to the Civil Assistance [Grazhdanskoe Sodeistvie] Committee, a significant portion of attacks against black foreigners in Moscow in late 2012 – early 2013 was geographically tied to the suburban train route on the Moskva-Kursk line.⁸

Despite the ever-present anti-Semitic rhetoric of right-wing blogs, actual anti-Semitic attacks have been rare in recent years. The most likely reason for this is the fact that the Jews are visually difficult to distinguish in a crowd, while attacks next to the synagogue, for example, are too dangerous. However, in the past year,⁹ we once again recorded a violent incident of this kind. On the eve of Yom Kippur on the suburban train approaching Kraskovo station of the Moskva-Kazan line (i.e. near the famous synagogue in the Moscow Region)¹⁰ an ultra-right group attacked a group of Jewish youth.

Attacks on other “ethnic others” under xenophobic slogans were also recorded (7 wounded). Natives of China were attacked in Moscow and Chelyabinsk; an Enets girl – in St. Petersburg, and a Roma man – in Chelyabinsk. Attacks motivated by hatred of ethnic Russian were also observed, with two victims in Astrakhan and St. Petersburg.

Besides attacks against lonely pedestrians, we observed a significant increase in the number of group attacks against alleged gathering places of “outsiders.” Thus, a group of hooligans attacked the cafe Tikhii Don in Chelyabinsk, whose owners were migrants from Armenia. Masked men attacked the cafe Vstrecha, owned by a native of Azerbaijan in Voronezh.

The number of “white cars”¹¹ organized by the ultra-right radicals in suburban trains and subway cars increased as well. On September 15, 2013, a group of nationalists even staged a “white tram” in Saratov.

⁸ For more details see comments by N. Yudina in “Serial attacks against citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Moscow District of Butovo” // The official website of the Civic Assistance (Grazhdanskoe sodeistvie) Committee. 2013. 18 September (http://refugee.ru/news/serijnye_napadenija_na_grazhdan_demokraticheskij_respubliki_kongo_v_moskovskom_rajone_butovo/2013-09-18-297).

⁹ On anti-Semitism in Russia in 2013, see: Anti-Semitic incidents in Russia in 2013. Analytical report of the Russian Jewish Congress and SOVA Center // Website of the Russian Jewish Congress. 2014. 22 January (<http://help.rjc.ru/site.aspx?SECTIONID=85646&ID=2527868>).

¹⁰ Group of Jewish youth was attacked in on a train in the Moscow Region // SOVA Center. 2013. 9 October (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2013/10/d28109/>).

¹¹ The action when the ultra-right walk through the subway or train cars, beating up the passengers of “non-slavic appearance”.

Apart from the usual attacks on ‘outsiders’, including the ones that involve steel, firearms or and traumatic weapons, explosions and arson, motivated by racism, continued in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Lipetsk; several (at least five) attempts at arson and bombings targeted the houses, dormitories and other places of residence associated with migrants.

We also have to point out the unprecedented attacks against the passenger trains: Moscow-Dushanbe (the night of October 26, 2013) and Moscow-Khujand (October 27, 2013). They were carried out by a group of young people at the Ternovka station (the Voronezh Region) of the South Eastern Railway, and accompanied by nationalistic statements and threats against the passengers. Several people received minor injuries. After the incident, the embassy of Tajikistan addressed the Russian side with an earnest request to conduct an objective investigation into the incident, committed with the connivance of local law enforcement officers. Egamzod Muhammad, a spokesman of the Embassy of Tajikistan in Russia, stated that it had been the first such attack ever observed, and suggested that it had happened due to “intensification of anti-immigrant sentiment.”

Attacks on Members of LGBT Community

The LGBT community accounts for a significant group of victims (2 killed, 25 injured).¹²

Violence against LGBT or those, perceived as such, has acquired menacing proportions this year. The brutal murder of Vladislav Tornovoy in Volgograd on the night of May 9-10, 2013 because of his suspected homosexuality was outrageous and caused a great deal of resonance.

As we wrote in the report for the first half of 2013,¹³ the attacks targeted protesters against to the law banning “homosexual propaganda”, the adoption of which caused outrage among the LGBT community. Most protesters, if not detained by the police, suffered from attacks by neo-Nazis, Orthodox radicals, Cossacks etc. Such incidents took place in Moscow, Voronezh, St. Petersburg, the Komi Republic and the Khabarovsk Region. The police on duty during these events either did not interfere with the attacks or were unable to fulfill their responsibilities and protect LGBT from aggression.

¹² LGBT organizations cite larger numbers, but, as with other groups, we don’t include the victims in our statistics, unless we are sure that it was, specifically, a hate crime.

¹³ V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, The State Duma Directed Right Radicals Toward New Goals: Xenophobia, Radical Nationalism and Efforts to Counteract It in Russia during the First Half of 2013 // SOVA Center. 2013. 12 July (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2013/07/d27507/>).

LGBT events unrelated to protests were targeted as well. On November 3, 2013, balaclava-masked men attacked LGBT activists, who gathered for tea in the office of an NGO on the Fontanka Embankment in St. Petersburg. One person, Dmitry Chizhevsky, was wounded in his eye; a woman activist suffered a minor wound on her back. There were several attempts to disrupt Side by Side (*Bok o Bok*) LGBT Film Festival with false reports about explosives in the building.

Victims of “pedophile hunters” are tallied in the same group. Basically, these “hunts” were organized by the participants of “Occupy – pedofilay” (more on this project below).

In some cases, the fighters against pedophilia even resorted to seeking the assistance of ethnic “diasporas.” In Novosibirsk, Russian vigilantes lured a homosexual – an ethnic Uzbek – to a meeting through a social network and then handed him over to the Uzbek community. On September 13, 2013, a video with scenes of brutal abuse was posted on social networks. The victim was forced to identify himself and undress. Then his clothes were burned. The man was handcuffed, beaten up, threatened with a gun and forced to rape himself with a bottle.¹⁴

Attacks against Political Adversaries and against Homeless People

In a marked change from the past years, the number of attacks on political, ideological or “stylistic” opponents of neo-Nazi was small (7 injured in 2013 against 1 killed and 55 injured in 2012). Antifascists in Cherepovets and rock musicians in Perm were among the victims.

An obvious reason for such a change was an almost complete halt of the street war between neo-Nazi and anti-fascists (although the information about the incidents still often simply fails to reach the media and NGOs). Antifascists explain it by a crisis within the movement and by the fact that some anti-fascist leaders were forced to withdraw from political activity or go abroad for fear of the government persecution after participating in the protest activities of 2011–2012. Another possible explanation suggests that the ultra-right switched from clashes with militant anti-fascists to attacks against other more defenseless groups, such as ethnic minorities or LGBT.

The number of attacks on homeless people was lower in 2013 than the year before – 2 killed and 3 injured vs. 6 dead and two injured in 2012. However, the number of attacks by the ultra-right (especially the straight-edge) against those

¹⁴ Video with scenes of brutal homophobic abuse // SOVA Center. 2013. 17 September (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2013/09/d27933/>).

known to be weaker and less able to defend themselves have remained quite high. We record only the cases where the investigation confirmed the motive for an attack, and this is obviously the exception rather than rule.

Violence Motivated by Religion

In the past year, the number of religion-based xenophobia victims doubled to 24 injured (vs. 12 in 2012).

Jehovah’s Witnesses, who constituted the largest group among the victims, have been subjected to a government-organized repressive campaign for about five years. In 2013, at least 13 followers of the Jehovah’s Witnesses doctrine were injured in the course of religiously motivated attacks, compared to at least 10 in 2012, and at least 24 in 2011.

The other victims included an Orthodox priest, Pentecostals and Muslims. Fortunately, none of the injuries were severe.

Other Kinds of Right Radical Violence

In 2013, right-wing blogs continued to post xenophobic and offensive videos that featured violent scenes of the ultra-right attacks against “non-Slavs” and “perverts.” For example, Hitler’s birthday was marked in right-wing radical segment of the Internet by a video that featured an attack on a “janitor.”

For the most part, the far-right group Sparrows Crew from Yekaterinburg took responsibility for making these videos. However, they have also acquired followers. For example, a new group, Gas Ghow, gained notoriety in 2013. A similar group was active in Novosibirsk. It was unclear whether the attacks on the videos had been real or staged.

In the past year, we once again encountered provocative nationalist acts in the style of the Big Game.¹⁵ One striking example of such an act was a fake explosive device, found next to the post office in the village of Monino in the Moscow Region on July 15, 2013: It was labeled “Bomb for the Russians. Die.” The right-wing forums have repeatedly discussed the notion that fakes carrying “anti-Russian” slogans, rather than neo-Nazi symbols and slogans, could produce a much greater effect and exacerbate hostility to “newcomers”. The majority of the ultra-right commentators agreed that it was a provocation.

Provocative actions of nationalists were generally quite popular in the past year. Two attacks against migrants from the Caucasus with incitement to riots

¹⁵ For more details on the Big Game see: Galina Kozhevnikova, Anton Shekhovtsov et al. *Radikal’nyi Russkii Natsionalizm: Struktury, Idei, Litsa*, Moscow: SOVA Center, pp. 236–237 [Radical Russian Nationalism: Structure, Ideas, People].

were staged in St. Petersburg on October 15, the day of the Muslim holiday of Kurban Bayram (Eid al-Adha) (see below).

The theme of threats against government officials and civil society activists, whose work is related one way or another to the problems of xenophobia, remained relevant in 2013. We have already mentioned¹⁶ that, on December 8, 2012 and February 10, 2013, the Moscow City Court received email messages with death threats against the Moscow City Court Judge Pavel Melekhin and his family. At the time, the judge was presiding over the trial of the NOMP leader, retired GRU Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov.

The law on “foreign agents” enriched this neo-Nazi activity with new overtones. On May 18, 2013, activists of Alexei Kolegov’s ultra-right organization Frontier of the North (*Rubezh Severe*) attacked a meeting of the Memorial Human Rights Commission in the Komi Republic, shouting “Down with the foreign agents!” On June 4, Syktyvkar neo-Nazis affixed stickers that read “Foreign agent lives here” on the apartment doors of several Komi Memorial Human Rights Commission members.

The involvement of right-wing radicals in the environmental movement should also be noted. They have participated in protests against nickel mining in Elan copper-nickel deposits in the Voronezh Region. In the evening of June 22, 2013, the crowd of about a thousand people, including the nationalists and the Cossacks, broke into the exploration camp in Novokhopersk District and set the rigs and some buildings on fire.¹⁷ Such radicalization of the environmental protest is atypical for Russia, and for the ultra-right movement such a large-scale attack is very unusual. According to some rumors, the most belligerent attackers could have been simply hired by the competitors.

Vandalism

In 2013, we recorded a significant reduction in the activities of vandals, motivated by religious, ethnic or ideological hatred. There were at least 70 such acts of vandalism in 38 regions of the country in 2013, while in 2012 and 2011, we recorded 95 and 94 such acts respectively.

This year, the greatest number of attacks was made against the sites belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church – 30 including 2 cases of arson. In the preceding year, the Orthodox objects were also more affected than others – 38 acts (only 5 of them arson). The reason for this, of course, was the growth

¹⁶ See: V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, *The State Duma Directed...*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

of anti-clerical sentiment in society as a whole, expressed, among other things, through the acts of vandalism.

The second place belongs to the sites of new religious movements – there were there are 12 such cases, and, all of these buildings were owned by Jehovah’s Witnesses (vs. 13 cases in 2012); the attacks included one bombing and two cases of arson.

Jewish sites are the third with 10 incidents including one bombing and two cases of arson. A year earlier, there were 8 such acts; this fact signals a break in a long trend of decline of specifically anti-Semitic vandalism.

Muslim objects are the fourth with 9 incidents (vs. 6 cases in 2012), including 4 cases of arson and one bombing.

Other kinds of vandalism motivated by religious hatred are represented by isolated cases, including a Baptist prayer house in the Belgorod Region, a pagan temple and tomb near Arkhangelsk and a Yezidi grave in the Volgograd Region.

Thus, compared to 2012, the number of attacks against the buildings of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslim and Jewish targets went up.

Vandalism against ideological objects (monuments to politicians, the Great Patriotic War memorials, etc.), which ranked second from the top in the preceding year, and topped the list for a few years prior to that, was only on the fifth position in 2013 (7 cases in 2012 vs. 24 cases in 2011); the monuments were desecrated in Blagoveshchensk, Ufa, in the Leningrad Region and the Samara Region.

The number of the most dangerous acts, such as bombings, shootings and arson, has increased significantly (24 out of 69 cases in 2013 vs. 11 out of 95 cases in 2012). The proportion of such dangerous incidents has really become alarming.

Public Activity of Ultra-Right Radicals

Spin on Criminal Incidents and Rallies against “Ethnic Crime”

The year of 2013 set a record in the number of criminal incidents involving local residents on one side and migrants on the other. These incidents achieved a degree of notoriety as “ethnic conflicts”, or even resulted in actual mass clashes motivated by ethnic hatred. Due to a large number of people involved and the extent of public resonance, these events became a factor that directed nationalist public activity in the past year, and not the ultra-right’s own actions, as was the case in 2011, or general protest events, as in 2012.

A promotion (spin) of the “ethnic relations” theme is largely the result of change in the media policy. However, much of the credit goes to the efforts of nationalist activists, who increasingly used all pretexts for staging public events

and promoting their ideology in general and the theme of “ethnic crime” in particular. All conflicts, which, in reality, had flared up for everyday reasons, were interpreted in terms of the ethnic conflict and aggravated by the allegations that the government and the law enforcement officers always side with “non-Russians.”

The first such incident that achieved a degree of publicity was the death of Alexander Terekhov, a soccer fan of FC Rostov, during a fight with the migrants from the Caucasus on March 28 in Rostov-on-Don. The nationalists responded with a network action Russian Day of Wrath on April 13, held in at least 10 cities across the country. It had any noticeable effect only in Moscow, where about 200 people gathered at the event on Pushkin Square, held without a permit, tried (unsuccessfully) to block Tverskaya Street and then spread out through the city once the police started detaining them. In other cities the gatherings numbered from 5 to 50 people, and, besides Moscow, the actions resulted in detentions only in Krasnodar.¹⁸ In general, especially due the riots in Moscow, this ultra-right initiative proved somewhat more successful than expected.

The Russian Day of Wrath showed that nationalists in the field are capable of self-organizing. As we already mentioned, the event took place in at least 10 cities, although it didn't have a particular organizer, was not annual, and a reason for it was not very obvious. However, their organizational abilities shouldn't be overestimated as well. In a number of cities the actions could not be held due to the lack of attendees despite the announcements, and the ones that took place failed to gather much audience.

The next significant incident occurred in the town of Udomlya in the Tver Region, where, on June 1, there was a fight between some locals and migrants from the Caucasus. On June 8, a people's assembly, also known on the Internet as “the Russian Day of Wrath”, took place in Udomlya. The Russian Party (*Russkaia Partiiia*) leader Nikolai Bondarik served as an organizer. The event was widely announced on ultra-right websites and blogs; nationalists from other regions arrived to the city as well. The police estimated the attendance at about 300-400 people, and, as apparent from the video recording, young people shouting xenophobic slogans were the most active participants of the event, while the remaining crowd appeared to be mere onlookers. Fortunately, this event did not aggravate the situation in the town further.

A month later, however, a highly resonant incident took place – the conflict in Pugachev, where 20-year-old paratrooper Ruslan Marzhanov, a local, was killed by a 16-year-old native of Chechnya in a scuffle on July 6. In the following days, the locals conducted rallies without permits, repeatedly tried to

block the auto route R226 (*Volgograd-Samara*), and attempted pogroms in the neighborhood that was home to a local Chechen community. Attempts by local authorities to stabilize the situation and pacify the disgruntled protesters, who demanded that all the migrants from the Caucasus be evicted, were unsuccessful at first, but the situation has more or less stabilized over time.

The main difference between the Pugachev incident and the one in Udomlya and others was that there was no need for the ultra-right to “rock” the situation to the point when the locals come out for manifestations under xenophobic slogans, the way they usually try to do (fortunately, in most cases to no avail). Here, the locals started rallying without them, but, naturally, the ultra-right couldn't remain indifferent. On July 9, 10 and 11, nationalists made a number of attempts to get into the city, but were actively confronted by the police. The following persons were arrested on their way to Pugachev: the leader of the Holy Rus' (*Sviataia Rus'*) movement Ivan Otrakovsky, the above-mentioned Nikolai Bondarik (was detained several times), the ROS leaders Ivan Mironov and Nikolai Kuryanovich and three Saratov activists of the same party, the head of the Russian Bloc – Saratov (*Russkii blok – Saratov*) movement Pavel Galaktionov together with three Cossacks of the Astrakhan Cossack troops, and several members of the Other Russia (*Drugaiia Rossiia*) party. As far as we can tell, among the relatively well-known ultra-right activists only Vitaly Shishkin, the leader of the Rights for European Development (*Pravye za evropeiskoiie razvitie*) from Kaluga and a former head of the Kaluga Branch of the “the Russians” (*Russkie*) association, made it to the city and even addressed the locals during one of the gatherings.

The nationalists tried very hard to maintain a high level of mobilization of their actual and potential supporters. For example, a video showing a column of armored vehicles and reports that it is moving toward Pugachev to forcibly disperse protesters quickly started to make rounds online (later, it was revealed that it had been a column of peacekeeping forces en route to their military training). Reports of mass arrests of the locals appeared as well, and, as usual, led to complaints about “repressions” by the authorities against the inhabitants of the city. This way, the ultra-right tried to add a protest component to an existing anti-immigrant character of the action.

Similarly to the Day of Wrath in April, nationalists tried to make the Pugachev event the theme of a Russia-wide action scheduled for July 18. Major ultra-organizations announced the events, but provided no list of cities or any other information. Apparently, as in April, they counted on people self-organizing, but in this case, in vain. By July 18, the situation in Pugachev stabilized, and the public lost interest in it.

In the wake of the Pugachev events, nationalists started regular rallies “against ethnic crime,” only formally timing them to random suitable incidents

¹⁸ Ibid.

they snatched from criminal chronicles. This was done in hopes that actualizing the subject of “ethnic clashes” could lead to Pugachev-like “hot spots” forming across the country. However, this technology is not new, and a series of these actions began even prior to the Pugachev events.

These events took place as follows: on July 6 in Saransk (organized by the Slavic Revival (*Slavianskoe vozrozhdenie*) movement); on July 8 in Yekaterinburg (organized by Maxim Vakhromov, the leader of the Russian March – Ural movement); on July 15 and 16 in St. Petersburg (organizer – National-Democratic Party (NDP); attended by Dmitry Bobrov (NSI), Dmitry “Rabid” Yevtushenko from Slavic Strength – North-West (*Slavianskaia sila – severozapad*) and Maxim Kalinichenko from the Russian Run (*Russkaia probezhka*)); on July 28 in Tula (organized by the National Union of Russia (*Natsionalnyi soiuz Rossii*)); again in St. Petersburg on August 9 (organized by N. Bondarik); on August 18 in Rostov-on-Don (organized by the For Honor and Dignity (*Za ches't' i dostoinstvo*) movement), on August 4 in Voronezh (organized by People’s Assembly (Narodnyi Sobor), Cossack groups, the Great Russia (*Velikaia Rossiia*) party and the Russian Imperial Movement (*Russkoe imperskoe dvizhenie*, RID)); on September 3 in Perm (organized by the Russian Perm (*Russkaia Perm*) group); again in St. Petersburg on September 1 and 21 (organized by N. Bondarik, with participation from Semen Pikhtelev’s National Democrats (*Natsional'nye demokraty*)); on September 15 in Saratov (organized by the “Rights” (*Pravye*) group, White Saratov (*Belyi Saratov*) the Russian Run, and the Russians – Saratov (*Russkie-Saratov*) Association.). The number of activists who took part in these actions ranged from a few dozen to no more than 250 people. Notably, many of these events had been a form of “People’s Assembly”, i.e. conducted without a permit, while, prior to the Pugachev events, the ultra-right activists had tried to obtain the consent of the authorities for most of their public events.

Despite the fact that none of the incidents serving as the cause for the above-listed actions, actually “caught fire”, a record number of rallies under the anti-immigrant slogans and high level of media coverage in the wake of the Pugachev events, along other factors discussed below, were keeping the issue of inter-ethnic situation on the agenda.

Arguably the most important event of 2013 for the ultra-right occurred in October, when riots under xenophobic slogans broke out in the Biryulyovo–Zapadnoe district of Moscow, and quickly progressed to outright pogroms.¹⁹

¹⁹ For more details see: Nationalist Riots in Biryulyovo: // SOVA Center. 2013. 15 October (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2013/10/d28140/>).

Wide resonance of this event can, to a large extent, be explained by the fact that the seed fell on a well-prepared soil: the locals had been complaining for years about a wholesale vegetable market, which was associated with many criminal incidents, and, in addition, a significant number of the neighborhood’s residents supported ultra-right views, which the media later paid much attention to, recalling the famous neo-Nazi groups with roots in Biryulyovo.²⁰

The first set of political nationalists, who took interest in the events, was members of the “Russians” associations, who helped the locals to organize a people’s assembly on October 13.²¹ This assembly, in fact, escalated into the most significant incident of riots in the entire Biryulyovo event. It is difficult to judge today on the extent of the role, played by the “Russians”, but, most likely, the call from local nationalists, heeded by the local residents as well as their fellow-nationalists from the right-wing youth milieu all over Moscow, played a much more important role.

After the events of October 13, the Biryulyovo pogroms turned into a major media topic, and all the ultra-right websites, not just the “Russians,” encouraged their associates to support the Biryulyovo locals. Moreover, many resources started to post statements supporting and endorsing the pogroms. Even on the Yandex Maps that allow a user to map vehicle accidents people were posting messages like “Biryulyovo, Golyanovo is with you!” in the place of an accident data. The far-right forums and websites, as well as in the Biryulyovo group on *Vkontakte* social network, started posting numerous inflammatory reports of attacks on locals by migrants and alleged retaliatory action being planned by the “non-Russians.”

Events in Biryulyovo came as a welcome gift for the ultra-right – after all, they failed to incite local residents to a public protest in Udomlya and got no role in the local residents’ protest in Pugachev. In Biryulyovo nationalists achieved both goals, and, moreover, they subsequently managed to utilize the April Day of Wrath technology, i.e. to use the Biryulyovo riots as a cause for public actions under anti-immigrant slogans.

Already on October 15, nationalists started raising yet another wave of protests in Moscow, organizing the “Our response to Kurban Bayram” meeting near Prazhskaya Metro Station. The protesters were supposed to gather

²⁰ The Biryulyovo front” is suspected of organizing pogroms // SOVA Center. 2013. 21 October (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2013/10/d28212/>).

²¹ From among the ultra-right public figures, the assembly of October 13 was attended by the “Russians” leaders Aleksandr Belov and Dmitry Dyomishkin, and Aleksandr Amelin, former coordinator of the “Russians” and now the leader of the Russian Renaissance (*Russkoe Vozrozhdeniie*) movement.

at 7 p.m., but the activists started arriving on the square much earlier. The media noted that the vast majority of the participants were minors. When the gathering tried to line up and move towards Biryulyovo as a single column, the riot police stood in their way. Those who managed to escape detention disappeared into the courtyards, smashing car windows and overturning garbage containers along the way. 276 people were detained.

Nationalists were even more active and aggressive in St. Petersburg. Here, the action was scheduled for October 20 (they were unable to get a permit for an earlier date) and organized by N. Bondarik. The ultra-right kept the issue on the forefront as much as they could. They sent out mass mailings informing that the Biryulyovo rebellion was the beginning of the revolution and published information (sometimes accurate, sometimes not) of various conflicts and fights, presenting them as an unfolding process of “people’s revolt” against migrants and the current political regime. N. Bondarik, apparently, tried to maintain the relevance of the issue a little too hard. On December 16, the police arrested him on suspicion of provocation. According to the law enforcement, he bribed two young people into performing as victims of aggression by migrants. One 16-year-old boy got a self-inflicted stab wound, and the other one, 25-year-old Vasily Baranov, was shot in the back with a stun gun.²² His arrest itself also served as a “cause;” it was used as an additional reason to mobilize, dedicating the event, among other things, to supporting the prisoner.

The action was planned as a rally, but it had been also suggested to turn it into a “mass sweep of the city” – to break up into groups and start smashing shops and stalls belonging to “non-natives.”

In the end, both scenarios were implemented. After the meeting on Marsovo Pole, where nationalists issued demands for the resignation of the St. Petersburg governor and of the Head of the Chief Directorate of the MOI of Russia in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, about 100 people tried to walk from Sadovaya street to Nevsky Prospekt, shouting racist slogans. The crowd went to Gostiny Dvor mall, and then onward to Apraksin Dvor market. Having entered the Apraksin Dvor territory, the nationalists began throwing stones and smoke bombs into the store windows and beating up the sellers. In response, the workers also began to beat up the nationalists with bats and iron rods. The riot police arrived at the scene and detained 16 people (11 of them minors). Several more nationalists were detained at the mall.

²² St. Petersburg: Nikolai Bondarik detained and arrested. He already faces charges // SOVA Center. 2013. 16 October (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2013/10/d28176/>).

There also was an attempt to hold a public action in Moscow on October 20. The gathering of activists was scheduled for 16:00 at Yerevan Plaza shopping center by Tuskaya Metro Station. The event was originally planned as a militant action; the participants promised to “go and return the Russian land.” However, the action as such never took place; a large number of police officers descended on a gathering place and detained almost everyone who didn’t leave, altogether over a 100 people, most of them minors. The attempts to hold actions “in the wake” of the Biryulyovo events were also reported in the cities, other than St. Petersburg and Moscow, but none of them achieved much resonance.

Although the role of the ultra-right organizations in the Biryulyovo events was very noticeable, the nationalists were unable to use these riots as a catalyst for more riots across the country. Moreover, the Biryulyovo pogroms were triggered not by the series of rallies against “ethnic crime,” organized after the Pugachev events – the principal role in this case belonged to the Moscow authorities, who chose to speculate on the theme of “illegal migration” during the election campaign.

Whatever it was, this notorious incident had a whole series of effects.

First of all, the overall level of ethnic xenophobia increased;²³ the anti-immigrant discourse has spread wider than ever before; the social networks were filled with reports of casual manifestations of xenophobia and hatred towards migrants.

Next, the idea of introducing visa regime with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus became a subject of even more active discussion by representatives of all political movements and a number of media outlets. This discussion also brings the nationalists, who initiated this campaign in the winter (see above), into the spotlight.

Finally, the Biryulyovo riots showed the effectiveness of a pogrom as a method to combat any inconvenient phenomena of local life. Issues that had annoyed the locals were tackled exceedingly promptly after the pogrom – there was a promise to close the wholesale market; a criminal case was opened against its manager for facilitation illegal immigration; Yegor Shcherbakov’s murderer (the death that precipitated the events) was apprehended, and, for some reason, brought directly to the office of the Minister of the Interior, etc. These actions demonstrated that a pogrom was the surest way to quickly solve the problems, previously ignored by the authorities for years. The notion that it was extremely difficult to motivate the authorities to solve local problems, or even simply to perform their daily duties without resorting to a pogrom was also actively discussed.

²³ Russians on migration and ethnic tensions // Levada Center. 2013. 5 November (<http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti>).

On the other hand, the situation started to stabilize by October 20. The leaders of the ultra-right organizations switched to organizing the Russian March, and the fervor of rank-and-file activists somewhat subsided, since mass arrests in Moscow and St. Petersburg had shown that the law enforcement agencies are mobilized and will no longer permit any riots. As a result, a significant level of nationalist activity in July-October came to naught, and they failed to build on its success. Even the Russian March on November 4 failed to become a catalyst in this respect.

Only in December, the ultra-right returned, albeit unenthusiastically, to the theme of “ethnic crime,” trying to hold actions during the anniversary of the Manezhnaya Square events in Moscow on December 11, 2010.

A. Amelin served as the organizer of the Moscow action, but, basically, the event never materialized. There was no permit, and, partially for this reason, few people were willing to participate. Apparently, some of those, who gathered on Manezhnaya Square, were detained by police, and the rest dispersed.

In St. Petersburg, the action was called the March against Ethnic Terror and, unlike in Moscow, the nationalists were able to get an official permit. It was organized by the D. Bobrov’s National Socialist Initiative (NSI). The march started at 15:00, went through Avtovskaya and Krasnoputilovskaya streets and ended with a rally on Komsomolskaya Square. About 100-120 people attended the march, including activists of the NSI, Slavic Strength – North-West, and the Other Russia. Despite the fact that the march brought together the same number of activists as the year before, it did not get much traction in the media, and generated little enthusiasm in the ultra-right circles.

The ultra-right practically ignored a potentially winning series of events in Arzamas – there was an appropriate incident, “people’s assemblies” and a pogrom by radically-inclined locals. On the night of December 7, a quarrel in the local cafe Ochag between patrons and employees about the quality of the kebab deteriorated into a fight. As a result, two local young men received stabbing wounds. One died in an ambulance shortly thereafter; the second one was hospitalized. On the same day, the city held a “people’s assembly” – about 50 residents took to the city’s main square, demanding that the authorities close all shops, owned by non-Russian entrepreneurs. One of the murder suspects was detained the next day in Arzamas, and then two more. Neither the names nor the nationality of detainees were reported by the investigators. Nevertheless, on December 9, another gathering was held, with attendance estimates ranging from 300 to 1,000. Representatives of the city administration and the police once again addressed the people. After leaving the assembly, several groups of aggressive young men went on a “Russian March” through the city, shouting

slogans like “Russia for the Russians” and “Russians, forward!” Not satisfied with the march, the protesters started pogroms in the city – the young men smashed two shop windows, destroyed property in cafes and kiosks that allegedly belonged to the “non-natives”, and broke a house window. Extra police forces were brought into the city; some rioters were detained.

On December 14, the third “people’s assembly,” attended by about 200 people, took place near the administration building. Michael Buzin, the Mayor of Arzamas, came out to address the gathering. He tried to reassure the residents by saying that 15 Armenian families had already left the city, and their food businesses had been sold. “All Armenian business in Arzamas has been closed for good,”²⁴ he said. “Arzamas belongs to its residents. They are our guests and should obey our customs and honor our traditions,” he added.

Despite all the media attention, the situation in Arzamas aroused no significant interest among the ultra-right. Many large ultra-right organizations ignored these events altogether and there were almost no related discussion on nationalist resources.

Another similar story was the murder of boxer Ivan Klimov in Omsk on November 23. According to the version spread by the ultra-right immediately after the incident, the 25-year-old boxer was stabbed to death by members of the Omsk Roma mafia. This version is based on the fact that in March Klimov had a conflict with Jan Lebedov, a Roma, which ended by Lebedov shooting Klimov several times with a stun gun and then fleeing the city. Since the ultra-right didn’t intervene in the situation directly, the protest by locals was directed not so much against the Roma as against the police, who had failed to undertake proper efforts to arrest Lebedov after the March incident.

In general, Klimov’s murder aroused a greater deal of interest among the ultra-right than the Arzamas events, but still the usual excitement never arose. The group in the social network *Vkontakte*, which announce the actions to demand investigation into the athlete’s death, features quite a lot of entries written by outspoken nationalists, even by A. Amelin, but still radical nationalists didn’t seem to take full advantage of the incident.

Absence of typical ultra-right attempts to enter the city and lead a protest of local residents in Arzamas and in Omsk could likely be explained by the fact that N. Bondarik, the most active “spinner” of such incidents in recent years, was under arrest, and the rest were afraid to follow in his footsteps. In the second half of the year, the law enforcement authorities opened criminal cases against a

²⁴ About 200 attended a “people’s assembly” in Arzamas // Kommersant. 2013. 17 December (<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2370275>).

number of prominent representatives of the far-right, making it clear that they would no longer tolerate their excessive activity.

Anti-Immigrant Raids

Rapidly increasing prominence of nationalist raids against “illegal aliens” was a key feature of 2013. From a secondary activity to fill the gap between political campaigns raids have turned into one of the focus areas. In the first half of the year, searching for illegal immigrants was a logical continuation of the nationalist campaign for the introduction of visa regime with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The trend intensified against the background of the media discussions of migration issues, which became more active than ever before. Sensing the growing public demand for anti-immigrant discourse, new actors started to appear like mushrooms after a rain. Major players, such as the NDP, the “Russians” association, Motherland party, and Andrei Saveliev’s Great Russia joined in as well. St. Petersburg activists tried to keep up with N. Bondarik and D. Yevtushenko creating their movement, the Russian Sweeps [*Russike zachistki*]; D. Bobrov’s NSI began to conduct their own raids. A number of regional ultra-right activists participated as well. Along with these new “migrant hunters,” those who had been involved in this activity earlier – for example, Aleksey Khudyakov’s Shield of Moscow (*Shchit Moskvy*) movement or Igor Mangushev’s Holy Rus (*Sviataia Rus*) – also continued their activities.

Even before the Pugachev events, nationalist raids started to attract the media and TV attention, thus providing the nationalists with a rare opportunity to promote themselves and their activities to a wider audience.

After the summer riots in Pugachev and in anticipation of the upcoming elections, including the mayoral elections of Moscow, the authorities have also decided to cash in on a popular topic and, using an attack against the police on Matveyevsky market as a pretext, they sharply intensified their demonstrative search operations against illegal migrants.

Despite the fact that most ultra-right activists regarded the police actions as a mere “window dressing”, they saw it as a license to conduct their own raids and doubled their intensity. The nationalist raids increased not only in number but also in the extent of their brutality. Feeling that their activity was condoned by the authorities and society, the organizers started conducting their raids in a manner more indicative of pogroms. The St. Petersburg nationalists from the Russian Sweeps were particularly uninhibited during their first actions in July and August. Not bothering to find out migrants’ places of residence, the activists gathered near a subway station and spent a few hours looking for neighboring shops, stalls and cafes that employed people of “non-Slavic appearance.”

Frequently they trashed the merchandize, attacked the employees and demanded to see their documents and medical IDs. If the documents were not in order, the activists called the police. Since many of the raid participants were armed with baseball bats, and some used masks to cover their faces, upon seeing them the merchants often just abandoned their goods and ran away.

In addition to their separate raids, nationalists have often succeeded in their efforts to participate in the raids by the police and the Federal Migration Service, thus gaining in authority. Afterward, the ultra-right activists actively advertised these actions via the social networks, posting videos and reports to demonstrate that not only did they help the society to fight the “scourge” of illegal migration, but the police officers accepted them as equals. For example, on August 20, the radicals from such organizations as the Shield of Moscow, the Bright Russia (*Svetlaia Rus*), the Attack (*Ataka* – a breakaway part of M. Martsinkevich’s Restruk), Reserve (*Rezerv*) military-patriotic club (the Great Russia’s project) and the Russian Moscow (*Russkaia Moskva*) movement, along with the staff of the Izmailovo Local Office of the Ministry of the Interior detained about 150 migrants in the Izmailovo District and on the site of former Cherkizovsky Market in Moscow. Based on the video footage, the police allowed nationalists to behave in quite a harsh manner. Online ultra-right resources very actively shared videos of the raid, and the action itself was portrayed as an example of a well-prepared and sufficiently large-scale operation.

The St. Petersburg activity of the Russian Sweep achieved such notoriety that their *VKontakte* group membership grew to over three thousand people in August (over 6000 at the time of writing), many of whom had never been previously involved in any ultra-right group and, most likely, weren’t even consistent nationalists. The group actively promoted the raids, and called for taking to the streets rather than being the “internet warriors”. In addition, the leaders began collecting money for this initiative. Thus, as early as the summer, there were some attempts to turn the Russian Sweeps into a separate project, self-funded and filled by activists outside the traditional organizational divisions. In addition, there was an attempt to make it a Russia-wide project – the Russian Sweep groups appeared in a number of Russian cities.

By the fall, the situation has reached the point where “the migrant hunts” started to be viewed as a possible consolidating factor for the fragmented ultra-right milieu, which showed the examples of cooperation between different nationalist groups, united disparate local activists and provided a direction for their activity. In contrast to the Russian Runs, which had also claimed this role at some point, the raids on illegal migrants were openly aggressive in character; it was amply demonstrated by the Russian Sweeps in the summer or by the September raid by the members of the Shield of Moscow against a migrant

residence in Kapotnya. In the latter case, a few dozen aggressive young men, armed with sticks, broke into the residence and started demanding documents from the tenants and kicking out into the street the ones, whose documents were, in their opinion, problematic. If tenants failed to open their doors, the doors were kicked down. The behavior of the nationalists sparked several clashes, some of which involved the use of firearms. At least two people received bullet injuries.²⁵

In general, the police makes practically no attempts to prevent nationalist raids and even, as was shown above, frequently brings them along to participate in their own action, but this activity didn't remain completely unpunished.

On many occasions, the police detained the participants of the raids and made records of their administrative violations; later the situation even resulted in a criminal prosecution. Thus, on July 31, the St. Petersburg police opened a criminal case under the Criminal Code Article 213 (Hooliganism) against several ultra-right activists, who conducted the Russian Sweep raids throughout the city markets, based on online video evidence of the raids posted by nationalists themselves. In addition, on October 1, the court arrested three participants in the attack against the migrants' residence hall in Kapotnya: 26-year-old leader of the Shield of Moscow Aleksey Khudyakov, 21-year-old leader of Narco-Stop project Alexander Voznesensky and "Sh", a 17-year-old activist of the Shield of Moscow.

Filing of these court cases contributed to the drop in the raids' level of aggression, but failed to stop them. The actions continued, and neither the police nor officials have taken a stand regarding this phenomenon. The NSI raid, which took place on August 27, illustrates the point. The activists entered the shops and food establishments, checking the employees' documents and medical IDs. The video recording shows that the NSI activists entered the first caf along with police officers, who did not interfere, while the nationalists asked for the employee's medical ID. Once the ID was found to be missing, the police reported on camera that they will compile a report of administrative violations against the employee. The nationalists accompanied by the police (it is unclear, whether the police officers were the same or different in both cases) also entered the second shop, but at this time the police did not collaborate, but instead informed D. Bobrov that his actions were illegal, and later demanded that the raid be stopped, threatening the nationalists with administrative responsibility under the Administrative Code Article 19.1 of ("Arbitrariness").

In their raid activity nationalists try to cooperate not only with the police but also with other government and quasi-government agencies, and this cooperation

²⁵ Nationalist conducted a raid in a migrant workers residence in Kapotnya // SOVA Center. 2013. 30 September (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2013/09/d28020/>).

is accepted, albeit without enthusiasm. For example, in September, the Russian Sweeps reported on their social network page that Elena Dunaeva, the Head of the Federal Migration Service in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region, had invited the Russian Sweep to participate in their raids. Alexander Rosenbaum, a singer, who serves as the chairman of the Public Advisory Board of Federal Migration Service, invited representatives of the Russian Sweep movement to join the Board (judging by the list of Board members, the nationalists were not included after all). As another example, in late October, representatives of the Guestbusters movement (the raid project of the "Russians" association) attended the meeting of the Municipal Control group of the Council on the Development of the Social Control at the Committee for Public Associations and Religious Organizations of the State Duma. After the meeting, the nationalists stated that they hoped "*to plan further visits to such working groups in order to build understanding and communication with official local representatives of the authorities.*"²⁶

By the end of 2013, despite the fact that the raids' novelty effect was gone, and the police made it clear that it would not allow nationalists to organize all-out pogroms under the cover of community initiatives, the raids still remained one of the most important nationalist activities. Due to the permissive attitude of the authorities, this kind of activity allowed the ultra-right to build connections with law enforcement structures and provided them with a sense of power and self-righteousness. Nationalists offer to anyone, who joins them, an opportunity to direct their xenophobic feelings against migrants without the risk of a prison term. However, after the criminal proceedings had been initiated against the activists of the Russian Runs and the Shield of Moscow, the "migrant hunters" have become more cautious. They try not to take untested people along on the raids and behave in a somewhat more reserved manner. At the time of writing, the search for illegal migrants remains a major source of self-promotion and recruiting for the ultra-right.

This high popularity of raids against immigrants overshadowed another, recently popular raid initiative, "pedophile hunts." Many small ultra-right groups engaged in this activity in 2012, but it lost its popularity a year later. The only person, who consistently continued to conduct the "pedophile hunts, was Maxim "Tesak" (Hatchet) Martsinkievich, the person, who initially popularized them by creating Occupy-Pedofiliay project within his Restruk! Movement. The Neo-Nazis of Occupy-Pedofiliay were luring alleged gay pedophiles "on bait," then proceeded to humiliate and abuse them, and published the video recording. Restruk! has gained wide popularity and many followers in the regions thanks

²⁶ Guestbusters in the State Duma! // Internet-diary of the Guestbusters community.

to this project, and not all followers showed restraint in their violence. The criminal case was filed, and Tesak left for Ukraine, where, together with his associates, he continued to work on trapping alleged pedophiles. Incidentally, Tesak and his colleagues conducted their Ukrainian actions much more harshly than those he had previously organized in Russia;²⁷ subsequently Tesak moved to Cuba. A criminal case was opened against M. Martsinkevich in December for incitement to ethnic hatred (CC Article 282) for posting several racist videos with incitements to murder. At the time of writing, the nationalist had already been expelled from Cuba and was arrested in Moscow. However, there is still a concern that many of his followers or competitors could continue the raids in their attempt to occupy the vacant place of the chief pedophile hunter.

Speaking about the Occupy-Pedofiliy project, we need to note an unexpected sequel, to this initiative that took place in the first half of the year. Ninth Grader Philip Denits,²⁸ who had formerly worked for Martsinkevich as “bait” to lure pedophiles, started his own movement called Occupy-Gerontofiliy. This movement also conducts raids, but targets not pedophiles, but boys, who agree to meet with adult men. The movement’s participants, posing as adults, lure children between the ages of 12 and 16 to a meeting, and then use threats to force them to talk about themselves on camera, humiliate and insult them, and, finally, they upload the resulting video online, and send it to the child’s acquaintances. In December, Denits was prosecuted for incitement to ethnic hatred, but the specific reason was, unfortunately, not reported. The teen announced that he was suspending the project for the duration of the investigation.²⁹

Traditional Nationalist Actions

Traditional nationalist actions are the ones, repeated from year to year and possessing an established form and content. They got little attention in 2012, but now that the ultra-right returned their focus to their independent activity, everything could be expected to return to normal.

The first in the series of traditional actions was the Heroes Day on March 1. The action was originally dedicated to the Pskov paratroopers, who died fighting in

²⁷ Ukraine: More abuse by Tesak // SOVA Center. 2013. 2 December (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2013/12/d28532/>).

²⁸ Denitz – not the real name and nickname, taken in honor of Karl Doenitz, who led Germany after Adolf Hitler’s suicide at the end of the Second World War.

²⁹ The search in the house of the founder of the Occupy-G erontofiliy project // SOVA Center. 2013. 26 December (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2013/12/d28717/>).

Chechnya in 2000, but this year it was decided to dedicate it to convicted Vladimir Kvachkov and Leonid Khabarov (see below). Compared to 2011 (comparison with 2012 is unhelpful, since nobody took responsibility for its organization), we see the expanded geography of the event, but no increase in numbers. The best-attended event took place in Moscow and brought together about 100 activists.³⁰

The Russian May Day shows similar results; it managed to increase attendance in two capitals only and lost some activists in the regions, but expanded its geography by three additional cities.³¹

In excitement caused in the ultra-right circles by the Pugachev riots and the ensuing events, another traditional action – The Day of Solidarity with Right-Wing Political Prisoners, observed by the right radicals on July 25 since 2009 – went practically unnoticed. Small rallies and pickets took place in several regions of the country; in other regions activists limited their activities to displaying their banners; large ultra-right organizations focused on fundraising for prisoners, as they did last year. For example, the “Russians” association managed to collect about 230 thousand rubles, which were sent to incarcerated nationalists, including those convicted of violent crimes.

Nationalists demonstrated even less enthusiasm when organizing the Day of Remembrance for Victims of Ethnic Crime, commemorated in early October and timed to coincide with the anniversary of the death of Anna Beshnova. The rallies were held only in Moscow, Saratov and Ryazan, and, apparently, weren’t even planned in other cities.

Lack of enthusiasm for the traditional actions in 2013 was partially offset by the Russian March, which, as always, took place on November 4 in many cities across the country.

While the main Russian March of 2012 in Moscow was obviously affected by the general protest events, the event of 2013 was held in the wake of Biryulyovo events, which infused it with a corresponding mood and character. The March, held in Lublino, was organized by the “Russians” association, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Russian All-People’s Union (*Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soiuz*, ROS). About 6000 people attended the event, which was about 500 more than the year before,³² and about the same as in 2011.³³ Most likely, the March organizers were expecting much larger attendance, given a

³⁰ See: V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, The State Duma Directed...

³¹ Ibid.

³² V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, The Ultra-Right on the Streets...

³³ V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, Alexander Verkhovsky, Between Manezhnaya and Bolotnaya: Xenophobia and Radical Nationalism in Russia, and Efforts to Counteract Them in 2011 // Xenophobia, Freedom of conscience and Anti-extremism in Russia in 2011. Moscow: SOVA Center, 2012. P. 5-61.

general rise in xenophobia, but so far they only attained a partial return of the activists, who ignored the march in 2012 because they were unhappy with the involvement of large ultra-right organizations in general protest activities and with the fact that, against the background of the united opposition rallies, the main nationalist event of the year lost its status as the biggest oppositional rally.

Unlike the March of 2012, which included an unusually large number of middle-aged participants, with meager attendance by radical youth groups, the Russian March in 2013 was mostly attended by young people (many were clearly minors) in a very radical state of mind. Many of them were chanting slogans, which directly called for violence against people from the Caucasus and other city residents that belonged to ethnic minorities; a much greater number of the participants, compared to the previous year, were seen raising their hands in a Nazi salute. An incident occurred during the procession – marchers in the column of the Bloc of Free National Socialist Societies (*Blok svobodnykh national-sotsialisticheskikh obshchestv*), i.e. autonomous neo-Nazis, tried to use the smoke bombs. The police wedged into the column, and most of the demonstrators ran away, having broken through the fence and nearly provoked clashes with police.

Radicalism of the attendees and their unwillingness to comply with rules displeased even some of the organizers. For example, Dmitry Dyomushkin in conversation with colleagues demanded that those most actively raising their hands in a Nazi salute be removed from the columns, since they were being constantly photographed by journalists and discredited the event. After the incident with the police action against the “national-socialist” bloc, Vladimir Basmanov proposed to tighten the requirements for organizers of individual Russian March columns.

However, it is not very clear, what else the organizers could have expected after they had called for participation in the Russian March using the 14-word slogan, “We must secure our Russian land for [the] future [of] our people and [the] future [of] Russian children!”, which is a slight modification of the slogan of American neo-Nazi David Lane, “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for White children”.

The interrupted tradition of alternative nationalist marches was resumed in 2013. This time they both of them took place near the Oktiabrskoe Pole Metro Station.

The first march was organized by the Russian Coalition for Action (*Russkaia koalitsiia deistviia*) which includes People’s Militia in the Name of Minin and Pozharsky (*Narodnoe opolcheniie imeni Minina i Pozharskogo*, NOMP), led by Yuri Ekishev, the Great Russia (Andrei Saveliev), and Russian Renaissance (*Russkoe Vozrozhdeniie*) led by Alexander Amelin (Russian Rescue Committee (*Russkii komitet spaseniia*)). A total of 550-600 people attended the march.

The second event was named the Russian Imperial March and brought together around 120-150 people. It was attended by Union of Orthodox Banner Bearers (*Soiuz pravoslavnykh Khorugvenostsev*) and three members of the Shield of Moscow movement. There were no political insignia, besides the little-known symbols of the Russian Orthodox Brotherhood (*Russkoe pravoslavnoe bratstvo*).

Thus, adding up the number of participants in all three major Moscow events on November 4, we see some growth in the number of people willing to attend a nationalist action on this day. According to our estimates, the marches in the capital (not counting the audience of the traditional LDPR rally) included about 6,700 participants, which may not be such a large number compared to the Bolotnaya Square rallies, but represents the absolute record for the Russian March.

Nationalists in St. Petersburg commemorated November 4 even more aggressively than in Moscow.³⁴ Here, a substantial portion of the ultra-right refused to participate in the march because it was organized by the allegedly pro-Kremlin Homeland (Rodina) party, and this refusal ultimately led to a number of riots in the city. Several dozen people were detained by police when trying to conduct an action near Oktyabrsky Concert Hall without a permit. The police also dispersed about 40 people, who were trying to dance “hardbass” on Dvortsovaya Square. After that, a group of the ultra-rights trashed the Udelyny market; there were also several organized group attacks on nonwhite people in the metro (“white cars”).³⁵

In addition to Moscow and St. Petersburg, the actions were held in at least 47 cities across the country, that is, the geographical spread of the Russian March continues to grow, albeit more slowly than before; the events took place in a total of 45 cities a year ago and in 32 cities two years ago. Nationalists in the regions, with few exceptions, also managed to either not lose their activists or even significantly increase their number.

Based on the above information, we can acknowledge this year’s march as a success for the ultra-right, as was expected against the background of a general rise in xenophobic sentiments. In theory, the potential of the ultra-right movement in Russia is very high, since more than half of the population shares the xenophobic views, but the growth in the ranks of nationalists was deterred by the low level of urgency of this particular problem compared to the others as well as excessive (from the point of view of an average Russian) radicalism of the nationalist movement. Now, when the topic of ethnic relations came to the

³⁴ The Russian March 2013 in the regions of Russia // SOVA Center. 2013. 6 November (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2013/11/d28355/>).

³⁵ For more details see: St. Petersburg, “white car” and a pogrom on the Udelnaya Metro Station Market // SOVA Center. 2013. 5 November (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2013/11/d28327/>).

forefront, an alarming increase in numbers of the ultra-right can be anticipated, at least due to the youngsters, whose parents approve of nationalist ideas.

Participation in the General Protest Movement

The ultra-right started the year of 2013 with their refusal to participate in oppositional rallies (which they counted on for almost of the entire 2012), since the rank-and-file right-wing radicals demonstrated to the leaders of the nationalist organizations their sharply negative attitude toward the idea of cooperation with the liberal and leftist movements as early as the second half of 2012. As a result, until May 2013, the nationalist leaders consistently refrained from calling on their supporters to attend the joint opposition rallies organized by the Opposition Coordination Council (*Koordinatsionnyi Sovet Oppositsii, KSO*), in which the nationalists played a prominent role. They still made two exceptions to this rule – for the actions on May 6, marking the anniversary of the Bolotnaya Square riots, and the rally on June 12, held in support of the “Bolotnaya Square prisoners.” In both cases, the ultra-right apparently hoped for popularity of the subject of political prisoners among rank-and-file nationalists, but they miscalculated and the ultra-right participation was barely noticeable.

We should also mention the demonstration on May 5, organized by the entity, alternative to Opposition Coordination Council, namely the Expert Council of the Opposition. Their Spring Freedom March brought together about 500 people, half of them nationalists. Most likely, such a high proportion of ultra-right activists had to do with the fact that Nikolai Bondarik, a popular figure among the right radicals, declared his support for the action. Their attendance was also affected by the fact that the ultra-right are well-represented in the Expert Council of the Opposition – 10 of its 41 members openly identify as nationalists.

In the first half of the year, while Opposition Coordination Council remained active, nationalists successfully used this coalition for expansion and legitimization of their own, purely nationalist, actions and campaigns.

The campaign for the introduction of a visa regime with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, started by the National Democratic Party in the winter can serve as an example. On April 14 the National Democratic Party (NDP) has initiated a network action “Say YES to Visas!”³⁶ which attracted not only the ultra-right movements – the “Russians” association, the Common Cause (*Obshchee delo*), the ROD Human Rights Center, the ROS – but also

³⁶ Nationalists conducted events in Moscow and other cities to call for limiting migration from Central Asia and the Caucasus // SOVA Center. 2013. 16 April (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2013/04/d26906/>).

the Democratic Choice (*Demokraticeskii vybor*), a liberal democratic party, led by Vladimir Milov. NDP along with its associates around the country had held small pickets and rallies to promote this initiative.³⁷

Moreover, nationalists engaged the KSO itself in the campaign by bringing the introduction of visas up to vote. On February 10 the KSO, without a single dissenting vote, supported the abolition of visa-free regime, without any statements on the nature of the initiative, that is, who, how and under what conditions should get the visas, and who and for what reasons should be denied them. As such, the KSO decision came across as populism and flirting with xenophobic sentiments of the majority of Russia’s population, but it was a victory for the nationalists in the Council and added credibility to their initiative. In parallel with the NDP, Valerii Solovey’s New Force (*Novaya Sila*) party launched a similar campaign; it collected more than 100,000 signatures in support of this initiative and even submitted them to the State Duma.

Thanks to these efforts, the ultra-right succeeded in attracting media attention to this, not too novel, initiative. A question on visa-free regime with the CIS countries became widely discussed not only online and in print, but also on the federal TV channels. Several TV shows even invited nationalists. For the first time in a long while, the far-right managed to keep their initiative on the agenda despite the clearly expressed disagreement from Kremlin. It is difficult to say with certainty what caused such a rare success – the already beginning governmental anti-migrant campaign or the connections established by nationalists in general protest structures.

However, since the mid-summer, the general protest activity continued to fade, and the involvement of the nationalist leaders gradually lost its purpose. Accordingly, they turned their attention to independent actions, especially since they experienced no lack of suitable occasions in 2013.

Party Building

Early in the year, the ultra-right were still more or less optimistic and believed that they would be able to register their parties, which they started creating over two years ago, once the registration procedures had been simplified. However, their efforts mostly failed. Valerii Solovey’s New Force party submitted their registration documents to the Ministry of Justice twice, and received an official denial on June 25. The party leader promised that “*the formal registration process of the New Force will be restarted in just a few days,*” and that he hoped

³⁷ For more details see: V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, *The State Duma Directed...*

that “*the registration will take place on a tight schedule.*”³⁸ In fact, on July 6, the party once again registered its organizing committee with the Ministry of Justice. However, the process, apparently, progressed no further. There were no reports on the new party constituent assembly or on the filing of documents for registration. Moreover, in the winter, the New Force disappeared from the Ministry of Justice list of registered organizing committees of the political parties altogether. Most likely, V. Solovey decided to abandon his attempts to give the New Force an official status of a political party.

K. Krylov’s NDP was also refused the registration, as it reported in May. The party pretty quickly registered its organizing committee with the Ministry of Justice once again, and held a new constituent assembly in October. There have been no reports of applying for registration so far.

The Nationalist Party (*Partiia natsionalistov*) announced by the “Russians” Association showed almost no progress in obtaining its registration. In August, the “Russians” stated that they had planned to hold a constituent assembly, but it was sabotaged because the administration of the Izmailovo hotel complex, which was supposed to host the event, suddenly refused to rent its facilities to the ultra-right. As far as we can tell, the organizing committee of the party made no further attempts to hold the assembly, citing the criminal case against D. Dyomushkin, who headed the organizing committee. Meanwhile, the association continues to evolve under the “Russians” brand and not the Nationalist Party, apparently, not really counting on being able to register. In the course of the year, the “Russians” added offices in Krasnoyarsk, Astrakhan, Khanty-Mansiysk and the Altai Region, and they were all presented as the cells of, the “Russians” association, not of the Nationalist Party.

The split that occurred in the “Russians” association in the end of February due to the expulsion of Georgii Borovikov³⁹ resulted in yet another ultra-right party project – The Right Wing for European Development (*Pravye za evropeiskoe razvitiye, PZER*). The party registered its organizing committee with the Ministry of Justice in the spring, but moved no further. PZER has practically no chance to obtain registration, so proclaiming itself a party had more tactical rather than strategic character, providing this insignificant new group with a higher status.

The leader of the Resistance (*Soprotivlenie*) movement, Roman Zentsov, who had previously left Sergei Baburin’s ROS, introduced his own party project earlier this year. The organizing committee of the new Order (*Poriadok*) party was registered with the Ministry of Justice; the constituent assembly was first

³⁸ Valerii Solovey: “The courage to continue” // The official website of the New Force (Novaya Sila) party.

³⁹ For more details see: V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, The State Duma Directed....

scheduled for May, then moved to the fall, with the following comment from the party leadership: “We are not going to fire a “blank” and conduct an assembly until we are hundred percent certain in our ability to obtain the registration.”⁴⁰ Since the fall assembly never materialized, we can assume that Zentsov’s level of certainty in his success has not increased.

The National Conservative Party of Russia applied for registration on October 18. It is a far-right party with the Russian Orthodox focus headed by Andrey Kochergin, a member of the Union of Orthodox Combat (*Soiuz pravoslavnykh edinoborstv*).

Thus, the most important far-right associations that expressed their intentions to register so far had no success. However, it would be inaccurate to say that Russia has no parties with nationalist or near-nationalist ideology. Big players, such as Sergei Baburin’s ROS and Alexei Zhuravlev’s Motherland party, are registered, as well as a number of more or less ideologically related smaller parties, such as Nikolai Starikov’s the Great Fatherland Party (*Partiia Velikoe Otechestvo*) also joined by Vladimir Khomiakov, the co-chair of the People’s Council (*Narodnyi Sobor*), Dmitrii Merkulov’s Autocratic Russia (*Samoderzhavnaiia Rossiia*), Andrei Kovalenko’s National Course (*Natsionalnyi Kurs*) and Svetlana Peunova’s Will (*Volya*) party.

Participation in the Elections

The scheduled election cycle allowed nationalists to try their hand at “big politics” in an attempt to win a place in the power structures during the September elections held in a number of regions.

From among the parties, the Motherland, led by A. Zhuravlev, was the most active participant in the elections. Almost in all cases where Motherland vied for the place in a regional parliament, it failed to score more than 1-3 % of the vote. The only exception was the Arkhangelsk Regional Assembly, where it elected one candidate. The Motherland has proved much more successful in the municipal elections. For example, in the town of Koryazhma in the Arkhangelsk Region it received even more votes than the United Russia in the elections to the City Duma.

The ROS, led by Sergei Baburin, participated in the elections as well. The party nominated its list of candidates for the elections to the Smolensk Regional Duma, but was able to get only about 0.4 % of the vote. This, of course, was a very weak result, especially considering the fact that Sergei Baburin himself

⁴⁰ Frequently asked questions about the Party // The official website of the Resistance (Soprotivlenie) movement. 2013. 13 April.

headed the list. Not a single candidate was elected among those who ran in single-mandate districts. Baburin himself scored 7.28% of the vote, finishing the third from the bottom.

Initially, the ROS leader was not planning to run for a place in the Smolensk Regional Duma, and tried, in vain, to register as a mayoral candidate in the Moscow Region. Two other prominent ROS activists declared their intention to personally seek important political positions – Ivan Mironov, who was going to run for governor of the Vladimir Region, and Nikolai Kurianovich, who aspired to the role of the mayor of Moscow. Neither one of them ever made it to the candidates' list.

The ROS election campaign for the Legislature of the Irkutsk Region also achieved some notoriety. The electoral commission has not approved the party list on formal grounds and then refused to register Alexander Turik, the head of the local ROS cell. The latter appealed the withdrawal of his candidacy, and the court restored his rights. In the end, he and his fellow party member Dmitry Chalbyshv ran in single-mandate districts and got 1.52 % and 2.53 % of the vote respectively. It is worth noting that A. Turik subsequently sued the district election commission of Electoral District No. 5, demanding compensation for the moral and material damages in connection with the unlawful removal of his candidacy. According to him, due to the actions of the election commission, he had to spend a month on litigation, and lost the time he needed for conducting his campaign. In December, the court partially granted the request of the nationalist.

The ROS put forward its own candidate for the mayoral elections in the city of Khabarovsk. Leonid Razuvanov ended up last on the list and scored only 2.67 % of the vote. A similar scenario played out during the election to the Ryazan City Duma, where the ROS candidate Artem Kuraev received the fewest number of votes in the district, 1.25%.

As in the past, the nationalists' electoral success remains modest. However, nationalists are denied registration quite often, so it is difficult to fully appreciate their electability.

Nationalists also could not remain indifferent to the mayoral elections in Moscow, which eventually led to a minor split in the ultra-right milieu on the issue of support for candidate Alexei Navalny.

The ROS stated: “... we, *Russian nationalists and patriots, stand against Navalny and his allies, we are not on the same path as a defender of gay pride parades, a protégé of the “democratic” leaders of the 90s, the “Russian orangeade” project and Yeltsin 2.0.*” As a result, the party supported the election of the Communist Party candidate Ivan Melnikov. The latter even promised to appoint Sergei Baburin vice-mayor in case of victory.

The St. Petersburg activists N. Bondarik, D. Yevtushenko, M. Kalinichenko (the Russian Runs), and organizations within the Russian Coalition for Action

agreed with the ROS. The difference between these opponents of Navalny and the ROS was that they suggested that nationalists not go to the polls altogether. The majority of autonomous ultra-right activists also concluded that Navalny could not be considered a nationalist, since he was a liberal and an “Orangeman.”

The National Democrats, i.e. the New Force, the NDP, the “Russians” Association and Vladimir Istarkhov’s Russian Right Party expressed the opposite opinion.

As a result, the confrontation resulted in two differently directed actions on August 31 in Moscow. The first one, the auto-rally in support of Navalny, was organized by the NDP and the “Russians”. The rally was held on the Garden Ring; about 10 cars took part in it, carrying the “Russians for Navalny” stickers on their rear windows. Contrary to the expectations of the organizers, the action failed to attract a significant number of participants, and police did not particularly try to block the vehicles.

The second ultra-right action, where the Russian Coalition for Action and Nikolai Bondarik urged to boycott the elections, was slightly larger. Their march, attended by 100 people, proceeded from the Oktiabrskoe Pole Metro Station towards Shchukinskaya Metro Station. Other far-right organizations did not attend the event.

Based on the small number of nationalist actions in support of A. Navalny, we can assume that the contribution of the ultra-right to his results was small.

Meanwhile, consistent nationalists and people with xenophobic views had a number of candidates to choose from at the recent Moscow elections, because almost all candidates, hiding behind the vague term “illegal immigrants,” were excitedly discussing the negative aspects of this phenomenon, albeit not offering any coherent concept of migration policy more sophisticated than “they should all just leave.” However, paradoxically, none of this managed to increase nationalists’ interest in the elections.

Counter-action to Radical Nationalism and Xenophobia

Public Initiatives

Public activity to counter xenophobia and radical nationalism in 2013 remained virtually invisible and took place within the framework of the traditional projects

On January 19, 2013, the All-Russian campaign in memory of Stanislav Markelov, Anastasia Baburova and all those who died at the hands of neo-Nazis took place in at least 15 cities in Russia. A year earlier, this event took place in 12

cities. The anti-fascist march in Moscow was attended by about 700 people. In St. Petersburg, the event was held in a picket format, since the authorities gave no permit for a march. Prior to the picket's start, ultra-right activists made an attempt to attack the protesters, but, fortunately, the anti-fascists managed to escape, and no one was hurt. The antifascist events in Irkutsk and Ust-Labinsk (the Krasnodar Region) were also marked with incidents – the police detained the participants on account of their “unauthorized gatherings.”

Public activity increased in the fall, as expected.

From November 9 to November 16, the activists organized the annual International Week of Tolerance under the slogan “Kristallnacht – never again!” timed to the International Day against Racism and Intolerance.⁴¹ Unfortunately, the week's events included mainly a number of online informational campaigns, while the street events took place only in a few cities and failed to attract a large audience.

Two annual events took place in St. Petersburg. An action in memory of antifascist musician Timur Kacharava, who died on this day at the hands of neo-Nazis, was conducted on November 13 near the Bukvoed bookstore on Ligovsky Prospect and brought together about 30 participants. The “March Against Hate,” instituted in 2004 after the assassination of scientist Nikolai Girenko by neo-Nazis, took place on October 27 (it was attended by about 200 people).

On November 4, that is, on the day of the Russian March, Moscow hosted a public forum “Russia's Unity Is in Solidarity of Its Citizens. Against Xenophobia and Nationalism” organized by the Yabloko party and human rights organizations. As a result, the Forum founded the Committee on United Resistance to Xenophobia and collected suggestions for further action. On December 10, the newly created Committee on United Resistance of Xenophobia held a picket in Moscow “against hatred,” dedicated to the Day of Human Rights and the International Migrants Day on December 10. The action on Tverskaya Boulevard near the Timiriyev monument was attended by about 15 people, including representatives of Yabloko, the Moscow Helsinki Group, the Inter-Regional Uzbek Fraternity “Vatandosh”, municipal deputies and civil society activists. Similar actions took place in several other cities and regions (Tambov, Krasnoyarsk, Bashkortostan, Smolensk, Kalmykia, Penza, Nizhny Novgorod and Tula), but didn't attract many participants.

⁴¹ On November 9 1938 was the beginning of a massive pogrom against the Jews in Germany, called “Kristallnacht,” which became the first step toward the Holocaust.

Criminal Prosecution

For Violence

The number of verdicts for violent racist crimes in 2013 was the same as in the previous year. In 2013 there were at least 32 convictions, in which courts recognized the hate motive in 23 regions of Russia, compared to 32 convictions in 24 regions in 2012. In these court cases 59 people were found guilty, compared to 72 people in 2012.

When prosecuting racist violence in 2012, the judiciary used almost the entire range of the Criminal Code articles that contain hate motive as aggravating circumstance, for example Part 2 paragraph “1” of Article 105 (“murder motivated by hatred”); Part 4 of Article 111 (“infliction of grievous bodily harm”), etc. The Criminal Code Article 282 (“incitement of hatred”) was utilized in 9 convictions related to violent crimes. Use of this article for violent crime convictions was justified in these cases, since the attacks were either committed by a group in front of witnesses or the attackers recorded their actions on video and published them online. In accordance with Resolution No. 11 of the plenary meeting of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation “Concerning Judicial Practice in Criminal Cases Regarding Crimes of Extremism,” adopted on June 28, 2011,⁴² the application of Article 282 to violent crimes is considered appropriate if the crimes were aimed at inciting hate in third parties, for example, through public and provocative ideologically motivated attack. The resolution implies that Article 282 should be used in conjunction with another appropriate Criminal Code article, such as “murder”, “bodily harm”, etc.)

There were two cases, when only Part 2 paragraph “a” of Article 282 (“incitement of ethnic hatred, committed with violence or threat of violence”) was utilized for the conviction. In one of these cases, this step was justified, since there had been no violence as such, but a public threat of violence, accompanied by anti-Russian slogans. In another case, the victim had suffered a beating, but the relevant article of the Criminal Code was, for some reasons, absent in the verdict.

Part 1 of the Criminal Code Article 280 (“public incitement to extremist activity”) was utilized in one verdict. This article was used in the conviction of the “Russian Breivik,” Dmitrii Vinogradov, who shot seven people in a drugstore in November 2012. Vinogradov's personal page on *Vkontakte* social network contained the “My Manifesto” file, with propaganda of “people-hate” ideology.⁴³

⁴² For more details see: V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, A. Verkhovskiy, *Between Manezhnaya and Bolotnaya...*

⁴³ *Ibid.* for more on the people-hate movement.

Court decisions in cases of violent crimes were distributed as follows:

1 person was released under an amnesty;

1 person found guilty but released from punishment because the statute of limitations had expired;

2 people were found guilty but released from punishment due to reconciliation of the parties;

12 people received suspended sentences;

4 people were sentenced to mandatory labor;

3 people were sentenced to correctional labor;

2 people were sentenced to fines;

1 person received a custodial sentence of up to one year;

3 people – up to 3 years;

11 people – up to 5 years;

9 people – up to 10 years

6 people – up to 15 years;

2 people – up to 20 years;

2 people received a life sentence.

Unfortunately, we only know of four verdicts where the offenders were ordered to pay a financial compensation to their victims for moral harm and medical expenses. Regretfully, the prosecutor's offices very rarely report about such measures. We believe that this practice should be encouraged.

As you can see from the above data, 20 % of the convicted offenders (12 out of 59) only received suspended sentences. Some of these people were defendants on large group trials (including two minors), and it is possible that the prosecution failed to prove their direct involvement in the attacks, or that they received a light sentence in exchange for assisting the investigation. However, some sentences are puzzling, to say the least. A suspended sentence issued in the Kostroma Region for an armed attack on a Chechen woman was outrageously inappropriate. We have to repeat that that suspended sentences for violent racist attacks tend to engender the sense of impunity and do not stop offenders from committing such acts in the future. The renewed increase in suspended sentences for violent crimes is alarming.

We are also extremely unsatisfied by an outrageous verdict issued by the Prioksky District Court of Nizhny Novgorod against Nazi skinheads from the White Flock (*Belaia staja*) group, who were charged with at least 10 attacks against people of “non-Slavic appearance” and “those thought to be pedophiles.” Out of seven offenders not a single one went to prison; the founder of the organization received a suspended sentence, and two others were sentenced to correctional labor. The cases against the remaining four offenders were discontinued due to reconciliation or amnesty.

More than half of the offenders (32 people) were sentenced to actual prison terms. Most of them were members of major racist groups (such as the three neo-Nazi skinheads from the Simbirsk White Power group in Ulyanovsk, two members of the Sverdlovsk neo-Nazi group Volksturm, a member of Ian Liutik's gang from Moscow and four members of Monolith SS gang from Togliatti) or had previously been convicted of other crimes.

Two people received a life sentence. Unlike the cases from the previous years,⁴⁴ neither of the two belonged to a neo-Nazi group. They are the aforementioned “Russian Breivik” Dmitrii Vinogradov and one of the Irkutsk “mallet-killers” Artem Anoufrieiev.⁴⁵

The arrests of Ilya Goryachev, the former leader of the Russian Image (*Russkii obraz*) party in Serbia and Mikhail Volkov, a former member of the skinhead group OB-88, in Ukraine generated a great deal of resonance in the spring. Both men were on the international wanted list in relation to the case of the Military Organization of Russian Nationalists (*Boevaia organizatsiia russkikh natsionalistov*, BORN) and were extradited to Russia. According to the prosecution, the organization also included Maxim Baklagin, Vyacheslav Isayev, and Yuri Tikhomirov. Other notorious BORN members include Nikita Tikhonov and Yevgenia Khasis convicted for the murder of Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova, as well as Alexey Korshunov, who died, when his own grenade exploded in October 2011 in Ukraine. The BORN members are suspected of being involved in a number of high-profile murders in Russia, including the murders of Moscow City Court judge Edward Chuvashov and lawyer Stanislav Markelov. The investigation of this case was completed in December 2013.

The past year has shown that the members and leaders of well-known ultra-right groups, in addition to their ideological struggle, do not shy away from committing common crimes. The most notorious incident was the arrest, in April 2013, of Georgy Borovikov, the leader of the RFO Memory (*Pamiat'*), the former head of the Moscow office and the head of the “court of honor” of “The Russians” Association. He, along with his associates, was convicted of robbery with violence. Victor Konshin, the leader of the local cell of the far-right organization Slavic Strength (now part of “The Russians” Association) was

⁴⁴ In the period from 2005 to 2013 the total of 22 people were sentenced to life in prison for motivated violent crimes (19 of them were members of organized neo-Nazi groups).

⁴⁵ More on mallet-killers see: V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, A. Verkhovskiy, *Between Manezhnaya and Bolotnaya...*

arrested in Orel for organizing prostitution using the threat of violence. Finally, an almost comic story took place in Moscow, where two far-right activists – Roman “Zukhel” Zheleznov and Alexey “Anti-Gypsy” Kasich from the Wotan Jugend association – were detained and arrested for stealing merchandize from the Auchan store.⁴⁶

For Vandalism

In 2013, the prosecution of ethno-religious and neo-Nazi vandalism was more active than in the preceding year – we know of 8 sentences issued to 11 people in 8 regions. We know of 5 convictions of seven people in 2012.

In six cases the charges were brought under Part 2 of the Criminal Code Article 214 (“vandalism motivated by ethnic or religious hatred.”). In one sentence (for the destruction of the graves of the Yezidis in the Volgograd Region) the charges were brought under Part 2 paragraphs “a” and “b” of Article 244 (“desecration and damage to gravestones by a group of persons, motivated by ethnic hatred”). In two other cases Article 214 was aggregated with Part 1 of Article 282, and in one case, additionally, with Part 2 of Article 213 (“hooliganism motivated by hatred”).

In addition, two cases contained charges under the Criminal Code Article 167 (“attempted destruction of other people’s property by means of explosion”) in Novosibirsk and Petrozavodsk -the former for attempted arson of a mosque, the latter for arson of an Orthodox church. In these cases Article 214 was not applied, and we do not know whether the hate motive was imputed by paragraph “e” of Article 63.

Two people received custodial sentences, one was sentenced to correctional labor, one – to mandatory labor, and one received a suspended sentence. Another offender was sentenced to 1 year of coercive educational measures. In one case, the vandal, who poured ink over two icons in the Christ the Savior Cathedral, in addition to a prison sentence, lost his right to visit churches for a year. We do not consider such penalties for graffiti on the walls and icons defaced with ink to be excessive.

Uncharacteristically, the majority of convicted offenders (five persons) received custodial sentences. Two people had been previously convicted of other crimes. The vandal from Segezha was already serving a sentence for theft at the time of sentencing, and Vladimir Smirnov, the well-known St. Petersburg personality, who planted a fake pig’s head near the mosque, had repeatedly received suspended sentences for racist crimes.⁴⁷ Three defilers of the Yazidi

⁴⁶ More details see: V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, The State Duma Directed....

⁴⁷ V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, The Ultra-Right on the Streets...

graveyard in the Volgograd Region, members of the “Grey Dogs” group, also went to prison.

From among the vandalism convictions, two sentences were handed down under the Criminal Code Article 214 for swastika graffiti in the hallways of apartment buildings. Most similar crimes (desecration of buildings, houses, fences) in the past year were traditionally qualified not as vandalism but as propaganda under Article 282 (see the next chapter). Apparently, the difference is due to the fact that in the above cases the xenophobic graffiti appeared on objects that, unlike religious buildings or monuments, could not be vandalized.

We have no knowledge of any sentences imposed for arson and explosions, that is, for acts that are really dangerous, in 2013. The number of such offenses increased (see “Vandalism”), but we receive almost no information on their investigation, and the annual number of convictions to these most dangerous vandals remains extremely small – one in 2012, vs. 2 in 2011.

For Propaganda

The number of propaganda-related convictions in 2013 was more than three times greater than the number of violence and vandalism convictions combined, and the number of people, convicted for propaganda constitutes almost twice the number of violent convicted offenders and vandals. At least 131 convictions for xenophobic propaganda against 133 people were delivered in 2013 (one person was acquitted) in 57 regions of the country. In 2012, 91 verdicts were issued against 105 people in 45 regions.

Article 282 was utilized in the 124 sentences to 125 people. An overwhelming majority (100 people) were charged under this article only, seven cases only involved Article 280, in seven additional cases people were sentenced under the aggregation of Articles 282 and 280, and two people – under the aggregation of Articles 214 and 280 (see also “Vandalism”).

Three people were convicted under articles 282 и 205² (“public incitement to terrorist activity or public apology of terrorism“): Alfred Ahmadullin and Azat Valishin accused of membership in Al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah organization, banned in 2010, and of preparing a terrorist attack in Tatarstan, and Aleykhanym Vakhid-Kyzy Mikailova charged with advocating terrorism via the Ahli al-Sunnah wal-Jamaat *VKontakte* group in the Rostov Region. Note that, as in the previous years, the sentences under Article 205² were only imposed for radical Islamist propaganda.

Some participants of group trials, such as the above-mentioned members of ultra-right groups Volksturm in Yekaterinburg and the Simbirsk White Power group in Ulyanovsk (see “Violence” chapter) were charged under an aggregation

of violence and propaganda articles. In some sentences Article 282 was used in aggregation with other nonviolent criminal charges, such as the Criminal Code Article 158 (“theft”) or Article 223 (“illegal manufacture of weapons.”)

The court verdicts for the propaganda cases were distributed as follows

- 1 person was acquitted;
- 5 people were released from punishment because the statute of limitations had expired;
- 1 person referred for educational measures;
- 3 referred for compulsory medical treatment;
- 14 people received custodial sentences;
- 12 people received suspended sentences without additional sanctions;
- 20 people were sentenced to various fines;
- 41 people were sentenced to mandatory labor;
- 30 people were sentenced to correctional labor;
- 1 person to restrictions on freedom;
- 4 people received a suspended correctional labor sentence;
- 1 person lost the right to engage in profession or trade
- 1 – penalty unknown.

In 2013, convictions that involved real prison terms were delivered in conjunction with the Criminal Code articles other than propaganda. They were issued to the members of neo-Nazi groups (Simbirsk White Power, Volksturm), members of the above-mentioned Al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah, who tried to blow up a sales office of the Chistopolsky Branch of the zonal electronic communication node, the leader of the Self-improvement Fund (*Fond samovershenstvovaniia*) group in Orenburg, which, besides “*applying psychological pressure on minors to force them into sexual promiscuity*,” also advocated a racist, neo-fascist ideology.

Lone offenders also faced the verdicts that involved real prison terms, either in conjunction with their previously committed other crimes – as in the cases of the leader of the Union of the Russian People of Volgograd and Volzhsky (*Soiuz Russkogo Naroda Volgograda i Volzhskogo*), who attacked a police officer with an ax, or Petr Molodidov, the author of the essay “Cossack land for Cossacks”, who was already serving a 17-year sentence for the murder of several people. The only incarceration sentence that provides any reasons for doubt was imposed in Novgorod on a VKontakte social network user for his calls “*to commit violent acts against people of non-Slavic nationality*,” but perhaps we do not know all the circumstances.

Another notable verdict was issued in the case of Colonel Yuri Menzhege, a professor of the St. Petersburg Interior Troops Military Institute of the Russian

Interior Ministry, who was deprived of the right to practice his profession for three years due to his negative statements about religion and non-Slavs during his lectures. This is the first time we encounter such a verdict in the past two years.

We also observed a ban on profession used as an additional penalty in the case of above-mentioned Petr Molodidov, who was banned from publishing his work in the mass media. It is unfortunate that bans on practicing a profession are not being used more extensively, since such a ban constitutes the most effective punishment for people, who regularly engage in nationalist propaganda, including professionally, in the mass media or among students.

The trend of diminishing proportion of suspended sentences for propaganda, observed in 2012, has persisted. It only came to 8 % in 2013 (12 of 134 convicted offenders). We see this trend as unambiguously positive, since, in our experience of many years, the majority of convicted propagandists do not view a suspended sentence as a serious punishment and are not being deterred from similar activity in the future.

The majority of convicted offenders (95 people) received penalties, not involving loss of freedom that we believe to be more effective (fines, mandatory and correctional labor. In our opinion, such sentences constitute an appropriate punishment for graffiti on buildings and fences or online social network activity.

Similarly to 2012 and 2011, the propaganda convictions overwhelmingly related to online publications (101). As expected, their share keeps increasing. The number of convictions for online propaganda in 2013 was almost three times larger than the number of convictions for offline propaganda (30).

Materials that resulted in convictions for online propaganda were posted on the following Internet resources

- Social networks – 88 convictions (*Vkontakte* – 68, unidentified social networks – 17; other (*Odnoklassniki*, *V krugu druzei*, *Moi mir*) – 3);
- Unspecified Internet resources – 8;
- Sharing books via local file-sharing networks – 3 (*Mein Kampf* in all cases);
- Blog post – 1;
- Sending via e-mail – 1.

Thus, the prosecution of propaganda for two years changed only in their quantity. Law enforcement officers continue to search for extremism on the *Vkontakte* social network. Such attention to *Vkontakte* is due to the fact that this network is popular among the Russian youth, particularly its ultra-right segment. In addition, its users are easily identified, since page owners have to provide their personal data and phone number during registration, and network administrators easily provide this information upon request from the law enforcement.

Unfortunately, all the shortcomings of the Internet-related law enforcement remain unchanged⁴⁸ For example, no attempts were made in 2013 to resolve the key issue for the “propaganda” Criminal Code Articles, namely, there were no clarifications regarding quantitative assessment of public exposure. This criterion is not even taken into account either in filing criminal charges or in sentencing. Meanwhile, the audience size obviously varied widely within the hundred sentences, issued over the course of the year.

The genre distribution of the criminal online materials also remained largely unchanged from the year before:

Video (including the notorious The Execution of a Tajik and a Dagestani (Kazn' Tadzhiika i Daga) – 52 convictions;

Audio (including the song by the music bands Kolovrat and Cyclone-B) – 7 convictions;

Images (photo or drawings) – 22 convictions;

Articles or other complete texts – 14 convictions;

Comments on articles or forum posts – 10 convictions;

Unknown – 7 convictions.

Similarly to the preceding year, the sentences for visual materials predominate. This is easily explained by the fact that that these materials are more straightforward and understandable than the text. In addition, linking to videos is technically simple, and the verdicts mostly pertain to references to materials posted elsewhere (e.g. on YouTube). Unfortunately, numerous republishers of these videos are the only ones facing responsibility. We think that it would have been much more appropriate to focus on identifying those who created and uploaded these videos, or, better yet, those who committed the crimes demonstrated on the video, especially when it comes to violence, since such recordings are not always staged (see: “Violence” above).

As for the texts, it is difficult to judge the degree of their public danger, as they are almost never available to us, and the message or the Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor’s Office does not provide any explanation. It is also unfortunate, that prosecution pays almost equal attention to the original texts and individual comments in social networks, blogs or forums .

⁴⁸ N. Yudina, Virtual Anti-Extremism: On the use of anti-extremist legislation on the Internet (2007–2011) // SOVA Center. 2012. 17 September (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2012/09/d25322/>).

There were far fewer (30) convictions for off-line propaganda. They were distributed as follows:

Graffiti – 11 convictions;

Lectures in an educational institution and the Army – 2 convictions;

Public xenophobic insults in the course of a casual attack – 5 convictions;

Public insults against the members of the military – 2 convictions;

Speech at the rally – 2 convictions;

Shouting slogans during rally – 2 convictions;

Distribution of leaflets – 1 conviction;

Newspaper publications – 1 conviction;

To members and leaders of ultra-right groups for specific (unspecified) incidents of propaganda– 4 convictions.

We largely agree with the sentences, imposed for xenophobic propaganda delivered in the form of a lecture, a newspaper article, or public insults, especially if they occur in the course of an attack, public humiliation of the soldiers, public speeches and distribution of leaflets during the rallies (obviously, depending on their content). However, we find criminal prosecution for the street graffiti to be excessive; meanwhile such cases represent 37 % of the verdicts (11 out of 30)

Criminal Prosecution of Extremist Groups and Banned Organizations

The prosecution under the Criminal Code Article 282¹ (Organization of an extremist community) and Article 282² (“Organization of an extremist group”) was more intensive than in the preceding year. We know of five such verdicts, compared to three in 2012 (not including the obviously inappropriate ones).

Article 282¹ was appropriately used against the groups guilty of systematic violence, such as the members of the Ulyanovsk right-wing group Simbirsk White Power (already mentioned several times in this report), the Irkutsk “mallet-killers,” and the Rostov-on-Don group that tried to plant a bomb in the local FMS office. In all these cases the defendants were sentenced to long prison terms, and the charges in every single case included other “violent” articles of the Criminal Code.

A very unusual verdict was delivered in Vorkuta under Part 3 of the Criminal Code Article 30 and Part 1 of Article 282¹ (“attempted creation of an extremist community”) against a young man, who, along with his accomplice, planned to create in the Komi Republic an “*organized group to prepare and commit extremist crimes against citizens of different ethnic backgrounds*” in Vorkuta. However, their efforts to recruit anyone into their ranks were unsuccessful, and a would-be organizer received a suspended sentence.

Activists of neo-pagan right-wing radical organization Spiritual and Tribal Sovereign Rus' (*Dukhovno-rodovaia derzhava Rus'*) were once again convicted under the Criminal Code Article 282². The members of this organization mail their propaganda to various government offices, including the Prosecutor's office on regular occasions. In 2013, Oleg Popov, the leader of Spiritual and Tribal Sovereign Rus', "the Tsar of Orda and the Great Prince of Spiritual and Tribal Sovereign Rus'", faced a fine of 100 thousand rubles.⁴⁹

Finally, the NOMP members, including both of its leaders Vladimir Kvachkov and *Leonid Khabarov*, were convicted in Moscow and Yekaterinburg under Article 2051 ("involvement in terrorist activity"); this was a de-facto verdict for the activity of this organization.⁵⁰

The Federal List of Extremist Materials

In 2013, the Federal List of Extremist Materials continued its rapid growth. It was updated 46 times and grew from 1589 to 2179 items.⁵¹ Note an increase in its rate of growth – it added 590 items, compared to 522 items added in 2012, 318 items added in 2011, and 281 items in 2010.

The additions are thematically distributed as follows (some items included a variety of materials):

- xenophobic materials by modern Russian nationalists – 283 items;
- materials by other nationalists – 38 items;
- materials by nationalist ideologues and classics (from books, written a hundred years ago to "venerable" modern authors)– 40 items;
- materials of Islamist militants and other calls for violence, issued by political islamists – 136 items;
- other Muslim materials (Said Nursi's books, materials of the banned organizations, including Hizb ut-Tahrir, etc.) – 42 items;

⁴⁹ Earlier, in April 2004, Oleg Popov, on the third attempt was sent for inpatient psychiatric examination during a criminal case on the insult of President Putin, whom the neo-pagan called "a lackey of Judeo-Nazism". In 2004, he repeatedly faced criminal charges for his threats against public officials and prosecutors of various levels (including "the death sentence" he issued to Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov and the like).

⁵⁰ For more details see: V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, *The State Duma Directed...*

⁵¹ As of January 20, 2014 39 items on the list were voided (materials excluded with the numbering intact): five of them were removed as duplicates, 34 were removed when a decision to recognize these materials as extremist have been canceled. 62 positions reflect duplicate judicial decisions (not counting the items referring to the same text with a different imprint) and two repeated the decision already reflected on the list.

- anti-Muslim and anti-Christian materials (not including materials by Russian nationalists – 3 items;
- other religious materials (from L. Ron Hubbard, to Metropolitan Andrei Sheptitsky) – 6 items;
- various anti-state materials, inciting to riots and violence (including anarchist materials) – 16 items;
- anti-LGBT materials – 3 items;
- materials calling for violence against neo-Nazis – 1 item;
- materials not classified above (including oppositional materials such as an article by Yuri Afanasiev and video by Alexei Navalny) – 12 items;
- materials that could not be identified – 12 items.

At least 333 items out of 590 are online materials.

The share of inappropriate bans is growing. It is obvious despite the fact that for many bans we are unable to evaluate the extent of appropriateness. In 2013, the list added many items that clearly were banned without a proper legal justification. For example, the books by Said Nursi, Jehovah's Witnesses materials, a critical review by R. Oshroev of Z. Kipeeva's the book *Peoples of the North- Western and Central Caucasus : migration and resettlement (1760s. – 1860s) (Narody Severo-Zapadnogo i Tsentral'nogo Kavkaza: Migratsii i Rasseleniia (60e gody XVIII v. 60e gody XIX v.)* – a completely baffling prohibition. Addition of an article by liberal historian Yuri Afanasiev to the List is similarly puzzling.⁵²

In March, the List once again came to the center of media attention when it added the entire contents of Issue No. 2 (2011) of the *Radical Politics* newspaper, which had been recognized as extremist by the Central District Court of Omsk. The Court provided a comma-separated list of materials in the banned issue. As a result, the List came to include articles by Vladislav Inozemtsev, Director of the Center for Research on Postindustrial Society (re-published from the *Ogonyok* magazine), by well-known Omsk human rights activist Victor Korb (previously re-published on several Internet resources), by Polish journalist Andrzej Poczobut and by Pavel Lyuzakov, Chief Editor of the *Svobodnoe Slovo* newspaper. The media paid a particular attention to the item "Congratulations from the President",

⁵² The article by liberal historian Yuri Afanasiev "Is Liberal Mission Possible in Russia Today" was published on February 16, 2011 on the website of the Liberal Mission (Liberal'naiia Missiia) foundation. Then the article was republished on the Radio Svoboda website on March 22, 2011, without attracting any law enforcement attention. The version of article that was added to the List was the one republished on Free Speech/Svoboda Slova website with a modified name, anti-Russian images and xenophobic foreword, but with its content unchanged.

identical to the texts published on *kremlin.ru* on the website of the United Russia party. After the scandal in the media, the court decision was overturned by a higher court; the case was sent back for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and No. 1674 (which included the entire newspaper issue) was excluded from the List, with numbering intact. However, some articles from the issue were once again recognized as extremist in September and re-added to the Federal List – and the reasons for prohibiting of many of these are still unclear.

The list is growing in size (it contains 2,212 items at the time of writing), but its quality remains unchanged. Materials are still entered with numerous and various errors, including spelling errors (“Korna” instead of “Koran”, “katakhezis” instead of “katekhezis,” etc.). Courts keep adding the same materials to the list due to parallel judicial decisions (this is the case for at least 64 items), or the same material is entered in different editions, or, in case of online materials, published on different sites. Almost identical editions of the book cannot be formally identified as duplicates due to their different imprints. For example, the decision of the Temryuksky District Court of the Krasnodar Region recognized as extremist the book *Udar Russkikh Bogov* [The strike of the Russian Gods] by V. Istarkhov (collective pseudonym of V. Ivanov and V. Selivanov) for the fourth (!) time, and the brochure *Racial Hygiene and Demographic Policy in the National Socialist Germany*⁵³ – for the third time. Sometimes the items directly duplicate each other.

Description of materials does not conform to bibliographic rules. Even leaving the bibliographic literacy aside, the List items are described in a way, which makes them impossible to identify. For example, No. 1715 is described as “*a leaflet, containing calls for extremist activities aimed at inciting hatred, hostility and humiliation of human dignity, that was publicly distributed in the hallways of the apartment buildings, located on Mira street and Internationalnaya Street in Shakhtersk, Uglegorsky District, Sakhalin Region*”

By the way, the practice of recognizing as extremist the leaflets that are only locally distributed (as in the example above) and deal with local current events seems highly questionable.

The majority of the online materials on the List look questionable and confusing as well. The electronic address (URL) of a resource is intentionally distorted prior to being added to the list. Thus, the list essentially contains dead hyperlinks. Obviously, the Ministry of Justice does not want to advertise extremist materials, but in this case the agency’s actions end up being simply meaningless.

⁵³ Make a Fool Pray: Udar Russkikh Bogov has been banned for the fourth time; Racial Hygiene – for the third time ... // SOVA Center. 2013. 5 April (<http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2013/04/d26836/>).

Banning of Organizations as Extremist

The Federal List of Extremist Organizations, published on the Ministry of Justice website⁵⁴ added four entries in 2013:

- Northern Brotherhood (Severnoe bratstvo) interregional public organization, banned by the Moscow City Court in early August 2012;⁵⁵

- Horde (*Orda*) religious association, recognized as extremist by a decision of the Kizilskii District Court of the Cheliabinsk Region in November 2012. We doubt the validity of this decision;⁵⁶

- Omsk office of the Russian National Unity (*Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo*), recognized as extremist back in October 2002 (sic!) by the decision of the Omsk Regional Court, but only added to the list ten years later;

- Kirov Regional public organization Fan Club of FC Dynamo-Kirov (*Klub Boleshnikov Futbol'nogo Kluba Dinamo Kirov*) recognized as extremist by the Kirov Regional Court.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ The official name – A list of public and religious associations, and other non-profit organizations, in respect of which the court accepted is a valid decision on liquidation or ban on activities on the grounds stipulated by the Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activity”.

⁵⁵ It was a network structure around the websites Severnoe bratstvo, V Desyatku and Bolshaya Igra: Slomai Sistemu [The Big Game: Break the System]. The organization’s website was recognized as extremist in March 2008. Ideologist of the Northern Brotherhood Petr Khomyakov was sentenced under Part 1 of Article 2821 and Part 4 of Article 159 of the Criminal Code (“fraud committed by an organized group or on an especially large scale”) to four years in prison in October 2012. Other members of the group, A. Mukhachyov and O. Troshkin, were convicted under the same articles. For more details about the organization, see: G. Kozhevnikova, A. Shekhovtsev, *ibid.* pp. 231-240.

⁵⁶ The fact that the followers of the organization experienced psychological effects and practiced non-traditional treatment methods (such as the holy water, appeals to the spirits, lashing, and visiting the holy places) was cited as the reason for the ban, but these actions do not fall within the definition of extremism. The same Horde organization (the successor to the Ata Zholy [The Way of the Ancestors] religious organization, banned in Kazakhstan) was shut down in July 2011 by the order of the Leninskii District Court in Ufa. However, we do not know whether it was recognized as extremist at that time or simply liquidated for violating the law “On freedom of conscience and religious organizations.”

⁵⁷ The club was closed in 2013 for “extremist actions by its members;” the prosecutors found on the club website a number of publicly accessible “photos and videos depicting Nazi symbols and people using Nazi greeting;” the organization used an official seal “carrying an image that was similar to the extent of confusion to the symbols used by a number of army units in Hitler’s Germany in 1942-1945.” One of the club’s members was convicted for incitement to ethnic hatred and enmity, and two others faced administrative responsibility for propaganda and public demonstration of Nazi paraphernalia or symbols or public display of attributes and symbols of extremist organizations.

Thus, at the time of writing, the Federal List of Extremist Organizations contains 33 organizations (not counting organizations recognized specifically as terrorist), whose activity has been legally banned, and any continuation of the activity is punishable under the Criminal Code Article 2822 (“Organization of an extremist group”).

An unprecedented decision was made regarding the Autonomous Combat Terrorist Organization (*Avtonomnaia boevaia terroristsheskaia organizatsiia*, ABTO), whose members were responsible for a series of bombings and arson incidents in 2009-2010. In June, the Moscow City Court banned ABTO specifically as a terrorist organization (not simply as an extremist organization). It will become the item No. 20 in the List of the Terrorist Organizations,⁵⁸ but have not been added yet. This is the first time such a designation was applied to a right-wing rather than an Islamist group.

Other Administrative Measures

In 2013 Roscomnadzor issued 21 warnings to media editorial staff for extremist activities (compared to 12 warnings in 2012). We view only five of them as appropriate – the warnings to the editorial boards of the newspapers “*Pretenziya*” *Agentstva zhurnalistitskikh rassledovani* (for publishing the article “Size Matters”), *Svoimi Imenami* (for publishing in different issues the articles by M. Shendakov, “An Open Letter to an Enemy of the Homeland and a Traitor of the Russian People” and by N.P. Zubkov, “The Red Guard of the Kremlin. Are they also Masons?”), *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (for Ulyana Skoybeda’s column “Politician Leonid Gozman said that Pretty Uniform is the only Difference between the SMERSH and the SS”), and *Russkaya Liniya* (for publishing monk Afanasy’s brochure “Give us Back our Homeland or Station-Baku (no luggage).”

Almost all of the remaining 16 warnings were issued for posting the materials (videos or images) on Pussy Riot collective or for publishing the news about Artem Loskutov, who was fined for creating t-shirts with a Pussy Riot image stylized to look like an icon. We found 7 inappropriate warning in 2012. Thus, the efficiency of the agency is rapidly declining.

No newspapers were closed for extremism in 2013 (it must be noted that decisions to close media outlets for publishing extremist articles are exceedingly rare). The *Svoimi Imenami* newspaper received three warnings in one year, and

⁵⁸ Single federal list of organizations, including foreign and international organizations designated terrorist by Russian courts // FSB Website (<http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm>).

Roscomnadzor has been requesting that the Moscow City Court shut it down since the fall of 2011.⁵⁹

On the other hand, administrative prosecution related to “extremism” is not uncommon. Unfortunately, prosecutors don’t always inform the public about such measures. Thus, our data is purely preliminary. It does not include the court judgments that we view as clearly inappropriate.

In 2013, we are aware of 41 cases of penalties under the Administrative Code Article 20.29 (“mass distribution of extremist materials, as well as their production or storage for the purpose of mass distribution”). There were 16 such decisions in 2012. The verdicts were imposed for dissemination of xenophobic material on the Internet and through file-sharing networks (songs and video by Kolovrat, the songs of Chechen armed resistance bard Timur Mutsurayev, “Format-18” video, the book *Azbuka Domashnego Terrorisma* [Home Terrorism Primer], Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, the movies *Rossia v Krivykh Zerkalakh* [Russia in Distorting Mirrors], *Rossia s Nozhom v Spine* [Russia with a Knife in Its Back], *Evreiskii Fashizm i Genotsid Russkogo Naroda* [Jewish Fascism and the Genocide of the Russian People], *the Eternal Jew* and *Jew Süss*), singing “banned songs” during a march, and selling books listed on the Federal List of Extremist Materials. The perpetrators faced the fines ranging from 2 to 20 thousand rubles.

We also know of 20 cases of penalties under Article 20.3 (“propaganda and public demonstration of Nazi attributes or symbols”), vs. 10 cases in 2012. In most cases, the offenders were fined for openly posting photographs of themselves in Nazi uniform or an image of Nazi swastika on the online social networks. Also fined were the owner of the store that sold swastika-decorated clothing, a member of the banned Spiritual and Tribal Sovereign Rus’, who sent letters with multiple swastikas to a number of government agencies, and a penal colony inmate who demonstrated his own swastika tattoo. In addition, three people were subjected to administrative detention: for racist graffiti at a bus stop, for displaying a flag bearing Nazi symbols on a soccer match, and for walking around a store, carrying a flag with swastika.

Two sentences were imposed under the aggregation of two Administrative Code articles mentioned above, both for the posts on *Vkontakte* social network. In the first case, a resident of Togliatti was fined for posting a photo with the

⁵⁹ The *Svoimi Imenami* newspaper is a successor of the *K Bar’eru* newspaper, closed in April 2011. *K Bar’eru*, in turn, succeeded the *Duel* newspaper, also closed after a multi-year court proceedings. Remember that *Svoimi Imenami* had previously received three Roscomnadzor warnings.

swastika and a song by Kolovrat. In the second case, a resident of the Tomsk Region was sentenced to six days of administrative detention for publishing racist images, videos and texts.

In Rostov-on-Don, the mother of a 15-year-old girl, who made “Glory to Russia” graffiti in the hallway of her apartment building, was found liable under the Administrative Code Article 5.35 (“improper fulfillment of child-rearing responsibilities by parents or other legal representatives of juvenile”). The student herself was exempt from punishment.

Unfortunately, information about the anti-extremist activity of the Prosecutor’s Offices is markedly incomplete when compared with data from other law enforcement agencies, so we will only outline its principal directions. The number of motions made by prosecutors, demanding that local Internet providers block access to “extremist” websites, has increased. This is the principal current method for fighting extremism on the Internet.⁶⁰ We know of at least 77 cases in 2013, not counting the clearly inappropriate ones (compare to 69 in 2012). Please keep in mind that the prosecutors and the Internet service providers do not always report on such measures, so we know our data to be incomplete and fragmentary. To the best of our knowledge, the law on the Registry of Banned Sites,⁶¹ which entered into force on November 1, 2012, was almost never applied against the websites with “extremist” materials.⁶² These sites are blocked using the old system.

Motions on the impermissibility of extremist activities sent to the management of schools and libraries due to the lack of content filtering software in their educational institutions still remain a common prosecutorial response measure. We know of at least 35 such motions, compared to 38 in the preceding

⁶⁰ See: N. Yudina, *Virtual Anti-Extremism ...*

⁶¹ For more details see: Maria Kravchenko, *Inappropriate Use of Anti-Extremist Legislation in Russia in 2012* // SOVA Center. 2013. 24 April (<http://www.sova-center.ru/misuse/publications/2013/04/d26952/>).

⁶² In 2013, we know of the case indicating that the new law affected the dissemination of extremist materials. In March 2013, the Internet provider Rostelecom blocked access to social networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, YouTube and livejournal.com blog platform in the Orel and Ryazan Regions (livejournal.com in Ryazan only). Rostelecom clients attempting to visit the site, found a notification that the resource is blocked due to its inclusion on the Unified Register of Banned Websites. The websites were added to the register due to some materials, posted on their pages, which had been previously banned as extremist. All these services were taken off the registry on the same day, but Rostelecom had already blocked them. Similar information on the actions of the Internet provider was reported from the Bryansk and Voronezh regions .

year. We have repeatedly commented⁶³ on fight against extremism on school computers. Once again we have to reiterate that the idea of pressuring schools in hopes of forcing them to block extremism by using Internet filters seems to us highly problematic. Ideal content filters do not exist, since it is impossible to compile an all-encompassing list of keywords and addresses. Experience has shown that the program, installed in Russian schools by the Federal Agency of Education in March 2008, is unable to cope with its assigned task.

⁶³ See for example: *Sancions against the Heads of Educational Institutions* // SOVA Center. 2011. 30 June (<http://www.sova-center.ru/misuse/news/persecution/2010/05/d18735/>).

Olga Sibireva

Freedom of conscience in Russia: Restrictions and challenges in 2013

SOVA Center for Information and Analysis presents its latest annual report on freedom of conscience in the Russian Federation¹

This report is based on information collated during monitoring carried out by the Center. This material is available on the Center's website, in the section 'Religion in Secular Society' (www.sova-center.ru/religion), including links to media and internet sources. In this report, references are given only for those sources which are not available via the website.

This report contains only relevant updates on events which have been analyzed in the previous year's report.² Generally events mentioned here serve to illustrate trends that we have observed; our aim is not to exhaustively describe all developments in the sphere of public religion.

Problems and cases connected with the misuse of anti-extremism legislation are discussed in a separate report specifically focused on this topic.

Summary

On the whole, many of the tendencies recorded in previous reports continued and developed in 2013.

In terms of relations between the state and religious confessions, one of the most notable events was the passing of a law which toughened administrative measures against, and introduced criminal responsibility for, offending believers' feelings. This legislation evoked stormy public debate. However, although there were numerous complaints about insult to believers' feelings, this law wasn't actually applied during 2013. 'Orthodox missionaries' made up for this by continuing to vigorously defend the aforementioned feelings, occasionally by force.

¹ This project has been financially supported by government funds, awarded by the President of the Russian Federation on 18 September 2013 decree no. 348-rp, and via a competition run by the Civil Dignity Movement.

² Olga Sibireva, *Freedom of conscience in Russia: Restrictions and challenges in 2012* // *Xenophobia, Freedom of conscience and Anti-extremism in Russia in 2012*. Moscow: SOVA Center, 2013.

There is continued anticlericalism in society. As in 2012, anticlerical slogans were used not only in 'specialized' anticlerical actions, which perhaps slightly decreased in number, but also in opposition protests. Levels of anti-Orthodox vandalism, which remain high, also testify to continuing anticlericalism.

A further particularity of 2013 is that Protestants ceased to be the main religious group to experience difficulties using places of worship. The majority of such cases now relate to Muslims.

The number of conflicts over the construction of places of worship for various confessions has not declined. Moscow remains the locus of particularly heated struggle, as local residents actively oppose the program to build Orthodox churches 'within walking distance'.

In contrast to the previous year, we recorded several instances of the liquidation of religious organizations, including for the failure to report on current activities. On the whole, however, the level of bureaucratic pressure on religious organizations appears unchanged.

In terms of positive developments, religious organizations – primarily Protestants and new religious movements – are increasingly literate in legal matters, and more actively defending their rights when discriminated against (including taking such cases to court). This relates to cases of bureaucratic harassment as to cases of defamation.

Legislation relating to religious organizations

Several laws regulating the activities of religious organizations were passed in 2013.

Federal legislation

The law 'On the introduction of amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and separate laws of the Russian Federation aimed at counteracting offense against citizens' religious convictions and feelings, the desecration of facilities and items of religious veneration (of pilgrimage), places of religious ritual and ceremony' (generally referred to as 'On the defense of religious feelings') passed by the State Duma on 11 June 2013 and signed into law by the president on 30 June, evoked the greatest public response. It was opposed by the Supreme Court and by the Presidential Council on Human Rights, and even in January 2014 the government issued a negative evaluation of this law, noting that it duplicates already existing legislative norms. Nevertheless, after some changes introduced by its drafters, the law was passed.

This law introduced a new version of article 148 of the Criminal Code ('Obstruction of the right to freedom of conscience and religion'. Sanctions in the original article – for illegally obstructing the activities of religious organizations or the enactment of religious rituals and ceremonies – were increased, and this is entirely legitimate and advisable.

A fine of up to 300 thousand rubles, compulsory community work of up to 240 hours or imprisonment of up to one year was introduced as a punishment for insulting religious feelings. If the offense happens in a religiously significant place, or during a religious ceremony, a fine of up to 500 thousand rubles, community service of up to 480 hours, or up to three years' imprisonment – with the possibility of restricting freedom for up to one further year – may be imposed

Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses also make provision for the strengthening of sanctions relating to the already existing article 5.26 ('Violation of legislation on the freedom of conscience, freedom of religious confession and on religious associations') and the broadening of its contents. Fines for private individuals were increased ten-fold (up to 10-30,000 rubles), and for those holding public office fines went up to 50-100 thousand rubles. Article 5.26 was expanded to include a fine – of 30-50 thousand rubles for private individuals, and for officials, 100-200 thousand rubles – for the premeditated public desecration, damage or destruction of religious or liturgical literature, religiously venerated objects, signs and emblems symbolic of worldviews.

The law has been formulated in an extremely slipshod manner, especially in terms of the offence it introduces in the criminal section: it is not even clear what is new about the crime compared with those which already exist, like hooliganism motivated by religious hatred and the degrading of human dignity in connection with an individual's attitude to religion. It is also very difficult to comprehend what should be understood by the term 'desecration', and which 'worldviews' are meant here.³ There is no doubt, however, that the new legal norms on 'insulting religious feelings' allow greater scope for free interpretation and misuse.

It is notable that at the time of writing, the law – which has provoked such argument – has not once been applied in practice.⁴

On 19 June 2013 the State Duma accepted a bill of amendments to a number of laws proposed by the government in connection with the passing of the federal law 'On education'. The president signed this bill on 2 July. The new legislation

³ For a detailed commentary see: A. Verkhovsky, *Zakon, vyrazhaiushchii neuvazhenie k zdravomu smyslu // Ezhednevnyi zhurnal*. 2013. 20 May (<http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=12957>).

⁴ In March 2014 a case of insulting religious feelings (article 148 of the Criminal Code) was initiated in relation to a Khanty-Mansi autonomous region resident who swore obscenely in a church.

proposes holding religious rituals on the grounds of educational establishments, and these amendments evoked some public concern about the principle of a secular education system. The final version only mentions accommodation '*historically utilized*' for this purpose, which in practice applies only to private churches within educational institutions. The originally proposed point about '*accommodation, specially set aside by the administration at the request of adult students or parents*' (in other words, about the creation of 'prayer rooms'), was excluded from the amendments.

The law 'On the freedom of conscience and religious associations' changed twice during the course of the year.

On 24 May 2013 the State Duma passed amendments to articles 4 and 24 of this law, and on 29 May these were signed by the president. This change accorded religious organizations the right to impose requirements on their clergy and employees. Anti-extremist amendments proposed in 2012 by the State Council of Tatarstan, which legitimized state control over religious education, were excluded from the final version of the law. The accepted amendments left requirements regarding the educational level of clergy and employees working for religious organizations under the jurisdiction of the said organizations.

On 21 June 2013 legislation introducing amendments to article 9 of the same law passed second and third readings by the State Duma straight away, and was signed by the president on 3 July. In accordance with the new amendments, foreign citizens or stateless individuals whose activities are deemed extremist by the courts or fall under the law on combatting money laundering and the financing of terrorism, or whose presence on Russian Federation territory is deemed undesirable, are forbidden to become founders, members or participants of religious organizations. It should be pointed out that the application of this law will prove difficult, since current legislation does not define membership of a religious organization.

Regional initiatives

We are aware of only one piece of legislation passed by federal subjects which affects the interests of religious organizations – a law initiated by Vitalii Milonov and passed by St Petersburg's legislative assembly. This law allows the city government to order expertise on publications and media content by recourse to the legislative assembly or the human rights commissioner. According to Milonov, this law is primarily intended to further the struggle with representatives of 'non-traditional religions', specifically the Scientologists and

Jehovah's Witnesses disseminating their materials in the city. This material can now be more easily deemed extremist.

Initiatives not successfully progressed in 2013

Considerably more legislative initiatives (relating to the activities of religious organizations in one way or another) failed to be progressed in 2013.

In September St Petersburg's legislative assembly brought proposed amendments to the federal laws 'On the freedom of conscience and religious associations' and 'On assemblies, meetings, demonstrations, marches and pickets' before the State Duma. These amendments recommended that in considering applications to hold public actions in close proximity to the property or premises of religious organizations, civil servants take the opinions of those religious organizations into consideration. The government did not support the proposed bill, noting that it limited the right of citizens to free assembly.

The State Duma of the Russian Federation considered a draft bill of amendments to article 16 of the law 'On the freedom of conscience and religious associations', proposed by the government of the Russian Federation, at a first reading in November. The proposed legislation outlined places where public liturgies and other religious events could be held without notifying the authorities. Pilgrimage sites, cemeteries, residential accommodation and *'the territory of organizations founded by religious organizations'* were amongst the suggested places, in addition to places of worship and land belonging to religious organizations.

Several of the legislative initiatives which weren't taken further related to the participation of religious organizations in charitable and social activities.

In April LDPR (*Liberal'no-demokraticheskaja partiia Rossii*, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) deputy Valerii Seleznev introduced amendments to article 10 of the law 'On advertising'. The deputy proposed supplementing this article – which regulates the dissemination of social advertising – with permission to mention the Russian Orthodox Church or another 'traditional' religious organization specific to the relevant region in such advertisements, if the contents of the advertisement were connected with religious activity (in accordance with the current antimonopoly legislation, the advertising of religious organizations may be forbidden). According to the proposer, *'the dissemination of information on religion and the Russian Orthodox Church can without doubt be regarded as a socially useful type of activity'*, and therefore should not be subject to restrictions. In January 2014, however, Seleznev nevertheless withdrew his bill.

Legislators attempted to regulate the activities of fortune-tellers, sorcerers and psychics (*ekstrasensy*), as they have more than once in previous years, and yet again these efforts have not been crowned with success.

In November State Duma deputy Iliia Ponomarev introduced a bill 'On the introduction of amendments to separate laws of the Russian Federation pertaining to regulation of the provision of independent health services and protection of the population from unscrupulous advertising'. The document proposes to allow the provision of *'occult-mystic services in healthcare'* only with the permission of regional authorities and under the supervision of qualified medical personnel. Thus far the bill has not made it even to first reading.

In March deputy Vitalii Milonov brought similar draft legislation before St Petersburg's legislative assembly for consideration, proposing that healers and fortune-tellers should register as sole traders in order to receive permission to practice. This bill wasn't passed either, however.

In February, Moscow's regional duma introduced a draft bill of amendments to the federal law 'On the organization of state and municipal services provision' for consideration by the State Duma. The bill proposed a supplementary point to article 22 of this law, making it possible for a citizen to refuse to accept and use a universal electronic card (UEK, *universal'naja elektronnaia karta*). It is not unusual for this right to be demanded by the most conservative Orthodox Christians, who see signs of the 'number of the Beast' in the card. The proposed legislation was voted down in November.

In May deputies of St Petersburg's legislative assembly proposed a bill of amendments to the current law 'On the fundamentals of public health protection in the Russian Federation' for consideration by the State Duma. These amendments would restrict the right of parents to refuse medical intervention on behalf of their children, and to support their argument for doing so the proposers cited cases of parents rejecting blood transfusions for their children on religious grounds. The State Duma voted down this draft legislation in November.

In June State Duma deputies Yaroslav Nilov and Ruslan Kaliuzhnyi, from the LDPR fraction, proposed amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses which would have increased the time within which those violating the law 'On the freedom of conscience and religious associations' could be charged to one year from the point at which the offence occurred. This proposed legislation was voted down in January 2014.

Deputy Elena Mizulina's initiative on behalf of a multi-party group of deputies should also be noted: she proposed to protect Christian values by including a preamble in the Constitution of the Russian Federation which mentioned Orthodox Christianity as the basis of *'Russia's national and cultural*

distinctiveness'. The idea was widely discussed; however there were more negative responses than positive. Those speaking against the proposal included not only the human rights commissioner, Vladimir Lukin, but also Yaroslav Nilov, head of the State Duma Committee on Civil Society Associations and Religious Organizations, and – most importantly – Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev.

Problems relating to places of worship

In 2013 religious organizations continued to experience difficulties both constructing places of worship and using existing facilities.

Problems with the construction of religious buildings

Muslims continued to encounter frequent difficulties with the construction of mosques. However, the construction of Orthodox churches proved just as problematic, if not more so.

The program to construct modular Orthodox churches in Moscow continues to be realized very slowly. In December 2013 Patriarch Kirill announced that only 17 of the 192 planned churches had been completed, and construction had begun on a further 24.

Local inhabitants opposed construction in a number of Moscow districts, particularly in Gagarinskii, Golovinskii, Ostankinskii, Ryzanskii, Khoroshevskii districts, and in Golyanovo, Kosino-Ukhtomskoe, Kuz'minki, Kurkino, Lefortovo and Severnoe Izmailovo. Sometimes these protests were supported by various civil society organizations – Yabloko and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (*Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossisskoi Federatsii*, KPRF) were active in Ostankino, for example.

Supporters and opponents of the building program organized demonstrations throughout the year. One such action – a prayer gathering in support of construction in Gagarinskii district – was disbursed by OMON because it had not been approved.

The main driver of public opposition to such construction is the resultant loss of green space, especially since the Moscow mayor's 2012 decision to permit the erection of places of worship on nature reserves. In 2013 a plot of land in the Setun river valley nature reserve was assigned to an Orthodox parish by order of Sergei Sobyenin.

Apart from ecological considerations, protests were often evoked by decisions about construction being made without taking the opinions of local residents into consideration. Either no public hearings were held, or the local population was not given enough warning about them, or there were procedural violations during the hearings.

In some cases the authorities attempted to accommodate the protesters' demands. In Golovinskii district, for example, municipal deputies rejected the first proposed location of a church, in a park on Kronshadtstkii boulevard. The construction site was likewise relocated in Khoroshevskii district.

Conflicts over the construction of Orthodox churches were also recorded in other Russian regions.

One of the most notable was the struggle over the Church of the Myrr-bearing Women (*tserkov' Zhen Mironosits*) in St Petersburg's Malinovka park. During the course of the year opponents of the building program collected signatures (23 thousand people had signed the petition by the beginning of 2014), held protest actions, and appealed to both the public prosecutor and the president. They also brought a lawsuit to court, arguing that construction on green zone territory is illegal. The city court banned the construction, but in November the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation overturned this decision.

Petersburg citizens also protested against the construction of churches on 6th Sovetskaia, Lakhtinskaia and Dolgootzernaia streets. In this last case, opponents of the construction also went to court, and in January 2014 the court recognized the building of the church as illegal.

In Tiumen local residents opposed the building of an Orthodox church in Komsomolskii park with the support of the Russian Communist Workers' Party (*Rossiiskaia kommunisticheskaia rabochaia partiia*, RKRK-KPSS). At the beginning of April 2014 the town authorities announced that the church would not be built on park territory, but opposition over this has not ended.

Two conflicts broke out at once in Togliatti, over the construction of churches on 40 Let Pobedy street and on Avtostroitelei street (a former recreation ground). In the former case protesters demanded the '*creation of a basic playpark and the reinstatement of felled greenery*', and in the latter they demanded the restoration of the recreation ground.

Besides these cases, conflicts over the construction of Orthodox churches were recorded in Kaluga, Kemerovo, Zheleznogorsk (Kursk region), Zhukovka (Moscow region), Viatskii Posad (Oriol region), Samara, and Balashov (Saratov region).

2013 saw the resolution of a conflict which had dragged on since 2012 over the erection of a church on a square in Chaplygin street, Novosibirsk. The eparchy bowed to public pressure and agreed not to build on the recreation ground, so long as the authorities granted them another plot. The town administration allotted them a new plot on Krasnogorskaia street in Zael'tsovskii district.

The construction of mosques also remains seriously problematic, and the majority of conflicts have dragged on for over a year. Regional authorities, as

before, are very reluctant to grant building plots or permission to build. Even if permission is granted, local residents are generally very opposed to the creation of mosques.

The shortage of mosques is still acutely felt in Moscow, however the city's mayor has announced that no new mosques are planned, and that it is more logical to build them in Moscow region, rather than in the city.

Meanwhile, building mosques in Moscow region is also proving difficult. The Council of Muftis of Russia, as in previous years, complained about conflicts over the building of mosques in Podol'sk, Kolomna, Balashikha, Pushkino, Zheleznodorozhnyi and Liubertsy.

In Oriol, where the authorities have refused to allot a building plot for reasons relating '*solely to town construction policies*', problems over the construction of a mosque have remained unresolved for several years.

Muslims have also been unable to secure permission to build a mosque in Stavropol.

A Muslim community in Iuzno-Sakhalinsk was not only unable to secure a building plot for a mosque, but was also unable to worship in the hangar which the local authorities had promised to transfer to the community back in 2012.

The authorities in the village of Berezovo, Khanty-Mansi autonomous region, agreed to provide the Muslim community with a building plot for the construction of a mosque, but local residents voted against this in public hearings. Shouts of '*Accept Christianity and go to church!*' and '*You want to build a mosque and grab our gas and oil!*' were heard during voting.

In Belovo town, Kemerovo region, local residents opposed the construction of a residential building, mistaking it for a mosque, and appealed to the authorities to halt construction.

In December Kaliningrad's tsentralnyi district court halted the construction of a mosque in Iuznyi park. Conflict over this project had dragged on for several years, and the reason given for the decision was a court case brought by the Finland Gates Museum (*Finlandskie vorota*) which demanded that the decision to award two plots of land for this construction be deemed illegal. Local Muslims are convinced that the statement of claim was signed under duress.

In several regions, right-wing radical organizations supported protests against the construction of mosques. In Novokuznetsk, for example, nationalists have protested alongside local residents for more than a year. News that the mayor had granted permission for the construction circulated in February, but by April the mayor had denied this story.

A Muslim community in Novosibirsk was granted permission to build a mosque, but local residents – supported by a number of civil society

organizations – demanded that the decision of the mayor's office be revoked. Slogans opposing the construction of the Novosibirsk mosque were also heard in November at the 'Russian March'.

Representatives of Cheliabinsk right-wing radical organizations initiated an investigation by the prosecutor's office into the legitimacy of the decision to award a building plot for the construction of a fourth mosque in the town. The public prosecutor recognized the allocation as legal.

During the year we recorded several conflicts over the building of places of worship by other religious organizations.

The authorities in Perm refused to allot a building plot for a synagogue and education center to the Chabad Lubavitch Jewish community. Construction plans were opposed by the director of a local center for the preservation of architectural monuments, as well as by local residents.

Having been awarded a building plot several years ago, Moscow followers of Krishna yet again experienced problems with their temple. In April the Moscow town planning and land commission decided to stop letting the plot allocated for the construction of a Center of Vedic culture in Molzhaninovo. In July bailiffs required the Krishna community to leave their existing temple on Leningradskii prospect – despite the original suggestion that the community use it until a new one had been built – by order of the Savelovskii district court. As far as we know, however, the Krishna community has not been physically evicted from their temple.

After protests by local residents, the St Petersburg authorities refused to allocate a building plot on Khoshimina street to the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (Mormons) for a proposed new building.

In Taganrog, Cossacks initiated protests against the building of a Mormon meetinghouse. The protesters were troubled by the fact that no public hearings about the proposed construction had been held, and by the proximity of the 'foreign organization' to a Communications research institute ('a sensitive site', *rezhimnyi ob'ekt*).

Positive resolutions

Following a 2012 court order which instructed the Kostroma administration to permit the Muslim community to continue building their mosque, local officials granted this permission in April 2013 and the community has entered into an agreement with contractors.

The Khabarovsk authorities agreed to allocate a building plot for the construction of a mosque after Muslims announced their intention to picket the local administration building.

In October a mosque was opened in Naro-Fominsk, Moscow region. Local residents had opposed the planned mosque, and in previous years the Council of Muftis had complained about the difficulties faced during this construction.

At public hearings, residents of Krasnoïarsk supported the construction of a Buddhist temple on Poliarnaia street.

Problems with existing religious buildings

In 2013 we recorded slightly fewer operational difficulties with buildings already used by religious organizations. Almost all the cases we know of relate to Muslim communities.

Muslims in Noiabr'sk went to court to secure the return of a mosque shut in 2012 and the transfer of ownership of this building, but were unsuccessful.

Gubinsk town court (Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous region) satisfied the public prosecutor's demand to forbid the running of a mosque which had been used by the liquidated Muslim organization Iman (see below).

Kislovodsk town court ordered the demolition of partially-built mosques in Belorechensk and Industriia, two Stavropol region villages. This decision was upheld by Stavropol regional court in July.

The town court of Pyatigorsk partially satisfied a case brought by the town administration. The court required the owner of an unfinished mosque – already in use – to demolish two floors, and banned the building from being used for religious purposes. The construction of this mosque, on 50-letiiia Oktiabria street, was deemed illegal in 2012. The town authorities promised to allocate a different building plot for the construction of a mosque.

The Tambov authorities announced the closure and demolition of an active Muslim prayer house, on Ryleeva street, on grounds that it failed to meet public hygiene standards and safety regulations. The house had been built on a plot allocated for the construction of a mosque in 2003. Since then the community has failed to erect a mosque, and in 2013 local residents began to protest against construction on that spot. Nevertheless, the official refusal was motivated by improper documentation. The authorities proposed a different plot – between Kikvidze and Bastionnaia streets – but this was rejected by the Muslim community because of the limited space and lack of communications.

Apart from Muslims, representatives of Orthodox organizations not under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate also faced problems using existing churches. In Penza the question of demolishing buildings belonging to the Mikhailovskii Cloister of the True Orthodox Church (*Istinno-pravoslavnaia tserkov'*, IPTs), in the village of Pobeda, was discussed by representatives from

the local authorities and Penza eparchy (Moscow Patriarchate). Since the 2008 court ruling which deemed the church and prayer house on cloister grounds to be illegal constructions and ordered their demolition, local officials have periodically returned to this issue. Each time, however, believers threaten to burn themselves alive. The buildings were not demolished in 2013 either.

The Moscow Metropolitanate Old Believer Council announced their readiness to transfer the territory of Rogozhskaia Sloboda to the city authorities because of high maintenance costs. The Moscow budget has funded restoration of the Rogozhskaia Sloboda complex over a number of years, and now the community wishes the upkeep of part of the complex to pass to the city budget too, '*on condition that the territory be used in accordance with its status as a spiritual center of the RPSTs [Russian Orthodox Old Believer Church]*'. We noted the community's inability to maintain property transferred to them in the previous year's report, and predict an increase in the number of such cases, as the number of property transfers to religious organizations increases.

As in previous years, such situations were rarely resolved in favor of religious organizations. Pervorechenskii district court in Vladivostok ordered the town administration to transfer ownership of the first floor of a prayer house to the Seventh Day Adventists free of charge. The community has been using the building for several years, and the city mayor's office made several attempts to deprive the religious organization of this accommodation in 2012.

Preferential treatment accorded certain religious organizations by the authorities

As in previous years, federal and regional budget funds were allocated to restore religious facilities in 2013. In the majority of cases this related to buildings of architectural significance, in accordance with the law.

According to Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets, over five billion rubles were spent restoring 230 Orthodox monuments in 2013. In Moscow, for example, 150 million rubles were spent restoring 14 religious facilities, and a further 200 million went on Rogozhskaia Sloboda. In Petersburg funds were spent on restoring the Sobornaia Mosque and the Great Choral Synagogue. Budget funds were also allocated to restore religious facilities in Ivanovsk, Leningrad, and Tula regions, amongst others.

As well as the direct allocation of funds, the authorities found ways of materially supporting religious organizations using a variety of privileges. In May 2013 the town дума of Togliatti reduced the rent ratio for religious organizations

from 3.5 to 1.2. On 18 December deputies decided to recalculate rental costs for ten religious organizations renting accommodation from the town, for the entire year. As a result, the town budget lost 650 thousand rubles.

In a series of cases government officials or state corporations selectively provided material help to religious organizations. It was revealed, for example, that the regional authorities provided Orthodox churches and monasteries in Kemerovo region with twelve thousand tons of coal for free between 2010 and 2013.

State corporations also provided support. Gazprom, for example, announced that it was allocating 50 million rubles to build an icon painting school in the Mirozhskii Transfiguration of the Savior Monastery (*Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Mirozhskii monastery*) in Pskov.

Some bureaucrats even resorted to extorting money from the local population in their desire to support religious organizations. In Elekrostal, Moscow region, an additional line was added to the bill for communal services – a 50 ruble monthly donation to the church. This practice appears to have been in existence for more than a year.

The transfer of property remains another widespread method of supporting religious organizations, although such transfers are not as common as might be expected in the third year since the law on the return of property of religious purpose was implemented.

The Federal Agency for State Property Management (Rosimushchestvo) published data on the transfer of real estate to religious organizations over the course of the year: according to Sergei Anoprienko, head of the Rosimushchestvo department for the accommodation of federal agencies, only 19 facilities were transferred. Moreover, by the end of December religious organizations had submitted 216 applications, of which 175 were allocated to Rosimushchestvo, about 30 to the Ministry of Defense, and the rest passed to the Department of Presidential Estate and Property Management for consideration. 21 applications were rejected, mainly on grounds of inadequate documentation. The majority of applications – 161 of them – were submitted by the Russian Orthodox Church; five were submitted by Muslim organizations and two each by the Federation of Jewish Communities in Russia, and the Roman Catholic, Old Believer and Evangelical Lutheran churches. One application was submitted by a Buddhist organization.⁵

⁵ On 29 January 2014, speaking at the Christmas Readings, Anoprienko cited different figures: 203 applications were received during 2013 from religious organizations, 187 of them from the Russian Orthodox Church. 32 transfers were finalized, a further 92 received a positive response but have not yet been implemented, and 53 are currently being worked on.

Buildings were transferred primarily, but not solely, to the Russian Orthodox Church. In Moscow more than 500 square meters of non-residential accommodation was transferred to the Augsburg Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Moscow Buddhist Center of Lama Tsonkapa for use free of charge. In Novgorod and Tambov regions several facilities were transferred to the Russian Orthodox Old Believer Church (RPSTs). Buildings were also transferred to Muslim organizations.

In a number of cases court decisions resulted in the transfer of real estate. In Tula region, for example, the town court of Kimovsk recognized the right of the Pokrov parish in the village of Pokrov, Kimovskii region, to own the eighteenth century church it has been using since 1998.

In Sochi a community of evangelical Christians also took matters to court. Back in March 2011 this religious organization had asked the mayor to transfer ownership of the House of the Gospel building used by the community since 1992, but had received no reply. The congregation filed a lawsuit after the Sochi authorities put the building up for sale as a municipal facility in March 2013. In October the court of arbitration ordered the town administration to consider the evangelical Christians' request to have ownership of the building transferred to them.

In contrast, two courts in Kirov region – the court of arbitration and Second arbitration appeal court – refused to transfer ownership of the former Vyatka Town Guardianship of the Poor to the eparchy. This building currently belongs to the Kirov State Medical Academy.

The Muslim community of Kasimovo, Ryazan region, also experienced problems. Since 2007 they have been attempting to secure ownership of the building they use as a mosque and madrasah, and in October bureaucrats again turned the religious organization down. At the same time the Khanskaia mosque – which has a fifteenth century minaret and had been occupied by a local history museum – was transferred to community ownership. It is proposed that, despite this transfer, the museum also be allowed to use the building in the future.

The transfer of real estate took place without any conflict in the majority of cases, and those institutions evicted for the sake of religious organizations are being rehoused by the authorities. In Nizhnii Novgorod, for example, new accommodation was allocated to the Blokhin epidemiology scientific research center, which had until recently occupied a building transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church.

Conflicts arose from time to time, however, and as before cultural institutions remain the most problematic.

The Rosimushchestvo's territorial administration of Vladimir region recommended that the head of the Vladimir-Suzdal Museum Reserve transfer the building of the Cathedral of St George (*Georgievskii sobor*) in Gus-Khrustalny to Vladimir eparchy for use free of charge. This building has housed a museum of crystal since 1974, and it was proposed that the building be used by both the museum and the Church to begin with. Museum workers rejected this proposal, since it does not allow for the accommodation of the museum repository and the museum does not have another building. Moreover, the building will require expensive restoration before religious services can be conducted there.

In Yaroslavl region the authorities were also prepared to sacrifice the interests of two museums for the sake of the Church. The eparchy demanded the transfer of five churches of the Transfiguration of the Savior Monastery (*Spaso-Preobrazhenskii monastyr'*): the churches of the Epiphany, Elijah the Prophet, St John the Forerunner, the Nativity of Christ and St Nicholas Nadein, jointly used by the Yaroslavl State Historical and Architectural Museum Reserve. The regional authorities announced that the museum would be moved only when a new building had been built for it – in other words, in several years' time. Local officials also agreed to move the Pereslavl-Zalessky State Historical, Architectural and Art Museum Reserve out of the former Dormition Goritskii Monastery (*Uspenskii Goritskii monastyr'*) by 2018, but are unable to guarantee that a new building will be ready for the museum by that date.

In observing this general tendency to transfer property to religious organizations, the bureaucratic bias against the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church (*Rossiskaia pravoslavnaia avtonomnoi tserkov'*, RPATs) – from whom property is, by contrast, removed – should also be noted. Several churches belonging to this organization were taken from it between 2010 and 2011, and in 2013 the RPATs lost a religiously venerated item: in August the Suzdal district court confiscated the relics of saints Evfimii and Efrosiniia of Suzdal. This decision was upheld by Vladimir regional court in October, and Suzdal district court ruled that they should be removed and transferred to the territorial department of Rosimushchestvo. The RPATs did not manage to contest this decision, but although bailiffs attempted to remove the relics, thus far they remain with the Church. This is the first case of ecclesiastical relic removal by the state since Soviet times.

Besides financial help and the transfer of property, other types of state patronage of religious organizations were noted during the course of the year. The Russian Federation government once again enlarged the list of individuals who

have the right to use VIP halls in Moscow, Moscow region, St Petersburg and Sochi airports, to include – amongst others – new religious figures: that accompanying the Patriarch, members of the Higher Church Council, heads of metropolitanates, directors and deputies of Moscow Patriarchate synodal institutions.

The practice of designating religious festivals as public holidays continued. Sagaalgan (New Year's Day according to the Lunar calendar) was declared a day off in Buryatia. In Bashkortostan and Tatarstan it was Uraza Bairam (Eid al-Fitr). 25 September was declared a holiday in Kursk, as this is day the Kursk Korennaia icon of the Mother of God of the Sign (*Znamenie*) is ceremonially processed into the town. In some regions, notably Krasnodar, Bryansk, Kemerovo, Saratov, Orenburg and Adygea, Radonitsa [when Orthodox Christians commemorate their dead] was declared a public holiday.

Defending believers' feelings

Despite the fact that the above-mentioned law on protecting religious feelings was not once applied in 2013, complaints were regularly made about offence to such feelings. For the most part, such complaints came from Orthodox Christians. It is worth noting that bureaucrats and the organizers of various events deemed dubious by some believers were a little more inclined to cancel or amend them in accordance with believers' wishes than in previous years.

At the request of the Orthodox metropolitan the mayoralty of Omsk cancelled an agreed Farewell to Winter festival, organized by a community of local neo-pagans (*rodnovery*), because it was scheduled during Lent.

In Krasnodar region Pavlovsk district administration cancelled 1 May celebrations because they fell within Holy Week [the week leading up to Easter]. It was not only the folk festival and demonstrations that were cancelled – the market fair was also banned.

In Voronezh region, the Rossoshanskii district authorities cancelled Ivan Kupala day [the nativity of St John the Baptist, conflated with midsummer] celebrations at the request of parishioners from two Orthodox churches, and also forbade '*pagan rituals as part of Youth Day celebrations*'.

Concerts in Kaluga and Tver by a Tver group, the Christ the Savior and Moist Mother Earth Ensemble, were cancelled at the initiative of the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods (*Soiuz pravoslavnykh bratstv*). Orthodox activists convinced the regional authorities that the group is 'anti-Church' and has a blasphemous name.

The Rizzordi Art Foundation, organizing an exhibition of Marat Gel'man's 'Icons' in St Petersburg, changed the time and place of the exhibition after

protests by Orthodox believers. It should be recalled that the exhibition was cancelled in St Petersburg the year before, after similar protests.

A display of Islamic children's fashion was cancelled as a result of pressure from Cossacks. The Cossacks were particularly distressed by the news that non-Muslim girls would be modelling Islamic clothes.

Journalists at Islam.ru deemed an illustration in Kornei Chukovskii's book *Moidodyr*, published in Rostov on Don by Kniga, to be offensive. The journalists considered that the artist had placed pages from the Qur'an in the paws of a crocodile. The publishing company decided not to use the 'inappropriate' illustration in the new edition, despite the fact that neither the editors, nor the local mufti, supported this perspective.

As in previous years, many regional officials – as well as Orthodox activists – led a crusade against Halloween, viewing this festival as a threat to 'spiritual security'. The education ministries of Omsk and Sverdlovsk regions sent a letter to the directors of educational institutions requesting that they suppress this festival 'for the purposes of preventing and not tolerating extremist moods in children and young people'.

Vitalii Milonov, a deputy in St Petersburg's legislative assembly, together with a group of activists, personally interrupted a Halloween festival in the Frunzenskii district Internationalists' park. The deputy considered it unacceptable to hold a '[witches'] sabbath' next to an Orthodox church.

There were also some refusals to take the 'feelings of believers' into account, but these were rarer than in previous years. One of these cases was the refusal by the organizers of an Elton John concert in Kazan to cancel the event, despite protests by an imam from one of the city mosques.

As before, the authorities rarely intervened when there was talk of insult to believers' feelings, and – as a rule – any interventions they did make did not have serious consequences for the 'blasphemers'. Chira Kovalski, a model photographed naked against the backdrop of a sacred grove, faced no sanctions after the Altai republic's Ministry of Culture appealed to the public prosecutor to evaluate her actions. The model apologized to believers, explaining that she had not known the place was venerated as holy by the local Altai people.

Mikhail Markelov, deputy chair of the State Duma's Committee on Civil Society Associations and Religious Organizations, asked the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation to examine Nikita Dzhigurda's video 'New Year Dzhigurdance' or 'Santa Dzhigurda' for insult to believers' feelings: an image of the crucified Christ is used in the video. The Investigative Committee found no grounds to initiate proceedings, however.

The sole case which evoked punishment for offending religious feelings as such is that of the Novosibirsk artist and civil society activist Artem Loskutov. In February Zheleznodorozhnii district magistrate court in Novosibirsk fined him a thousand rubles under the old version of article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offenses, for the dissemination of an image of Pussy Riot members in the style of an icon. In September the image itself was found insulting to religious sensibilities and banned as extremist by the city's Tsentralnii district court.

In November Tiumen regional court sentenced Andrei Korablev, a representative of the Union of Militant Atheists (*Soiuz voinstvuiushchikh bezbozhnikov*) to two years' imprisonment, suspended, for the publication of a pornographic video clip depicting women dressed as nuns. The court found Korablev guilty under point b, part 3, article 242 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation ('Illegal production and distribution of pornographic materials or items using mass media or the internet').

The champions of 'religious sensibilities' have notably increased their campaigning activity since 2012. In 2013 'Orthodox activists' carried out several attacks on cultural establishments and participants in street actions in Moscow. These activists are basically a fairly small group of one and the same people; representatives of the God's Will (*Bozh'ia volia*) movement, headed by the 'missionary' Dmitrii (Enteo) Tsorionov.

In February a group of Orthodox Christians attempted to get into the G-Spot Museum of Erotic Art in Moscow. A man with an icon and a group of elderly women with bags and a holy water sprinkler attempted to enter, but were stopped by security guards. During the resulting scuffle the icon was damaged.

Several attacks happened at once in March. Orthodox activists headed by Tsorionov attempted to disrupt two street actions: they threw eggs at participants in a meeting for women's rights organized by the Yabloko party, but instead of attacking those conducting single person pickets in defense of Pussy Riot, they read them extracts from the Bible.

Moreover, God's Will representatives attacked the Yabloko party office and the State Darwin Museum. They took literature from Yabloko's office and ceremonially burned it as '*pulp literature of a party of Satanists and perverts*' near metro Novokuznetskaia. They hung a banner reading 'God created the world' up at the Darwin Museum, conducted a prayer service and scattered leaflets in the central hall: '*We are protecting our children from lies! The universe was created by God 7522 years ago. The "theory of evolution" is a pseudo-scientific myth, an untenable thesis unproven by anyone at any time. Trotsky and Hitler and the "Russian Breivik", Vinogradov, used this frightening occultist myth to justify the murder of millions of people*'.

Then even members of the Federal Migration Service interrupted a performance of ‘The Moscow Trials’ at the Sakharov Center, accompanied by Cossacks, Orthodox activists headed by Enteo and Kirill Frolov, and an NTV film crew. The play offered its own interpretation of the court cases against the ‘Danger, Religion!’ and ‘Forbidden Art’ exhibitions, and the trial of Pussy Riot. After representatives of the Federal Migration Service had left, declaring that they had no problem with the Center, the Orthodox activists and Cossacks – wishing to ‘prevent lawlessness’ in relation to Orthodoxy – disrupted the performance yet again.

In July, the Orthodox Faith Corps, part of the youth organization Nashi, organized an Orthodox F.A.Q. festival at Triumfalnyi Square in Moscow, during which they hung up a banner listing twelve enemies of Orthodoxy: Stanislav Belkovskii, Marat Gel'man, Sergei Bychkov, the newspaper *Novaia gazeta*, the Jehovah's Witnesses, Pavel Gusev, *The New Times*, FEMEN, the Sakharov Center, Alexander Soldatov, Alexander Nikonov, and Pussy Riot.

In November a group of Orthodox activists headed by Tsorionov attempted to wreck a performance of ‘An Ideal Husband’ at the Moscow Art Theatre. They rushed onto the stage crying ‘*How can you tolerate this mockery of our faith? Why do you so hate Christ, when he was crucified for us?*’ In December God's Will began gathering signatures for a petition demanding that the plays ‘An Ideal Husband’ and ‘The Karamazovs’ be cancelled, and the theatre's artistic director Oleg Tabakov – together with all those responsible for these performances – be dismissed.

Liquidation of religious organizations and denial of registration

In contrast to 2012, we recorded some instances of religious organizations being liquidated.

Two Muslim organizations were liquidated for failing to provide reports on their activities, for having charter documents which did not accord with legislation, or for providing inaccurate information.

In February, at the request of the Ministry of Justice, Primorye regional court liquidated the Qadi Directorate of Muslims of Primorye (*Kyzyiatskoe upravlenie musul'man Primor'ia*). The Ministry had already asked the Directorate to eliminate a number of legislative infringements on several occasions, but the organization had not done so. These violations included being composed of only two local religious organizations, instead of the required three, and failing to report on activities.

In June Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous region court liquidated the Iman Muslim religious organization (under the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Asian Russia) of Gubkinskoe, at the request of the regional prosecutor's office. The organization had provided inaccurate information in the documents they submitted for registration, and failed to provide reports for 2010-2012. In October the Supreme Court upheld this decision.

Sanctions were also applied to two Orthodox organizations for failing to submit reports on their activities or tax declarations by the deadline, but matters didn't proceed as far as liquidation.

In Tula region a magistrate's court fined the parish priest of the Church of the Holy Epiphany (*Sviato-Bogoiavlenskii khram*) in Kimovskii district 300 rubles for this sort of violation.

The Moscow Federal Tax Service Office excluded the Russian Orthodox Church from the Unified State Register of Legal Entities for failure to submit the necessary documentation on time, but within a few days the matter was sorted out and the Church once again accorded the status of a legal entity. Naturally there was no question of liquidating the Russian Orthodox Church; rather this was simply a conflict over its failure to provide the required documentation.

Efforts to ban the Horde (*Orda*) organization were also noted over the course of the year, with criminal proceedings being initiated against this religious association in Cheliabinsk and Kurgan regions, and in Bashkortostan. In February, the Horde organization in the village of Izmailovskii, Cheliabinsk region, was banned as extremist by order of the Kizil'skii district court. First the public prosecutor, and then the court, identified this organization with the religious association Ata Zholy (The Way of Ancestors), banned in Kazakhstan. However, the provision of non-traditional healing methods, cases of diagnoses being made by people without medical training, and instances of refusing traditional medicine were the main complaints against the local Horde.

Thereafter the Horde was included in the Federal List of Extremist Organizations. In April Cheliabinsk prosecutor's office requested that the court ban Horde activities in the regional center. The Horde organization was banned in the village of Lesnikovo, Kurgan region, in October, and in December the woman who ran the Ufa Horde was found guilty by a Bashkortostan court under part 1, article 239 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code (‘Organization of an association which encroaches upon the person and the rights of citizens’). She was fined 100 thousand rubles. In all these instances the law enforcement agencies' complaints amounted to using ‘*psycho-technologies, including alteration of consciousness*’, the application of prayer and *kamchevanie* (blows of the lash)

and interaction with the spirits of the dead. We do not propose to evaluate the harm inflicted by such practices, but we do consider the banning of the Horde for extremist activity to be unlawful, since the violations the organization is accused of are not covered by anti-extremist legislation.

Besides these, several organizations conducting educational activities without a license were liquidated.

The prosecutor's office shut the Bible College of the Far East (*Dal'nevostochnyi bibleiskii kolledzh*) in Khabarovsk, because 'the organization is a professional religious education institution' but was not registered as religious.

St Petersburg city court liquidated local religious organization the Harvest (*Zhata*) Church of Christians of the Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals), for not having a license to conduct educational activities. Moreover the church's charter documents did not mention the provision of educational services, and the court considered that the church had provided them. The Supreme Court upheld this ruling in 2014. According to the defense, the decision to liquidate the church was unlawful because the church had not conducted educational activities, but simply provided accommodation for children's classes.

In contrast, the Petersburg Orthodox Enlightenment Center was liquidated for conducting religious activities instead of the educational activities specified in its charter documents. The fact that Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church parishes were accommodated in the Center's premises was also considered an infringement of this charter, despite the fact that – according to Center director, archpriest Alexei Lebedev – the Center has no legal relationship with this church, but simply provides accommodation to various religious organizations.

The Nizhegorodskii district court of Nizhnii Novgorod supported the legal action brought by the regional department of the Ministry of Justice to liquidate the Nizhnii Novgorod Faizkhanov Islamic Institute (*Nizhegorodskii islamskii institut im. Kh. Faizkhanova*). The lack of a license to conduct educational activities, use of symbols not registered in accordance with established procedures on their forms and stamps, and misrepresenting the legal-organizational type of the institution in charter documents served as reasons to close the organization down. Incidentally, when Damir Mukhetdinov received an order to rectify the violations back in 2012, he himself suggested dissolving the organization since by then another organization with the same name had been registered, but this time as a private educational institution. It is precisely this second organization which has continued its activities.

As in previous years, several religious organizations experienced difficulties securing state registration.

The Primorye regional department of the Ministry of Justice refused to register two local Muslim organizations called Islam, in Partizansk and Arsen'ev, because it deemed the information provided about the founders of these organizations to be unreliable.

The Moscow Church of Scientology once again failed to appeal against the refusal by the Ministry of Justice to re-register them. As before, the Ministry of Justice did not implement the 2007 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights, which found the refusal to re-register the organization unlawful. Moscow city court refused to uphold the Scientologists' complaint against the Ministry's actions. The Ministry, and the Moscow city court thereafter, considers that the charter documents of this religious organization contain violations which contravene legislation, in particular, that the name of the organization does not indicate its legal-organizational and confessional nature. The Church of Scientology considers these complaints groundless, since the charter has previously been registered by the Ministry of Justice.

Religious organizations encountering difficulties with government agencies often managed to defend their rights in court. It was most often Protestant organizations and representatives of new religious movements (henceforth, NRMs) which succeeded in proving the sanctions taken against them to be unlawful.

In April Kemerovo regional court failed to uphold a complaint by Iurga prosecutor's office, Kemerovo region. The public prosecutor had hoped to overturn the decision not to ban the activities of a local group of Jehovah's Witnesses, taken in 27 December 2012 by the Iurga town court.

In Rostov region a Protestant organization managed to contest the decision to liquidate it. An unregistered group of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, who ran a rehabilitation center for those dependent on drugs and alcohol, was liquidated in June as a result of an action brought by the Shakhta town prosecutor's office. Lack of state registration and a failure to comply with the law 'On civil society organizations' were cited as grounds for the ban, although this law does not apply to religious groups and they are not required to register. Not perceiving any violations in the group's activities, the Rostov regional court overturned this decision in August.

In March the St Petersburg prosecutor's office filed a lawsuit requesting the liquidation of the Islamic Cultural Center for violations it had identified, including of public hygiene and fire safety regulations at the property rented by the center. Moreover, two copies of a book deemed to be extremist, *Gardens of the Righteous (Sady pravednykh)* by the famous medieval imam al-Nawawi, were found at the center. In December the Thirteenth arbitration appeal court decided the actions of the public prosecutor were unlawful.

Discrimination against religious organizations and citizens on the basis of their attitude to religion

As in previous years, Protestant organizations and representatives of NRMs were most often subject to discrimination, as government officials and members of the security services perceive them to be followers of ‘non-traditional’ religious teaching, and to represent a danger to Russia. Bureaucrats made ‘anti-sectarian’ announcements and attempted to restrict the rights of representatives of such religious organizations, one way or another, at both regional and federal level.

A special structure was even created in parliament to further the struggle with these religious organizations. A working group, supervised by Mikhail Markelov, was set up under the State Duma Committee on Civil Society Associations and Religious Organizations to study the activities of ‘representatives of non-traditional religions’, ‘civil society associations of religious persuasion’, and ‘foreign religio-civil society organizations’, and to ensure that the law on protection of religious feelings would not apply to them. The group did not report on its findings during the course of the year, however.

Government officials united with various civil society forces – in first place, the Russian Orthodox Church – in the fight against ‘sectarians’. In Kaluga region, for example, only ROC representatives were invited to attend a round table on ‘Freedom of conscience and religious confession’. At the behest of local officials, representatives from Protestant and Muslim organizations were refused entry to the event by security guards.

The governor of Stavropol region, Valerii Zerenkov, proposed to ‘*protect the region from dangerous teachings*’ with the help of the Cossacks. We are unaware of how, or whether, this idea has actually been applied in practice.

Religious organizations of all confessions, in various regions, were affected by the wave of checks on non-commercial organizations initiated in connection with the law on ‘foreign agents’, despite the fact that they are not even covered by this law. According to the Pentecostals, for example, checks were conducted on 1,500 of their communities. In the majority of cases the religious organizations did not face any serious consequences as a result of these checks: occasionally they were asked by investigators to make some changes to documentation. Many of those organizations against which sanctions were applied managed to contest them.

In Rostov region Catholic parishes in Rostov-on-Don, Novochoerkassk, Volgodonsk and Azov were subjected to such checks. A check on the Assumption of the Most Holy Virgin Mary parish (*prikhod Uspeniia Presviatoi Devy Marii*)

in Novochoerkassk revealed violations of fire safety regulations, and both the religious organization and the parish priest were fined. The fine, moreover, amounted to more than the parish’s annual income. A court later repealed the decision about the fine.

In 2012 we noted the abatement of a long-running campaign of harassment against Jehovah’s Witnesses. We can verify that in 2013 representatives of this organization experienced discrimination as before, but the pressure on them from bureaucrats and the security services has not increased.

In August the vice governor of Murmansk region, Anatolii Vekshin, sent a letter out to the heads of municipalities which talked about the ‘threat’ of Jehovah’s Witnesses and ordered them to inform the law enforcement agencies about any events organized by this organization. In December the Administrative Center of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia appealed to Murmansk’s Oktiabr’skii district court to recognize this letter as unlawful and recall it. The vice mayor agreed to recall the letter in January 2014, and the case was closed.

Detaining Jehovah’s Witnesses who are engaged in door-to-door preaching continues to be the main way of discriminating against them. Police officers detained believers in Moscow, Bashkortostan, the Komi republic and Tatarstan, in the Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous regions, and in Altai, Belgorod, Cheliabinsk, Irkutsk, Kirov, Kostroma, Krasnodar, Orenburg, Oriol, Primorye, Ryazan, Samara, Saratov, Sakhalin, Tambov, Tver, Tiumen, Volgograd, and Vologda regions. As a rule those detained were taken to the police station, where ‘conversations on religious themes’ were conducted. Sometimes they were searched, literature was seized and they were forcibly photographed and fingerprinted.

Bureaucrats and members of the law enforcement agencies also obstructed the worship of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Police officers attempted to disrupt services in Novyi Urengoi and Novokuibyshevsk, for example. A Jehovah’s Witness community in Orlov region was fined for conducting a service without the permission of the authorities. The director of a House of Culture in Nakhodka, Primorye region, received a warning from the prosecutor’s office and was fined under article 19.1 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (‘Arbitrariness’) for providing accommodation to a Jehovah’s Witnesses’ assembly.

There were also cases of discrimination against representatives of ‘traditional’ religions.

As in previous years, instances of discrimination against foreign preachers were recorded. Despite a request from the parliament of Kalmykia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs once again refused to issue an entry visa for the Dalai Lama.

Several cases of police arbitrariness with regard to Muslims were recorded. While checking the documents of customers in a caf  next to a mosque, Surgut police demanded that Muslims cut off their beards, threatening to set fire to their beards if they didn't. The victims attempted to initiate a criminal case against the police officers under article 286 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation ('abuse of office'), but the Investigative Committee for Khanty-Mansi region refused to initiate proceedings, perceiving no indications of violence in these police actions.

Muslim caf customers were subjected to police attack in Moscow, too. Forcing the Muslims to lie on the floor, police officers beat them with gun-butts, stood on their hands and insulted them. According to the official line, this operation was implemented to apprehend a band of robbers.

Several citizens were sacked as a result of conflicts in which religion was the underlying cause. A Perm resident, for example, was sacked for expressing his displeasure at the Orthodox ritual blessing of an office.

Artist Lusine Dzhanian, who had worked at the Krasnodar University of Culture and Arts for a decade or so, was sacked by university management after demonstrating support for Pussy Riot. The management demanded that she stop supporting the punk group and delete photographs of placards from Live Journal. The artist was called 'an enemy of Orthodoxy' during the academic board meeting at which the decision was taken to sack her.

We recorded the first instance in several years of a religiously-motivated refusal to treat a medical patient. A doctor at one of Petrozavodsk's clinics for women refused to accept a patient in a Muslim headscarf, declaring that she herself was a Jew and '*because of my religious feelings, I will not accept a Muslim woman [patient], or any other such [women] in headscarves*'. After the administration intervened, the patient was admitted, but '*with a hostile attitude*'. The doctor was formally disciplined, and the victim received apologies for the incident from the republic's Ministry of Health and Social Development and the head doctor.

Attending educational institutions – especially state schools – in Muslim dress remains seriously problematic. Even Vladimir Putin has commented on this issue: on the program 'A direct line to Vladimir Putin' in April, asked about the possibility of girls attending lessons in Muslim headscarves, he declared that '*there has never been any such tradition in our country, including in the Muslim regions*'.

Nevertheless, many Muslims consider the school dress code, which excludes scarves for girls, to be an infringement of their rights. When school uniform was

introduced in Stavropol region in 2012, around ten Muslim students transferred to alternative types of study. The necessary consultations with teachers were arranged for all these children.

Muslims in Ulyanovsk region appealed to the governor to reconsider the regional legislative assembly's ruling on school uniform requirements, which included a ban on wearing headgear. According to the petitioners, this requirement '*is unacceptable for Muslims who practice their religion*'.

Wearing the 'hijab' occasionally became an issue in higher educational institutions too. A student of Krasnodar's medical university was expelled for wearing a Muslim headscarf, but managed to get herself reinstated and to collect five thousand rubles compensation from the educational institution for the moral injury suffered.

Protection from discrimination

Many of those who experienced discrimination – above all, Jehovah's Witnesses and representatives of Protestant organizations – successfully defended their rights in court. Legal proceedings against the Jehovah's Witnesses of Bryansk and Belgorod for administrative offences were halted by higher legal authorities, for example.

The Tsentralnyi region court of Cheliabinsk upheld the complaint of a Jehovah's Witnesses community which demanded that the 2012 ban on their holding a convention be recognized as illegal.

Jehovah's Witnesses in Gorodets, Nizhnii Novgorod region, appealed against the district administration's refusal to grant them permission for a convention. The head of the district administration, moreover, had cited the opinion of the local Orthodox bishop. Gorodets town court found this refusal to be unlawful.

The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Russia should pay five thousand euros compensation each to Jehovah's Witnesses Ekaterina Avilkina (from Nal'chik) and Valentina Zhukova (St Petersburg) for moral damages. The women's medical records had been disclosed to the public prosecutor without their consent, after they refused blood transfusions on religious grounds in 2007. The ECHR considered this a violation of article eight of the European Convention (the right to respect for private and family life).

The public prosecutor applied to the courts to shut down a rehabilitation center for drug addicts and alcoholics run by the Exodus (*Iskhod*) Church of Christians of the Evangelical Faith in Rostov region. After running checks on the activities of the Exodus Church, the prosecutor's office decided that the religious organization's social work was unlawful. Moreover, a number of violations were identified in the work of the rehabilitation center itself, which

included – for example – ‘*the unsmiling faces of drug addicts during examination*’ and the presence of ‘*crawling lice*’. The court found the prosecutor’s arguments unsound, all the witnesses called by the prosecution gave evidence in defense of the rehabilitation center, and the case was terminated.

Syktyvkar town court found the town administration’s failure to agree somewhere for the God’s Glory (*Bozh’ia Slava*) Church to hold services to be unlawful, and recognized the organization’s right to conduct services near the Avrora shopping center and a household services center. This is not the first time that church representatives have successfully appealed against the actions of the town’s bureaucrats.

Insufficient protection against defamation and attacks

We did not record any murders clearly motivated by religious hatred in 2013, but there were around 30 attacks in which the underlying causes were religious. Although in the majority of cases the victims were not seriously injured, this represents a significant increase on the previous years’ figures.

Jehovah’s Witnesses engaged in their door-to-door missionary work were – as before – most often subject to attack. Over the course of the year Witnesses were attacked in Moscow, Mari El, and in Voronezh, Ivanov, Moscow, Omsk and Rostov regions, amongst others. No fewer than 12 witnesses were assaulted, but – with one exception – the victims suffered no serious harm to health. The exception was an elderly woman assaulted by an Omsk resident in March: she received a broken rib and damage to her right lung. Witnesses conducting missionary work in Moscow, Moscow region and Kirov were threatened with pistols.

We also recorded one attack apiece on representatives of Islam, Protestantism, Judaism and Orthodox Christianity.

A worker from the God’s Glory Pentecostal church in Syktyvkar was beaten up. He had been participating in a picket in support of Pastor Viktor Dudin, on hunger strike to protest what he perceives to be a forcible takeover of property belonging to one of the Protestant charitable foundations.

A man attacked an imam’s aide after Namaz/Salah [prayers] in Nefteugansk, bursting into his office with the words: ‘you pray incorrectly’.

In Moscow region, a group of young people wearing kippot [Jewish skullcaps] were beaten up by two passengers on a suburban train on the eve of Yom Kippur. The attackers shouted nationalist slogans.

In Volgograd hieromonk Gerontii (Potapov), out walking in a cassock, was beaten up by unknown assailants. The victim suggested that his attackers might

be nationalists or Satanists, but it is possible that the attack was connected with the upcoming ataman elections and a pre-election struggle amongst Cossack organizations.

72 cases of vandalism against religious targets were recorded in 2013, slightly more than those recorded in 2012 (69 cases).

The majority of targets, as in 2012, were Orthodox (32), but this represents a drop of about a quarter in comparison to the previous year (42 cases). In Vladimir three Orthodox churches were all desecrated on Christmas night. Although the campaign of cutting down crosses in public places has continued, it is winding down – there were four cases of vandalism against crosses recorded in 2013.

In second place came NRM targets (11 cases), barely changing since last year, when ten instances were recorded. All of these cases, moreover, were directed against Jehovah’s Witnesses’ property.

The number of attacks against Muslim targets almost doubled – from five to nine cases – possibly in reaction to the terrorist attacks in Volgograd.

Six cases of vandalism against Jewish property were recorded, and one case each of attacks on Protestant, pagan and Yezidi targets.

The number of dangerous acts of vandalism remains high. A synagogue in Ekaterinburg was shot at, as were Jehovah’s Witnesses buildings in Altai region and Kurgan. There were arson attacks against a Jewish community center in Perm, a Baptist prayer house in Belgorod (possibly the result of an explosion), Muslim prayer houses in Astrakhan and Volgograd, and a mosque in Kazan. Seven Orthodox churches were set on fire in Tatarstan, and a further seven cases of arson against Orthodox targets were recorded in other regions. Happily no one was injured in any of these incidents.

As in previous years, xenophobic material about religious organizations was published in both federal and regional mass media. Most often this sort of reporting was ‘anti-sect’ and anti-Islamic. As a rule the organizations mentioned in this material sought an official retraction, and some of them received it.

One of the most sensational cases was the ‘Followers of Aum Shinrikyo want to build a “City of Happiness” in Nizhnii Novgorod region’ report by the Rossiia-1 television channel, which focused on the Divya Loka Center of Vedic Culture in Nizhnii Novgorod region. Settlement residents were accused of ‘*damaging the spiritual health of another person, driving a person to commit murder, similarity with the terrorist sect Aum Shinrikyo, group sex and orgies*’. Representatives of Divya Loka took the television channel to Moscow’s Savelovskii court over the defamatory information disseminated, and in January 2014 the court ordered the television channel to publish a retraction.

Novosibirsk eparchy's missionary department published an article entitled 'Hare Krishna followers go on the offensive in Novosibirsk', which called for the mayor 'not to allow Krishna devotees' religious marches, which represent a threat to the spiritual health of our citizens and the country as a whole, onto the streets of our town'. The Novosibirsk public prosecutor's office issued a warning to archpriest Alexander Novopashin, the director of the eparchy's Information and Consultation Center on Sectarianism, reminding him not to infringe the rights of citizens to freedom of conscience and religious confession. The article was withdrawn.

In addition to the above mentioned anti-Krishna devotee reporting, the Rossiia-1 television channel also broadcast anti-Islamic material. The story 'Aggressive Islam: Stavropol splits into our own and aliens' attracted the attention of the Chechen ombudsman, Nurda Nukhazhiev, who requested that it be examined for evidence of inciting enmity.

Members of the Assalam women's Islamic community in Stavropol were disturbed by the contents of a news story, 'An ordinary house, hostel, or sect?' on the same television channel. The story focused on the search of a madrasah on 1 November 2013, and journalists represented members of the religious group as extremist.

Representatives of 'alternative' Orthodox Christianity were also subject to defamation. Newspapers *Vladimir Gazette* (*Vladimirskie vedomosti*) and *The Virgin Soil of Suzdal* (*Suzdal'skaia nov'*) published an article about the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church entitled 'State department in a cassock?' Representatives of RPATs demanded a retraction and declared that the article offended their feelings, containing as it did '50 slanderous assertions, insults and misinformation, much of which contains open incitement to inter-confessional enmity and confrontation, together with extremist slogans'.

The 'anti-Church campaign' – material critical of the Russian Orthodox Church which appeared in the media in 2012 in connection with the Pussy Riot case – evidently disturbed the authorities, since in 2013 a federal channel was moved to expose it. At the beginning of the year NTV aired a film by Boris Korchevnikov, 'I don't believe!', presented as a journalistic investigation into the 'information war' against the Church. The film was a selection of incomprehensible 'pictures' and interviewees' remarks taken out of context, intended to convince the viewer that the 'anti-Church campaign' was the work of art gallery owner Marat Gel'man and blogger Rustem Agadamov in particular, supported by Ukraine and the West.

One of the participants in this 'campaign' – Mikhail Anshakov, head of the Society for the Protection of Consumers (*Obshchestvo zashchity prav potrebitel'ei*)

– was found guilty under part 2, article 128.1 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code ('Slander, contained in a public speech, publically displayed work or the mass media'). Anshakov was fined 100 thousand rubles for a 2012 interview in which he talked about the business center, the car washing, servicing and tyre fitting, the 305 parking spaces, the laundry, canteen, and retail outlets active on the territory of the Christ the Savior Church (*khram Khristos Spasitel'ia*).

As in previous years, private individuals and representatives of civil society organizations periodically attempted to oppose religious organizations by a variety of means, from defamation to threats.

Activists from the organization Emergency Services for Youth (*Skoraia molodezhnaia pomosh'*) held a few single person pickets against Jehovah's Witnesses in Belgorod. Picketers handed out brochures entitled 'Beware – a sect' to passers-by.

In Syktyvkar Aleksei Kolegov, leader of the national-patriotic organization Frontier of the North (*Rubezh Severa*) disrupted the single person picket in support of the aforementioned pastor of God's Grace Church, Viktor Dudin.

In 2013 we recorded a type of defamation that we had previously not encountered. On the eve of Eid al-Adha in October, hackers attacked three Muslim websites. The hackers posted images of a pig's head and an insulting inscription on sites belonging to the Council of Muftis of Russia, the chair of the Council of Muftis, and the Moscow Sobornaia Mosque.

Maria Kravchenko

Inappropriate enforcement of anti-extremist legislation in Russia in 2013

Summary

In general, the year of 2013 was characterized by decrease in political activity in Russia, although the authorities were still clearly concerned about the rise of a new oppositional movement of some kind. These concerns were reflected in both in legislative and law enforcement trends in the area, designated in Russia as “counteracting extremism.”

This counteraction targets primarily radical nationalist movements and groups; this topic has been covered in another SOVA Center report,¹ and we noted the incidence of controversial or even clearly excessive law enforcement decisions in this area. This report focuses exclusively on the anti-extremist policy measures that we view, regardless of their target, as excessively restricting the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms.²

The above-mentioned federal government concerns resulted in a very active creation of new legislative acts in 2013. A number of existing rules were tightened, and new repressive mechanisms were created. In some cases, particularly repressive intentions of the lawmakers even had to be moderated either in the course of the adoption of laws or by amending the existing ones. Some measures – such as criminalizing incitement to separatism or insults to religious feelings – seem simply far-fetched; others implicitly addressed specific groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir Islamist party. However, some changes had a general impact, primarily a dramatic expansion of prerogatives for blocking Internet resources.

Together, all these developments warrant some serious concerns regarding the growing scale of repressive law enforcement in 2014, especially when taking

into account the aggravated foreign policy situation and intense debates it has prompted in the country.

Interestingly, in the criminal law enforcement, that is, in its most critical part, the repressive use of anti-extremist legislation actually decreased over the past year, compared to 2012. This holds true for two most persecuted categories – political and civil society activists (mostly various moderate nationalists) and religious and religio-political activists (this group is more populous, and persecution against followers of Said Nursi merits our particular attention) – despite the fact that politics in the sphere of religion does not appear directly related to the intensity of the opposition movement in the country.

A common feature that characterized the wrongful criminal convictions in 2013 was the disproportionate response by the law enforcement system. Unconstitutional, but peaceful Hizb ut-Tahrir propaganda was prosecuted not as such, but as a preparation for a coup d'état; intolerant, but not specifically inciting, statements by various activists and bloggers were penalized as incitement to hatred and enmity; preaching superiority of one's own religion or criticism of someone else's – the position, which, while unpleasant to others, is natural for a religion – was punished as incitement to religious hatred.

The proportionality of anti-extremist law enforcement is becoming an increasingly dire problem, but, so far, no solution has been found.

The problem becomes particularly evident from the decisions made under administrative and civil law. The Federal List of Extremist Materials has been growing faster with every year, while its use to combat really dangerous groups is still extremely rare. Prosecutors keep expanding their already extensive inspections of schools and libraries in order to check their supervision over online or offline access to something extremist, despite the fact that such practice has long been discredited.

The 2011 Supreme Court recommendations reduced the number of clearly fictitious charges, but, nevertheless, such cases continue to occur – for example, there was a charge of inciting hatred towards a social group of “men.” The Supreme Court recommendations are also clearly ignored when filing criminal charges for criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church or its leadership.

In general, anti-extremist law enforcement has shifted to the virtual realm. This applies both to a growing share of verdicts specifically relating to the online materials and to creation of new regulatory acts, which, in 2013 and in early 2014, focused on the Internet regulation as a priority among control-tightening policies. Internet users, however, have solid resistance potential against such policies, and this is likely to trigger new repressive norms and measures.

¹ See in this book: Vera Alperovich, Natalia Yudina, *The Ultra-Right Shrugged: Xenophobia and Radical Nationalism in Russia, and Efforts to Counteract Them in 2013*.

² Our interpretation of “inappropriate anti-extremism” is introduced in detail in a Preface to: A. Verkhovsky, *Inappropriate enforcement of anti-extremist legislation in Russia in 2009 // Xenophobia, Freedom of conscience and Anti-extremism in Russia in 2009*. Moscow: SOVA Center, 2010. P. 82-86.

Creation of Regulatory Acts

In 2013, the creation of regulatory acts was characterized by active implementation of the program of expanding measures to “combat extremism” adopted in the preceding year; anti-terrorism legislation was significantly toughened as well. At the same time, regardless of the arguments, provided by the government in support of these measures – from the Islamist threat to the nationalist one – its legislative policy in this area was, clearly, largely dictated by the overall political situation in the country. The state seeks to strengthen its control over the sphere of information and to expand the set of tools it can use to suppress opposition activity. In addition, the authorities increasingly insert themselves into the sphere of religion with obvious intention to protect the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church and to control other denominations. We maintain that harsher legislation and expanded mandate of the authorities will inevitably lead to proliferation of anti-extremist legislation abuse. Notably, some measures adopted in 2013 were so harsh that the state had to soften them by the year’s end.

In June 2013, the government submitted a draft law “On amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (with regard to increasing liability for extremist action)” to the State Duma for consideration; the deputies started working on it in December, and it was signed by the President in early February 2014. The new law increased the punishments under the Criminal Code Articles 280 (“incitement to extremist activity”), 282 (“incitement to hatred and hostility”), 282¹ (“Participation in an extremist group”) and 282² (“Continuing the activity of an organization banned for extremism”). Fines and terms of forced labor were increased for all these articles, and upper limits for prison terms were increased for three of them (except for Article 282). The maximum terms now constitute four years under Article 280, up to ten years under Article 282¹, and up to six years under Article 282². Thus, the corresponding crimes were moved from the category of minor offenses to the category of moderate and even severe offenses. As stated in the explanatory memorandum to the bill, such arrangements created “*legal conditions to conduct necessary search and discovery operations for the purpose of solving the crimes and bringing the perpetrators to justice*” and were needed in order to give the right signal to the public in a situation of intensifying extremism, fraught with increasing terrorist activity. Raising the upper limits of fines and terms of forced labor can be regarded as a reasonable innovation. However, lengthening the maximum prison terms runs contrary to the general policy in the criminal law. From our perspective, deviation from this policy for the sake of “sending a signal to the society” and investigators’

convenience is inappropriate. It should also be noted that intimidation, as a method of fighting against radical groups, was proved ineffective.

On November 3, 2013, the President signed a law introducing a range of new anti-terrorism measures. Along the lines of the anti-extremist Articles 282¹ and 282², the Criminal Code now included Articles 205⁴ (“organizing a terrorist community or participation in it”) and 205⁵ (“organizing activity of a terrorist organization or participation in it”), which provided for much more severe punishment than the corresponding extremist articles (which such offenders were previously charged under, since our legislation views terrorism as a form of extremism) – 10 to 15 years of imprisonment with a fine of up to one million rubles for organization, and 5 to 10 years of imprisonment with a fine of up to 500,000 rubles for participation. The Criminal Code also added Article 205³ (“undergoing training in order to carry out terrorist activities”), so the same sentence is imposed for apprenticeship with terrorists as for participation in activities of a terrorist organization. Note that the introduction of these items makes life easier for law enforcement agencies that often seek to indict as terrorists people, who were not involved in any attacks. Among other cases, the law will cover future prosecutions of people, charged with membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamist party that could have been banned as extremist, but, instead, was inappropriately banned as a terrorist organization. The first such case was filed in February 2014 against five residents of the town of Dyurtyuli in the Republic of Bashkortostan.

The prohibition of “separatist propaganda” was signed into law on December 28, 2013, adding Article 280¹ (“public calls for action violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation”) to the Criminal Code. The new article mimics the wording of Article 280. Actually, since “violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation” is part of the definition of extremist activity, public calls for it had previously fallen under the Criminal Code Article 280; it is still not entirely clear what changes the new wording brings to the current law. We remain convinced that, in the spirit of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, only secessionist acts associated with violence should be considered illegal.

On June 28, 2013, the Federal Law No.134-FZ “On the Introduction of Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation with Respect to Countering Illegal Financial Operations” was signed. In accordance with this law, Russian banks had to freeze all accounts and operations of all listed entities and individuals who were reported as involved in extremist activity or terrorism (the so-called Rosfinmonitoring List) and of those not included on this list but suspected of involvement in terrorism. An opportunity was provided to appeal

the inclusion on the Rosfinmonitoring List in court. As a result, in addition to convicted offenders, suspects charged under anti-extremist articles and their dependent family members were de facto deprived of livelihood and ability to make any financial transactions, and were unable even to pay their court-imposed fine. We believe that these measures were not only excessively harsh, but also unnecessary – it would have been sufficient for the authorities to monitor the accounts of the “extremists,” as previously done. It is also worth noting that a significant portion of transactions related to individuals’ illegal activities (for example, buying weapons on the black market) is conducted in cash.

By the end of the year, this striking innovation was finally relaxed. The Federal Law No. 403-FZ “On Amending the Federal Law “On the National Payment System” and the Federal Law “On counteracting legalization (laundering) of proceeds from crime and financing of terrorism” was signed on December 28, 2013. Among other things, the new law mitigated the aforementioned amendments to some extent. Now, the law stipulates the right of individuals included in the Rosfinmonitoring List “*in order to ensure their livelihood and the livelihood of family members who share their residence and have no independent sources of income*” to carry out operations for the receipt and expenditure of wages (in an amount not exceeding 10,000 rubles a month per family member), pensions, stipends, benefit payments, etc., and also for payment of taxes, fines, etc. Citizens also gained the right to apply for permission to perform operations on the amount exceeding 10,000 rubles; Rosfinmonitoring has to make a decision to allow or deny such an operation within five days.

At the same time, the restrictions of the voting rights for certain categories of convicted offenders were also relaxed. On December 13, 2013, the State Duma adopted in the first reading the draft law “On Amending the Federal Law “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in Referendum for Citizens of the Russian Federation” (pertaining to the voting rights restrictions for certain categories of citizens of the Russian Federation).” According to this document, persons convicted of serious crimes are barred from electoral participation as candidates for 10 years (15 years for particularly grave crimes) from the date of removal and expunging of their criminal records. The bill was intended to fix the situation that arose after the amendment to the law No. 67-FZ “On basic guarantees of electoral rights and the right to participate in the referendum for citizens of the Russian Federation” imposed a life-long ban on eligibility for these categories of citizens on April 2, 2013. The Constitutional Court pointed out the impermissibility of this situation. Note that lifetime disenfranchisement would also apply to those convicted of extremist crimes, now shifted to the category of grave offenses. However, in

any case, this move translates into a prolonged restriction on passive suffrage rights for offenders, convicted under these articles; given the current state of anti-extremist legislation, this situation should be a cause for concern, as it gives authorities greater leverage in the electoral process.

Let’s review the laws designed to establish control over the sphere of information.

On December 30, 2013, the President signed the law (known as “Lugovoy’s Law”) on extrajudicial blocking of websites that call for extremist actions, riots or even conducting public events without a due permit. Access to such information must now be blocked immediately without judicial process, as it is done in child pornography cases. The difference is that, according to the Lugovoy’s Law, only the Prosecutor General’s Office can make this decision (implemented by Roskomnadzor), thus limiting the potential number of arbitrary bans. However, the Prosecutor General’s Office is not obligated to inform editorial offices or site owners about its reason for blocking (and, indeed, as it became evident in March 2014 when the law went into force, the prosecutors don’t provide this information), hindering the owners’ efforts to resolve the problem. We view extrajudicial blocking of the materials based merely on suspicion of extremism as unacceptable, since it inevitably leads to arbitrary actions and abuse by the law enforcement and to an attack on freedom of speech. Even if the law enforcement views the materials as hazardous and in need of urgent blocking, they must, nevertheless, act with court approval, which can be issued in an expedited manner, as it is done for search or arrest warrants. Note that the Russian Association of Electronic Communications (RAEC) also spoke against this law, stating that it was untimely and contradicted the Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activity.” The Presidential Council on Civil Society and Human Rights stated that the law would lead to a serious infringement on the constitutional rights and freedoms pave the way for the growth of legal nihilism and create an illusion of fighting extremism rather than contributing to real work to eradicate it.

Next, we turn to the legislative acts in the sphere of religion.

On July 1, 2013, the Federal Law “On Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Order to Counter the Insult of Citizens’ Religious Beliefs and Sensibilities, the Desecration of Subjects and Objects of Religious Veneration (of Pilgrimage) and Places of Religious Rites and Ceremonies.” This bill on offending religious sensibilities, submitted to the Duma in 2012 in response to the performance of Pussy Riot punk band inside Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ

the Savior, was met with a strong reaction from the press and non-governmental organizations, and with protests from human rights activists. In late 2012, the Russian President proposed to defer consideration of the bill for a few months, and the parliament passed it in the first reading in spring 2013, with the proviso that the bill was to be substantially amended in the second reading. Indeed, the most odious components – such as a vague concept of “insulting the believers’ convictions” and discriminatory character of protection, provided only for the religious sentiments of those “religious associations which are professing religions that constitute integral part of the historical heritage for the peoples of Russia” – ended up excluded from the bill,

As a result, the law changed the composition and sanctions under the Criminal Code Article 148 (“obstruction of the right to freedom of conscience and religion”) and the Administrative Code Article 5.26 (“violation of the legislation on freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and religious organizations”). The new Part 1, added to Article 148, stipulates penalties for “public actions, expressing obvious disrespect for society and committed in order to insult religious feelings of believers” – a fine of up to 300 thousand rubles, or compulsory labor for up to 240 hours, or imprisonment for up to one year. If these acts are committed in places of worship, or places intended for religious rites and ceremonies, the fine could constitute up to 500 thousand rubles, the term of compulsory work could be extended up to 480 hours, and the term of imprisonment – up to three years with a possible restriction of freedom for up to a year. There were no changes to the sanctions for unlawful obstruction of religious organizations’ activities or performance of religious rites and ceremonies (they now constitute part 2 of the article), but if these acts include abuse of authority or threats of violence, an offender can face a fine of up to 200 thousand rubles, correctional labor for up to 480 hours or one year of imprisonment.

We view the reform of Article 148 as redundant. The content of Part 1 overlaps with the content of Article 213 in its part pertaining to explicit manifestations of disrespect for society (without reference to violation of the public order) and with the content of Article 282 in its part pertaining to offending religious feelings (compare to the vague wording of Article 282 about “humiliation of dignity”). Thus, the Criminal Code added a new article with nebulous content, because it is extremely difficult to understand what constitutes an “action, expressing an obvious disrespect to society” that involved no violation of public order, or an action committed “with the purpose of insulting religious feelings,” which possibly had no such effect. In such circumstances, qualifying acts against religion or believers becomes problematic. Indeed, the law enforcement practice based on the new law is non-existent at the time of writing this report.

The fines under the Administrative Code Article 5.26 for “obstructing the exercise of the right to freedom of conscience or freedom of belief” increased tenfold or more. The penalties now constitute 10,000-30,000 rubles for ordinary citizens and 50,000-100,000 rubles for officials. The wording of Article 5.26 Part 2 and sanctions under it were changed as well. Intentional public desecration of religious or theological literature, objects of religious worship, signs and emblems of worldview symbolism, or their damage or destruction became subject to a fine of 30 to 50 thousand rubles for the citizens and 100 to 200 thousand rubles for officials. In this case, questions arise about the terms, used by the authors of this new formula in the second part of Article 5.26. “Desecration” is a religious concept, and its meaning within the secular law is not obvious. It is also not clear whether all signs and emblems of “worldview symbolism” fall under its protection, and, if not, exactly which ones do.

On July 3, 2013, President Putin signed the law “On Amendments to Article 9 of the Federal Law ‘On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.’” The document added to Article 9 of the current law “Creation of Religious Organizations,” a new Paragraph 3, which stipulated that foreigners or stateless people “*in respect of whom, in accordance with the judicial procedure of the Russian Federation, the decision was issued about the undesirability of their stay (residence) in the Russian Federation,*” and persons, whose activities have been deemed by a Russian court to be extremist or subject to the law on combating money laundering and financing terrorism, were prohibited from becoming a founder, participant or member of a religious organization. Since the Russian law does now define participation in a religious organization, and many such organizations have fluid memberships anyway, the adoption of this law provides new opportunities for law enforcement abuse. For example, a mosque can be closed just for being attended by a convicted anti-extremist.

On June 8, 2013 a bill “On Amendments to Articles 4 and 24 of the Federal Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” was signed into law. Initially, authors of the bill suggested (following the example of Tatarstan, where such measure already exists) to give the subjects of the Russian Federation the right to establish “*requirements for religious education of ministers and religious personnel.*” From our perspective, establishing state requirements for religious education constitutes an unacceptable interference of the state in the religious sphere of the society. However, these amendments have been excluded from the law. The new norm has left requirements for religious education of ministers in the hands of religious organizations.

Major Trends in 2013

“Excessive Vigilance”

In the abundance of legislative initiatives launched in 2013 no opportunity was found to change the wording and clarify controversial formulas in anti-extremist legislation, which have long attracted criticism from lawyers and human rights defenders.

The text of Article 282 still includes “abatement of human dignity by reason of religion, national, or racial affiliation.” As you may remember, we believe that, in its extent of social danger, such an offense is close to the ones covered under the article on insult and, likewise, should be moved to the Administrative Code, but lawmakers have taken no steps in this direction. The state took the course on increasing extremism-related penalties, rather than clarifying its definition. This course also implies increased vigilance and, particularly, control over citizens’ online activity. As the authorities expand their fight against provocative statements on the Internet, the number of criminal cases, based on incidents that merit no law enforcement attention at all or deserve merely warnings or administrative measures, is growing as well. (This also applies to many cases of prosecutions for racist statements, which formally fit the wording of Article 282, but pose no significant public danger due to their small real audience. See more on this in our report on combating xenophobia.)³

In March, the sentence was issued in the notorious case of Ivan Moseev, the president of the Association of Pomors of the Arkhangelsk Region. It was opened in July 2012 under Part 1 of Article 282 (“incitement of hatred or enmity, or abatement of human dignity”). According to the investigators, Moseev left a comment, insulting ethnic Russians, on the Web site of the online news agency *Ekho Severa* under the username “Pomors.” In our opinion, this comment, of which Moseev denies authorship, can be classified as hate speech, but provides no grounds for criminal prosecution. Moseev was sentenced to a fine of 100,000 rubles, and, in addition, he was expelled from the university upon request of the prosecutors, expelled from the membership of all Russian public organizations upon request from the Ministry of Justice, and added to the Rosfinmonitoring List upon request from the FSB Department of the Arkhangelsk region – the latter action resulted in blocking of all his financial accounts. As a result Moseev was left unable even to pay the fine, to which he had been sentenced. After fruitless attempts to appeal the sentence, Moseev appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in November.

³ See: V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, *ibid.*

Pavel Khotulev faced the fine of the same amount under the same article in February in Kazan. He was accused of publishing several anti-Tatar comments in the users group “Russian Language in Tatarstan’s Schools” on the social network My World (*Moi Mir*). Khotulev asserted that the Tatar language instruction in schools should be made voluntary; he also criticized local authorities. Experts saw signs of extremism in such expressions as “so-called Tatarstan,” “losers,” “Tatar encampment,” and “the province of Russia.”

In the summer of 2013, a criminal case under Article 282 Part 1 was opened against Vasily Purdenko, the editor of the blog *Svobodnoe Slovo Adygei* [Free Speech of Adygea]. Criminal charges were initiated over the publication of the article “Being a Russian in Adygea is Possible, but Hopeless” on September 5, 2012. Purdenko asserts that the text was written by a certain A. Ivanov, but the investigation still believes that it was written by Purdenko. Clearly written from the nationalist perspective, “Being a Russian in Adygea is Possible, but Hopeless” contained criticism of local authorities: their cronyism, violations of national parity, and their generally misguided personnel policies. However, the material contained no signs of incitement to hatred or enmity towards the Adyge people, and, certainly, no incitement to violence.

A criminal case under Article 282 Part 1 was opened in Bashkortostan, in February against Guzalia Galimova, a history and social studies teacher in an Ufa lyceum. She was charged for her Facebook message, in which she spoke rather sharply about the behavior of Russian women at Turkish resorts. The experts found in her text “*negative information on members of Russian nationality, prompting sharply negative psychological attitudes against another person or group of persons in a reader.*” Note that negative judgment, or distribution of negative information are not mentioned in the text of in Article 282, and the law enforcement mentioned no calls for aggression in Galimova’s text. The teacher voluntarily resigned from the lyceum; she was charged in April.

As in the previous years, such element of the definition of extremist activity as “propaganda of superiority or inferiority of a person on the basis of their social, racial, national, religious or linguistic or religious affiliation” continues to bear its sad fruits. We have repeatedly pointed out that this vague wording underlies the majority of inappropriate bans against religious literature, which, in turn, lead to unfounded persecutions against believers for “inciting hatred or enmity.” In 2013, three criminal cases were initiated against the believers under Article 282. They will be described in detail in our section on religious persecution.

An extremely unfortunate wording “inciting hatred or enmity towards a social group” – which constitutes a part of the law “On Combating Extremist Activity” and of Article 282 and which law enforcement agencies tend to use

in order to prosecute verbal forms of ideological confrontation – was not as widely utilized in 2013, as in the previous years. Presumably, this component of Article 282 was originally designed to protect certain vulnerable population groups that constituted potential targets for aggression, but the vague notion of a “social group” has never been clarified by the legislators. This law sets the stage for numerous abuses, since, as interpreted by law enforcement agencies, the social groups in need of protection are, first of all, the government officials and the law enforcement agents (although the Supreme Court decision of 2011 has seriously affected the practice), and, additionally, the Russian Orthodox Church, which is closely affiliated with the authorities.

As a rule, people accused of inciting social hatred include civil and political activists, journalists and bloggers (this will be discussed in the relevant sections). Sometimes, however, such charges could be brought against citizens far removed from politics, and the social groups in need of protection are particularly creatively defined. Among the juicier anti-extremist cases filed in 2013 is the case of Zhanna Tsaregradskaya, the founder and the head of Rozhana Center for perinatal care and breastfeeding support in the Kaluga region. In addition to the Criminal Code Article 239 Part 1 (“Creating a public association whose activities involve violence against citizens”), Tsaregradskaya was charged with inciting hatred or enmity or debasement of human dignity on the basis of gender (the group in question being the “men”) and on the basis of belonging to a social group of spouses. Tsaregradskaya was also accused of rejecting the family as social institution, advocating rejection of health care, education, employment, military service and alternative service – all this, of course, bears no relation to the content of Article 282. The investigation in the case is currently pending.

The Internet and Anti-Extremism

In 2013, the total number of sentences under the Criminal Code Articles 280 and 282 for inciting hatred by placement of extremist materials, symbols or provocative comments on the Internet continued to grow, exceeding the figure for 2012 by about a third. We recognize 131 verdicts issued in 2013 for online xenophobic propaganda as appropriate.⁴ As usual, we have been frequently unable to assess the validity of these verdicts, since, for example, the offending comments are usually promptly removed from the network. Recall also that prosecutors and courts still don’t take into account a level of publicity, i.e. online propagandists’ real audience size, and their corresponding degree of social danger.

⁴ Op. cit.

We view three verdicts under Article 282 for online activity as inappropriate – to Radik Nurdinov of Bashkortostan for posting an article by Tatar nationalist Vil Mirzayanov, certainly separatist in its tone, but containing no calls to violence; to Pavel Khotulev from Kazan for speaking out against requirement to study Tatar language in schools; to Ivan Moseev for uncivil remark about Russians on the *Ekho Severa* website. We also disagree with the verdict under Part 2 of the Criminal Code Article 119 (“threat of murder motivated by hatred or enmity”), issued to journalist Elena Polyakova from Klin for her aggressive comment under the article about the activities of the head of the Klin Department of Education Alena Sokol’skaya, since this comment couldn’t be interpreted as a genuine threat.

According to our data, nine new unjustified criminal cases for online publications were opened in 2013 – eight under the Criminal Code Article 282 and one under Article 280. Extensive prosecutorial activities also took place in two previously opened cases.

Two websites with the works of Turkish theologian Said Nursi were inappropriately banned in 2013 in Volgograd. A ban was also imposed on oppositional website *ingusheti.ru* in Ingushetia – yet another successor to the *ingushetia.ru* website banned in 2008 – for publication of the materials containing serious and unsubstantiated accusations against the head of the republic Evkurov. From our point of view, in such cases law enforcement agencies should seek the removal of the offending material or block it, but the entire website should not be deemed extremist. A Muslim website *firdauz.ucoz.net* was banned in Pyatigorsk also because of a single item, the video lecture “Aliens” by Sheikh Khalid Yasin, which presents no danger, but was legally recognized as extremist. In addition, the Central District Court of Tver banned the official site of Jehovah’s Witnesses *jw.org* in August, since several brochures, posted there, had been recognized as extremist, but the decision was reversed by the Tver Regional Court in January 2014.

Until March 2013, the old mechanism of removing materials from the Internet was in operation; it involved a number of possible scenarios: a court decides to ban a site for extremism and then issues a separate judgment for its blocking; a court makes a decision merely to block access to the site for hosting forbidden information; or the prohibited or suspicious information is deleted by the website owner or blocked by the provider upon request from law enforcement agencies.

The first case of blocking websites due to their inclusion on the Registry of Banned Websites for their “extremist” content, in accordance with the law on control over the online information, was reported in the end of March 2013. Thus, a new blocking mechanism has been launched. Based on the court rulings

of 2013, only six pages, appropriately recognized as extremist, were added to the Registry. However, the mechanism as a whole appears problematic, since Roskomnadzor often blocks large websites due to minor content fragments, which are later removed, and the sites are subsequently unblocked.

The aforementioned very first case can serve as an example. On 28 March 2013, the Internet provider Rostelekom blocked access to the social networks *Vkontakte* and *Odnoklassniki* and the video sharing portal *You Tube* in the Orel region and the Ryazan region, as well as to the blog platform *livejournal.com* (the latter was blocked only for Ryazan users). When attempting to access these sites, Rostelekom, customers encountered a message stating that the resource had been blocked due to its ban and inclusion on the Federal List of Extremist Materials or on a Uniform Registry of Banned Websites. Later, it was established that the resources had been entered into the Registry due to presence of specific materials, banned for extremism, and then taken off the Registry on the very same day, but Rostelekom had already implemented the decision. In a short while, Rostelekom customers have regained their access to the resources.

In fact, similar incidents of users temporarily losing access to entire large resources due to a particular controversial page and then having to wait until the authorities sort things out, are taking place regularly. Reasons for imposing access restrictions could vary, since extremist materials represent only one possible kind of “forbidden information.” Obviously, the only viable solution to the problem is blocking separate offending pages, but it is not always technically possible, and, indeed, the convenience of the Internet users is obviously not a top priority of the law enforcement system, which shows no interest in reducing the number of blocking errors. The only way to improve the responsible agencies’ quality of work is to block access to prohibited online materials only after a court decision, in which the courts would be obligated to specify exact addresses of pages that are subject to restrictions.

Numerous cases of inappropriate blocking of websites and sanctions against Internet providers were recorded in 2013. Unfortunately, the law enforcement and the media often do not identify the blocked resources to the public. We noted 83 cases, in which the proper basis for denying access or imposing sanctions was arguably absent. In the course of the year, prosecutors repeatedly demanded that the ISPs block online libraries (due to individual banned items they contained), websites with inappropriately banned Muslim literature, Jehovah’s Witnesses materials or other religious writings, Ingush opposition websites, and non-banned websites of banned organizations. Some restrictions against major Internet resources, implemented due to individual problematic

pages, were evidently temporary; we have no information on the length of time they were in place.

In 2013, prosecutors continued their campaign for content filtering by organizations that provide citizens with the Internet access: educational institutions, libraries, Internet cafes and clubs. Similarly to Internet providers, these organizations are required to block illegal content.

Schools and libraries still face prosecutorial claims more frequently than any other organizations. Their computers have to be equipped with filters that block access to restricted information, including extremist materials. If the system of user protection malfunctions or doesn’t perform as expected (and perfect filters simply don’t exist), the prosecutors issue warnings not to the program developers or distributors, but to the administration of educational institutions; the “responsible parties” subsequently face disciplinary charges.

The number of audits in schools and libraries, and various acts of prosecutorial response based on their results has dropped slightly in 2013, compared to the previous year. According to our very conservative estimates,⁵ the sanctions were imposed in 378 cases in 2012 and in 349 cases in 2012.

Incidental Victims of Inappropriate Anti-Extremism

People and organizations that are clearly not related to any radical activity, but simply happened to attract attention of law enforcement agencies, still become victims of inappropriate enforcement of anti-extremist legislation.

The number of sanctions against public libraries that arise from the contradiction between the law “On Librarianship,” requiring them to provide unfettered reader access to collections, and anti-extremist legislation forbidding mass distribution of prohibited materials, continued to grow in 2013.

Prosecutors charge libraries with a variety of offences from presence of banned materials (usually books) in their collections (despite the fact that libraries have no legal ground for de-accessioning these materials) to the text of libraries’ bylaws that fail to mention the ban on the dissemination of extremist materials.⁶

According to our admittedly incomplete data, in the period from mid-2008 through the end of 2010, at least 170 cases of inappropriate sanctions against

⁵ We, most probably, receive no information regarding most audits. Sometimes we know of a series of inspections, but have no data on the number of warnings or other acts of prosecutorial response. In such cases we count an entire series as one item.

⁶ A detailed list of possible charges can be found in our report. See: A. Verkhovskiy, *Inappropriate Enforcement of Anti-Extremist Legislation in Russia in 2011 // Xenophobia, Freedom of conscience and Anti-extremism in Russia in 2011*. Moscow: SOVA Center, 2012. P. 103-104.

library administrators (including school libraries) were recorded; there were at least 138 such cases in 2011, at least 300 in 2012, and at least 417 in 2013.⁷

As a rule, the penalties are limited to disciplinary actions, however, occasionally, the library personnel also faces administrative sanctions. Three librarians were fined in 2013 under the Administrative Code Article 20.29 for possession of extremist materials with intent of mass distribution. They were, de facto, punished for performing their professional duties.

For example, in late April 2013, a court in Ivanovo sentenced the Director of Central Joint Academic Library to a fine of two thousand rubles under the Administrative Code Article 20.29. The reason for the prosecution was the book *What is Scientology?*, found in the library collection (in our opinion, the book had been banned inappropriately). In addition to the fine, the Leninskii District Prosecutor's Office of Ivanovo issued a motion to eliminate violations of the law, addressed to the Director. Two additional employees faced disciplinary charges. The book was withdrawn from the general library collection, marked with a special label and deposited in a specially designated place.

Some cases, when citizens became a target of specifically anti-extremist law enforcement, can only be explained by desire of some law enforcement officers to improve their report statistics in the area of combating extremism.

We classify into this category the warnings about impermissibility of violating the anti-extremism legislation issued to organizers of various mass events and public gathering, regardless of their relation to extremism or lack thereof.

In 2013, we recorded eight cases of sanctions for displaying of Nazi symbols, in which the purpose of promoting Nazism was clearly absent. In the past year, media outlets, antique dealers, and activists, who used Nazi symbols in the images denouncing their opponents, were all fined under the Administrative Code Article 20.3 ("propaganda and the public display of Nazi paraphernalia or symbols"). For example, the editor-in-chief of a newspaper in the Smolensk region was fined for using a swastika to illustrate material on countering extremism. The editorial board of *Bereznikovskiy Rabochiy* newspaper in the Perm region was penalized for the mistake of their technical staff, who illustrated an article with a 1930s photograph of girls wearing the Hitler Youth uniform.

⁷ We used the same conservative counting method as was described above with respect to the Internet filtering inspections.

Principal Targets of Persecution

Religious Groups

In 2013, the extent of inappropriate prosecution of members of various religious and religio-political groups exceeded that of political and civic activists

As in the previous years, anti-extremist legislation was used, first and foremost, against Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami party, which had been banned as terrorist in 2003. We view this ban as inappropriate, since Hizb ut-Tahrir does not practice violence and does not view it as a method in its struggle for building the global Caliphate. In any case, the court decision cited no instances of illegal activity by the party members. In connection with the above mentioned law introducing a complex of new anti-terrorism measures, adopted in October 2013, the position of Russian Hizb ut-Tahrir followers has worsened considerably. While they were previously persecuted for organizing or participating in the organization, banned as extremist, under the Criminal Code Article 282², now their activities fall under the new Criminal Code Article 205⁵, which stipulates the punishment for organizing the activities of a terrorist organization and participation in it, and provides much lengthier prison sentences. Article 205⁵ was not utilized against Hizb ut-Tahrir followers in 2013;⁸ prosecutors operated mostly under an old scheme, involving Article 282², but in November 2013 five people in Chelyabinsk were convicted of involvement in the Hizb ut-Tahrir not only under Part 2 of Article 282², but also under part 1 of Article 205¹ ("involvement in the commission of terrorist offenses or other assistance in committing them") as well as under Part 1 of Article 30 and Article 278 ("actions aimed at the forcible seizure of power.") Four Hizb ut-Tahrir supporters were each sentenced to six years' imprisonment in the maximum security penal colony and to a fine of 150 thousand rubles; the fifth one was sentenced to 6.5 years in the maximum security penal colony; all of them also received an additional penalty of one year of restrictions on freedom following their release. Meanwhile, the charges of incitement to terrorism and preparations to seize power were based only on the fact of the defendants' party-related activities (meetings, distribution of literature, etc.); no other evidence of the allegations was submitted. The Memorial Human Rights Center recognized all defendants, convicted in the case, as political prisoners.

In early April 2013 in Moscow, four Hizb ut-Tahrir followers, previously detained in the course of the criminal investigation under part 1 of the Criminal

⁸ The first such case under Parts 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code Article 2055 was filed against five Hizb ut-Tahrir followers in the town of Dyurtyuli in the Republic of Bashkortostan in February 2014.

Code Article 282² were indicted under the same Articles 30 and 278. Similar charges were brought in Ufa in August against four local residents, who had been previously accused under Part 1 of Article 282²; they were arrested. Finally, on suspicion of crimes, which fell under the three above-listed Criminal Code articles, three Hizb ut-Tahrir followers were arrested in Dagestan in December.

As for the charges against Hizb ut-Tahrir followers under Article 282², we no longer include such cases in our statistics. As we noted earlier, the ideology of the party shows signs of extremism in the context of Russian legislation, but the Russian authorities have never considered this issue on the merits. In March 2013, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), when ruling on the complaint, submitted by Yusup Kasymakhunov and Marat Saybatalov, issued a special decree on the Hizb ut-Tahrir activities. The complaint by Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov stated that the decision on their conviction as members of Hizb ut-Tahrir had been made prior to the publication of a closed-court decision by the Supreme Court to ban the organization as a terrorist. The ECHR agreed with these arguments and condemned the violation by Russian courts of Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which states that “*no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense, which did not constitute a criminal offense under national or international law at the time it was committed.*”

However, regarding Hizb ut-Tahrir in general, the ECHR stated that, although neither the doctrine nor the practice of the party was sufficient to consider it a terrorist organization, it had many features that could provide a reason for a state to ban the organization. These features include the calls to overthrow the existing political systems and establish a Sharia-based dictatorship, anti-Semitism and radical anti-Israeli propaganda (for that, in particular, Hizb ut-Tahrir was banned in Germany in 2003), categorical rejection of democracy and political freedoms, and justification of the use of force against the countries, which the party considers to be the aggressors against the “lands of Islam.” Despite the facts that Hizb ut-Tahrir ideology contains no direct incitement to violence and justifications of violence against democracy as such are “suspended” until the start of the jihad led by the somehow restored Caliphate, the Hizb ut-Tahrir goals run manifestly contrary to the values of European Convention on Human Rights, in particular its commitment to the peaceful settlement of international conflicts, sanctity of human life, recognition of civil and political rights and democracy. All of the above makes it impossible to raise the question of whether Hizb ut-Tahrir followers are covered by Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights that protect freedom of conscience, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.

Recognizing the validity of the ECHR decision, we believe that the Russian authorities should reconsider the Hizb ut-Tahrir ban, focusing not on the

imaginary terrorist activities of party members or their non-existent preparations to seize power, but on potentially dangerous elements of the party propaganda. We continue to monitor the inappropriate legal cases, in which adherents of Hizb ut-Tahrir face unfounded accusations of violent acts or preparations to commit them, as well as the cases of inappropriate prohibition of the party materials that, in our opinion, contain no dangerous propaganda. Unfortunately, the content of the Hizb ut-Tahrir materials is usually not considered in courts, and they are essentially prohibited simply by association with a banned organization.

For example, one of the defendants in the Chelyabinsk case was also found guilty under Part 1 of the Criminal Code Article 280 (public incitement to extremist activity) solely on the basis of sharing a video that called for boycott of the elections.

In August 2013, it was reported that Roskomnadzor had issued a warning to the editorial board and the founder of the Khanty-Mansiysk information agency *muksun.fm* for online publication of the material “They do not appear in mosques,” which merely cited the banned book *The Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir*, written by the party’s founder Taquiuddin al-Nabhani.

The author of the material criticized the Hizb ut-Tahrir precepts and quoted from al-Nabhani’s book in support of his criticism, so the sanctions against the publisher in this case were completely unfounded.

Three verdicts under the Criminal Code Article 282² were issued in 2013 against the members of inappropriately banned Tablighi Jamaat religious movement. This movement was banned as extremist despite the fact that it deals exclusively with promoting Islamic religious practices and was never implicated in inciting violence.

One person in Orenburg was sentenced to a fine of 200 thousand rubles under Part 1 of Article 282² for creating a “Tablighi Jamaat cell” in Sol-Iletsk; one of his followers in the Sol-Iletsk was fined 250 thousand rubles under the same Part 1 of Article 282², and three others were found guilty of participation in the cell under Part 2 of Article 282² and fined 150, 100 and 50 thousand rubles respectively. A resident of Kansk (the Krasnoyarsk region) was fined 100 thousand rubles under Part 1 of Article 282² for conducting religious meetings aimed at disseminating the ideas of the movement.

Another case, initiated a year earlier under part 1 of Article 282² against the adherents of Tablighi Jamaat imams Serzhan Svatov and Haidar-Ali Bugusynov from the village of Kosh-Agach in the Altai region, was in progress in 2013; the decision was issued in the spring of 2014.⁹

⁹ Serzhan Svatov was found guilty and sentenced to a fine of 100 thousand rubles and a two-year ban on religious activity. The case against Haidar-Ali Bugusynov was closed due to the statute of limitations.

In addition, at least two new criminal cases were initiated against the followers of Tablighi Jamaat under part 2 of Article 282²: one against a resident of Sayanogorsk (Khakassia) and the other one, under Parts 1 and 2 of Article 282²: against five residents of the Novosibirsk region.

Persecution of Muslims, who studied the inappropriately banned works of Turkish theologian Said Nursi, intensified in 2013 compared with the previous year. Two guilty verdicts were issued for organizing the activity of non-existent, but, nevertheless, banned Nurcular organization¹⁰ under Part 1 of Article 282²— in a high-profile case of Novosibirsk imams Ilkhom Merazhov and Camil Odilov and in the case of a St. Petersburg resident Shirazi Bekirov. Despite the publicity around the former case and the attempts of the Muslim community to intercede, Merazhov and Odilov were each sentenced to a year in prison for an attempt to organize a Nurcular cell. The imams filed a complaint with the ECHR against the verdict. We would like to remind that the only reason for their persecution was the fact that they studied Nursi's books with other Muslims. Bekirov, accused of organizing meetings where people studied the works of Nursi, was arrested and spent six pre-trial months in prison. The court sentenced Bekirov to six months in a penal colony; his pre-trial detention was credited against his prison term, and he was released several days after the verdict.

Another case under part 1 of Article 282², initiated in 2012 against a Kaliningrad resident on charges of “creating a Nurcular cell”, continued in 2013 and was closed in early 2014 due to the statute of limitations.

Five new criminal cases under parts 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code Article 282² for “creating Nurcular cells” were initiated in 2013 against the following people: a resident of the Rostov region, seven residents of the Perm region, a resident of Krasnoyarsk, and two criminal cases against two males and one female from Naberezhnye Chelny.

In February, the Central District Court of Kaliningrad recognized as extremist 14 books and 2 brochures by Nursi; it was the second ban for four of them it. The Court agreed with the results of the expert examination, according to which “*books and pamphlets of this author constitute a single set of tools for psychological impact on consciousness, will and human behavior, contain elements of incitement to religious hatred, create hostility to other religions and distort information about them, encroach on the rights and freedoms of citizens, who do not follow Islam.*” Obviously, relying on the phrase “a single set” invented in mid-2000s by experts from the Tatarstan Republican Prosecutor's Office to characterize works of Nursi, the Kaliningrad

¹⁰ See: The Supreme Court of the RF banned Nurcular as extremist // SOVA Center 2008. 10 April (<http://www.sova-center.ru/misuse/news/persecution/2008/04/d13081/>).

police never bothered not only to examine the contents of the books, but even to compare their list with the Federal List of Extremist Materials, banning them en masse on the basis of their association with Nurcular.

Note that the similar, but much more massive ban on Islamic literature associated with Nurcular — the ban on 68 Muslim religious materials issued by the Leninskii District Court of Orenburg in March 2012 — was not revised in 2013. The regional court began consideration of 14 complaints against this decision in September 2012, but still has not completed the process.

Meanwhile, administrative prosecutions continue for distribution of materials from the “Orenburg List”, which includes many works of high authority for the Muslims. We know of at least 12 related prosecutions under the Administrative Code Article 20.29 in 2013. An Islamic Cultural Center in St. Petersburg was nearly shut down under pressure from the prosecutor's office, due to two copies of a book from the “Orenburg List” found in the prayer room.

In addition, one person in Usolye-Sibirskoye was charged under the Administrative Code Article 20.29 for the distribution of *The Fundamentals of Sincerity* by Nursi, banned by the Koptevsky District Court of Moscow in 2007.

Employees of the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) faced disciplinary charges for banned books by Nursi, found in the libraries of a prison in Ulyanovsk and penal colonies in Novosibirsk and Ulyanovsk.

In 2013, two websites were deemed extremist in Volgograd for publishing Nursi's books from the *Risale-i Nur* collection, including the prohibited ones.

In 2013, there were 20 cases of Muslims being prosecuted under the Administrative Code Article 20.29 for the distribution of inappropriately banned Islamic literature.

Five websites were recognized as extremist by the Pyatigorsk City Court in 2013, all of them due to the same banned Islamic video of Khalid Yasin's lecture “Aliens”: the Muslim sites devoted to religious matters *al-hakk.com* and *firdauz.ucoz.net*, major Kazakh entertainment portal *www.kiwi.kz*, Korean-language real estate website *www.mlook.com*, and the media search engine *www.wikibit.net*. The banned sites, in general, had nothing to do with extremist propaganda and contained a lot of different materials. The law enforcement agencies could have requested that the website administrators remove prohibited material, and, in case of no response, they could have blocked access to it, rather than ban the entire websites. In addition, the ban, imposed on the video by the Leninskii District Court of Krasnodar in summer 2012, was in itself inappropriate. In his lecture Khalid Yasin contrasts the Islamic religiosity with temptations of the modern world and the Western civilization, but does not promote violence as a way to resolve the conflict.

The most notorious and scandalous ban of in 2013 pertaining to Islamic spiritual writings was the decision of the Oktyabrsky District Court in Novorossiysk recognizing *Translation of the meaning of the holy Koran into Russian* by the Azerbaijani religious philosopher Elmir Kuliyeu as extremist. This translation contains no fundamental differences from other translations of the Koran. Perhaps, the law enforcement officers decided on the ban based on their previous – and inappropriate – ban, imposed on another Kuliyeu’s book related to Koran. In any case, the claims, presented by the experts against Kuliyeu’s translation could have been brought against any ancient religious text – the book contains “*statements, which negatively evaluate person or group of persons on the grounds of relationship to a particular religion (specifically, non-Muslims); contains statements which assert the superiority of one person or group of persons over other people on the grounds of their religion, specifically the Muslims over non-Muslims; statements containing the positive assessment of hostile actions of one group of people against another group of people united on the basis of religion, in particular Muslims towards non-Muslims; as well as statements of the inciting character that call for hostile and violent acts of one group of people against another group of people united on the basis of religion, specifically Muslims against non-Muslims.*” The court found these claims to be sufficient for prohibiting Kuliyeu’s Koran translation.

This ban caused unprecedented outrage among the Russian Muslims. Almost, if not completely, unanimous and loud reaction of believers led to an opportunity to appeal the ban; in December, the Krasnodar Regional Court repealed the decision to recognize the book as extremist.

The protest against the ban on the Koran translation served as a pretext for opening a criminal case against the believers in Chelyabinsk. In September, the banners with quotations from the Koran and posters “Islam is forbidden in Russia,” “Muslims! There are 20 million of us in Russia, and our Koran was banned!” attracted the attention of law enforcement agencies in the city. The banners and the posters contained no signs of extremism, but their display constituted part of the charges under the Criminal Code Articles 282 and 282², brought against four residents of Chelyabinsk, also accused of distributing Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets on the day of protest against the Koran ban and of organizing a rally with the Hizb ut-Tahrir flags in the winter of 2012.

In our opinion, Russian courts inappropriately banned three religious organizations in February 2013.

The Sovetskii District Court of Kazan recognized as extremist and banned the activity of the Fayzrahman Sattarov community (usually called the community of fayzrahmanists) that existed on the Kazan territory since the 1990s. Its leader, former Deputy Mufti of Tatarstan, considers himself a messenger (not the prophet) of Allah and considers his followers to be the only true Muslims. The community

was leading insular but not aggressive lifestyle. The prosecutorial claims were based on the fact that the head of the religious group demanded that the group members “*lead isolated life, forbade them to visit health institutions or send their children to school.*” These claims, while legitimate, gave no reason to ban the community as extremist. Recognizing a handwritten collection of fayzrahmanist prayers as extremist was also inappropriate, in our opinion. In the spring of 2014, the community was evicted from its plot on one of the Kazan streets, which it occupied illegally, according to law enforcement officials.

The Kizilskii District Court of Chelyabinsk banned as extremist the religious organization Horde (*Orda*), which operated in the village of Izmailovskiy. From our standpoint, the ban should have been substantiated differently. In the course of their audit of Horde’s activity, the prosecutors discovered incidents of non-traditional medical treatments, incidents of medical diagnoses issued by people with no medical training, rejections of traditional treatment, and, in addition, concluded that “*under the impact of special methods of psychological influence the mental health of citizens suffers harm in a form of increased suggestibility, formation of dependency and affective involvement in a pseudo-religious doctrine.*” All of this bears no relation to the anti-extremist legislation.

The Novosibirsk Regional Court recognized religious organization Elle Ayat as extremist and banned its activities. Followers of the Elle Ayat offered a cure for all diseases with the help of certain texts and by applying the *Zvezda Selennoi* (sic) magazine to an injured spot. According to experts, “*adherents of the religious group applied to citizens the methods of psychological influence that harm one’s physical and mental health.*” Analyzing the texts and video, the experts “*identified psychological factors inciting hatred and enmity between people on the basis of religion, promoting the absolute superiority of adherents of a religious group in comparison with other people.*” They also pointed out that “*the authors of the texts used special language tools for intentionally conveying negative attitudes toward the world religions.*” Propaganda of the superiority of one’s own faith and negative attitudes toward other faiths are natural for believers; in the absence of aggressive manifestations neither one should be considered a sign of extremism. In this case, the prosecutor’s office had to find another reason in order to dissolve the organization, whose leader was under criminal investigation for fraud.

No criminal convictions under anti-extremist articles were issued against Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2013; one case, initiated in 2011, which involved charges of inciting religious hatred (Part 1 of Article 282) against the woman follower of Jehovah’s Witnesses from Akhtubinsk, was closed with recognition of the right to rehabilitation.

Unfortunately, a number of new criminal cases were initiated as well. Preaching “the doctrine of Jehovah’s Witnesses superiority” over other religions and dissemination of Jehovah’s Witnesses materials were cited as the reasons for prosecution of community leader Ilnur Ashirmametov in Tobolsk under Part 1 of Article 282 (the case was closed in January 2014). Charges under Part 2 paragraph “b” of Article 282 (“inciting hatred or hostility, and humiliation of human dignity committed by an organized group”) were filed in connection with the activities of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community of the Sergiev Posad District in the Moscow region; the liturgical building and the apartment of the community leader were searched.

In 2013, the trial began in the case of 16 Jehovah’s Witnesses in Taganrog. Recall that the local community has been banned as extremist in 2009; in 2011 the charges were filed under Part 1 and Part 2 of the Criminal Code Article 282², based on the fact of continuation of the group’s activities, as well as under Part 4 of Article 150 (“involving minors in committing a crime”), based on the fact of participation of children in the prayer meetings. The court found the indictment in this case to be illegal in 2012, but it was immediately issued again. The court hearings continued throughout 2013, but the sentence was never imposed. In addition, the same investigator brought similar charges against five Jehovah’s Witnesses in Rostov-on-Don.

Five Jehovah’s Witnesses were sentenced in 2013 to a fine under the Administrative Code Article 20.29 for distributing illegal religious pamphlets; one of them was later acquitted.

In August 2013, the Central District Court of Tver recognized as extremist the official Jehovah’s Witnesses website *jw.org*, but the Tver Regional Court overturned this decision in January 2014.

Russian courts have continued to prohibit the Jehovah’s Witnesses texts. Thus, one brochure was banned in Birobidzhan, another one in the Krasnodar region, three in Krasnoyarsk, and the Traktorozavodskii District Court of Chelyabinsk started considerations on the case that calls for banning 95 Jehovah’s Witnesses publications at once.

We regard the persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses as religious discrimination.

A resident of the Rostov region was fined under the Administrative Code Article 20.29 for possession of 10 publications on Chinese spiritual practice Falun Dafa. Notably, several Falun Dafa materials were banned without any reasonable basis in 2011, and the ECHR is considering the complaint regarding this case. However, they are not currently included on the Federal List of Extremist Materials, so the Rostov resident may not have known that he was breaking the law.

In 2013, the Yegoryevsk Town Court recognized as extremist the literature of the White Brotherhood religious organization. The Court upheld the opinion of experts that these texts “*contain statements calling for propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person on the basis of religion, violation of human rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens, depending on his or her religion, and incitement to religious hatred.*” The peaceful nature of the White Brotherhood’s religious doctrine suggests that these materials were banned inappropriately.

In 2013, the authorities continued to prosecute public critics of the Russian Orthodox Church and outspoken atheists for incitement of hatred.

In the summer, it became known that the Investigative Committee of the Sverdlovsk Region opened a criminal case under Article 282 against Pentecostal Peter Tkalic from Asbest based on his blog posts. The criminal case involved two texts published by Tkalic in 2006, “Boiling pot” and “Boiling pot-2.” Both texts were critical of the Patriarch Cyril and the ways of the modern-day Orthodox believers, but contained no calls for illegal actions. We would like to remind that, according to the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation “Concerning Judicial Practice in Criminal Cases Regarding Crimes of Extremism,” adopted in June 2011, “*criticism of political organizations, ideological and religious associations, political, ideological or religious beliefs, national or religious identity per se not should be regarded as an act aimed at inciting hatred or enmity.*” In 2013, Tkalic and his family members had the status of witnesses; the expert examination was scheduled in the case.

In May, the Domodedovo Investigations Division of the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of Russian Federation for the Moscow region initiated criminal proceedings under Part 1 of Article 282 against Domodedovo resident Roman Matveev on charges of publishing seven religion-themed demotivational posters on the Domodedovo online town forum in the threads for “Orthodoxy,” “the ROC (in comics),” and “Atheism.” According to the investigators, “*the images and statements*” had a purpose of “*inciting hatred and enmity, as well as humiliating a group of persons on the basis of religion; giving and showing negative evaluations, attitudes, and expressions offensive to the religious groups of Christians and Muslims; comparing them to the Nazis, expressing hatred, hostility, cynicism, and thus provoking incitement of a violent reaction from religious groups.*” According to Matveev, one of the posters contained a photo of Patriarch Kirill with a quote from his speech; another one depicted a man with a bandage on his head and the Koran in his hand and the text “Don’t you believe that Islam is the religion of peace and love? Then we are coming to you.” Matveev was added to the so-called Rosfinmonitoring list, so his financial transactions were blocked; he also had problems at his place of employment. We believe that the

case against Matveev was inappropriate. Publication of satirical images with no inflammatory appeals in the forum segment, specifically dedicated to atheism does not fall under Article 282.

The court proceedings to ban four items on a popular local website *orlec.ru* began in Orel in summer. *Orlec.ru*, which positions itself as a free online encyclopedia, provides an opportunity for everyone to speak anonymously and ironically about city life, including the city politics. A year earlier, the court banned three xenophobic entries, posted on the site through anonymous proxy servers and promptly deleted by the administrators. This time, however, the case was initiated by the collective appeal from “the Orthodox community” to the Orel FSB Department demanding that some materials on the site be “checked for the offense under the Criminal Code Article 282.” The experts concluded that “the submissions contain hostile and/or derogatory statements directed against individuals that belong to a particular religious group, namely those of the Orthodox faith.” We do not agree with the results of the expert examination, since the experts interpreted the authors’ ironic and critical remarks against the clergy, which had nothing to do with extremism, (including unrecognized quotes from the *Tale of Bygone Years (Povest Vremennykh Let)* as signs of hostility against the Orthodox believers. The Court sent the materials for a new linguistic expertise. Meanwhile, a criminal case under Article 282 was initiated based on the fact of the publication, and searches were carried out in the homes of Editor-in-Chief of TsentRus online news agency Dmitry Krayukhin and one of the website authors Nikita Shchetinin, at the official residence address of another *orlec.ru* author Victor Zyryanov, and at the editorial offices of the website. The computers and a large number of media were seized by the investigation.

Developments in the case of artists from the punk collective Pussy Riot are covered below in the section on the persecution of political and civil society activists.

Political and Civic Activists

We continue to monitor the persecution of political activists conducted using the anti-extremist legislation.

In 2013, the number of prosecutions against members of the Other Russia (*Drugaya Rossiya*) party, charged with continuation of Eduard Limonov’s banned National Bolshevik Party, has decreased slightly, but they still remained a major law enforcement focus. We believe that the NBP was inappropriately banned in 2007; moreover, the Russian law does not specify what actions should be considered a continuation of the activity of a banned organization, and it is far from certain that the activities of the Other Russia, which changed its course

more than once, after all these years still remains a continuation of the NBP activities.

In June 2013, the Military Court of the North Sea Garrison found officer of the Northern Fleet Denis Bespalov guilty under part 2 of Article 282² and sentenced him to a fine of 75 thousand rubles. Bespalov was accused of having attended the meetings of the Other Russia Murmansk Branch since 2011. It was reported that propaganda materials with NBP insignia were seized from him; several electronic issues of the banned *Limonka* newspaper (some of the issues and the entire pre-2005 online *Limonka* archive were banned) as well as articles, written by Bespalov and published in *Limonka* and another banned publication *The Duel*, were found on his computer

The trial of Anton Lukin and Svetlana Kuznetsova ended in Komsomolsk-on-Amur in May; the case had been initiated under Part 2 Paragraph “a” of Article 282 (“actions aimed at inciting hatred and enmity, committed using violence or the threat of force”), Part 1 of Article 280 (“public calls to extremist activity”), and Part 3 of Article 212 (“calls to mass riots”). Lukin and Kuznetsova were found guilty on all three counts and received suspended sentences of three and one and a half years respectively. Lukin and Kuznetsova were charged with distribution of *Victory will be ours!* and *Gagarin. Results. 50 Years* leaflets and the *Vysshaya Mera* newspaper during the Komsomolsk-on-Amur rally on June 18, 2011. We don’t have complete information on the case, so we cannot definitely judge the verdict as inappropriate. Nevertheless, we would like to note that, in our opinion, the fragments of the materials distributed by Lukin and Kuznetsova that are cited in the expert opinion, which formed the basis for the charge and the verdict, can be interpreted neither as calls to extremist activity nor as hate speech.

In June, the St. Petersburg City Court upheld the verdict, imposed at the end of 2012 by the Vyborg District Court of St. Petersburg in the case of the Other Russia activists. Seven activists were convicted under Parts 1 and 2 of Article 282² for organizing activities of the banned National Bolshevik Party and participation in the party; they were sentenced to a fine but exempt from liability due to the statute of limitations. Their attorneys announced their intention to appeal to the ECHR.

In 2013, the proceedings continued in the case of Igor Popov, the Other Russia activist from Vladivostok; it travelled along the similar trajectory as in 2012.¹¹ In October, the Leninskii District Court of Vladivostok once again found

¹¹ M. Kravchenko, Inappropriate enforcement of anti-extremist legislation in Russia in 2012 // Xenophobia, Freedom of conscience and Anti-extremism in Russia in 2012. Moscow: SOVA Center, 2013. P. 90-129.

Popov guilty under Part 1 of Article 282 for inciting hatred to the authorities and the law enforcement agencies and under Part 2 of Article 282² for participating in an illegal organization. This time, charges of inciting extremist activity have not been presented. Popov was sentenced to a fine of 50,000 rubles (as opposed to 150 thousand rubles in 2012) and, once again, released from liability. However, in February 2014, the regional court once again remanded the case to the Leninskii District Court of Vladivostok on formal grounds. At the same time, civil proceedings were taking place in the case of Popov's dismissal from his post as sound engineer in a puppet theater, as a citizen, who was being prosecuted for crimes against the constitutional order and therefore was not entitled to work with minors. In the spring, the same District Court made the decision that the activist should be fired; in summer this decision was reversed by the regional court.

Proceedings in two criminal cases against the anti-fascist activists ended in 2013. The defendants in both cases had been previously cleared of extremist community-related charges.

In August, the Zamoskvoretskii District Court in Moscow found antifascist Igor Kharchenko guilty under part 2 of the Criminal Code Article 213 ("hooliganism committed with the use of objects as weapons by organized group, motivated by social hatred") and Article 111 ("intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm") and sentenced him to 3 years and 6 months in a maximum security colony. His pre-trial detention was credited against his prison term. In addition, a civil lawsuit court ordered Kharchenko to pay his victim a compensation of 300 thousand rubles. Kharchenko was accused of attacking far right activists Vladimir Sumin and Vladlen Zhidousov in July 2010. The defense arguments about Kharchenko's alibi, which we found compelling, were not taken into account by the court. In addition, we oppose the idea of including nationalists among the social groups protected under anti-extremist legislation, since they are not a vulnerable group in need of special protection.

The Antifa—RASH case of anti-fascists Pavel Krivososov, Oleg Gembaruk and Dmitry Kolesov from Nizhny Novgorod, also previously accused of fights with nationalists, ended with only one charge remaining from the initial set of charges against them – Part 2 of Article 213 ("hooliganism committed by an organized group or associated with resistance to authority"). In December, all three defendants, as charged with hooliganism, were granted amnesty in honor of the 20th anniversary of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

In January, the Zamoskvoretskii District Court in Moscow sentenced Konstantin Krylov, a leader of the National Democratic Party, to 120 hours of mandatory work under Part 1 of Article 282. The criminal proceedings against

Krylov were initiated as a result of his speech at the "Stop feeding the Caucasus" rally on October 22, 2011. At that time, Krylov made some extremely offensive statements about the "Caucasians," but refrained from direct incitement. In our opinion, this incident didn't form a sufficient basis for criminal prosecution. Formally, Krylov's actions qualify under Article 282 ("the abasement of the dignity of people based on their national affiliation"), but we are convinced that this part of the article should be decriminalized and moved to the Administrative Code or the Civil Code.

The case against artists from Pussy Riot punk collective Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Maria Alyokhina and Yekaterina Samutsevich for their performance in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was reviewed in the Moscow City Court twice in 2013, and both times the Moscow City Court entirely confirmed the verdict issued to the activists by Khamovnicheskii District Court. We believe that the criminal prosecution of the Pussy Riot members and their conviction for hooliganism under Part 2 of Article 213 were inappropriate. We are convinced that the defendants' actions did not contain the motive of religious hatred and hatred for Orthodox Christians, and the court failed to present evidence of this motive. Furthermore, we do not agree with the qualification of this action as hooliganism in criminal rather than administrative sense – the act they committed presented little public hazard; it strongly violated the rules of conduct appropriate to believers inside the church, but not the social order in general. The Supreme Court upheld the verdict to Samutsevich in October.

The ECHR communicated the complaint of Alyokhina, Tolokonnikova, and Samutsevich in early December, presenting Russia with a series of inquiries, concerning their trial and the conditions the artists had to endure when under arrest. In addition, the Court inquired whether the criminal prosecution and verdict for the action in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior on February 21, 2012, as well as recognition of the video as extremist, violates the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In just a few weeks Alyokhina and Tolokonnikova were released under amnesty as offenders convicted under Article 213. At the same time, the Supreme Court returned the case of Alyokhina and Tolokonnikova (later, Samutsevich as well) to the Moscow City Court. The Supreme Court drew attention to the fact that, when imposing a sentence, the court did not specify the factual circumstances of the case, but merely pointed out the presence of the religious hate and enmity motive in the defendants' actions, and provided no evidence that the defendants were motivated by hatred to any social group. Besides, the following mitigating factors were not taken into account: the defendants had

minor children; it was their first offense; the age of the defendants, the opinion of the victims, who did not insist on a strict punishment, and Tolokonnikova's and Alyokhina's family situation, as well as non-violent nature of their acts.¹²

Oppositional politician Alexei Navalny and his supporters became the subject of growing interest of the government and law enforcement agencies.

In the summer of 2013, the Kirovskii District Court of Novosibirsk banned the video "Let's Remind Crooks and Thieves about Their 2002 Manifesto" (*Napomnim zhulikam i voram ikh manifest-2002*) posted in Alexei Navalny's blog and on YouTube in October 2011. The video was published on the eve of the State Duma elections of 2011. It merely listed a number of unfulfilled campaign promises of the United Russia party, taken from its 2002 party manifesto, and urged the viewer to vote for any party except the United Russia. This material contained no signs of extremism.

In the fall, the Novoaltaisk city court fined Barnaul opposition activist Andrei Teslenko a thousand rubles under the Administrative Code Article 20.29 for posting this video on his *Vkontakte* social network page.

Law enforcement agencies in different regions of Russia confiscated the runs of printed materials from Navalny's supporters, citing the need to test them for extremism or simply declaring them "forbidden" without any proof. Thus, the runs of *For Navalny* newspaper (tens of thousands of copies) were seized from activists in Krasnodar and in the town of Krasnogorsk in the Moscow region. Confiscation of a large quantity of materials (including 90,000 leaflets) in the headquarters of Navalny's supporters in the Kirov region following an anonymous report was not only recognized as legitimate, but also brought awards to the employees of the Regional Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Note that the government used these methods in 2013 not only against Navalny supporters. The police seized three hundred leaflets with the party program from the activists of the local branch of Mikhail Prokhorov's Civic Platform (*Grazhdanskaya platforma*) party during a picket in Yaroslavl; the runs of communist publications were confiscated in the Novosibirsk and Irkutsk regions.

We view the law enforcement practice of removing the entire runs or large quantities of printed materials in order to test it "for extremism" as inappropriate, since several copies are generally sufficient for the test.

¹² In April 2014, the Presidium of the Moscow City Court partially granted the appeal in the Pussy Riot case and excluded the hate motive against a social group of Orthodox believers from the verdict. However, the participants of the action in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior were found guilty of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred conducted by a group of persons in prior agreement. Their prison term was shortened by one month.

Media Topics

In 2013, Roskomnadzor issued 21 "anti-extremist" warnings to editorial boards of various publications. We believe that 16 of them lacked proper justification. According to established practice, two warnings received in the course of one year can serve as a basis for closing down the resource.

Eight warnings were issued for the publication of inappropriately banned Pussy Riot video, based on their performance in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. The warnings were issued to the websites of newspapers *Argumenty i Fakty* and *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, web portals *polit.ru*, *Piter.TV*, and *KM.ru*, to the *Neva24* website, and to the news agencies Novyi Region and *regiony.ru*. Five additional warnings for photos of the t-shirts with a Pussy Riot image stylized to look like an icon (by artist Artem Loskutov) were received by *grani.ru*, *polit.ru*, *obeschaniya.ru* and web portal *sibkray.ru*; *grani.ru* received the warning twice, for publishing the image on two separate occasions. The attempts by *grani.ru* and *obeschaniya.ru* to challenge the warnings in court were unsuccessful.

Khanty-Mansiysk news agency *muksun.fm* received a warning for publishing on the Internet the material "They do not appear in mosques," which merely cited the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir book. Moreover, the author of the material criticized the precepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir and quoted from the book in support of his argument.

The warning was also issued to Sampo TV in Petrozavodsk for distributing the information about the introduction of national currency in the Republic of Karelia via a news program, interpreted as a threat to integrity of the Russian Federation. The news program contained a humorous sketch involving activists of the Free Karelia (*Svobodnaya Karelia*) movement, who printed Karelian "runes" for tourists and for limited use during art events. Issuing of this "money" was timed to the anniversary of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of Karelia, published by the parliament of the Republic on August 9, 1990. On that date, the Parliament announced its intention to build a law-based, democratic, sovereign state within the USSR and the RSFSR. Free Karelia movement is not separatist, but regionalist in its nature, i.e. it stands for "civilian self-government and the cultural identity of the region" and was not involved in illegal activities. Roskomnadzor's concerns regarding the possible threat to Russia's integrity were completely unreasonable in this case.

Kanal-TV channel in Chelyabinsk received a warning "for using the mass media to carry out extremist activities by disseminating an insert inside its "Telefakt" news release of 31 July 2013." On that day, the channel's news program was interrupted for a few minutes with a video clips from the 2010 documentary *Russia: Putin's Era* and from the story by Georgian Russian-language channel

PIK about Putin's 2012 return to presidency. The video listed events and developments in Russia under Putin that usually serve as the basis for anti-Putin criticism in the opposition circles. The material contained no legally-recognized signs of extremism.

In 2013, the Central District Court of Komsomolsk-on-Amur recognized as extremist issues no. 8, 24, 25 and 27 of the *Vysshaya Mera* newspaper for 2009-2011. The prosecutorial opinion, based on the psycho-linguistic expertise, contends that the newspaper texts contain “calls for extremist activities, including calls for changing the constitutional order.” These are the issues of the newspaper that served as pretext for prosecution against the Other Russia activists Anton Lukin and Svetlana Kuznetsova (see above) under Articles 280 and 282, so we see this ban as questionable.

The decision of the Central District Court of Omsk to ban issue No. 2 of the 2011 *Radikalnaya Politika* [The Radical Politics] newspaper was overturned in 2013. In addition to inflammatory articles by the editor Boris Stomakhin (sentenced under Part 1 of Article 280 and Part 1 of Article 205² in April 2014 for calls to extremist activity and justification of terrorism), this newspaper issue featured the texts of various authors, which showed no signs of extremism, such as an article by Vladislav Inozemtsev reprinted from the *Ogonyok* magazine, the Democratic Union (*Demokraticeskii Soiuz*) party flyer from August 19, 1991, “Contract vs. norm” essay by Omsk public activist Victor Korb, “On difficulties of human trafficking” article by Polish journalist Andrzej Pochobut, “There will be no political colonies. There will be death camps” by the editor of the *Free Speech* newspaper Paul Lyuzakov, etc. The court decision, which recognized this issue of the newspaper as extremist, was overturned, and the ban was lifted for a significant portion of the materials in September; the corresponding item has been removed from the Federal List of Extremist Materials.

The Morgaushskii District Court of the Republic of Chuvashia found journalist Ille Ivanov guilty under Part 1 of Article 282 over the publication of the article “Show Me Your Tongue, and I Tell You Who You Are” published on May 4, 2011 in the *Vziatka* newspaper, and sentenced him to a 300 hours of mandatory labor. However, Ivanov was released from punishment due to the statute of limitations. You may remember that the article “Show me your tongue, and I tell you who you are” was banned, and Ille Ivanov faced the charges for its publication despite the repeated statements by Eduard Mochalov, the editor-in-chief of *Vziatka*, that Mochalov himself was the author of the article. The article, written from the Chuvash nationalist perspective and telling the story of the persecution against the Chuvash language, condemned the imperial policy

of the Russians, who oppressed the Chuvash population. The text contained uncivil statements regarding the Russians, but presented no reason for the ban and prosecution. Ille Ivanov has filed an appeal against his conviction.

The editorial board of *Bereznikovskii Rabochii* newspaper in the Perm region was inappropriately fined under the Administrative Code Article 20.3 for the display of Nazi symbols without propaganda purposes, due to an error by the technical staff, who used the 1930s photograph of girls wearing the Hitler Youth uniform to illustrate an article.

A Bit of Statistics

According to our data, 32 verdicts to 59 people were delivered for violent hate-motivated crimes in 2013; 131 verdicts against 133 people were issued for real hate propaganda (as usual, in some cases we don't have enough information to evaluate the appropriateness of the verdict, and in a number of cases we can conclude that the statements in question were xenophobic, but the extent of their public danger was clearly insignificant), and eight sentences against 11 people for ideologically-motivated vandalism.¹³ The number of people, whose verdicts were definitely inappropriate, is much smaller.¹⁴

In 2013, six people received six verdicts under the Criminal Code Article 282 that we consider at least partially inappropriate, compared to seven verdicts against 16 people in 2012. Mostly these are the cases of inappropriately criminalizing nationalist rhetoric that, in our view, presented no danger to society. They include the sentence to Radik Nurdinov from Bashkortostan for publishing an article by Tatar nationalist Vil Mirzayanov, the sentence to Pavel Khotulev from Kazan for anti-Tatar comments on the social network, the sentence to journalist Ille Ivanov from Chuvashia for an article in *Vziatka* on the oppression of the Chuvash by the Russians, the sentence to Ivan Moseev of Arkhangelsk for rude remarks against the Russians in the comment section of a news site, the verdict to a National Democratic Party leader Konstantin Krylov for insulting remarks at the “Stop feeding the Caucasus” rally, and, finally, the verdict to Igor Popov, the Other Russia activist in Vladivostok, for inciting hatred

¹³ For more details see: V. Alperovich, N. Yudina, *ibid*.

When evaluating court decisions as appropriate or inappropriate we consider them merely on the merits, not covering the subject of possible procedural violations.

¹⁴ We do not elaborate here on our objections to these verdicts; most of them were already covered in the preceding chapters.

to the authorities (in early 2014, this particular court decision was overturned and sent for a review).

One case under Article 282 (against Elena Grigorieva, the Jehovah's Witness from Akhtubinsk) was closed in 2013 due to court-identified violations in the course of the investigation.

However, at least 12 new criminal cases, which we consider inappropriate, were initiated under this article in 2013.

Two sentences were issued in 2013 under Article 280 of the Criminal Code, one of which – the verdict to Rinat Idelbaev, a Hizb ut-Tahrir follower convicted in Chelyabinsk – is, in our view, definitely inappropriate, and the other one, against Anton Lukin and Svetlana Kuznetsova, the Other Russia activists from Komsomolsk-on-Amur, could also be problematic. One new case, initiated under this article, we view as qualified incorrectly. In 2012, two sentences were issued under Article 280 as well, but the total number of convicted offenders was seven; however, one verdict, pertaining to two people, has since been overturned.

The courts issued no inappropriate sentences under Article 282¹ in 2013, and filed no unjustified charges under this article. In the preceding year, we recorded two such verdicts against 8 people. Moreover, wrongful prosecutions under this article against the anti-fascists – a group of defendants in the Antifa –RASH case in Nizhny Novgorod and Igor Kharchenko in Moscow – were dropped.

As in the preceding year, six inappropriate verdicts to 11 people were issued under Article 282² for organizing the activity of organizations recognized as extremist. Six people were convicted in Sol-Iletsk, the Orenburg region, for the creation of “Tablighi Jamaat cells,” three (two in Novosibirsk and one in St. Petersburg) – for studying Said Nursi books, and two (in the Murmansk region and Vladivostok) for continuation of the banned National Bolshevik Party; one of these sentences (Igor Popov from Vladivostok) was overturned.

The case of Amir Abuyev from Kaliningrad, filed under Article 282² in 2012, was dropped due to the statute of limitations.

Unfortunately, at least nine new inappropriate cases under this article were filed in 2013.

One inappropriate conviction under the Criminal Code Article 213 (“hooliganism”) aggravated by the hate motive was issued against antifascist Igor Kharchenko in Moscow. Four such sentences against 14 people were issued in 2012, but 3 of them against 11 people were only partially inappropriate. In two cases the defendants, previously convicted under Article 213, were

granted amnesty late in the year – these are Maria Alyokhina and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova from Pussy Riot collective and three anti-fascists from Nizhny Novgorod charged in the Antifa –RASH case.

We would like to mention separately the sentence against five Chelyabinsk Hizb ut-Tahrir followers, which we view as inappropriate in its part pertaining to Part 1 of Article 30, Article 278 and Part 1 of Article 205¹.

So, 15 inappropriate verdicts against 25 people were issued under the anti-extremist articles of the Criminal Code in 2013; the sentence against one person was later overturned. In general, the difference in the number of sentences between 2013 and 2012 is small (16 verdicts in 2012, not including the case under Article 282² against Hizb ut-Tahrir followers), but the number of wrongfully convicted people was only half of the corresponding number from the preceding year (50 in 2012, also excluding Hizb ut-Tahrir followers). At the same time, we know of over 20 criminal cases inappropriately initiated during this period.

Most convicted offenders were sentenced to fines or compulsory labor or received suspended prison sentences. Five Hizb ut-Tahrir followers in Chelyabinsk were the only group that received long prison terms, six years each in a maximum security penal colony. In one of two cases that involved real prison terms, the indictment was based on aggregation of the articles, including violent crime charges, and, in the other case the inmate was released, having already served his sentence prior to the verdict.

We also would like to point out that the courts still often resort to the tactics of delaying the process in complex cases, and, subsequently, convict the defendants, but release them from punishment due to the statute of limitations.

Before turning to our data on the use of the Administrative Code to combat extremism, keep in mind that our records here are much less complete than in criminal prosecution cases.

We know of 37 wrongful convictions for mass distribution of extremist materials or for possession with intent to distribute, i.e. under the Administrative Code Article 20.29. They more than doubled compared to the 2012 number (17 verdicts). People and organizations, fined under this article, include sellers of Islamic literature, individual Muslims, Jehovah's Witnesses, library staff and Internet service providers. As a rule, these people were not involved in actual *mass* distribution of banned materials.

Four Internet providers were inappropriately fined under the Administrative Code Article 6.17 (“violation of legislation to protect children from information harmful to their health and (or) development”) for poor quality content filtering.

Eight people were inappropriately fined for public demonstration of Nazi or similar symbols, i.e. under the Administrative Code Article 20.3 (compared to seven in 2012).

Federal List of Extremist Materials added 590 new items in 2013. The rate of growth of the list continues to increase, so we are not always able to familiarize ourselves with prohibited materials; in addition, they are often not available (for example, online comments are usually promptly removed upon request of the law enforcement). Therefore, we can not always evaluate the extent of the ban's appropriateness.

We view the following materials as included on the List inappropriately: 26 diverse Muslim materials ranging from works by Said Nursi to medieval treatises, two Jehovah's Witnesses brochures, the White Brotherhood materials (combined into a single List item), the book by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptitskii, eleven diverse oppositional materials, such as Ingush opposition websites and Pussy Riot videos, three items banned for what we consider non-threatening nationalist rhetoric, and 14 historical books, 13 of which were seized during a search in the Ukrainian Library in Moscow. The total of 58 inappropriately included items constitutes approximately half of the corresponding total for 2012. Once again, however, we would like to emphasize that we are not familiar with every single material on the List and cannot rule out the possibility that prohibition of the materials we were unable to examine was also unjustified.

Appendix. Crime and punishment statistics

Statistics of Racist and Neo-Nazi Attacks between 2004 – 2013 (with categorization of regions)¹

	2004			2005			2006			2007			2008		
	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims
Total	50	219	269	49	419	468	66	522	588	97	623	716	116	499	615
Including:															
Moscow and Moscow Oblast [*]	18	62	80	16	179	195	40	228	268	57	224	281	64	223	287
St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast [*]	9	32	41	4	45	49	6	56	62	11	118	129	15	40	55
Adygei Republic	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Altai Kray	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	3	2	5	7	0	0	0
Amur Oblast [†]	0	2	2	0	7	7	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	2
Arkhangelsk Oblast [†]	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	7	8	0	5	5
Astrakhan Oblast [†]	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bashkir Republic	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	1	0	4	4
Belgorod Oblast [†]	0	5	5	0	4	4	0	18	18	0	1	1	0	2	2
Bryansk Oblast [†]	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	3	0	13	13
Buryat Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast [†]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast [†]	1	4	5	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	11	11	1	7	8

¹ The data in our tables is true as of January 27, 2013.

	2004			2005			2006			2007			2008		
	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims
Chita Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	3	3	0	0	0
Chuvash Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	2	2
Dagestan Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Irkutsk Oblast'	3	0	3	2	5	7	0	8	8	1	53	54	0	0	0
Ivanovo Oblast'	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0
Jewish Autonomous Oblast'	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kaliningrad Oblast'	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	11	11	0	1	1	0	1	1
Kaluga Oblast'	0	0	0	0	12	12	1	4	5	2	1	3	0	10	10
Karelian Republic	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kemerovo Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	4
Khabarovsk Krai	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	2
Khakass Republic	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	1
Kirov Oblast'	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Komi Republic	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	1	1
Kostroma Oblast'	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	10	10	0	3	3	0	1	1
Krasnodar Krai	2	32	34	1	3	4	0	7	7	0	11	11	0	0	0
Krasnoyarsk Krai	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	3	3	0	4	4	0	0	0

	2004			2005			2006			2007			2008		
	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims
Kurgan Oblast'	0	0	0	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
Kursk Oblast'	0	5	5	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	3
Lipetsk Oblast'	0	1	1	0	3	3	1	0	1	0	3	3	1	1	2
Mari El Republic	0	1	1	0	15	15	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Murmansk Oblast'	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	5	5	0	0	0
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	5	6	4	12	16	0	36	36	1	44	45	4	21	25
North Ossetia Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Novgorod Oblast'	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Novosibirsk Oblast'	2	12	14	1	9	10	0	9	9	1	5	6	3	7	10
Omsk Oblast'	0	3	3	0	0	0	1	3	4	1	2	3	0	2	2
Orel Oblast'	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	9	9	0	0	0	0	1	1
Orenburg Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	0	0	0
Penza Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	15	15
Perm Krai	0	2	2	3	2	5	0	1	1	0	3	3	2	3	5
Primorye Krai	5	9	14	0	3	3	2	18	20	1	3	4	3	6	9
Pskov Oblast'	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rostov Oblast'	0	0	0	0	10	10	0	2	2	1	7	8	0	4	4
Ryazan Oblast'	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	4	4	0	6	6	1	9	10
Sakha Republic (Yakutia)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0

	2004			2005			2006			2007			2008		
	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims
Sakhalin Oblast'	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Samara Oblast'	1	3	4	4	5	9	0	2	2	2	9	11	0	3	3
Saratov Oblast'	1	0	1	0	0	0	4	4	8	2	4	6	0	0	0
Smolensk Oblast'	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stavropol Kray	0	0	0	0	21	21	0	1	1	1	8	9	3	10	13
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	7	8	6	6	12	0	6	6	3	17	20	4	16	20
Tambov Oblast'	0	3	3	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Tatar Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	0	1	1	0	9	9	
Tomsk Oblast'	0	3	3	0	6	6	0	4	4	0	5	5	0	0	0
Tula Oblast'	1	0	1	0	3	3	1	2	3	0	0	0	1	3	4
Tver Oblast'	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	7	9	0	4	4	1	2	3
Tyumen Oblast'	3	1	4	1	0	1	0	15	15	0	1	1	3	3	6
Udmurt Republic	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	6	7	0	5	5
Ul'yanovsk Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	12	1
Vladimir Oblast'	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	7	7
Volgograd Oblast'	0	2	2	0	1	1	2	9	11	1	5	6	0	4	4
Vologda Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	3	0	1	1	
Voronezh Oblast'	1	2	3	1	21	22	1	6	7	0	17	17	2	23	25
Yaroslavl Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	7	0	3	3	0	1	1

* Up to the beginning of 2009 data on attacks committed in Moscow and the Moscow region and St.Petersburg and the Leningrad region had been summed up and from the beginning of 2009 they are considered separately.

	2009			2010			2011			2012			2013		
	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims
Total	94	443	537	44	414	458	26	208	234	19	191	210	21	178	199
Including:															
Moscow	35	114	149	18	146	164	7	57	64	5	66	70	8	53	61
St. Petersburg	16	42	58	2	44	46	3	27	30	1	21	22	3	32	35
Adygei Republic	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Altai Kray	0	1	1	1	5	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Amur Oblast'	1	8	9	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	0	4	4	0	2	2	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Astrakhan Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	1	1
Bashkir Republic	0	1	1	0	7	7	0	1	1	0	20	20	0	0	0
Belgorod Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bryansk Oblast'	0	3	3	1	1	2	1	3	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Buryat Republic	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	1	0	1
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	7	8	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	8	8
Chita Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chuvash Republic	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

	2009			2010			2011			2012			2013		
	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims
Perm Krai	0	0	0	0	5	5	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	3	3
Primorye Krai	2	13	15	1	2	3	0	4	4	4	2	6	0	0	0
Pskov Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rostov Oblast'	0	2	2	0	9	9	0	3	3	1	3	4	0	2	2
Ryazan Oblast'	2	7	9	1	2	3	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	3
Sakha Republic (Yakutia)	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sakhalin Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Samara Oblast'	3	5	8	0	11	11	2	1	3	2	4	6	0	4	4
Saratov Oblast'	0	0	0	0	6	6	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Smolensk Oblast'	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stavropol Krai	2	11	13	1	5	6	2	2	4	0	3	3	0	1	1
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	20	21	0	7	7	0	2	2	1	1	2	2	4	6
Tambov Oblast'	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Tatar Republic	0	4	4	0	8	8	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	0	0
Tomsk Oblast'	0	0	0	1	10	11	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tula Oblast'	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	3	3	1	2	3	0	0	0
Tver Oblast'	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	2
Tyumen Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Udmurt Republic	0	1	1	0	4	4	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

	2009			2010			2011			2012			2013		
	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims
Ul'yansovsk Oblast'	1	0	1	0	4	4	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vladimir Oblast'	0	10	10	0	2	2	0	3	3	0	2	2	0	2	2
Volgograd Oblast'	0	4	4	1	5	6	0	0	0	0	4	4	1	1	2
Vologda Oblast'	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	1	1	0	2	2
Voronezh Oblast'	0	5	5	0	3	3	0	7	7	0	3	3	0	6	6
Yaroslavl Oblast'	3	6	9	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zabaikalye Krai	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1

The cities are arranged in alphabetic order, except Moscow and St.Petersburg – two major centers of racist violence.

Victims of attacks in the North Caucasus are not counted in this and the following tables; victims of mass brawls and homeless victims (before 2009) are only counted where a hate motive has been attributed by law enforcement officials.

Consolidates Statistics of Racist and Neo-Nazi Attacks in 2004 – 2013 (with categorization of victims)

Year	2004		2005		2006		2007	
	K	B	K	B	K	B	K	B
K – killed, B – Beaten, wounded	K	B	K	B	K	B	K	B
Total	50	219	49	419	66	522	93	623
Dark-skinned people	1	33	3	38	2	32	0	38
People from Central Asia	10	23	18	35	17	60	35	82
People from the Caucasus	15	38	12	52	15	72	27	64
People from the Middle East and North Africa	4	12	1	22	0	11	2	21
From other countries of Asia	8	30	4	58	4	52	2	45
Other people of “non-Slav appearance”	2	22	3	72	4	69	20	90
Members of subcultures, anti-fascists and leftists	0	4	3	121	3	119	5	195
Homeless	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ethnic Russians	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jews	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Religious groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LGBT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others (including ethnic Russians), or not known	10	57	5	21	21	107	2	88

This table reflects not the “actual identity” of victims, but rather the identity given to them by the attackers. In other words, if a Slavic person was taken for a Caucasian, he would be registered in the category “people from the Caucasus”.

We also know about attacks on homeless people committed, as police suspects, with ideological motivation. In 2004 we have reports about 13 murders of this kind, in 2005 – about 5 murders and

2008		2009		2010		2011		2012		2013	
K	B	K	B	K	B	K	B	K	B	K	B
116	499	94	443	44	414	26	208	19	191	21	178
2	23	2	59	1	26	1	19	0	26	0	5
63	123	40	92	20	86	10	36	7	36	13	45
27	76	18	78	5	45	7	18	4	14	3	26
2	13	0	2	0	2	0	5	0	0	0	1
1	41	14	36	3	19	0	13	0	5	0	6
11	56	9	62	7	100	1	25	1	15	1	28
4	87	5	77	3	66	1	40	1	55	0	5
-	-	4	0	1	3	3	3	6	2	2	3
-	-	0	8	1	8	1	9	0	7	0	2
-	-	0	3	0	3	1	2	0	0	0	2
-	-	1	2	0	22	0	24	0	10	0	24
-	-	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	12	2	25
6	80	1	24	3	31	1	11	0	9	0	4

4 beatings, in 2006 – 7 murders and 4 beatings, in 2007 – 4 murders and not less than 2 beatings, in 2008 – 7 murders and 1 beating, in 2009 – 1 murder, in 2010 – 1 murder and 2 beatings, in 2011 – 1 murder and 1 beating, in 2012 – 1 murder and 2 beatings.

Since 2010 we have not included victims of death threats. In 2010 we have reports about 6 persons who received such threats and in 2011 – 10, in 2012 – 1, in 2013 – 9.

Statistics of convictions for violent crimes with a recognized hate motive in 2004 – 2013

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2004			
Moscow	4	11	Not known
St. Petersburg	2	10	4
Novgorod Oblast'	1 ¹	1	0
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	1
Voronezh Oblast'	1	3	0
<i>Total</i>	9	26	5
2005			
Moscow	2	4	0
St. Petersburg	2	10	4
Amur Oblast'	1	4	0
Lipetsk Oblast'	1	4	0
Moscow Oblast'	4 ²	14	0
Murmansk Oblast'	1	2	1
Perm Kray	1	1	0
Primorye Kray	1	1	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	3	0
Tambov Oblast'	1	1	0
Tyumen Oblast'	1	5	0
Volgograd Oblast'	1	7	0
<i>Total</i>	17	56	5

¹ For threats to blow up a synagogue.

² Regretfully, we don't have an exact date for one murder conviction motivated by ethnic hatred, but we assume it was issued in 2005

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2006			
Moscow	5	11	1
St. Petersburg	3	10	4
Altai Kray	1	1	1
Bashkir Republic	1	3	3
Belgorod Oblast'	1	11	1
Jewish Autonomous Oblast'	1	3	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	2	0
Kostroma Oblast'	2	7	5
Moscow Oblast'	3	18	4
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	4	6	Not known
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	Not known	Not known
Orel Oblast'	2	6 ³	2
Rostov Oblast'	1	2	0
Sakhalin Oblast'	1	1	0
Saratov Oblast'	1	5	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	3	8 ⁴	0
Tomsk Oblast'	1	3	0
Voronezh Oblast'	1	13	7
<i>Total</i>	33	109 ⁵	24
2007			
Moscow	4	11	0
St. Petersburg	2	11	3
Belgorod Oblast'	1	2	0

³ At least; In one case we only know that the verdict has been delivered.

⁴ Three of them were convicted of organizing an extremist community, and also for the murder, where the hate motive was not taken into account.

⁵ At least.

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2007			
Kaluga Oblast'	1	3	2
Komi Republic	1	1	0
Krasnoyarsk Krai	1	2	1
Leningrad Oblast'	1	1	0
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	9	9
North Ossetia Republic	1	1	0
Omsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Stavropol Krai	2	2	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	3	9	0
Tambov Oblast'	1	1	0
Tyumen Oblast'	1	6	2
Voronezh Oblast'	1	4	0
Yaroslavl Oblast'	1	1	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>18</i>
2008			
Altai Krai	1	3 ⁶	0
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Ivanovo Oblast'	1	1	0
Kaluga Oblast'	2	13	6
Kostroma Oblast'	1	1	0
Krasnodar Krai	1	1	0
Lipetsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Moscow	7	40	4
Moscow Oblast'	2	11	3
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	2	2
Novgorod Oblast'	1	2	0

⁶ Including one without the hate motive.

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2008			
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Omsk Oblast'	1	4	0
Penza Oblast'	1	1	0
Samara Oblast'	1	1	1
St. Petersburg	4	9	2
Stavropol Krai	1	2	1
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	3	10	0
Tambov Oblast'	1	3	3
Vladimir Oblast'	1	2	0
Yaroslavl Oblast'	1	1	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>25</i>
2009			
Moscow	11	41	7
St. Petersburg	2	3	0
Adygei Republic	1	1	1
Altai Krai	1	7	2
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	4	4
Chuvash Republic	2	9	0
Kaluga Oblast'	3	8	3
Khabarovsk Krai	1	1	1
Kirov Oblast'	1	2	0
Kostroma Oblast'	1	1	0
Krasnoyarsk Krai	1	1	0
Kursk Oblast'	1	2	0

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2009			
Moscow Oblast ⁷	3 ⁷	3	0
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast ⁷	5	12	5
Novgorod Oblast ⁷	2	5	0
Novosibirsk Oblast ⁷	3	4	3
Orenburg Oblast ⁷	1	2	0
Samara Oblast ⁷	1	6	6
Stavropol Kray	1	2	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast ⁷	1	1	0
Tambov Oblast ⁷	1	1	0
Tula Oblast ⁷	1	2	0
Tver Oblast ⁷	1	1	0
Udmurt Republic	1	1	0
Vladimir Oblast ⁷	2	2	0
Voronezh Oblast ⁷	3	7	3
<i>Total</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>129</i>	<i>35</i>
2010			
Moscow	10	35	3
St. Petersburg	6	27	18
Adygei Republic	1	3	0
Amur Oblast ⁷	1	1	0
Bashkir Republic	2	10	5
Bryansk Oblast ⁷	3	4	2
Chuvash Republic	1	2	0

⁷ The Moscow Regional Prosecutor's Office reported that in 2009 15 cases were examined in the region, 9 of which resulted in convictions against 13 people; 6 cases involving 7 people ended with reconciliation in court. We only know of three cases against four people that ended in guilty verdicts and of one case that ended with a reconciliation of the parties, and didn't include the other ones in our count.

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2010			
Irkutsk Oblast ⁷	1	1	0
Kaliningrad Oblast ⁷	1	6	2
Kaluga Oblast ⁷	3	5	2
Karelian Republic	2	8	1
Khabarovsk Kray	1	2	0
Kirov Oblast ⁷	2	5	5
Kostroma Oblast ⁷	1	1	1
Krasnodar Kray	2	3	0
Moscow Oblast ⁷	7	15	8
Murmansk Oblast ⁷	2	7	3
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast ⁷	10	34	22
Novgorod Oblast ⁷	1	3	0
Penza Oblast ⁷	2	6	2
Primorye Kray	2	14	10
Rostov Oblast ⁷	1	1	1
Ryazan Oblast ⁷	1	2	2
Samara Oblast ⁷	2	5	2
Saratov Oblast ⁷	1	1	0
Smolensk Oblast ⁷	1	0	1
Stavropol Kray	4	29	6
Sverdlovsk Oblast ⁷	3	9	0
Tatar Republic	2	7	5
Tver Oblast ⁷	3	16	2
Tyumen Oblast ⁷	1	14	3
Udmurt Republic	1	2	0
Ul'yanovsk Oblast ⁷	1	9	0
Vladimir Oblast ⁷	4	3	4
Volgograd Oblast ⁷	1	2	0

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2010			
Voronezh Oblast'	4	5	10
<i>Total</i>	<i>91</i>	<i>297</i>	<i>120</i>
2011			
Moscow	10	34	4
St. Petersburg	3	36	16
Altai Krai	1	3	0
Altai Republic	1	1	1
Astrakhan Oblast'	1	1	0
Bashkir Republic	1	1	1
Bryansk Oblast'	1	4	5
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Irkutsk Oblast'	2	8	4
Kaliningrad Oblast'	2	3	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	1	0
Karelian Republic	2	3	1
Kemerovo Oblast'	2	2	0
Khabarovsk Krai	1	2	0
Kirov Oblast'	2	3	0
Moscow Oblast'	4	6	5
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	5	17	4
Novosibirsk Oblast'	2	2	1
Omsk Oblast'	1	2	0
Orel Oblast'	1	1	0
Ryazan Oblast'	1	7	1
Samara Oblast'	1	2	2
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	3	5
Tatar Republic	3	11	4
Tomsk Oblast'	1	7	2

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2011			
Tula Oblast'	3	3	0
Tver Oblast'	1	1	1
Udmurt Republic	1	2	2
Vladimir Oblast'	1	4	3
Volgograd Oblast'	1	1	0
Vologda Oblast'	1	1	1
Voronezh Oblast'	1	1	0
Yaroslavl Oblast'	1	19	12
<i>Total</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>193</i>	<i>75</i>
2012			
Moscow	4	12	1
St. Petersburg	3	5	3
Altai Krai	1	1	0
Bryansk Oblast'	1	1	0
Buryat Republic	1	1	0
Irkutsk Oblast'	2	3	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	3	1
Kirov Oblast'	2	2	0
Komi Republic	1	1	1
Kostroma Oblast'	1	2	0
Krasnodar Krai	1	1	0
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	5	2
North Ossetia Republic	1	1	0
Omsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Orel Oblast'	1	11	2
Perm Krai	1	6	0
Smolensk Oblast'	1	1	0
Stavropol Krai	1	1	1

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2012			
Vladimir Oblast'	1	2	0
Volgograd Oblast'	1	1	0
Voronezh Oblast'	1	3	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>11</i>
2013			
Moscow	4	4	0
St. Petersburg	1	1	0
Altai Kray	1	2	1
Bashkir Republic	1	1	1
Irkutsk Oblast'	1	2	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	1	1
Karelian Republic	1	4	0
Khabarovsk Kray	1	1	0
Kirov Oblast'	2	2	0
Kostroma Oblast'	1	1	1
Moscow Oblast'	1	3	2
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	2	4	5
Omsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Rostov Oblast'	1	3	0
Samara Oblast'	3	7	0
Stavropol Kray	2	3	2
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	2	4	1
Tatar Republic	1	2	0
Tula Oblast'	1	3	0
Ul'yanovsk Oblast'	1	3	1
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0
Vologda Oblast'	1	1	0
Voronezh Oblast'	1	1	1

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
<i>Total</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>16</i>

This table and the tables that follow include all court verdicts except for the cases where all accused parties were acquitted, the cases that were closed due to the offender's contrition.

The number of convictions reflects only the offenders who faced court-ordered penalties – not the ones who were referred for medical treatment or received no punishment due to the statute of limitations or other reasons.

Statistics of convictions for hate propaganda (art. 282 of Criminal Code) that we do not rate as inappropriate in 2004 – 2013

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2004			
Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Udmurt Republic	1	1	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>
2005			
Moscow	1	1	1
Kabardino-Balkaria Republic	1	1	1
Kemerovo Oblast'	4	4	1
Khabarovsk Krai	1	1	0
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	0
Komi Republic	1	1	1
Novgorod Oblast'	1	3	0
Orel Oblast'	1	2	2
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	1	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>6</i>
2006			
Moscow	1	1	0
St. Petersburg	2	2	1
Astrakhan Oblast'	1	1	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	3	0
Kemerovo Oblast'	2	2	2
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	0
Komi Republic	1	1	0
Krasnodar Krai	1	1	0

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2006			
Moscow Oblast'	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Samara Oblast'	2	2	2
Saratov Oblast'	1	1	1
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Yaroslavl Oblast'	1	2	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>7</i>
2007			
Moscow	1	1	1
Altai Krai	1	1	1
Altai Republic	1	2	2
Amur Oblast'	1	1	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Chuvash Republic	1	4	0
Kaliningrad Oblast'	1	1	1
Kaluga Oblast'	1	8	0
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	0
Komi Republic	3	3	0
Krasnodar Krai	3	3	2
Kurgan Oblast'	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	3	3	0
Ryazan Oblast'	1	2	0
Sakha Republic (Yakutia)	1	2	0
Samara Oblast'	1	2	2
Stavropol Krai	1	1	1
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Ul'yanskovsk Oblast'	1	1	1

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2007			
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0
Vologda Oblast'	1	1	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>12</i>
2008			
Moscow	2	4	2
St. Petersburg	3	3	0
Adygei Republic	1	1	0
Altai Krai	1	1	0
Amur Oblast'	2	4	2
Astrakhan Oblast'	2	4	0
Bryansk Oblast'	1	1	0
Buryat Republic	1	1	1
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	2	2	1
Dagestan Republic	1	2	2
Kaliningrad Oblast'	1	1	0
Karelian Republic	2	2	2
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	0
Komi Republic	2	2	0
Krasnodar Krai	2	3	2
Kursk Oblast'	1	1	1
Leningrad Oblast'	1	1	1
Lipetsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'	2	2	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Penza Oblast'	1	1	1
Primorye Krai	1	1	1
Rostov Oblast'	2	2	1
Samara Oblast'	3	3	1

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2008			
Stavropol Krai	1	1	0
Tatar Republic	1	6	1
Tyumen Oblast'	1	1	0
Ul'yankovsk Oblast'	1	4	0
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0
Voronezh Oblast'	1	1	1
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug	1	1	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>44</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>21</i>
2009			
Moscow	5	9	2
St. Petersburg	2	2	0
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	3	3	1
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Ivanovo Oblast'	1	1	0
Kaliningrad Oblast'	2	1	1
Kamchatka Krai	1	2	2
Karelian Republic	1	1	0
Kemerovo Oblast'	1	1	1
Khabarovsk Krai	3	5	4
Komi Republic	2	1	2
Kostroma Oblast'	1	1	0
Krasnodar Krai	1	1	0
Krasnoyarsk Krai	2	2	0
Kurgan Oblast'	1	0	1
Kursk Oblast'	2	2	2
Murmansk Oblast'	1	1	1
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'	2	2	0

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2010			
Omsk Oblast'	1	2	0
Orenburg Oblast'	2	5	0
Primorye Kray	1	1	0
Sakha Republic (Yakutia)	1	1	0
Samara Oblast'	1	1	1
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	2	0
Tyumen Oblast'	1	1	0
Vladimir Oblast'	2	2	1
Vologda Oblast'	2	3	2
Zabaikalye Kray	1	1	1
Tomsk Oblast'	2	2	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>22</i>
Moscow	1	1	1
St. Petersburg	1	3	2
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	2	2	0
Astrakhan Oblast'	2	2	1
Bashkir Republic	1	1	1
Belgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Buryat Republic	1	1	1
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	2	5	3
Chuvash Republic	2	2	1
Kaluga Oblast'	2	2	0
Kamchatka Kray	1	1	1
Karelian Republic	2	2	0
Khabarovsk Kray	1	1	1
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	1	1	0
Kirov Oblast'	2	2	1
Komi Republic	4	5	4

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2010			
Kostroma Oblast'	3	3	2
Krasnodar Kray	3	3	0
Krasnoyarsk Kray	1	1	0
Kurgan Oblast'	1	1	0
Kursk Oblast'	3	3	2
Leningrad Oblast'	1	0	1
Mari El Republic	1	1	1
Novosibirsk Oblast'	3	3	2
Orel Oblast'	1	1	0
Pskov Oblast'	1	1	0
Rostov Oblast'	1	1	0
Sakhalin Oblast'	1	2	1
Samara Oblast'	1	1	1
Stavropol Kray	4	4	1
Tyumen Oblast'	1	0	1
Udmurt Republic	3	3	1
Ul'yanovsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Vladimir Oblast'	5	5	0
Volgograd Oblast'	1	1	1
Voronezh Oblast'	2	2	1
Tomsk Oblast'	1	1	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>32</i>
2011			
Moscow	2	2	1
St. Petersburg	1	1	0
Adygei Republic	2	2	2
Altai Kray	1	1	0
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	3	4	3

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2011			
Bashkir Republic	3	3	1
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	4	4	2
Chuvash Republic	5	4	1
Kalmyk Republic	1	1	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	1	1
Karelian Republic	2	2	0
Khabarovsk Kray	1	1	0
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	4	4	2
Kirov Oblast'	2	3	1
Komi Republic	4	4	2
Krasnoyarsk Kray	1	1	0
Kurgan Oblast'	2	2	0
Kursk Oblast'	2	2	0
Lipetsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Moscow Oblast'	2	2	2
Murmansk Oblast'	1	1	1
Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Primorye Kray	1	1	1
Pskov Oblast'	2	2	2
Sakhalin Oblast'	1	1	0
Saratov Oblast'	2	2	0
Smolensk Oblast'	1	1	1
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	4	4	3
Tatar Republic	1	4	0
Tomsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Tula Oblast'	1	1	0
Tver Oblast'	1	0	0

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2011			
Tyumen Oblast'	1	1	1
Udmurt Republic	1	1	0
Ul'yanovsk Oblast'	1	2	0
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0
Volograd Oblast'	1	1	1
Vologda Oblast'	1	1	1
Voronezh Oblast'	1	1	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>69</i>	<i>73</i>	<i>32</i>
2012			
Moscow	4	5	3
St. Petersburg	1	1	0
Altai Republic	2	1	0
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	6	6	2
Bashkir Republic	2	2	1
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	0	1
Chuvash Republic	3	3	0
Irkutsk Oblast'	2	2	0
Kaliningrad Oblast'	1	1	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	1	0
Kemerovo Oblast'	2	0	1
Khakass Republic	1	1	0
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	1	1	0
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	0
Kostroma Oblast'	3	3	0
Krasnoyarsk Kray	1	1	1
Kurgan Oblast'	2	2	0
Kursk Oblast'	4	4	0
Murmansk Oblast'	2	3	0

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2012			
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	0	1
North Ossetia Republic	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'	4	4	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	2	2	0
Omsk Oblast'	2	2	0
Orel Oblast'	1	1	0
Orenburg Oblast'	1	0	1
Primorye Kray	1	1	0
Pskov Oblast'	4	4	0
Rostov Oblast'	1	1	0
Ryazan Oblast'	1	1	0
Sakhalin Oblast'	1	1	0
Samara Oblast'	2	2	1
Stavropol Kray	1	1	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	4	4	0
Tatar Republic	1	1	0
Tomsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Tyumen Oblast'	2	2	0
Udmurt Republic	3	3	1
Ul'yanovsk Oblast'	2	7	0
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0
Volgograd Oblast'	3	3	0
Voronezh Oblast'	1	1	1
Zabaikalye Kray	1	0	3
<i>Total</i>	<i>82</i>	<i>82</i>	<i>17</i>
2013			
Moscow	1	1	0
St. Petersburg	1	1	0

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2013			
Adygei Republic	1	1	0
Altai Kray	1	1	0
Altai Republic	2	3	1
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	2	1	2
Astrakhan Oblast'	1	1	0
Bashkir Republic	3	3	1
Buryat Republic	1	1	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	4	4	3
Chuvash Republic	5	4	0
Irkutsk Oblast'	2	2	0
Ivanovo Oblast'	1	1	0
Kaliningrad Oblast'	1	1	0
Kalmyk Republic	1	1	0
Kaluga Oblast'	2	2	0
Kamchatka Kray	1	1	0
Kemerovo Oblast'	2	2	1
Khabarovsk Kray	2	2	0
Khakass Republic	1	1	0
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	2	2	0
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	0
Komi Republic	3	3	1
Kostroma Oblast'	1	1	0
Krasnodar Kray	2	1	1
Kurgan Oblast'	3	3	0
Kursk Oblast'	2	1	1
Leningrad Oblast'	1	1	0
Magadan Oblast'	1	1	0
Murmansk Oblast'	1	1	0

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2013			
Novgorod Oblast'	3	3	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	6	6	0
Omsk Oblast'	1	0	0
Orel Oblast'	1	1	0
Orenburg Oblast'	2	2	0
Penza Oblast'	2	1	1
Pskov Oblast'	2	2	0
Rostov Oblast'	2	2	0
Sakhalin Oblast'	1	1	0
Samara Oblast'	5	4	0
Saratov Oblast'	1	1	0
Smolensk Oblast'	1	1	0
Stavropol Kray	3	3	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	8	9	2
Tatar Republic	7	7	0
Tomsk Oblast'	5	5	0
Tula Oblast'	2	2	0
Tver Oblast'	1	1	0
Tyumen Oblast'	1	1	0
Udmurt Republic	2	2	0
Ul'yanovsk Oblast'	4	4	1
Vladimir Oblast'	3	3	0
Vologda Oblast'	1	1	0
Voronezh Oblast'	2	2	0
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug	1	0	1
Zabaikalye Kray	3	2	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>122</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>17</i>

Statistics of convictions for incitement to extremism (art. 280 of Criminal Code) in 2005 –2013

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2005			
Kemerovo Oblast'	3	3	2
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	1
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>3</i>
2006			
Moscow	1	1	0
Astrakhan Oblast'	1	1	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	3	0
Kemerovo Oblast'	2	2	2
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	2	3	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>2</i>
2007			
Kemerovo Oblast'	1	1	0
Krasnodar Kray*	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	1	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>0</i>
2008			
Moscow**	1	1	0
St. Petersburg	1	1	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	1	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Samara Oblast'	2	3	3
Tatar Republic*	1	5	1
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2008			
Vologda Oblast'	1	2	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>7</i>
2009			
Moscow	1	1	1
Amur Oblast'	2	3	2
Arkhangelsk Oblast'*	1	1	1
Jewish Autonomous Oblast'	1	2	2
Kemerovo Oblast'	1	1	1
Khabarovsk Kray	1	1	Not known
Novosibirsk Oblast'*	1	2	2
Primorye Kray*	1	1	1
Samara Oblast'	1	1	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>11</i>
2010			
St. Petersburg	1	1	0
Amur Oblast'	1	1	1
Bashkir Republic**	1	1	1
Chelyabinsk Oblast'***	1	1	1
Kemerovo Oblast'	1	1	1
Komi Republic ⁸	2	2	1
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	1	Not known
Omsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Sakhalin Oblast'	1	2	1
Tyumen Oblast'	1	1	0
Yaroslavl Oblast'***	1	2	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>7</i>

⁸ One indictment also includes a charge under the Criminal Code Article 282.

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2011			
Adygei Republic **	3	3	2
Bashkir Republic ⁹	1	2	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast'***	3	3	1
Khabarovsk Kray	1	1	0
Moscow Oblast'***	2	2	2
Primorye Kray *	1	1	1
Sakhalin Oblast'*	1	1	0
Tyumen Oblast'	1	1	1
Voronezh Oblast'*	1	1	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>8</i>
2012			
Moscow **	1	1	0
St. Petersburg **	1	1	1
Arkhangelsk Oblast'*	3	3	2
Khabarovsk Kray **	1	1	1
Khakass Republic *	1	1	0
Lipetsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'*	1	1	0
Orel Oblast'***	1	6	0
Sakhalin Oblast'*	1	2	0
Tyumen Oblast'	1	1	0
Voronezh Oblast'*	1	1	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>6</i>

⁹ The verdict also uses the Criminal Code Articles 2052 and 282.

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
2013			
Altai Kray	1	1	0
Amur Oblast'	1	1	0
Arkhangelsk Oblast'*	1	1	0
Bashkir Republic*	1	1	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast'*	2	2	1
Kaliningrad Oblast'	1	1	0
Kemerovo Oblast'	1	1	0
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	0
Komi Republic **	1	1	1
Novgorod Oblast'*	1	1	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'***	1	1	0
Rostov Oblast'	1	1	0
Vologda Oblast'	1	1	0
Voronezh Oblast'*	1	1	0
Zabaikalye Kray *	3	2	2
<i>Total</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>4</i>

* Sentences includes also art. 282 of the Criminal Code.

** Sentences include also other articles of the Criminal Code.