The following is our review of the primary and most representative events in the misuse of Russia's anti-extremist legislation in February 2023.

Sanctions for Statements against the Authorities

Incitement of Hatred and “Disrespect for Authority”

As we learned in February, the Zavodskoy District Court of Novokuznetsk placed Maxim Pavlov under arrest for 24 hours in late January under Article 20.3.1 (inciting hatred or enmity, as well as humiliating human dignity) of the Code of Administrative Offenses (CAO). The case was based on four comments Pavlov left on a social network in January, February and August 2022. According to the court decision, at least one of the comments contained a statement “that negatively assessed a group of persons based on their belonging to the social group “representatives of the authorities.” We believe that the authorities do not form a vulnerable social group in need of special protection from manifestations of hatred (moreover, SOVA suggests that the vague concept of “social group” be excluded from anti-extremist legislation altogether). The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation pointed out back in 2011 that media criticism of officials should not, in and of itself, be viewed as an act aimed at humiliating their dignity, since the limits of permissible criticism are wider for officials than for private individuals. From our point of view, this argument applies not only to mass media but also to statements made by ordinary citizens. Apparently, Pavlov's comments contained no calls for violence.

In early February, the Vakhitovsky District Court of Kazan sentenced Iskander (Iskender) Yasaveev, a sociologist and columnist for Idel.Realii, previously recognized as a foreign agent, to three days of arrest under Article 20.3.1 CAO. The case against him was based on his column “The Hood Way or the Soviet Way: Why is Russia at War?” (Po-patsanski ili po-sovetski: pochemu Rossiya voyuyet), published by Idel.Realii. The expert opinion, upheld by the court, argued that Yasaveev’s text contained signs of “incitement to violence on the basis of belonging to a particular ethnicity,” “humiliation of human dignity on the basis of professional affiliation” and “incitement of enmity towards a group of individuals identified by a social characteristic (the Russian authorities).”

In his column, Yasaveev argued that parallels between the actions of the Russian leadership and those of street gang members in the USSR were misleading. In fact, he said, the current state of affairs in the country and the hostilities in Ukraine indicated that the Russian authorities shared the typical attitudes of the so-called “Homo Sovieticus:” that the country is in the “ring of enemies,” and that it was permissible to sacrifice people for the sake of the state’s greatness. According to Yasaveev, getting rid of the Homo Sovieticus, who is “aggressive and helplessly patient, submissive and cunning, constantly building hierarchies,” would take not only a regime change but also decades of democratization and educational work. Without such a process “we can’t be certain that Russia will not again become a threat to the world and to itself.” We found no signs of incitement to hatred, let alone incitement to violence against officials, in the text. The expert linguist, and then the court, interpreted as incitement Yasaveev’s words about the regime change and the threat posed by Russia. In our opinion, neither criticism of the authorities, nor social criticism, including disapproval of citizens’ characteristic attitudes and views, provide the grounds for prosecution under the charges of inciting hatred, enmity, and humiliation of dignity, especially if expressed in a civil manner, as was the case for Yasaveev’s column.

The Tsentralny District Court of Novokuznetsk in February fined local resident Oleg Sibirkin 10 thousand rubles under Article 20.3.1 CAO. The law enforcement claims were based on the post shared by Sibirkin on VKontakte back in October 2013. It began with the words “Unfortunately, that’s the kind we have here, but maybe they aren’t all like that...” followed by a poem about the police and accompanied by a meme depicting a mustachioed Ministry of Internal Affairs officer. We believe that Sibirkin was punished inappropriately. In our opinion, police officers do not form a vulnerable social group in need of special protection from manifestations of hatred. On the contrary, as the European Court of Human Rights repeatedly noted, law enforcement officers should be extremely tolerant of criticism, unless it involves a real threat of violence. We reviewed the poem in question. It contained criticism of the human qualities of the police, but neither the poem nor the illustration used in the post included any calls for violence.

The Isilkul City Court in the Omsk Region imposed a fine in the same amount on Ruslan Yeliseev for posting insults against local border guards in the Isilkul Classified Ads group on Odnoklassniki. We view the sanctions against Yeliseev as inappropriate, since we do not consider the border guards a vulnerable group, and the posts evidently contained no calls for violence.

Two fines were imposed on residents of Zabaykalsky Krai under Article 20.1 Part 3 CAO (dissemination on the Internet of information expressing disrespect for society, the state or government agencies in indecent form). The Tsentralny District Court of Chita fined Nelli Loseva 35 thousand rubles for sharing on Odnoklassniki an image with an obscene statement about the Russian president (Loseva tagged the post as “class,” so it appeared on her page). The Chita District Court fined Igor Cherneyko 30 thousand rubles for leaving an obscene comment about Vladimir Putin in the Domna online community on Viber.

Participation in Opposition Movements

In February, the decision of the Leninsky District Court of Astrakhan, issued in late January against local activist Georgy Verbitsky, came into force. The court fined him three thousand rubles under Article 20.28 Part 2 CAO (participation in the activities of a non-profit organization included in the foreign agents register, in respect of which a decision has been made to suspend its activities). According to the decision, Verbitsky published photos of protest actions on the Vesna Telegram channel between September 26 and November 9, 2022. The activity of the youth democratic movement Vesna was suspended on September 30, 2022, upon request of the St. Petersburg Prosecutor's Office in conjunction with filing a claim to recognize it as an extremist organization. The St. Petersburg City Court upheld the claim to ban Vesna in December. We consider this ban inappropriate.

Distribution of Extremist Materials

In February, we recorded one case filed under Article 20.29 CAO (mass distribution of extremist materials) for distributing the banned video “Let's Remind Crooks and Thieves about their Manifesto-2002.” The Privolzhsky District Court of the Astrakhan Region fined Fatykh Yakhyaev a thousand rubles in late January, after the video was found on his VKontakte page. “Let's Remind Crooks and Thieves about their Manifesto-2002,” circulated by Alexei Navalny's supporters, gained wide popularity online and was declared extremist in 2013 along with several materials by Russian nationalists. The video merely lists a number of United Russia's unfulfilled campaign promises from the party's draft manifesto of 2002 and calls for voting for any party other than United Russia. We view the ban against this video as unfounded and sanctions for its distribution as inappropriate.

Displaying Banned Symbols

The Mariinsk City Court in the Kemerovo Region fined local resident Vyacheslav Romazanov a thousand rubles in February under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO (public demonstration of symbols of an extremist organization). The claim was based on videos he had posted, which included symbols of the Navalny headquarters. The Alexei Navalny Headquarters, the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) and the Citizens' Rights Defense Fund (FZPG) were recognized as extremist organizations on June 9, 2021. In our opinion, the court did not have sufficient legal grounds to ban Navalny's organizations as extremist. Accordingly, we also regard sanctions for displaying the symbols of Navalny's team as inappropriate.

In Sochi, the Tsentralny District Court fined Victoria Tkacheva under the same article. She was ordered to pay two thousand rubles for setting her WhatsApp messenger status to read “Glory to Ukraine!” in Korean. The court ruled that this statement was a greeting, that is, an attribute of two banned Ukrainian organizations – the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People's Self-Defence (UNA–UNSO) and the Right Sector.

It is worth reminding that Article 20.3 CAO penalizes displaying the symbols or attributes of banned organizations but not publishing their slogans, and the basis, on which the courts classify slogans as attributes, is not clear. It is also worth noting that the slogan “Glory to Ukraine,” which came into use in the early 20th century, cannot be viewed solely as the motto of Ukrainian nationalist organizations banned in Russia. In recent years it has been ubiquitous in Ukraine and, since 2018, it has become an official greeting in the Ukrainian army and police.

Discrediting the Actions of the Russian Armed Forces or Government Agencies

We believe that sanctions for discrediting the actions of the Russian armed forces and state agencies abroad constitute an unreasonable restriction of the right to freedom of expression and are specifically intended to suppress criticism of the official political course. Therefore, we view sanctions under the relevant articles (Article 20.3.3 CAO for the first violation and Article 280.3 Part 1 of the Criminal Code (CC) for repeated violations) for statements that contain no direct calls for violence as inappropriate.

In February, we recorded a whole series of new criminal cases initiated under Article 280.3 Part 1 CC.

In Kotlas of the Arkhangelsk Region, municipal deputy Anatoly Arseev became a suspect for repeatedly discrediting the army's actions. According to the investigation, his case is based on the comments he left on a social network between July and September 2022. Arseev had also faced administrative responsibility under Article 20.3.3 Part 1 CAO for comments that characterized the actions of the Russian armed forces as criminal and violent, “associated with the destruction of cities, which led to human misery and death.”

The next case was initiated in Magnitogorsk of the Chelyabinsk Region against a minor; the investigator released him on bail. We know no details of the case.

In Penza, a criminal case was opened against retiree Nikolai Gutsenovich. According to the investigation, Gutsenovich left reactions under posts in Odnoklassniki, which characterized the actions of Russian troops as “criminal, predatory,” and argued that Russian troops were “targeting Ukrainian citizens” and carrying out rocket attacks on residential buildings in Kyiv, “which resulted in the death of civilians.” The posts, to which Gutsenovich reacted, were automatically added to his page.

A court placed Vadim Kharchenko, a video blogger from Gelendzhik, under house arrest. Criminal prosecution against him was based on the video “Kherson Surrendered? Who Is to Blame? Russian troops leave Kherson. Shoigu Surovikin Stremousov Saldo,” posted in November on Kharchenko’s YouTube channel “Personal Opinion.”

In the Kaluga Region, a criminal case was opened against Irina Lopanova from Obninsk, who has left Russia. The case is based on her posts on VKontakte, including a post, in which Lopanova shared her opinion about the special operation in Ukraine.

In the Lipetsk Region, activist Stanislav Korvyakov became a suspect. The investigation believes that he criticized the symbols of the special operation in Ukraine and wrote about the actions of the Russian military in his posts on the content platform Dzen.ru. Previously, Korvyakov had faced administrative responsibility not for his online posts, but for his complaints to various authorities demanding that they remove symbols of the special operation from city buildings, ambulances and a diesel locomotive.

AvtoVAZ factory worker Dmitry Vaschenok was detained in Tolyatti of the Samara Region. We do not know the reason for his criminal prosecution, but Vaschenok had been brought to administrative responsibility twice for sharing on VKontakte the information about the hostilities in Ukraine taken from the "Om TV” YouTube channel and ICTV Channel of Ukrainian television.

In Tomsk, the investigation placed activist Leonid Rybakov under travel restrictions. The case against him was based on two disrespectful comments Rybakov made on VKontakte under a photo of General Sergei Surovikin posted on his page by another user. Rybakov had faced administrative responsibility twice under Article 20.3.3 CAO, not for his online posts but for participating in an anti-war rally and for displaying in a window a Ukrainian flag and a “Russia without Putin” poster.

In Kasimov of the Ryazan Region, a criminal case was opened against Vasily Bolshakov based on his post on VKontakte. Previously, he had been fined under Article 20.3.3 CAO for his comments on the same social network.

Yet another case (according to the available information, also under Article 280.3 Part 1 CC) was initiated in St. Petersburg against Vladimir Mironov, a graduate student of Alferov University of the Russian Academy of Sciences; he was also charged under Article 213 Part 2 (hooliganism) and taken into custody. According to law enforcement agencies, Mironov smashed the windows of the Vyborg District Military Commissariat and wrote anti-war statements on the building’s walls.

In the Leningrad Region, the court took businessman Dmitry Skurikhin into custody; previously, he had only been banned from engaging in certain activities. He is facing a more severe measure of restraint due to his solitary picket on February 24, 2023, in protest against the actions of the Russian armed forces. Qualifying his picket as discrediting the army, the investigator additionally charged Skurikhin under Article 280.3 CC Part 1 and, on this basis, petitioned for his arrest.

The investigation of one more previously unreported case has already been completed. This is the case of Andrei Prikazchikov from Orenburg, the head of the regional “Derzhava” Union of Defenders of the Fatherland and the unregistered Russian Party “Derzhava.” He was charged not only under Article 280.3 Part 1 CC, but also under paragraph “e” of Article 207.3 Part 2 CC (disseminating knowingly false information about the use of armed forces motivated by political hatred). The charge pertains to his social media posts published between September 2 and October 10, 2022. Previously, Prikazchikov had been fined under Article 20.3.3 Part 1 CAO for publishing an anti-war video message entitled “Think! And Stop Being Afraid! We Have Nothing to Be Afraid Of! Only of a Nuclear War! And Don't Fool Yourself! Putin the Liberator Has Not Come to Bring Peace.”

“Fakes about the Army” Motivated by Hatred

In February, Russian courts issued four sentences under paragraph “e” of Article 207.3 Part 2 CC (disseminating knowingly false information about the use of the Russian armed forces and the activities of Russian government agencies abroad motivated by political, ideological or social hatred). Please note that we monitor only the sentences that contain the hate motive, that is, the ones formally considered extremist. We believe that most cases that invoke the motive of political or ideological hatred do so inappropriately – usually these cases are based on statements that are indistinguishable from ordinary political criticism of the official decisions. We do not classify as inappropriate the cases based on statements containing obvious signs of incitement to national hatred or calls for violence.

The Basmanny District Court of Moscow sentenced journalist Alexander Nevzorov in absentia to eight years in a minimum-security penal colony. The case was based on Nevzorov’s publications on Instagram, Telegram and YouTube about the air strike on a hospital in Mariupol and the events in Bucha. Nevzorov had left Russia before the case was opened, and subsequently was granted Ukrainian citizenship.

The same court sentenced blogger Veronika Belotserkovskaya, in absentia, to nine years in a minimum-security penal colony. The case was based on Belotserkovskaya’s Instagram posts made in March–April 2022. The posts decried the use of the Russian army to “destroy the cities and civilian population of Ukraine, including children.”

The Leninsky District Court of Barnaul sentenced journalist Maria Ponomarenko of RusNews to six years in a minimum-security penal colony. The case was based on her Instagram post dated March 17, 2022, in which Ponomarenko claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces had attacked the theater in Mariupol, and, as a result, “thousands of non-military people, mostly women and children,” were killed.

The Pervomaisky District Court of Kirov sentenced in absentia composer Prokhor Protasov (who lives in Canada) to five years of imprisonment. The case was based on publications from Meduza, Current Time TV, and Maxim Katz about the missile attack against Kremenchuk and the events in Bucha shared online by Protasov. The court dropped the charges against Protasov based on the publication posted before the retraction appeared on the Ministry of Defense's website but found him guilty under the other charges.

Hate-Motivated Vandalism

In Sevastopol, a criminal case under Article 214 Part 2 CC (vandalism motivated by hatred) was opened against a 62-year-old woman from Balaklavsky District of the city. At night, the retiree painted Ukrainian flags on bus stops, benches, lampposts, fences in parks and squares, as well as on the walls of several houses in the center of Balaklava. After her arrest, she told the police that she did this because she “loves Ukraine and decided to support it this way.”

Apparently, the retiree’s actions were qualified as motivated by political hatred. We doubt the validity of imposing sanctions for vandalism motivated by political hatred, since, in most cases (including the case of the woman from Balaklava) these actions represent a form of political propaganda. The manifestation of political hostility, in and of itself, is not criminalized. We believe that this motive is only appropriate as an aggravating circumstance in the articles on crimes that pose significant public danger, specifically in the articles on the use of violence. Additionally, in our opinion, unless the property damage is significant, vandalism cases should be terminated for insignificance. If damage occurred but was relatively minor, we suggest introducing an article similar to Article 7.17 CAO that penalizes destruction or damage of other people's property or amending Article 7.17.

Recognizing Materials as Extremist

In February, the Federal List of Extremist Materials came to include Issues 5–6 of Nauchnye Zapiski for 2016. The decision to ban the Ukrainian almanac was issued back in August 2022 by the Oktyabrsky District Court of St. Petersburg. Experts from St Petersburg University, whose opinion was upheld by the court, decided that the almanac’s authors sought to “make their readers form conclusions about the aggressive foreign policy” pursued by Russia and to form a “negative image of the Russian people.” According to experts, this issue of Nauchnye Zapiski also contributed to the spread of Russophobia, could serve as “an ideological basis for ultra-radical social aspirations” and could be used to promote violence and endorse discrimination against Russians. Finally, the experts decided that the magazine contained “signs of humiliation of the dignity of a person or a group of persons” on the basis of their belonging to the Orthodox religion and the Russian people.

We believe that the court had no legal grounds for recognizing the issue of Nauchnye Zapiski as extremist material. The publications in the almanac present an analysis of the political development of Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries; they also criticize the decisions of the Russian authorities and the role played by the Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, the texts contain no calls for violence or discrimination against ethnic Russians or on religious grounds and the criticism is delivered in a civil manner. Most of the articles in the almanac are academic in style. The objections of law enforcement agencies and the court likely pertain primarily to the material called “’Russkiy Mir’ zakreslyuye Pereyaslav,” which is more appropriately characterized as an opinion piece; however, in our opinion, there still was no sufficient grounds for banning it.

Protection of Historical Memory and Traditional Values

Prosecution for Hooliganism Motivated by Hate

In Primorsky Krai, the prosecutor's office approved the indictment in the case of Maxim Chikhunov – a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, a lawyer and an ex-candidate for the Artyom City Duma. He was charged with hooliganism motivated by political hatred, using an object as a weapon (Article 213 Part 2 CC). In October 2022, Chikhunov published a video he recorded in Vladivostok near a plaque commemorating the centenary of the Zemsky Sobor of the Amur Region convened by the White Army General Mikhail Diterikhs (at the Sobor, an attempt was made to restore the monarchy in Russia). In the video, Chikhunov holds in his hands a grenade launcher tube, declares that he will smash the board “to smithereens,” and presses the trigger with an audible click.

We doubt the appropriateness of prosecuting Chikhunov under Article 213 Part 2 CC. Hooliganism is defined in the Criminal Code as a gross violation of public order expressing clear disrespect for society. A gross violation of public order in judicial practice means such actions that lead to an infringement upon the public right to work and leisure, the work of institutions, and so on. However, Chikhunov's action, as far as we know, resulted in no such consequences. It took place late in the day and, based on the video, there were no witnesses. In our opinion, Chikhunov's actions should not be interpreted as expressing obvious disrespect for society – his motive was to express his political position, not just antagonize others. We also doubt the appropriateness of classifying a grenade launcher tube that cannot actually launch grenades as “an object used as a weapon”.

Sanctions for “Rehabilitating Nazism”

In late January, the Volgograd Regional Court terminated the criminal prosecution against Alexander Digas due to the death of the defendant. His case involved the charges under Article 128.1 Part 5 (slander combined with accusing a person of committing a crime against sexual integrity), Article 354.1 Part 3 (desecrating the symbols of Russia's military glory, insulting the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland or humiliating the honor and dignity of a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, committed in public) and paragraph “b” of Article 242 Part 3 CC (illegal making or public demonstration of pornographic materials, committed using information and telecommunication networks). The charges under Article 354.1 and 232 CC pertained to a collage, which Digas, according to the investigation, had posted in Odnoklassniki. The author of the collage combined a pornographic image with a photograph of a veteran of the Great Patriotic War in uniform decorated with the Order of the Patriotic War against the background of St. George's ribbon. During the investigation, the Investigative Committee also established that the Volgograd resident posted on Odnoklassniki false information that the veteran had served time in a penal colony for rape (the investigation qualified this post under Article 128.1 CC). While acknowledging that society may view Digas’ actions as immoral and cynical, we, nevertheless, consider the charge against him under Article 354.1 Part 3 CC inappropriate. It is not clear why people should face criminal prosecution for the sake of protecting abstract objects, such as days of military glory, memorial dates or symbols of military glory, unless their statements contain propaganda of violence, hatred and discrimination. Protection of honor and dignity of individual veterans, as well as other persons, in our opinion, are best addressed within the civil rather than the criminal legal framework. We should also keep in mind that in General Comment No. 34 to Article 19 (freedom of opinion and expression) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee expresses its concern about laws that punish such acts as disrespect for the flag and symbols. The UNHRC also states that “laws should not provide for more severe penalties solely on the basis of the identity of the person that may have been impugned.”

Two sentences were issued in February under Article 354.1 Part 3 CC to punish the desecration of memorial structures. The Supreme Court of Crimea sentenced Denis Rybalov, a resident of Simferopol, to 200 hours of compulsory labor. In September 2022, he set fire to flowers laid at the Eternal Flame in Feodosia pretending to cook food. The Tula Regional Court sentenced Andrei Zdor to 10 months in prison. In October 2022, he burned the insulation off an electric cable in the Eternal Flame in the city of Aleksin and later sold the cable wire for scrap metal. Another similar case was initiated in February in Togliatti against the brothers Alexei and Ivan K. (their full last name was not reported). According to the investigation, they sprinkled salt on the Eternal Flame.

In our opinion, such actions deserve public censure. However, criminal prosecution is justified only for crimes that pose a significant danger to society. Even if we agree to understand “desecration” of monuments as something other than direct damage, it is already punishable under Article 214 CC (vandalism). Article 354.1 Part 3 CC provides for more severe penalties, which we see as disproportionate punishment for the acts described above. In addition, the list of symbols of military glory, whose desecration is punishable under this article, has not yet been defined by Russian law – only the St. George Ribbon has acquired this status starting this year. As for insulting the memory of non-specified “defenders of the Fatherland,” we believe that criminal prosecution for acts defined in such abstract categories fails to meet the international legal human rights standards.

Sanctions for Insulting the Feelings of Believers

It was reported in early February that artist Maxim Yevstropov was charged with insulting the religious feelings of believers (Article 148 CC), and the court subsequently arrested him in absentia. The case against Yevstropov was based on his post published on Telegram and VKontakte on April 28, 2022. The post described the event organized by the Party of the Dead (Partiya myortvykh), an art project founded in 2017 by Yevstropov among others. The event took place at the cemetery in celebration of Easter. Yevstropov’s post included several photographs of activists in black cloaks and masks holding anti-war posters that included references to Christ and the resurrection, and several other similar statements. One poster criticized Patriarch Kirill – the activists wrote that he supported the extermination of civilians, destruction of cities, violence and looting “in a z-shaped detour around all commandments.” In our opinion, the vague concept of “insulting the feelings of believers” does not and cannot have a clear legal meaning. The post by the Party of the Dead contained no signs of inciting hatred towards Christians, which could make it punishable under Article 20.3.1 CAO. Accordingly, there are no grounds for prosecuting the post’s author.

In Smolensk, a case under the same article was initiated against a local resident who, between November 2019 and February 2021, posted on a social network certain comments that “contained signs of humiliating and insulting the religious feelings of believers.” We were unable to review the content of these comments, but we believe that if they incited hatred towards representatives of a particular religion, the defendant’s actions could be qualified under Article 20.3.1 CAO; otherwise, he should not have been prosecuted at all.

The Golovinsky District Court of Moscow released blogger Polina Morugina (Polina Face) from criminal liability and referred her for mandatory treatment in a general psychiatric hospital. The criminal case against her under Article 148 Part. 1 CC was opened after she posted on Instagram in August 2021 a photo of herself posing naked in front of the Church of the Intercession at Fili. We believe that the case was opened inappropriately. Morugina’s actions showed no signs of inciting hatred towards believers, and she wasn’t charged with petty hooliganism under Article 20.1 of the Code of Administrative Offenses at the time of filming, so her actions likely did not disturb the parishioners or passers-by.

Persecution against Religious Organizations and Believers

Jehovah's Witnesses

In February, prosecutions against Jehovah's Witnesses continued on the charges of involvement in the activities of local religious organizations banned as extremist. We believe that the decision to ban them had no legal grounds and consider it a manifestation of religious discrimination. It is worth reminding that the ECHR ruled on the Jehovah's Witnesses’ complaint in June 2022. The decision stated that the ban on Jehovah's Witnesses materials and organizations and sanctions against believers violated the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The ECHR demanded the end to the criminal cases under Article 282.2 CC against Jehovah's Witnesses and the release of imprisoned believers.

In February, courts in various regions passed seven sentences against 17 believers:

• The Lesozavodsk Town Court in Primorsky Krai issued six-year suspended sentences under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC (organizing the activities of an extremist organization) to Yevgeniy Grinenko and Sergei Kobelev, and a three-year suspended sentence under Article 282.2 Part 2 (participating in the activities of an extremist organization) to Svetlana Yefremova;
• the Spassky District Court in Primorsky Krai sentenced Dmitry Malevany and Alexei Trofimov to seven and six years in a minimum-security penal colony respectively under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC. Olga Panyuta was sentenced to four years in a penal colony under Article 282.2 Part 1.1 CC (involving others in the activities of an extremist organization), and Olga Opaleva received a suspended sentence of four and a half years;
• the Sovetsky District Court of Kazan sentenced Konstantin Sannikov to six and a half years in a penal colony, under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC and Article 282.3 Part 1 CC (financing extremist activities);
• the Gorno-Altaysk City Court issued a suspended sentence of six and a half years under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC to Alexander Kalistratov;
• the Birobidzhansky District Court of the Jewish Autonomous Region re-examined the case of Yevgeny Yegorov and issued a suspended sentence of two and a half years under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC (his earlier trial resulted in the same punishment);
• the Vakhitovsky District Court of Kazan sentenced Andrei Bochkarev under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC to three years and a month of imprisonment (he was immediately released since the court took his pre-trial detention into account). His wife Leysan Bochkareva received a suspended sentence of two and a half years, and Tatyana Obizhestvit – a two-year suspended sentence;
• the Yalta City Court sentenced Taras Kuzyo to six and a half years in a penal colony. Pyotr Zhiltsov was sentenced to six years and one month in a penal colony under Article 282.2 Part 1 and Article 282.3 Part 1 CC. Sergei Lyulin received six years and one month in a penal colony under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC, and Daria Kuzyo – a three-year suspended sentence under Article 282.3 Part 1 CC.

Additionally, at least five new cases were opened against 12 people:

• Liliya Dolinina from the village of Dormidontovka in Khabarovsk Krai became a defendant under Article 282.2 Part 1.1 CC (involving others in the activities of an extremist organization);
• a Jehovah's Witness from Taganrog in the Rostov Region, whose name has not yet been reported, became a suspect under Article 282.2 CC;
• in Saransk, a criminal case under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC was opened against Ivan Neverov, Mikhail Shevchuk and Artyom Velichko; all three were arrested;
• in the Kingiseppsky District of the Leningrad Region, six Jehovah's Witnesses were detained as part of the investigation of a case initiated under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC, including Igor Zhmyrev, Kirill Khabrik, Andrei Morozov, Yevgeny Poveshchenko and Sergei Ryabokon; the court placed them in custody;
• in Elista, the court placed Kishta Tutinova, who faces charges under Article 282 Part 1 CC, under house arrest; the investigation also opened a case under Part 2 of the same article against unidentified persons.

Allya-Ayat

In early February, local adherents of the Allya-Ayat (Elle-Ayat) teaching were searched in Kazan as part of the investigation of the case under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC. One of them, Aidar Galiev, was detained. Investigators believe that the work of two “Ayat Centers” in Kazan continued the activities of a religious group recognized as an extremist organization in Samara in 2019.

The Allya-Ayat doctrine was founded in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Kazakhstan by Farhat Abdullaev. Its adherents are sun worshipers, who advocate a cure for all illnesses through the use of special tea, saying the “life formula,” invoking the sun energy, repeatedly reading and applying to sore spots the issues of the Zvezda Selennoy magazine published by the doctrine’s founders. Several issues of this magazine were recognized as extremist materials. In January 2023, the European Court of Human Rights found that the ban on the Zvezda Selennoy issues violated Articles 9, 10 and 11, which guarantee freedom of religion, freedom of speech and freedom of association. We also believe that the magazine was banned inappropriately. Meanwhile, the Allya-Ayat religious group in the Samara Region was recognized as extremist specifically for the alleged distribution of the banned publications. As a result of this decision, Allya-Ayat adherents from different regions of Russia face prosecution for continuing the activities of an extremist organization even though their relation to the Samara group is unclear.